The editorial concluded with the following:
It is to be hoped that the above narrative will be regarded as dispassionate, as it is meant to be impartial. Some slight errors may have crept in; but this may possibly stimulate others to come forward with a rectification. Had General Meade been more copious in his report and less reserved as to his own important acts, the necessity for this communication would not have existed.
HISTORICUS 12
An outraged Meade passed the Historicus article to the War Department, asking for action “as may be deemed proper and suitable” particularly since the author was either “present at the battle, or dictated by some one present, and having access not only to official documents but to confidential papers that were never issued to the army, much less made public.” Meade had little doubt who was responsible. “I cannot resist the belief that this letter was either written or dictated by Maj. Gen. D. E. Sickles.” Meade continued:
In my official report I deemed it proper to state that this position was a false and untenable one, but I did General Sickles the justice to express the opinion that, although he had committed an error of judgment, it was done through a misapprehension of orders, and not from any intention to act contrary to my wishes. The prominence given to General Sickles’ operations in the enclosed communication, the labored argument to prove his good judgment and my failings, all lead me to the conclusion he is directly or indirectly the author.
As the communication contains so many statements prejudicial to my reputation, I feel called upon to ask… that the Department will take steps to ascertain whether Major-General Sickles has authorized or indorses this communication, and, in the event of his replying in the affirmative, I have to request of the President of the United States a court of inquiry, that the whole subject may be thoroughly investigated and the truth made known …13
Privately, Meade complained that the Historicus article was “filled with false and perverted statements, which have astonished even myself.” Meade understood that while “my orders were always looking to fighting, I did, at times… hold in view the contingency of a reverse and endeavor to be prepared for it. This is the sum and substance of my offense, and I regret to say that, among a certain class of my fellow country men, this will be an offense and indicative of what they call too much caution [emphasis in original]… proving that I did not have the dash and blundering audacity of others.” Not only did Meade have an accurate measure of his critics, but he had also summarized the main difference between himself and Sickles. Meade’s critics thought he exuded “too much caution.” Sickles, on the other hand, had demonstrated ability in a characteristic that could never be applied to Meade: Sickles was blundering audacity personified. Henry Halleck advised Meade to “ignore” Sickles since “nothing would suit him better than to get you into a personal or newspaper controversy. He would there be perfectly at home, and, with his facilities for controlling or giving color to the New York press, would have greatly the advantage.” Lincoln likewise urged Meade to avoid being “diverted” by a court of inquiry.”14
Was Historicus really Dan Sickles? Historians have been asking the question since 1864. Harry Pfanz summarized the feelings of most when he wrote, “Historicus was Daniel Sickles’ alter ego, his partisan, if indeed he was not the general himself.” Pfanz also wondered what Henry Tremain “might have had to do” with the article. Four potential suspects have been generally proposed as Historicus: Sickles, Tremain, Dan Butterfield, and historian John Bachelder.15
John Bachelder is the easiest suspect to cross off the list. In 1925, Robert Carter told historian W. A. Graham that Sickles probably would have been tried for disobedience “had he not lost a leg. But John B. Bachelder, a loud-mouthed, blatant photographer, and henchman [emphasis in original] of Sickles, made the people believe by an avalanche of propaganda that Sickles held back Longstreet, and all writers began to believe it [emphasis in original] and praised Sickles’ act.”16
Using Carter as his source, Meade biographer Freeman Cleaves labeled Bachelder as Historicus in his widely reprinted biography entitled Meade of Gettysburg. However, historian Richard Sauers observed that no evidence has yet to be uncovered linking Bachelder to Sickles’ efforts against Meade. Bachelder was not present during the battle (as Historicus clearly was), and arrived at Gettysburg afterward to begin his studies. Bachelder, with Meade’s permission, spent the winter of 1863-1864 with the army interviewing eyewitnesses. Carter may have mistaken John Bachelder for staff officer Lt. Col. R. N. Batchelder. In fact, in the 1890s when John Bachelder, Sickles, and Dan Butterfield were all active in the early memorialization of Gettysburg, Bachelder made it quite clear that he did not support attacks on Meade’s reputation.17
