Captain Patrick Hart arrived on the scene with his four-gun 15th New York Independent Battery about the same time as Bigelow and Phillips. McGilvery selected a position for Hart to occupy, and Hart was moving his battery there when he was intercepted by General Hunt, “who ordered me to take a position on the left of the peach orchard.” Hunt posted Hart to the right of Clark’s battery. Once in place, Hart “directed the fire of my battery on one of the enemy’s batteries, which was doing heavy execution on our line of battle.”34
In 1891, however, Hart told historian John Bachelder something different than what appeared in his official report. In his later version, Hart claimed he had written orders from Hunt to “report without delay to Sickles.” Looking all over for Sickles, Hart finally noticed a party of officers under a large tree to his rear. Riding to the tree, Hart inquired of several staff officers where Sickles could be located. The officers refused to cooperate and Hart was about to return to his battery when Sickles stepped forward and identified himself. Sickles “pointed over his shoulder and ordered me to go out there and you will find room enough to fight your Battery.” It was only while Hart was riding to place his guns in Sickles’ vague and undefined position that Hunt intervened and posted Hart.35
The deployment of George Burling’s infantry brigade, meanwhile, serves as an illustration of how Sickles’ command and control was breaking down. Burling had been previously detached from Humphreys’ division and ordered to support Birney, who massed Burling in Trostle’s Woods. At roughly 3:45 p.m. Burling received orders to move forward (west) out of the woods at the double quick toward the Emmitsburg Road. Confederate projectiles found the range as the brigade advanced from the woods. After moving no more than one hundred yards, Burling ordered his men to return to the shelter of the timber. When Captain John Poland of Sickles’ staff rode forward to demand why Burling had pulled back, the brigade leader countermanded his order and began moving forward a second time until a message from Birney ordered him to shift his brigade to the left. Burling’s brigade had just crossed the Wheatfield Road when yet another order arrived detaching the 2nd New Hampshire and 7th New Jersey regiments to report directly to Graham. Similar orders arrived peeling away one regiment after another until his brigade was scattered along Sickles’ line. When the general eventually reported back to Humphreys, he did so without a command.36
Captain Randolph placed yet another Third Corps battery, Lieutenant John Bucklyn’s First Rhode Island, Battery E, along the Emmitsburg Road in the 150-yard gap between the Wentz and Sherfy buildings. Along with Smith’s battery at Devil’s Den, the combined Union fire temporarily silenced Henry and Cabell’s battalions. Being on the left end of the line, Smith’s guns were particularly effective in hitting the Confederates with what Cabell complained was “a flanking fire from the enemy’s mountain batteries.” Porter Alexander was impressed with the Union artillery’s obstinacy and the damage it was inflicting upon Cabell’s guns. “The Federal artillery was ready for us and in their usual full force and good practice. The ground at Cabell’s position gave little protection, and he suffered rapidly in both men and horses.” When Longstreet noticed that no Confederate guns were unlimbered immediately west of the Peach Orchard, he pointed to a gap in front of General Lafayette McLaws’ lines and asked him, “Why is not a battery placed here?” McLaws protested that a battery would “draw the enemy’s artillery [fire] right among my lines…[and] be in the way of my charge, and tend to demoralize my men.” Unimpressed, Longstreet ordered that guns be placed in the gap. Four of the six batteries from Alexander’s own battalion (still temporarily under Huger’s command and the only battalion not yet in action) answered the call.37
Two of Huger’s batteries were placed immediately left of Cabell and just south of the Millerstown Road, while two more batteries were placed immediately north of the road. The deployment proved the wisdom of McLaws’ prediction when the guns immediately drew Federal counter battery fire and sent tree limbs and shrapnel into the ranks of his waiting infantry. Although some authors (McLaws among them) have taken Longstreet to task for this, the corps leader was making excellent use of the Confederate exterior line to smother the Union salient. The best way for Longstreet to use Sickles’ salient against him was to hit the Union line from two sides. Huger could now fire from the west while Cabell and Henry did the same from the south. Huger’s placement was perhaps Alexander’s most effective moment during the entire battle; why it took him at least thirty minutes to realize the potential of his position remains unclear.38
