As with each of Longstreet’s brigade commanders who had attacked before him, Kershaw expected to connect immediately with William Barksdale’s Mississippi brigade, positioned to his left. Both Longstreet and McLaws had previously assured Kershaw “that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my movement; that Semmes would follow me, and Wofford follow Barksdale.” But when Kershaw’s line was “about the Emmitsburg road, I heard Barksdale’s drums beat the assembly, and knew then [emphasis in original] that I should have no immediate support on my left, about to be squarely presented to the heavy force of infantry and artillery at and in rear of the Peach Orchard.” Given that Kershaw was, by his own admission, in personal contact with both Longstreet and McLaws, this confusion over Barksdale’s role seems inexplicable. E. P. Alexander lamented that Barksdale’s delay “was especially unfortunate in this case, because advancing Kershaw without advancing Barksdale would expose Kershaw to enfilade by the troops whom Barksdale would easily drive off. Few battlefields can furnish examples of worse tactics.” One of the primary weaknesses of Sickles’ Peach Orchard salient was its ability to be attacked on two sides at once; the Confederates continued to oblige him by attacking but one side at a time.6
Modern view taken from the “Longstreet Tower” onWarfield Ridge looking east toward the Peach Orchard. Barksdale (left) and Kershaw (right) attacked across the open foreground toward orchard in the center. Author
One of the reasons Sickles had occupied the Peach Orchard was because he considered it a strong position for artillery. Confederate brigades under G. T. Anderson, Kershaw, and later Semmes had to cross the low ground south of the elevated orchard to reach the Wheatfield and Stony Hill. Kershaw’s problems were compounded by a miscommunication of orders that caused his left regiments to veer to their right and further expose their left flank to fire from McGilvery’s Wheatfield Road artillery. “I immediately trained the entire line of our guns upon them, and opened with various kinds of ammunition,” reported Colonel McGilvery. When Kershaw’s men reached the Rose farm buildings, McGilvery “gave them canister and solid shot with such good effect that I am sure that several hundred were put hors de combat in a short space of time. The column was broken—part fled in the direction from whence it came; part pushed on into the woods on our left; the remainder endeavored to shelter themselves in masses around the house and barn.” Ames, Hart, Clark, and Thompson’s left sections around the Peach Orchard all pounded away at the South Carolinians. But as John Bigelow noted, they could not completely prevent the Confederates from gaining Rose’s woodlot to their front.7
About the time of Kershaw’s assault, Ames’ battery expended its ammunition and received orders to withdraw. Ames reported the time when he retired from the Peach Orchard as 5:30 p.m., “having been engaged for two and a half hours.” Ames claimed in his battery’s history that “the enemy was advancing a heavy line in front, [when] an order was received from General Sickles to fall back. The enemy was so close that it would have meant the loss of our guns had we attempted to limber up at that time and retreat.” As Ames headed back toward Sickles’ headquarters at the Trostle farm, there is some debate over whose battery replaced him. Henry Hunt, George Randolph, and Ames reported that his replacement was Malbone Watson’s Battery I, Fifth U.S. Artillery, which naturally led to the assumption that Watson moved his guns into the orchard. (Hunt later admitted to John Bachelder that his own report inaccurately placed Watson’s battery.) In another scenario, Watson was waiting near the Trostle Farm for orders and was ordered to the front by Sickles (or an aide), but before Watson could reach the orchard the position was collapsing and the other batteries were in retreat. Wherever Watson went, the battery and its crew had a rough afternoon ahead of them.8
