Meade only followed Hooker’s plans at Gettysburg, and did not have any plan of his own. Hooker, and not a confused and indecisive Meade, designed the victory.
Meade did not want to fight at Gettysburg, intending instead to retreat to Pipe Creek. Only a collision with Lee’s army forced the battle.
Meade wanted to retreat on July 2. Only Sickles’ battle with Longstreet prevented the Army of the Potomac from abandoning Gettysburg.
Meade failed to follow up and finish Lee’s army and allowed Lee to escape at Williamsport.13
Hooker’s return to the Army of the Potomac was not as far-fetched a scenario as it initially appears. Stranger things had happened in that army: George McClellan had returned for a second stint in command. During late July and early August of 1863, an interesting series of communications passed between Lincoln and Meade regarding Hooker’s role with the army. The thrust of the exchange was Lincoln’s inquiry as to whether Meade would be agreeable to allowing Hooker to resume command of a corps within the army. Despite Lincoln’s assurance that Meade could reply “in perfect freedom,” Meade walked a tight diplomatic line when he replied, “I have no hesitation in saying, that if Genl. Hooker is willing to take a command under me, I shall be very glad to have the benefit of his services.” In mid-August, Lincoln mentioned the proposal to Hooker, who “seemed gratified” and “would accept the offer if it was still open.” Perhaps realizing that it was time to speak or forever hold his peace, Meade sent the following reply to his Commander-in-Chief:
You seem to think, or rather such is the inference left on my mind, that I have made an offer to Genl. Hooker & that I desire his assignment to this army. Now in the frankness which has marked your letters, permit me to say, this is a mis-apprehension on your part. My position is one of acquiescence. I wrote you, that if you desired Genl. Hooker to have a command under me I should not object, but you will pardon me, if I call to your recollection, that the proposition originated with yourself that the offer when made was yours and that I have neither entertained nor expressed any desire upon the subject.14
Given the committee’s agenda, the committee would have pounced on Meade regardless of Sickles’ involvement. This fact is sometimes lost on Gettysburg students. Sickles was only a supporting player in a much larger political apparatus. But Dan obviously decided to both cooperate and furnish the committee with fresh ammunition. Meade’s report and refusal to allow Sickles’ return to the Third Corps may have been the initial stimulus, or perhaps it was Halleck’s report that pushed Sickles over the edge. One popular theory is that while recuperating in Washington, Sickles may have heard a rumor that only his wound had prevented Meade from court-martialing him. But Meade repeated on several occasions that he believed Sickles had honestly misinterpreted orders. Meade’s report, correspondence, and his own Congressional testimony does not suggest that he was considering Sickles a worthy candidate for court martial. Meade might have taken some pre-emptive action if he was aware of Sickles’ animosity toward him, but Meade appears to have been relatively unaware until after Sickles had launched his own assault.15
It initially seems odd that Sickles, a prominent Democrat, would ally himself with Radical Republicans, but his cooperation would strengthen his image as a “War Democrat”—a far cry from the traitorous Southerners and indifferent Northerners of his party. Sickles had aligned with Republicans before; after all, he was a close friend of Abraham Lincoln. Still, the committee’s agenda was more radical and opposed ideologically to Lincoln. In effect, Sickles was spending his nights with the Lincolns (Mary Todd chastised Dan for missing a matinee on February 20 by inviting him to dinner the following evening) while working days with Lincoln’s rivals. It was a fine act that only a deft political professional like Sickles could balance. Also working in Sickles’ favor with the committee was the fact that he was not a “tainted” West Pointer. For once his status as a military “amateur” would actually benefit him, for he had not been educated in that despised institution.16
Sickles had another reason to cooperate with the committee: his participation would put him back in the political and newspaper spotlight. The forced inactivity since Gettysburg must have been unbearable for a man of his energy and ego. More importantly, there was the matter of his fledgling military reputation. Despite the relative brevity of his military career, he had reinvented himself from disgraced politician to war hero. Meade’s and Halleck’s reports jeopardized that new image. Without his involvement, the committee’s proceedings might further incriminate his own July 2 actions, or serve to diminish his role in the battle. Plus, if he wanted his Third Corps command back, getting Meade replaced with Hooker was likely Sickles’ last chance. Unfortunately for Meade, Dan had demonstrated during the Key murder trial (when he demolished his wife’s reputation) that no price was too high to save his own neck.