Regarding Henry Tremain as the sole author, Third Corps historian John Watts de Peyster noted Tremain’s “many literary efforts… Mr. Tremain has not infrequently been a contributor to the press. During the war he was often a correspondent of the New York Evening Post.” In 1865, while serving in North Carolina, Tremain also wrote editorials for the Wilmington Herald. Tremain’s postwar memoirs exhibit an obvious disdain for George Meade, and he remained loyal to the Third Corps cause for the remainder of his life. But Tremain seems unlikely to have acted alone as Historicus. He would have benefited by the return to power of Sickles, Hooker, and Butterfield, but a staff officer working alone to engineer the removal of the commanding general seems improbable. Tremain was also very interested in returning to an assignment following Sickles’ wounding. In other words, he had much to risk if he were unmasked as Historicus. Tremain remains a strong potential co-conspirator, however, and he may have physically taken the dictation, placed pen to paper, or helped Historicus craft sentences. But it is doubtful that Historicus originated with Henry Tremain.18
In choosing between Tremain, Butterfield, and Sickles as Historicus, the question of Historicus’ identity is more easily answered. Historicus is obviously telling Gettysburg from Sickles’ point of view. The author arrives on Cemetery Hill on July 1 (with Sickles), and is apparently not present after July 2. Sickles is clearly the battle’s hero: “always reliable,” “always first” and “making good use” of his time. Historicus follows Sickles all over the battlefield, and is not at headquarters issuing orders with Butterfield or running errands with Tremain. He knows Sickles’ actions and even his conversations. Anything that occurred outside of Sickles’ sphere is also outside of Historicus’ interest. Historicus is not physically at army headquarters with Butterfield drafting the alleged retreat order. This probably rules Butterfield out as the originator, although he obviously provided Historicus with supporting information.
Historicus hit all of the themes that Sickles targeted in his congressional testimony and would repeat for decades to come: Howard welcomed Sickles as a savior on Cemetery Hill; Meade had drawn up a retreat order; Hunt agreed with Sickles’ position, Meade ignored him, and then promised support; the Fifth Corps was tardy in its assistance; the Third Corps held out alone against Longstreet’s overwhelming odds. Dan Sickles spent the next fifty years replaying these themes in newspapers and in speeches. Not only did Historicus have access to official reports, but as he proved when he published a second letter several weeks later, Historicus also had access to private correspondence from Third Corps division commander David Birney. There is nothing in Historicus’ account that Dan Sickles would have disagreed with. Sickles may have physically written the letter, or he may have dictated to Henry Tremain or any of his other devoted staff officers. But exactly who physically put the pen to the paper is irrelevant. The Historicus letters relay Sickles’ thoughts, motives, and agenda. The letters were written either physically or under the direction of Sickles. There is virtually no doubt that Dan Sickles was Historicus.19
Historicus is perhaps best remembered for his criticism of Barnes’ division. Earlier that summer, General Barnes had confronted David Birney over “some comments” in Birney’s report accusing Barnes of not providing proper sup
port. The survivors of Barnes’ division were irate both at the omission of credit to Strong Vincent’s brigade on Little Round Top and the severe criticism of the performance of Tilton and Sweitzer’s brigades near Stony Hill. Colonel Tilton called the claim that “Barnes’ Division broke—a most diabolical lie,” and dismissed the idea of “our division lying down to let other troops (tramp) over them to the front!” He thought the entire Historicus manifesto “a slander… for the apparent object of praising Maj. Genl. Sickles upon the public as an injured but capable soldier, giving him in fact the whole credit of the victory, which is sickening when we consider how near he came to losing the battle for us. Had Sickles’ orders to some of Sykes’ Brigade Commanders been obeyed, the rebels would surely have had both Round Tops early in the fight.”20
