With Grant’s arrival, the reorganization, and warmer weather, Historicus and the committee captured a decreasing amount of newspaper coverage and Meade’s attention. It was time for another year’s campaign. But the committee continued their work and resumed with its final Gettysburg witnesses. After Sixth Corps commander “Uncle John” Sedgwick testified rather uneventfully in Meade’s favor (he “never heard of any such” retreat order) on April 8, Brigadier General Seth Williams, Meade’s assistant adjutant general, appeared ten days later. Although Williams is not remembered today as one of the battle’s leading generals, his testimony was important. Williams’ job was to ensure that orders prepared by Butterfield were copied and distributed. He would have been aware of any retreat order if it had existed. In reality, after his first committee appearance, Meade had ordered Williams to search for a copy of Butterfield’s retreat order. Williams replied that the order did not exist, and assumed it had been destroyed. Meade eventually told his wife that the headquarter clerks remembered “something of the kind” existing but that it was destroyed as “worthless” since it was never issued. (This passage was omitted from Meade’s letters when published by his family.) 51
Williams told Senator Wade that once Meade had “made up his mind to fight the battle at that place… he concentrated the army there with all possible rapidity.” Williams provided a detailed and well reasoned response to questions regarding the alleged retreat. To the best of Williams’ recollection, Butterfield gave Williams or a clerk “an order looking to a contingency which possibly might happen,” but this was never distributed because Butterfield told him not to do so “until I received further instructions from him.” Williams could not remember the order’s exact terminology, “but to the best of my belief it was an order which, if carried out, would have involved a retrograde movement of the army.” Congressman Daniel Gooch asked if Williams had participated in any conference, at any time, in relation to a retreat. “No, sir, none at all. I have very good reason to suppose that General Meade knew nothing of the existence of such an order.” Meade’s concentration of his army all led to the conclusion that he wanted to fight, not retreat, otherwise “he would have been blocking up the road.”52
As the spring of 1864 progressed, Meade’s correspondence increasingly reflected a pre-occupation with Ulysses Grant’s presence and Grant’s impact on Meade’s future with the Army of the Potomac. While it was still unclear if Meade would survive under Grant, it was becoming increasingly obvious that Sickles was not going to return to field command with the Army of the Potomac.
Dan Sickles in middle-age, still looking formidable in uniform. GNMP
Chapter 16
Spoil a Rotten Egg
The 1864 campaign was viewed by both contemporaries and later historians as Grant’s and not Meade’s. This took much of the attention away from attempts to displace Meade. Many of the key players were more interested in looking for assignments, not wanting to sit on the sidelines as the war moved into another summer. Brigadier General Samuel Crawford uneventfully closed the committee’s Gettysburg testimony on April 27, and Wade’s committee increasingly lost their ability to influence Meade’s fate, if they ever really possessed that authority to begin with.1
Generations of Americans, and Gettysburg visitors, have lived under the false assumption that Grant “replaced” Meade after Gettysburg. In reality, Grant may have savedMeade. As George Meade Jr. admitted, Grant’s appointment and “continuous presence with the Army of the Potomac, caused the command of that army to cease to be a position so much to be sought after, and for a time the labors of the committee [were] diverted to other fields,” Birney wrote privately that “Grant killed the demonstration for Hooker that was assuming shape, and would have ended in the decapitation of Meade.” Although Grant’s presence dissuaded Meade’s enemies from pursuing his head, Meade had certainly done his part to help his own cause. He hadn’t fully received Congress’ “official thanks” for Gettysburg, and he hadn’t successfully refuted the criticism over Lee’s escape at Williamsport. But he had convincingly discredited the alleged Sickles/Butterfield retreat order, even if Wade’s committee would never admit it. A supposed novice at politics and media manipulation, Meade had essentially beaten Sickles, Wade, and Butterfield.2
Much of this activity occurred without Sickles, leaving the full extent of his involvement with the committee open for question. He had finally departed Washington in April on Lincoln’s diplomatic tour of the South. Accompanied by Henry Tremain, the stops included Nashville, Georgia, Memphis, Arkansas, New Orleans, Pensacola, and Charleston. While in Georgia, he visited Hooker and Butterfield, and could only observe them direct troops at Resaca and the opening of the Atlanta campaign. During a June troop review in Louisiana, one enlisted man noticed that Sickles “rides just as well as if he had both legs. An orderly carried his crutches for him, and a pocket built on the saddle, in which to rest the stump, answered the purpose of a stirrup.” But despite his improved equestrian abilities, Sickles returned to Washington in August and then headed home to New York City to await further orders.3
In mid-October 1864, Sickles was unexpectedly required in Philadelphia to serve as a pall-bearer at David Birney’s funeral. Birney had served with distinction through Grant’s 1864 Overland campaign, and was even selected in July to command the Tenth Corps. But the hardships of the fall campaign and the malarial climate had taken their toll on Birney’s health. By early October, he had taken ill and (although he refused to leave the army) was forced to return home to Philadelphia. On October 18, he “was attacked by a violent hemorrhage of the bowels” and he died that evening at home, surrounded by his family. Like so many other military men, his delirious mind wandered to the battlefield, his last intelligible words being, “Keep your eyes on that flag, boys!”4
In addition to Sickles, the October 21 funeral was attended by Governor Curtin, numerous staff officers, and a long line of dignitaries. One newsman watched Sickles and commented that Dan testified “by his presence with his mutilated body, his sense of the high and soldierly ability that distinguished the lamented deceased, and how profoundly he mourned the loss of a brother-soldier.” Birney’s favorite horse, which was a gift from Sickles, was led behind the hearse. Birney was buried in full major-general uniform and wore the decoration of the Third Army Corps Union, of which he was then serving vice-president.5