Sickles was sworn before the committee on February 25. Since Meade had rejected his attempted return to the army, he explained, “I have been waiting orders… meanwhile, giving my best attention to the entire re-establishment of my health and strength for active duty.” During his first day’s testimony, he answered questions regarding Joe Hooker and the Chancellorsville campaign. Sickles ultimately attributed the campaign’s failure “To the giving way of the Eleventh Corps.” Prior to Hooker’s removal from command (which Dan emphasized was at Hooker’s request), “Fighting Joe” had managed to strategically maneuver his army into position between Lee and Washington. “Those movements resulted in compelling General Lee to fight at Gettysburg,” Dan testified, “the most advantageous position, I think, that we could have taken for our battle-ground.”17
The following day, February 26, Sickles became the first witness to present testimony regarding the Gettysburg campaign. His testimony, for whatever character flaws it revealed, demonstrated his skill as an attorney and his comfort level in playing politics. In order to dispel any notions that he had made a near-fatal blunder on July 2, he used the historical record and many of Meade’s own communications to spin a complex tale. In this version of Gettysburg, George Meade had intended to retreat, and Sickles’ advance to the Peach Orchard had forced Longstreet’s attack, thereby preventing Meade from withdrawing. If Sickles had not forced this attack, Gettysburg would not have been fought, and therefore not have been won.18
Sickles started his assault by characterizing Meade’s Pipe Creek Circular not as a contingency, but rather as an order to “retreat” and “fall back.” As Sickles spun it, Meade considered the campaign’s objectives to be the protection of Washington, Baltimore, and Pennsylvania—not the destruction of Lee’s army. Sickles read the circular to the committee, but only selected those portions that supported his argument. For example, he neglected to read the part where Meade stated: “Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions.”19
Sickles laid the groundwork for the committee’s portrayal of a timid and indecisive Meade by pointing out the conflicting orders that Sickles had received while at Emmitsburg on July 1. Oliver Howard had wanted Sickles to come to Gettysburg; Meade had not. Dan criticized Meade’s preference for “another line of operations.” Despite this apparent reluctance on the part of his commander, “I therefore moved to Gettysburg on my own responsibility.” Sickles further misrepresented his July 1, 9:30 p.m. dispatch to Meade as “begging him [Meade] by all means to concentrate his army there and fight a battle, stating that in my judgment it was a good place to fight… and that in my judgment it would be most destructive to the morale of the army to fall back, as was apparently contemplated in his order of that morning.” In reality, this message to Meade had been nothing of the sort. As discussed earlier, Dan had written the dispatch to defend his decision to leave Emmitsburg without Meade’s permission. It is true that Sickles had ended the message with, “This is a good battle-field.” But this hardly equated to Sickles “begging” Meade to fight at Gettysburg. Sickles was portraying himself as aggressive, decisive,
and competent—exactly the qualities the committee thought Meade lacked. While Sickles did not explicitly tell the committee that he had selected the Gettysburg battlefield, he aggressively implied that he deserved a share of the credit for keeping the army at Gettysburg. In fact, he deserved none.20
In order to elevate his own status, Sickles also dispelled the notion that the battle had actually consisted of three days. Although it was “popularly understood” that the battle commenced on July 1, “we in the army do not regard the operations of the two corps under General Reynolds as properly the battle of Gettysburg. We regard the operations of Thursday and Friday [July 2 and 3], when the whole army was concentrated, as the battle of Gettysburg.” He later added that July 2 was the “second day of fighting; but, as we in the army consider it, the first day of the battle.” This was a popularly reoccurring theme throughout the remainder of his life. Since the Third Corps had not participated on July 1, this day was simply excluded from the battle’s history. The second of July, he would repeatedly tell audiences, was the decisive day.21