What is certain about Watson’s actions is that his guns were hijacked by Sickles and staff, causing numerous complaints amongst Union commanders. Watson’s battery entered the field sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. behind Barnes’ division, along with Hazlett and Lt. Aaron Walcott’s batteries. While Hazlett was ordered to Little Round Top, Watson and Walcott were left in rear of Barnes with instructions to await orders. Captain Augustus Martin, commanding the Fifth Corps Artillery Brigade, complained in his report, “When positions had been selected and orders sent for the batteries to move to the front, they were not to be found.” Walcott was subsequently located “in rear of the Third Corps. The officer commanding reported that he had been ordered there by an officer of General Sickles’ staff, who had orders to take any batteries he could find, no matter where they belonged.” Watson’s battery was “taken in the same way, thus depriving the Fifth Corps of its proper amount of artillery … [Watson] was placed in position by some unknown officer of the Third Corps.” General Sykes later complained that Watson was “appropriated by Sickles without my knowledge, in consequence of which it was for a time lost.” Henry Hunt lodged the same complaint against Sickles’ staff officers, saying there was “no necessity” for doing so, as “abundant provision having been made to supply all needs from the Artillery Reserve.” Nor did their positioning meet with Hunt’s approval. “The batteries were exposed to heavy front and enfilading fires, and suffered terribly.” In fact, both Watson and Walcott’s batteries would be temporarily captured later in the afternoon.9
Artillery alone does not deserve all of the credit for repulsing Kershaw’s first attack. As the South Carolinian led his men across the Emmitsburg Road, the 2nd New Hampshire’s Colonel Bailey received permission from Graham to “charge” about 150 yards and take up a position along a rail fence at the southern end of the orchard with their right flank on the Emmitsburg Road. From this advanced location, Bailey’s men fired on the Confederate infantry advancing to their front and left. The 3rd Maine rushed forward onto Bailey’s left, while the 68th Pennsylvania arrived on his right. The three regiments formed a right angle at the Emmitsburg Road, with the 68th facing west while the others fronted to the south. “Many regiments fought in a peach orchard at Gettysburg,” boasted the 2nd New Hampshire’s regimental history, “but the three enumerated above were the only ones who formed a line in ‘the’ peach orchard that day [emphasis in original].” The trio of regiments was also joined on the 3rd Maine’s left flank by the 141st Pennsylvania and the 3rd Michigan on the far left. These five regiments now formed Sickles’ infantry front along the southern edge of the Peach Orchard.10
Kershaw was so “roughly handled” that his left regiments took cover to regroup among the available rocks and shrubbery of the Rose farm, where the Union batteries continued shelling them. Kershaw’s right pair of regiments enjoyed more success. As they approached the Stony Hill, and in what became a hotly debated movement, the awkwardly posted regiments of Tilton and Sweitzer’s brigades retreated. Sickles, Birney, de Trobriand, numerous Third Corps veterans, and an anonymous witness dubbed “Historicus” later ridiculed Tilton and Sweitzer for allegedly retreating prematurely and exposing de Trobriand’s right flank. As Kershaw’s right regiments approached Stony Hill, G. T. Anderson’s brigade renewed its attack against Colonel de Trobriand’s left. De Trobriand complained in his report that during the “raging” battle “two regiments [sic] from the Fifth Corps, sent there to my support” fell back “without engaging the enemy (by what orders I could never ascertain).”11
Regis de Trobriand’s brigade defends the Wheatfield against attacks from Anderson’s and Kershaw’s brigades. Tilton and Sweitzer’s Fifth Corps brigades support de Trobriand and attempt to close the gap with Graham’s brigade in the Peach Orchard before withdrawing under pressure from Kershaw.