Union artillery accounts consistently confirm that the new threat from directly west of the orchard was an unwelcome surprise. Ames, who called the action as “sharp an artillery fight” as he had even seen, said a Confederate battery “opened upon my right from a grove 500 yards distant, and at the same time a new battery opened on my front.” Phillips reported, “we were most annoyed by a battery on our right, hidden from us by the rising ground and the Peach orchard which enfiladed our line.” Hart wrote, “They poured a tremendous cross-fire into me, killing three of my men and wounding five, also killing thirteen horses.”39
One of the unique aspects of Sickles’ position in advance of Cemetery Ridge was the relative proximity of the opposing artillery and infantry. Sharpshooters from the 2nd New Hampshire were posted among the Wentz buildings, close enough to give the Confederates a “wicked reception.” Captain Osmund Taylor reported that his Virginia battery was firing with canister, which was typically intended to defend against attacking infantry at relatively short range. Any final analysis of Sickles’ performance in the Peach Orchard and along the Emmitsburg Road has to factor in the effect of his infantry being subjected to demoralizing artillery fire from close range prior to the main Confederate attack. The men of the 2nd New Hampshire recalled “closely hugging the ground” for “two hours and more.” Colonel Andrew Tippin of Graham’s 68th Pennsylvania reported that his men suffered “severely from the destructive fire of the enemy’s batteries posted on our left and front.” As one member of the 57th Pennsylvania recalled it, “we were exposed to one of the hottest artillery fires we ever encountered.”40
The regimental historian of the Excelsiors’ 72nd New York echoed these comments. The regiment, he reported, spent one hour “lying under the heaviest artillery fire the corps had ever experienced.” While terrain and positioning protected some more than others, the Third Corps leaders did little to create their own protection. Thomas Rafferty, of the Excelsiors’ 71st New York, claimed that Graham’s brigade in particular was “sadly decimated by the fire of Longstreet’s artillery on the hill above him. Our men not having yet learned, what they did later in the war, to cover themselves in an hour with a substantial breastwork.” Watching the action from farther north on Cemetery Ridge, one soldier in George Willard’s unoccupied Second Corps brigade could see the dense smoke that “rose in huge volumes like heavy summer clouds, enveloping the combatants and obscuring the sun.”41
While Sickle’s infantry hugged the earth, Tyler and McGilvery poured in more guns from the Artillery Reserve. McGilvery posted two sections of Captain James Thompson’s Independent Pennsylvania Light Artillery between Hart and Ames. The artillery action also spread to Humphreys’ front when a Confederate battery from A. P. Hill’s Corps under Captain George Patterson unlimbered about 300 yards north of Alexander’s battalion, roughly 800 yards west of Humphreys’ line. Two Federal batteries under Lt. Francis Seeley and Lt. John Turnbull near the Klingle house, however, “immediately opened fire with solid shot and spherical case, and, after a rapid and well-directed fire, lasting about fifteen minutes, succeeded in silencing this battery [Patterson] and causing it to retire.” The artillery on both sides would continue firing after Longstreet’s infantry stepped off Warfield Ridge and began their attack.42
Sickles’ salient at the Peach Orchard offered the Confederates the ability to pound it with converging and enfilade fire. The heavy target density in and around the Peach Orchard shoul
d have increased the potential for more Federal guns to be hit by enfilade, ricochet, and overshoots. Despite their advantage in this regard, the Confederates lost at least twelve—and possibly as many as fourteen—guns (including Patterson’s seven pieces that were driven off) during the duel; during the same period, the Federals did not report the loss of a single gun. Alexander had at least fifty-four guns (his own estimate) available for use, but he may have ultimately deployed as few as forty-one during the course of the assault. Counting all of the Federal batteries involved (with the exception of Winslow in the Wheatfield, who played a minimal part in this phase) the Federals may have inserted as many as fifty-six guns into action. Alexander allowed himself to be outgunned and permitted Hunt, McGilvery, and Randolph to successfully engage several Southern batteries with a smothering fire. The fact that Sickles and the Third Corps commanders had been tipped off to a pending attack, and had sent orders for reinforcements in advance of the assault also contributed to Alexander’s failure. Although Sickles’ infantry suffered under the bombardment, and many Federal batteries expended their ammunition, Longstreet’s artillery arm did not turn in a good performance that afternoon.43