“The services of that distinguished officer deserve the signal recognition of his countrymen,” Sickles wrote, “and especially do they merit honor at the hands of his fellow-citizens of Pennsylvania.” To Regis de Trobriand, Birney “was one of the best friends I had in the army…he died, in the midst of his family, still young, without living to see the triumph of the cause to which he had sacrificed his fortune and his life.” Perhaps the most surprising tribute came from none other than George Meade. During the 1864 campaign, Birney had earned Meade’s professional respect. “This has shocked everyone here…General Birney is undoubtedly a loss to the army. He was a very good soldier, and very energetic in the performance of his duties. During the last campaign he had quite distinguished himself. I never liked him personally, because I did not consider him a reliable person,” concluded Meade. Given their acrimonious history together, Meade’s professional praise was enough.6
Sickles made one last futile attempt to re-start the old Third Corps. In the fall, he assured Lincoln that “with proper and sufficient facilities I could reorganize and fill up my old Army Corps with new Regiments.… ” Although nothing came of the offer, rumors still circulated that Sickles would return once again. Andrew Humphreys wrote privately, “I learn that General Sickles says he expects a command after the election.” (Humphreys meanwhile received command of the Second Corps in November 1864.) In 1861, Lincoln had needed War Democrats like Sickles on the battlefield. But the landscape was radically different by late 1864, and Sickles was no longer essential to the cause. Dan had to content himself instead with campaigning for Lincoln during t
he 1864 presidential re-election. As 1864 drew to a close, and Sickles was still home without an assignment, he made one final plea to the President. “I beg respectfully to remind you that I am still unassigned. Fully restored to health, as competent as ever for active duty, and anxious for employment, I hope to be spared the humiliation of being dropped from the rolls among the list of useless officers.… ”7
Sickles remained on the active rolls, but Lincoln never returned him to that field command which he wanted most. Instead, he was sent on a special diplomatic mission to Columbia and Panama. Riding over mountainous roads on horseback and mules allowed him to make “gratifying progress in the use of my artificial limb.…I venture to believe that Gen. Meade even would not now doubt my ability to ride far enough to the front to ‘post a battery’ or make a reconnaissance.… ” But it must have been bittersweet when he received word in May of Lee’s April surrender while in Bogotá, and more shocking when word of Lincoln’s assassination reached him later that month while he was near the Andes. For a man who had been in the thick of American politics since the 1850s, he was more than two thousand miles away in a remote locale as Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac for one final campaign, Grant accepted the surrender, Lincoln was murdered, and Hancock oversaw the execution of the assassination conspirators.8
Since the war ended with the Committee on the Conduct of the War having failed to replace Meade, there was little left for Wade’s committee to do except to finish their report. The final report was published on May 22, 1865, more than one month after Lee’s surrender and Lincoln’s assassination. Congress’ Radical Republicans were now re-focusing their efforts on subjugating the conquered South, thus it was simply too late to have any impact on the Union war effort. All they had accomplished was to demoralize and distract Meade and other generals whose efforts would have been better focused on the war. Alfred Pleasonton, of all people, was given primary credit for selecting Gettysburg, although they did accept Meade’s claim that he determined to concentrate at Gettysburg before hearing from Hancock.9 Regarding the July 2 attack:
General Meade and others criticized General Sickles for the disposition he made of his troops before the fighting commenced; claiming that by throwing forward his corps from the regular line he exposed himself to and invited the attack of the enemy. General Sickles in his testimony gives his reason for the course he pursued, and holds that the movement he made prevented a disastrous flank attack on our left, which was threatened, besides being advantageous in other respects. Some troops of the 2d and 5th corps were also engaged in support of the 3d corps.10
About the alleged retreat, “There is testimony to show” that Meade “contemplated abandoning his position.” The committee admitted “there is some controversy on that point,” so it highlighted Butterfield, Williams, Gibbon, Howe, Hunt, Sedgwick, and Meade’s testimony to counter-balance both sides of the argument. Sickles was included as believing that the question was to be discussed at the 3:00 meeting, before being broken up by the battle. In reality, the committee telegraphed their bias against Meade since the testimony in Meade’s favor, particularly from Hunt and Williams, had been far stronger than Sickles and Butterfield’s testimony against him. However, the committee presented the issue as if it were still open for debate. As expected, the report condemned Meade’s failure to prevent Lee’s escape back to Virginia. An immediate pursuit “would have resulted in a great victory, and the loss of the most, if not the whole” of Lee’s artillery. Williamsport, and not the alleged Sickles/Butterfield “retreat,” became the one criticism that was hardest for Meade to live down. In summary, Wade’s final verdict was: “The battle of Gettysburg, though important in its results, was purely a defensive battle on our part, and was not followed by such active measures as in the opinion of the majority of the witnesses were necessary and practicable to enable us to reap the full fruits of the victory there gained.” Viewed by history as a great victory, Gettysburg was officially labeled a disappointment.11
At first glance, there were no clear winners in this Second Battle of Gettysburg. Although Meade retained his command, his name and reputation had been dragged through the historical mud. The failure to prevent Lee’s escape has dogged Meade in varying degrees since 1863, but after creating the accusation that he planned to retreat on July 2, the committee did at least offer a forum for Meade to successfully defend himself against the charge. The arguments that key officers knew nothing of the order, and that a retreat made no sense given the army’s rapid concentration were convincing, even if Wade ultimately did not accept them. Today, few (if any) serious Gettysburg students believe Sickles’ accusation that Meade planned to retreat during the afternoon of July 2.