Colonel de Trobriand described the unfolding chaos more colorfully in his memoirs. An aide approached and “told me that a brigade of the Fifth Corps was lying in two lines behind us, awaiting the time to come into action. This was good news. But, as I went to assure myself of its accuracy, I saw these troops rise up and fall back hurriedly at the command of their officers. I galloped forward towards the nearest of them, and asked them, – �
�Where are you going?’ – ‘We do not know.’ – ‘Who has given you your orders to retire?’ – ‘We do not know.’ They then filed out of the woods.… These regiments belonged to General Barnes’ division.” Tilton and Sweitzer departed the Stony Hill area and headed toward Trostle’s Woods on the north side of the Wheatfield Road.12
As usual, everyone had a different story. The most damaging and public criticism of Barnes’ brigades would come in March 1864 when an “important communication from an eye-witness” was published in the New York Herald. The self-named eyewitness, “Historicus,” made several embarrassing accusations against Barnes. According to Historicus, Birney was sent to order Barnes back into line, but Barnes replied, “No. It is too hot. My men cannot stand it.” John Bigelow thought that he saw “some Federal troops in good order move out of these very woods the enemy had gained, and marched to the rear, I know not where.” According to Robert Carter, who fought in the 22nd Massachusetts, Tilton ordered his brigade to retire only after they were outflanked by Semmes and Kershaw. The veterans of the 118th said the retreat was ordered because “at the same moment the artillery on the right was evidently preparing to withdraw.” A captain in Sweitzer’s 62nd Pennsylvania remembered that Tilton went first and “left our brigade in a critical condition. We were directed to fall back, which was done deliberately and in good order.”13
Barnes, Tilton, and Sweitzer emphatically denied the charges. Kershaw’s approach, explained Barnes, “had penetrated through the unguarded space” on Tilton and Sweitzer’s right. Barnes was worried that “there were no means of checking his advance toward my rear” and claimed that he only ordered Tilton to change front, which of course was “at once executed, deliberately, yet promptly, and in good order.” Barnes claimed that Sweitzer was then “directed to fall back in good order, and to take up a new position a short distance in his rear, for the purpose of co-operating in opposing this heavy attack upon the flank.”14 Colonel Tilton admitted that he too was very worried over his exposed right. He acknowledged more than a “change of front”:
The onslaught was terrible and my losses heavy—so much so that I was somewhat doubtful if our line could withstand it. This fact I communicated to the general commanding division [Barnes], who ordered me to fall back in good order if unable to hold the position; [emphasis added] but my men behaved nobly, and twice repulsed the assailants. My colonels wished to advance. Being anxious about my right, however, I reconnoitered in person, and discovered the enemy in large force coming from the direction of Rose’s house, with the evident design of outflanking me. I immediately retired [emphasis added] and took up a new position (in two lines), at the left and rear of a battery which had been posted about 300 yards to my right and rear. The battery soon commenced to retreat, firing, followed by the rebels, who were now again upon my right flank. To avoid this flank movement, I retired, firing, a short distance in the timber.…15
Sweitzer, who had the best day of the three officers, addressed the accusations by reporting, “When the attack commenced, word was sent by General Barnes that when we retired [emphasis added] we should fall back under cover of the woods.” This was only intended to inform the men “how to retire when it became necessary.” Sweitzer clearly reported that he did not retreat until after Tilton’s brigade had fallen back, and then fell back by Barnes’ order. Whether Barnes or Tilton was responsible, each had given Sickles plenty of post-battle opportunity to deflect criticism toward them and away from himself (even though Barnes’ problems were at least partially caused by Sickles’ over-extended front). 16
“It was a hard fight,” Regis de Trobriand remembered. “The Confederates appeared to have the devil in them.” His brigade continued slugging it out as the Confederate infantry advanced on several sides. Private John Haley in the 17th Maine grumbled that while the enemy seemed to be increasing in strength, the Federals seemed to be fighting without any support of their own, either through “gross neglect on our side or unaccountable stupidity.” With ammunition running low, Birney sent an aide to the wall with an order to “fall back immediately!” The breaking of Ward’s line on his left, the renewal of G. T. Anderson’s attack, Barnes’ retreat, and the occupation of Stony Hill by Kershaw finally compelled Colonel de Trobriand to withdraw his own battered brigade.17
