Where had Sickles wanted to be buried? In 1905, when his beloved pet spaniel Bo-Bo died, Sickles had him buried in a New Rochelle plot that his father George had purchased for human members of the family. (George was buried there when he died in 1887.) Descendants of George’s second wife were outraged when they learned they would be sharing eternity with Dan’s dog. There was debate at the time of Bo-Bo’s interment over whether Sickles wanted to rest in New Rochelle “beside his faithful dog” or beside the less-faithful Teresa Sickles, who had been moved to an unmarked grave at the Green-Wood Cemetery.65
Caroline Sickles touched off a debate (that would resurface nearly eighty years later) when she proposed that the Secretary of War bury Sickles near the New York monument at Gettysburg. “Can not be slightest objection to Sickles’ interment,” replied John P. Nicholson. The New York Timesreported on May 5, “This disposed of the idea that the body might be brought to Washington for burial at Arlington.”66 However, this plan was quickly rejected as the Times updated readers on May 6:
Major Gen. Daniel E. Sickles will not be buried at Gettysburg, but in Arlington National Cemetery, according to a statement made yesterday by his attorney, Daniel P. Hays. In April, 1910, Gen. Sickles visited Arlington with the late Major A. J. Zabriskie, at that time Secretary of the New York Monuments Commission, and expressed a desire to be buried there. Major Zabriskie made a note of this and informed his son, who told Mr. Hays. Confirmation is given in a note which Gen. Sickles left for Mr. Hays, in which he expressed a preference for Arlington.67
A memorial service was held at Sickles’ home on the evening of May 7. His body lay in a coffin in the back parlor of the house, which was filled with Mrs. Sickles, Stanton, friends, elderly GAR veterans, and flowers. Sickles descendant John Shaud was told by his great-grandmother, Dan’s half-sister Roma, that as she and her daughter arrived at the wake, they were “confronted by Stanton who snapped his fingers at them to get their attention and escorted them to the seating in the rear, he seemed to be flaunting the fact that he spoke fluent French as he spoke both in English and French to them in an angry tone. It must have been because he found out that the general left him with no money.” A flag was draped across Dan’s chest, and at the coffin’s foot were his old war cap, sword, and golden epaulettes. A simple silver nameplate bore his name, date of birth (listed as October 20, 1820), and death, and the inscription “Major General of the United States Army.” A ritual of the Grand Army was read, reminding the remaining veterans that “soon they, too, would be called to join their late comrade at the Grand Encampment.”68 Gen. George Loud of W. S. Hancock Post 250 delivered the memorial address:
We stand by this coffin to-night, and think of the heroic achievement of this man in the greatest battle of the world’s greatest war, of his heroic courage and sublime patriotism. He was a man of charming cheeriness, the memory of which will long survive in his comrades and friends…in the twilight of his life he became in truth a man of sorrows. But the keynote of his career was ever an indomitable courage. He was a faithful friend and a generous foe.69
The funeral was held at St. Patrick’s Cathedral on Friday morning, May 8. According to Mrs. Sulzer, all agreed that Sickles “would turn in his coffin with unholy indignation at having a Catholic funeral; but he had a most pretentious one” due to the wishes of Caroline Sickles. The coffin was placed upon a caisson and the funeral procession was escorted by the Twelfth Regiment, New York National Guard, the Grand Army Posts, and a battalion of regular troops from Governor’s Island. Joe Twichell, one of the last surviving members of Sickles’ inner circle, attended and observed the other veterans, “all aged men, including myself—whose hearts were in common stirred with memories of days long past when, in our youth, we followed the Flag together.” After mass, a train carried the funeral party to Washington for final burial at Arlington National Cemetery, where Sickles was laid to rest on May 9 with full military honors. The procession included the usual military trappings of a rider-less horse. An artillery salute was fired during the procession, while three rifle salvos were fired over the grave. In addition to the Regular Army escort, a number of veterans also turned out to support him one last time.70
Dan Sickles’ funeral procession, May 8, 1914. Library of Congress
Sickles was buried as a soldier in a soldier’s cemetery. (Ironically, his military ceremony received less resistance than had the funeral of his Gettysburg counterpart and professional soldier James Longstreet.) It was final proof that he was no longer an attorney, politician, or even the murderer of Barton Key. He had long outlived most of his friends and enemies, his first wife and daughter, the Lincolns, Meade, Longstreet, and all of his fellow corps commanders. His uncharacteristically simple Arlington tombstone reads the way he wanted to be remembered:
DANIEL E. SICKLES
Medal of Honor
Maj. Gen.
US Army
Dan Sickles’ grave in Arlington National Cemetery.