One historian characterized the proceedings as “a battle for the opinion of future generations- a struggle over history and memory.” But the participants had actually fought for more immediately practical reasons: notably professional advancement and political agendas. “From the standpoint of military history,” historian Bill Hyde analyzed, “Sickles’ testimony is so full of misstatements and outright lies as to be of little value. Yet it cannot be disregarded by the serious student of the Civil War or the battle of Gettysburg. Its worth lies in what it represents. Sickles’ vendetta against Meade shows the degree and intensity of divisions among members of the officer corps in the Army of the Potomac.” Although Sickles is usually singled out for the “lies” in his testimony, nearly everyone (from Doubleday to Butterfield to Meade to Hancock to Warren) were guilty of varying degrees of omissions and “errors.” Whether the testimony was accurate or not, the post-battle political posturing within the Army of the Potomac is as much a part of Gettysburg’s history as the battlefield tactics and strategies themselves. Sickles was not the only army officer to testify against Meade, nor did he create this environment. But history has generally accepted Meade’s version of the “truth” and decided that he was in the right. In that sense, George Meade certainly won the 1864 Gettysburg battle against his more experienced political foes.12
From a historical perspective, Sickles’ efforts to inflate his own battlefield role and hasten Meade’s removal decidedly back-fired against him. Sickles is reviled by many modern Gettysburg students because of these efforts, and he has also helped elevate Meade’s historical image as a solid professional officer who was attacked by a den of political vipers. Had Sickles taken a higher road, it is possible that he would be remembered historically in a more positive light. Numerous generals made mistakes on battlefields, at Gettysburg and elsewhere, yet they are not remembered historically as such villains. Ambrose Burnside’s performance at Fredericksburg was arguably more disastrous, yet he is remembered today more as a buffoon than “scoundrel.” Sickles’ negative image transcends his battlefield performance. What is even worse for Sickles as a historical figure, his political underhandedness has overshadowed the positive services that he later performed in veterans’ affairs and the establishment of Gettysburg National Military Park. George Meade beat Dan Sickles in 1864’s Second Battle of Gettysburg, and Sickles’ historical image remains permanently damaged as a result.
With Gettysburg and the Civil War seemingly behind him, Sickles was assigned to Boston and command of the Second District, Department of the East, in August 1865. He was greeted enthusiastically when he arrived and, noting “the state of his health,” he told well-wishers at the Parker House that he hoped his “command would not be a very arduous task.” But the country faced the significant challenge of Reconstruction. With the Radical Republicans treating the South like a conquered territory, the former Confederacy was carved into five Military Districts, each under the command of a major general. The general commanding each district was given broad civil and military authority needed to rebuild their destroyed territory, including establishment of voting rights for the freed slaves. Due to his combination of military, political, and diplomatic experience, Sickles received command of the Second Military District. Sickles arrived in Charleston in Sep
tember 1865, originally tasked with rebuilding South Carolina, but eventually received command of both North and South Carolina. With an initial starting force of about 7, 000 troops (many of whom eventually mustered out during Sickles’ tenure), Dan was responsible for the order and security of approximately two million people. Although he had missed the end of the war, Sickles was back in the military and political limelight.13
Henry Tremain served under Sickles for a time in the Carolinas until he resigned from the army in April 1866 as a brevet Brigadier General. Tremain eventually went onto a successful law career and in 1879 he was elected President of the Third Army Corps Union. Two familiar faces who did not move to Charleston were Teresa and daughter Laura. Both remained, again, in New York. Still married in name, by 1866 the forty-seven year old Sickles was still very much a ladies man, despite his missing leg. But he now managed his private affairs more discreetly than he had in his youth. Reconstruction was difficult, sometimes violent work. Although he played diplomat several times during his long career, he was temperamentally not suited for the tact and diplomacy that was required in the position.14
James A. Hessler Page 39