Even with the combined efforts of both the Third and Fifth corps, Sickles’ advanced line was teetering on the edge of destruction. General Birney fully realized the trouble he was in. “As the fight was now furious, and my thin line reached from Sugar Loaf Hill to the Emmitsburg road, fully a mile in length, I was obliged to send for more reenforcements to Major-General Sickles.” Sickles apparently requested these reinforcements from Meade, who then sent a courier to Hancock. Meade’s courier located Hancock, who sent in Brigadier General John Caldwell’s First Division of Hancock’s Second Corps, which had been in reserve near the site of the present-day Pennsylvania State Monument. However, the Second Corps reinforcements were not to report to Sickles. According to Hancock, he was “directed by General Meade to send a division to the assistance of the Third Corps, with orders to report to General Sykes, commanding Fifth Corps.”18
The Second Corps had watched with growing alarm as Longstreet’s infantry slammed into Sickles’ line. Lieutenant Frank Haskell rhetorically questioned the wisdom of sending more reinforcements to support the position. “To move down and support them there with other troops is out of the question, for this would be, to do as Sickles did, to relinquish a good position, and advance to a bad one. There is no other alternative, – the 3d Corps must fight itself out of its position of destruction! What was it ever put there for?”19
General Kershaw later told historian John Bachelder that as Tilton and Sweitzer “seemed to melt away,” he spotted a “heavy [Union] column” move “in two lines of battle across the wheat-field” toward Kershaw’s right and rear. These approaching troops belonged to General Caldwell, who was rushing forward another 3,200 men to bolster Sickles’ crumbling front. Colonel Edward Cross’ brigade entered the Wheatfield first, and “steadily drove the enemy back,” while Colonel Patrick Kelly’s famed Irish Brigade entered the field on Cross’ right, hitting Kershaw’s right flank.20
Caldwell’s arrival emboldened Birney and de Trobriand to counter-attack. Lt. Col. Charles Merrill was regrouping his 17th Maine near the Wheatfield Road when “Major-General Birney rode upon the field and directed our line to advance. With cheers for our gallant commander, the regiment moved quickly forward, and pouring into the enemy volley upon volley, their advance was checked. The contest was now of a most deadly character, almost hand to hand, and our loss was very severe.” Colonel de Trobriand, meanwhile, rallied the 5th Michigan and 110th Pennsylvania and “charged through the wheat field, driving the rebels back to the other side of the stone wall.” The attack “was also the last effort of my brigade” for de Trobriand received “orders to fall back, and during that movement I understood in what a hazardous position I had been placed without knowing it.” Of Birney’s three brigades, Ward was in the process of losing Houck’s Ridge, and Colonel de Trobriand was leaving the field to reorganize. Only Graham’s fate remained undecided.21
While these events were unfolding, Sickles had sent Henry Tremain to locate Hancock and confirm that Second Corps help was on the way. As Caldwell’s division was moving toward the Wheatfield, Brigadier General Samuel K. Zook’s 975-man brigade was bringing up the rear. Tremain ensured they were headed toward Sickles. From that point forward, there are at least two distinct versions of exactly how Tremain appropriated Zook’s brigade.22
In his memoirs, Tremain wrote that he spotted Caldwell’s column moving toward the front and happened on Zook’s men in the rear. Realizing that it would take too long to locate either Hancock or Caldwell at the division’s head, Tremain asked Zook to detach his brigade immediately. Zook replied “that his orders were to follow the column.” But the situation was desperate and both men knew that military protocol had to be followed. A
ccording to Tremain, Zook answered, “with a calm, firm look, inspiring me with its significance, ‘if you will give me the order of General Sickles I will obey it.’” Tremain responded, “General Sickles’ order, general, is that you file your brigade to the right and move into action here.” With that understanding, Tremain led Zook and the brigade toward the Wheatfield. Tremain praised Zook’s decisiveness. In fact, Zook is one of the few non-Third Corps officers who come off well in Tremain’s memoirs. “[H]ad he acted otherwise it might have changed the fate of the day,” wrote the aide. “Who knows? It was such acts of sagacity and nobleness that won Gettysburg.” The detachment of Zook’s brigade was a bold move, but it was also another example of Federal regiments and brigades being scattered all over the field to plug holes in Sickles’ line, and being placed under the command of whomever had the greatest momentary emergency.23
Josiah Favill, one of Zook’s trusted staff officers, told a remarkably different story. Lieutenant Favill was watching the “intensely interesting” opening of Longstreet’s attack when Henry Tremain arrived and requested Zook to move to Sickles’ assistance. In Favill’s version, Zook “instantly put spurs to his horse and galloped directly across the field to Sickles, who, surrounded by a large staff, was in a state of great excitement; the enemy’s shot were dropping about him, and he seemed to be very much confused and uncertain in his movements. When Zook approached him, he excitedly asked him to put his command into action on his left, where he admitted Longstreet was steadily driving him back near the two small mountains. Zook declared his willingness to act, and galloped back to his command.” When Zook and Favill returned to the brigade, Cross and Kelly “were already on the march toward the threatened left, and we promptly followed.”24
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