Sickles argued that his advance to the Emmitsburg Road line was necessitated by Meade’s lack of attention to the left flank. Dan admitted that he had received orders to relieve Geary’s division “at a very early hour,” but he was confused over where to go since Geary “was not in position, but was merely massed in my vicinity.” Sickles claimed he asked Meade for further orders, received none, and felt his fear over an impending flank attack “was not concurred in at headquarters.” Artillery chief Henry Hunt, Sickles explained to the committee, declined to formally approve his advanced line, “although he said it met with the approval of his own judgment; but he said that I would undoubtedly receive such orders as soon as he reported to General Meade.”22
Sickles seemingly took full responsibility for his Gettysburg actions. Since Meade and Halleck’s reports had accused Sickles of “not fully apprehending” and “misinterpreting” his orders, Dan had to choose between portraying himself as either incompetent or as an aggressive fighter who advanced to meet the enemy. Sickles chose the latter. Almost five years earlier, Sickles had publicly accepted blame for reconciling with Teresa with the declaration, “Whatever blame, if any belongs to the step, should fall alone upon me.”23 Now, with the national stakes even higher, he nearly repeated himself:
I took up that position, which is described in the report of General Halleck… which, in his report, he very pointedly disapproves of, and which he further says I took up through a misinterpretation of orders. It was not through any misinterpretation of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and, whichever it was, I took it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already stated, that it was approved of in general terms by General Hunt… I took up that line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take as they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force- would have rendered our position on the left untenable; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us.24
Although it was really the only strategy open to him, since Dan would never willingly call himself incompetent, it was still a risky course. If later testimony were to conclusively prove that his advance was a colossal military blunder, then Sickles would have admitted to his own military ineptitude. Sickles attempted to reduce this risk with obviously false testimony, such as, “Fortunately, my left had succeeded in getting into position on Round Top and along the commanding ridge to which I have referred; and those positions were firmly held by the Third Corps.” That he was forced into such a lie indicates that even he believed he had blundered by leaving the hill unoccupied. Dan admitted that he had told Meade at the Peach Orchard that “I could not, with one corps, hold so extended a line against the rebel army; but that, if supported, the line could be held; and, in my judgment, it was a strong line, and the best one.” Neither Wade nor anyone else on the committee bothered to challenge Sickles on this point. If he knew his line was too extended, and could only be saved by support from others, then why did he advance in the first place? Such lack of scrutiny leads to the suspicion that Wade was treating his “star witness” with kid gloves.25
Sickles testified that Meade had promised support from the Fifth and Second corps, as well as “as much artillery as I wanted.” He was indebted to Hancock, continued Sickles, but the Fifth Corps “came up, somewhat tardily, to be sure. It was three-quarters of an hour, or an hour I suppose, before it got into position.” The enemy’s attacks “were successfully repulsed… until I was wounded and carried from the field.” Sickles lied again by claiming the Third Corps held its advanced position (at least until he was wounded, when it became Birney’s problem) and that the Fifth Corps (which defended Little Round Top) had “tardily” offered minimal support. Sickles must have realized that the historical record simply wouldn’t support him without these fabrications.26
While much of Sickles’ testimony was intended to elevate his own part in the Federal victory—and he was far from the only witness to attempt this—his most serious accusation was that Meade had wanted to retreat on July 2. Even if the Pipe Creek order had been proof that Meade did not intend to fight at Gettysburg, Sickles admitted that Meade must have been willing to do so by the evening of July 1, “else he would not have concentrated there.” Still, Sickles testified that he had “reason to know that his [Meade’s] plan of operations was changed again on Thursday [July 2], and that he resumed, in substance, the plan… to fall back on Pipe creek, or to some place in that neighborhood.” Sickles presumably received this “information” from his friend Dan Butterfield during his 11:00 a.m. visit to Meade’s headquarters. “I was satisfied, from information which I received [at 11:00], that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg.” This charge painted Meade in the worst possible light, and opened the door for decades of accusations from both camps.27