In the Herald’s March 18, 1864, edition, “a staff officer of the Fifth Corps,” wished “to correct his [Historicus] misstatements” and refuted seven of Historicus’ arguments. General Barnes published a credible reply of his own on March 21. Barnes described the accusation that he had ordered his men to lie down to allow Zook’s brigade to pass as “pure invention. No such occurrence as is here related took place. There is not a particle of truth in it.” Barnes blamed Tilton and Sweitzer’s poor performance on the gaps created by Sickles’ overextended line. “The motives and the object of the narrative must be judged by its general tenor,” concluded Barnes. “I think it [Historicus] is filled with errors, detracting from the merits of some and exalting the moderate claims of others to a ridiculous excess.” Like so many other battlefield controversies, the question of whether Zook’s brigade tramped over Barnes’ prostrate men was never satisfactorily settled. Since Zook was mortally wounded in battle, he never lived to offer his view, while the veterans (predictably) offered conflicting accounts.21
Although Historicus had not disparaged Hancock’s Second Corps, a battle Sickles was always careful to avoid, “Another Eye-Witness” appeared to blast Historicus in the Herald for omitting Hancock completely from the battle. He also attacked Sickles for advancing unsupported and with flanks exposed. In fact, there was no “just defense for the movements of General Sickles.” When Historicus eventually replied again on April 4, he assured the world that “it was far from my intention” to disparage either Hancock or the Second Corps. Historicus admitted that “Another Eye-Witness” was “deeply offended that General Sickles figured so conspicuously in the fight of July 2; but that is no fault of mine. The blame, if any, is to be attributed to the eagerness and activity of General Sickles.”22
Meade’s efforts to solicit friendly sources drew a favorable response from Lieutenant Ranald S. Mackenzie of Gouverneur Warren’s staff. As a courier for Warren, Mackenzie had witnessed much of the struggle to place Union bodies on Little Round Top. He assured Meade, “At the opening of the battle of July 2, there were no troops belonging to General Sickles’ corps on Round Top ridge. General Sickles, when called upon by General Warren, through me, to furnish troops for the defense of that position, refused to do so, stating that his whole command was necessary to defend his front, or words to that effect.”23
John Gibbon proved to be one of Meade’s strongest allies. The Second Corps division commander told the press that there was “no truth” to published statements that “one of the corps commanders” had a retreat order “in his pocket” on July 2. Gibbon warned Meade privately that Butterfield was willing to swear that he had prepared the retreat at Meade’s order. Meade assured Gibbon that it was only intended as a “contingency… and I may have told Butterfield to familiarize himself with the roads, etc., so that if it became necessary we would be prepared to do it promptly and in good order. Out of this he has manufactured the lie that I intended at the time [emphasis in original] to do so.” Meade was “heartsick” that “I am to suffer from the malice of such men as Sickles and Butterfield.”24
With all of these charges and counter-charges being aired in public, it became easy to lose sight of what, if anything, the Joint Committee was still trying to accomplish. One news report from Washington tried to clarify Sickles’ role in the investigation. “The statement that General Sickles had preferred charges against General Meade to the committee on the conduct of the war is erroneous. It appears that the committee, while examining into matters connected with the battle of Gettysburg, were necessarily compelled to notice the reflections of General Halleck and Meade on the conduct of General Sickles, and accordingly he and Generals Pleasonton, Birney, Doubleday, and Howe were summoned to testify.”25
Andrew Humphreys, another Meade ally, testified before the committee on March 21. Although he led a division in the Third Corps, Humphreys had never joined Sickles’ inner circle. Now that he was free of the Third Corps, Humphreys’ testimony included (in much detail) Third Corps snafus such as his own circuitous arrival at Gettysburg on July 1, and the collapse of Birney’s line on July 2. Humphreys testified that Sickles had erred in moving too far in advance of Meade’s battle line. The fact that the Confederates had crushed Sickles’ position, but were unable to capture Meade’s Cemetery Ridge line on July 3, “undoubtedly” showed that Meade’s judgment had been correct. The committee tried to get Humphreys to admit that, having fought a defensive battle, the Army of the Potomac should have been fresher than Lee’s army and better equipped to prevent the Confederate escape. Humphreys did believe “we should have attacked them as soon as possible” at Williamsport, but generally thought that the later examination of Lee’s line proved that “we should have suffered very severely” had such an attack been launched.26