Sickles’ unauthorized advance and Meade’s last minute discovery would keep Union commanders scrambling all afternoon, but in the early stages the Federal artillery responded successfully by siphoning guns from the Artillery Reserve to supplement Third Corps batteries and bolster Sickles’ weaker position. Although Hunt’s cannons were ultimately unable to prevent Sickles’ line from collapsing, Alexander’s inability to destroy or disperse the Federal artillery meant that Longstreet’s infantry would have to advance under fire. The long bombardment also removed any final element of surprise, if any still existed, for Longstreet’s flank attack. While Sickles was already on the alert, the opening of Longstreet’s artillery guaranteed that the Southern infantry would not bound out of the woods against an unsuspecting Federal line, as Jackson had done to Oliver Howard only two months earlier. There was still much to be decided, however, on the afternoon of July 2, 1863, when Hood’s division, holding Longstreet’s right flank, opened the infantry assault sometime around 4:00 p.m.44
Amodern view of Devil’s Den and Houck’s Ridge taken from the foot of the “Slaughter Pen.” (Compare to the early postwar view that appears on page 163.) Author
Chapter 9
The “Key” of the Battleground
History records that Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s flank attack succeeded at Chancellorsville primarily because of the element of surprise, aided substantially by Dan Sickles’ reports that Jackson was retreating. William Fox, the New York Monument Commission’s postwar historian, thought a repeat of Jackson’s attack with a “disguised march was natural, in view of Jackson’s success at Chancellorsville.” Sickles agreed, arguing that the “conception of the enemy’s movement [on July 2] was based upon Jackson’s assault on our right flank at Chancellorsville,” with one significant difference: “the menacing attitude of my corps, in close proximity to Longstreet’s column, threatening its flank, compelled every inch of ground to be disputed from the outset.”1
William Oates, whose Confederate regiment eventually attacked Little Round Top, believed that “Sickles’ apprehension of another flank movement on Lee’s part, as at Chancellorsville, was well founded.… To guard against a similar surprise, Sickles changed his first formation and placed Birney’s fine division, well supported, on his flank and facing to the rear, which thwarted Lee’s plan of attack made two hours before, which was a masterly piece of strategy when made.” One of Sickles’ enlisted men, Private John Haley of the 17th Maine, wrote that although Sickles had formed a “weak line,” the difference between Gettysburg and Chancellorsville was that “we suffered no surprise” at Gettysburg.2
Although Sickles had left both Round Tops undefended, a signal station atop Little Round Top recorded Longstreet’s infantry forming on Warfield Ridge to the west. “[F]rom this point the greater part of the enemy’s forces could be seen and their movements reported,” wrote Captain Lemuel B. Norton, the Union Chief Signal Officer. At 3:30 p.m., Norton “discovered the enemy massing upon General Sickles’ left, and reported the fact to General Sickles and to the general commanding.” The enemy, he continued, finally “opened a terrific fire, but our left was fully prepared for them.” The message might have been sent too late to have any real impact on Sickles’ troop dispositions, but it was further evidence that Longstreet’s flank attack lacked the critical element of surprise that had marked Jackson’s successful Chancellorsville maneuver.3
General John B. Hood’s division moved south past McLaws’ line and into position, extending Longstreet’s right flank across the Emmitsburg Road. Hood later recalled his instructions as simply, “place my division across the Emmettsburg [sic] road, form line of battle, and attack.” When Hood’s batteries opened fire during the initial artillery assault, the response from Smith’s New York battery at Devil’s Den helped develop the Federal lines. And like many other Southern officers that day, Hood did not like what he saw. David Birney’s division appeared to angle off to the southeast and end on Little Round Top, with a “line bending back and again forward, forming, as it were, a concave line as approached by the Emmettsburg road. A considerable body of troops was posted in front of their main line, between the Emmettsburg road and Round Top mountain.” Hood realized that the extension of Birney’s line from the Peach Orchard to the front of Little Round Top (but not on the hill itself as Hood inaccurately believed) prevented an attack “up” the Emmitsburg Road as ordered. Not only would such an attack allow the Federals holding the extreme left flank to rake Hood’s exposed right flank and rear, but the immense boulders dotting the landscape would break apart Hood’s formations. After several vain attempts to get Longstreet’s permission to move around the Round Tops and take the Federals in the rear, Hood began his infantry attack.4