Sickles was questioned rather extensively about troop dispositions around Washington, Baltimore, Harpers Ferry, and the Peninsula both before and after Gettysburg. Since Sickles rejoined the army on June 28 and departed on July 2, he was hardly qualified to address this subject. Nevertheless, he was asked and answered a number of questions concerning Halleck’s support of the army. Sickles assumed Meade received more cooperation than Hooker from Halleck because Meade “had the confidence and friendship of General Halleck, while General Hooker had not.” Withholding the Harpers Ferry garrison from Hooker, wrote Sickles, “was sacrificing a great end for a minor consideration… I cannot conceive of any military reason which explains that extraordinary inconsistency.”28
Sickles, of course, had not been with the army during Lee’s retreat to the Potomac River. But that didn’t stop Senator Wade from questioning him on the “propriety” of encountering Lee before he “had an opportunity to recross the river.” Sickles’ response was direct: Lee “should have been followed up closely, and vigorously attacked before he had opportunity to recross the river.…If we could whip them at Gettysburg, as we did, we could much more easily whip a running and demoralized army, seeking a retreat which was cut off by a swollen river; and if they could march after being whipped, we certainly could march after winning a battle.”29
Whether Meade’s decision-making during the retreat was right or wrong, it was perfectly within Sickles’ character to opt for the aggressive course. It is also illustrative of the committee’s bias that they accepted his opinion on this point. Wade wanted Sickles’ opinions as “a military man, and one of a great deal of experience,” and Sickles replied “as a military man” that “I do not think there was any military difficulty to prevent a decisive attack upon General Lee, which must have resulted in the destruction of his army.” Sickles’ very public transformation from disgraced politician-attorney to “military man” continued apace.30
In assessing Sickles’ testimony before the committee, historians enjoy speculating why Sickles attacked Meade with such relish. Some assume any criticism directed at Sickles’ Ge
ttysburg performance was simply unacceptable to a man with his ego and ambition. His public image, however, had survived many career-threatening hits prior to Gettysburg. As a career politician, he was used to harsh criticism. Here, after all, was a man who had once been compared to “fetid gas”; George Meade’s Gettysburg report was decidedly mild in comparison. One author deduced that Sickles’ “future depended on Meade’s destruction.” This conclusion surely is an exaggeration, for President Lincoln was almost certainly willing to employ Sickles in some capacity. Whatever his motives, Sickles was not fighting for his “survival.” But, he had fallen in love with the trappings of a field command, and more than simply being out for revenge against Meade, Sickles must have hoped that his testimony would buy something practical: the return of both himself and Hooker.31
Abner Doubleday appeared before the committee after Sickles. Meade (and many other officers) did not think much of Doubleday’s abilities as a commander. In fact, Meade was previously pleased when Doubleday assumed command of Meade’s old division because, as Meade put it, the division “will think a great deal more of me than before.” The officer assuming the witness chair was justifiably bitter about his treatment at Gettysburg. Doubleday had led the First Corps as well as could be expected following Reynolds’ untimely demise on the morning of the battle’s first day. But Oliver Howard told Hancock later on July 1 that Doubleday’s command “gave way”, information Hancock dutifully passed on to Meade. This news played a role in having Doubleday replaced as commander of the First Corps by Major General John Newton—a man David Birney characterized as an “engineer with but little executive capacity, fond of whiskey, and will never distinguish himself although a pet of Meade.” The fact that Newton was junior to Doubleday in seniority only added insult to injury. Doubleday’s participation, along with his obvious bitterness about the manner in which Meade treated him, has led to suggestions that he coordinated his testimony with Sickles and the committee. When word of Doubleday’s testimony reached the Army of the Potomac’s camps, First Corps artillery chief Charles Wainwright wondered what Sickles and Doubleday were up to. “A pretty team!—Rascality and Stupidity. I wonder which hatches the most monstrous chicken.” It seems that Doubleday’s time away had not earned any additional respect from his peers.32
James A. Hessler Page 34