Winfield Scott Hancock was the next witness on March 22. Since Hancock read the newspapers and knew what charges were being directed at Meade, one wonders exactly how friendly he was to his commanding general. Hancock told the committee that Meade had “made up his mind to fight a battle on what was known as Pipe creek.” John Reynolds’ occupation of Gettysburg “was really a mask” to buy the time needed for the Pipe Creek line to be established in the rear, explained the wounded Second Corps commander. But the Confederates had reached Gettysburg earlier than anticipated, he continued, and Reynolds’ First Corps delayed Lee’s advance until Meade “should come to some decision.” Hancock also appeared to confirm Abner Doubleday’s complaint that Meade promoted his friends over superiors. Even though Hancock knew that Meade had received Halleck’s permission to promote anyone he chose, Hancock still testified that his own July 1 ascension over his seniors Sickles and Howard was not “legally… proper.” He further testified that on July 2, Meade thought there would be a “formidable attack by the enemy on the right of our line,” leaving the potential interpretation that Meade was ultimately deceived by Lee’s attack on the Federal left.27
Although Hancock did not score many points on Meade’s behalf, he did not take Sickles’ side, either. Hancock “could not conceive” the objective of Sickles’ July 2 advance and thought “it would be disadvantageous to us.” The Confederates had ultimately succeeded in turning Sickles’ left flank by passing between the Third Corps and Little Round Top, countering Sickles’ claim that his corps had held the mountain. Sickles’ move had caused “a vacancy in the original line” which allowed Lee’s army to break through “at different places” and required Hancock to “patch up that line all the latter part of the afternoon and evening.” All of this was a far cry from Sickles’ contention that he had defended Little Round Top. Hancock testified that he knew nothing about Meade’s alleged retreat order.28
Although he had been desperately wounded in Longstreet’s July 3 attack, Hancock was sure Meade would have “won a great victory” had they attacked immediately after Longstreet’s repulse. Some historians have called Hancock “a very impressive witness” in Meade’s defense, but it is hard to see how he helped Meade significantly. His straight forward delivery could enhance Meade’s image as a weak commander who did not want to fight at Gettysburg, a general who violated the army’s law of seniority, needed councils of war to strengthen his
resolve, and failed to capitalize on his victory. However, Hancock’s balanced criticism of both sides also decisively rejected Sickles’ July 2 advance and self-proclaimed defense of Little Round Top.29
After Sickles, the most noteworthy witness to testify against Meade was Dan Butterfield, who appeared before the committee on March 25. After being replaced as chief of staff with Humphreys, Butterfield had asked Meade if he should report back to the Army of the Potomac, to which Meade replied, “I do not know… If you come here I will do the best I can for you but it is impossible to say in advance what that will be.” Butterfield instead rejoined Hooker in the Western Theater. In January 1864, Butterfield was offended by a passage in Henry Halleck’s report stating that the condition of the Harpers Ferry garrison had been “incorrectly represented” to Meade. Meade admitted that he based his Harpers Ferry decisions upon information obtained from Butterfield, and that this had in fact been incorporated into Halleck’s report. Later in February, Butterfield told General William “Baldy” Smith that he possessed a rough draft of the alleged July 2 retreat order.30
Butterfield’s appearance was one of the few instances where documentary evidence supported Sickles’ covert cooperation with the committee. The details are murky, but Butterfield apparently arrived in Washington absent without leave at the end of February. Frustratingly (and conveniently), Butterfield’s widow omitted her husband’s March 1864 movements from her 1904 Biographical Memorial of General Butterfield. Given their stormy personal history, it was not surprising that Butterfield would be hostile to Meade, and this probably explains why Halleck did not want Butterfield in Washington. On February 30, Sickles wrote to Senator Chandler:
(Private) My dear Senator:
James A. Hessler Page 37