General Fitzhugh Lee later admitted that General Robert E. Lee was “deceived by [Sickles’ position] and gave orders to attack up the Emmitsburg Road, partially enveloping the enemy’s left, which Longstreet ‘was to drive in’.” Unfortunately for Confederate hopes, “there was much behind Sickles.” Unable to attack up the road, Hood knew his only hope of “enveloping the enemy’s left” would require him to abandon the Emmitsburg Road in the process. As a result of Sickles’ position, Hood moved the axis of his attack east toward Devil’s Den and the Round Tops—under the circumstances his only practical option. Hood’s “digression” (as he reportedly called it) combined with Sickles’ advance to dictate the flow of fighting.5
Postwar view of Devil’s Den looking west from Plum Run valley toward the Den and Houck’s Ridge. GNMP
There is a common misconception that Longstreet’s attack was intended to be en echelon by brigade, a progressive attack that required each brigade to move only after the brigade on its right had advanced. This interpretation appears accurate for R. H. Anderson’s division of A. P. Hill’s Third Corps, which was supporting on Longstreet’s left. Porter Alexander also considered it a progressive attack, the management of which he described as “conspicuously bad.” Such an attack had been used on previous occasions, he explained, “and always with poor success.” Although Longstreet’s attack was essentially executed as a progressive attack, there is substantial proof that no such attack was intended for Longstreet’s brigades. In fact, if Longstreet’s attack was supposed to be en echelon, then someone neglected to inform at least two of his key brigade commanders. General Jerome Robertson, commanding a brigade in Hood’s division, understood that “the attack on our part was to be general, and that the force of General McLaws was to advance simultaneously with us on my immediate left.” General Joseph Kershaw, a brigadier under McLaws, also thought that William Barksdale’s brigade on his left “would move with me and conform to my movement.” Ultimately, Longstreet’s attack was executed en echelon by division, with Hood attacking first, followed by McLaws. Based on the numerous post-
battle complaints of Confederate brigade commanders, Longstreet’s brigades and divisions were apparently launching the attack with an imperfect understanding of how they were to support one another.6
A strategy based upon an en echelon attack would make more sense if Longstreet had intended to progressively hit different sectors of Sickles’ line in order to either break through or force Meade to send reinforcements from other points of his battle line. This does not appear to have been the plan. Longstreet intended Hood’s division to drive in the Federal left, not progressively attack it. McLaws’ role was either to hammer away at the Peach Orchard front or, as Kershaw believed, connect with Hood as they drove the Federal line toward Gettysburg. In any event the Confederate plan failed, and Sickles would spend decades praising the fighting performance of his Third Corps. While it is true that the common soldier fought admirably while defending a less than admirable position, they were aided by questionable Confederate strategy, disjointed tactics, and poor communication.7
When it finally stepped off, Hood’s division swept generally eastward toward Sickles’ left flank. At this time Birney’s Second Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General J. H. Hobart Ward, formed the extreme left of the Union army at Devil’s Den. With more than 2,100 men, Ward led the largest brigade in Meade’s army. His 3rd Maine and 1st US Sharpshooters, however, were detached and operating near the Peach Orchard, leaving Ward with six regiments of about 1,650 men. Like their counterparts in Graham’s brigade near the Peach Orchard, Ward’s men had also neglected to build any breastworks prior to the Confederate assault. This was especially surprising since the rocky terrain offered ample protective opportunities. As one veteran remembered it, “we had not yet learned the inestimable value of breastworks, and instead of spending our time rolling the loose stones into a bullet-proof line, we lounged about on the grass and rocks.”8
James A. Hessler Page 21