Author
When residents of Gettysburg read of the death, they were reminded that “General Sickles was well known to Gettysburg people and has been a visitor here many times. There is scarcely a citizen of the town who has not at some time attended a camp fire during the re-unions of veterans here, and listened to the thrilling war stories and reminisces of General Sickles.” His crutches “alone told a story of valor and suffering, [and] created an impression that will linger long in the memory of those who knew him.” The Star and Sentinelasked its readers: did Sickles err in advancing to the Peach Orchard on July 2, 1863? The paper supposed that James Longstreet had the answer when he told Sickles in 1902: “I believe that it is now conceded that the advanced position at the Peach Orchard, taken by your corps and under your orders saved that battlefield to the Union cause.” But even to the local press, Sickles’ controversial Gettysburg performance and ability to spin fascinating anecdotes seems to have overshadowed his role in developing the National Military Park.71
After a lifetime of financial excess, it was only fitting that the once wealthy Sickles left an essentially bankrupt estate. Since his Will was dated in August 1912, prior to their reconciliation, Stanton and Caroline were excluded. The only remaining real property was his New York home, which carried two mortgages. Eleanor Wilmerding, since deceased, was left with $5, 000 while smaller legacies were left to other servants. The reality was that after the debts were cleared, only $500 of personal property remained in the estate. Perhaps his most prized remaining possessions were three war swords, which were bequeathed to Wilmerding and grandchildren. Even in death, Sickles still managed to garner some news coverage. In 1915, Stanton began action to learn what had become of his grandfather’s estate, still threatening to call that same “prominent society woman” he believed had broken up Dan and Caroline’s marriage, and Wilmerding’s sisters, to testify. Attorney Daniel P. Hays declined to be the estate’s executor, saying that he had done his full duty to Dan in life (and neglected to give Stanton that long hoped for accounting of the George Sickles estate), but Hays was “empowered to revise and publish the General’s memoirs,” which unfortunately have never surfaced. If they had survived, perhaps they might have given some lift to the general’s post-burial reputation. They certainly would have been entertaining. In fewer than one hundred years after his death, the man who was buried with full military honors would be cast by many as the villain of Gettysburg.72
A modern photo of the Excelsior Brigade monument at Gettysburg. The legendary missing Sickles bust would have been on the inner pedestal between the five columns. This view looks toward the west, with the Excelsiors’ 73rd New York regimental monument and Sherfy barn along the Emmitsburg Road in the background.Author
Epilogue
That Damn Fool Sickles
If Dan Sickles went to his grave believing that his long career of “noteworthy achievements” would ensure a favorable posterity, then he most certainly would be disappointed by his image today. J. Howard Wert’s published 188
6 opinion that Sickles was the “personal ideal of the perfect hero and the fearless soldier” has not been shared by many historians. Today, Sickles is more commonly remembered as “The Congressman Who Got Away With Murder,” and even more famously as the amateur general who on July 2 left Little Round Top unoccupied and then spent years attempting to destroy George Meade’s career.1
From a military viewpoint, an 1893 debate in the pages of The Nation symbolized the differing schools of thought on the military value of Sickles’ Gettysburg position. Retired General Francis A. Walker dismissed James Longstreet’s claim that Sickles’ line had delayed him just long enough to prevent the Confederate occupation of Little Round Top by simply pointing out that Sickles would already have been on Little Round Top if he had not advanced to the Peach Orchard. “Gen. Sickles will hardly assert that the splendid brigade of Trobriand [sic] or Ward would not have stood off the Confederate troops just as effectively as Vincent’s brigade did.”2
Not true, replied one H. White. Although he argued inaccurately that Meade did not expect Sickles to hold Little Round Top, he did note that Sickles had acted as a buffer and caused Longstreet’s men to waste “all their strength and valor in gaining the Emmitsburg Road, which, after all, was of no particular benefit to them.” The merit of this reasoning can never be disproved, but it did reinforce the fact that Longstreet (and A. P. Hill) had expended much of Hood’s, McLaws’, and R. H. Anderson’s divisions overrunning ground at Devil’s Den, the Wheatfield, and the Peach Orchard, which ultimately held no value in driving Meade off Cemetery Ridge.3
Although support from other corps had ensured that Sickles’ advance to the Peach Orchard would not lose July 2, 1863, for the Union cause, the day’s final numbers appeared to prove the error of his ways. Estimates of the second day’s Federal casualties approximate 9,000 against 6,000 Confederate losses—a staggering disparity given that the Union spent the afternoon on the defense. Given these results, there is a general presumption by many Gettysburg students that only Sickles’ most loyal cronies could possibly have supported his actions. If so, then that list of supporters would actually have been a fairly lengthy one. James Longstreet claimed that Sickles’ move had been for the Union’s best, but much of Longstreet’s postwar commentary is viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. Phil Sheridan and Ulysses S. Grant reportedly supported Sickles’ action. Neither general had fought at Gettysburg, but their military opinions carried no small amount of weight with Americans in the nineteenth century.4
Many of the Third Corps survivors, the men who actually fought that day, refused to direct any anger at Sickles. Private John Haley of the 17th Maine admitted that the Third Corps did not hold one “foot of ground” at the day’s close, but Haley still considered Sickles “one of the bravest and best fighters of the war. And the curious thing about it all is that he was not a ‘West Point Edition.’” Haley acknowledged that Sickles had disobeyed Meade’s orders, but Meade had committed the greater sin (in Haley’s view) when he “abdicated all generalship … what ever of saving grace attached to this days doings here on the left belongs to Gen. Dan E. Sickles … ‘Old Dan’ was a game bird and if he knew the sensation of fear he had a wonderful faculty for concealing it.”5 Private Haley knew that the Third Corps had fought in a poor position, but it still did not diminish his support for Sickles:
And although it has been claimed by many that Sickles line was exceedingly faulty on that day (which no one denies) still, in my judgment, it was Providential, if there ever was anything of this nature; for he held the rebels in check, and exhausted them, so that when the 6th Corps troops struck them they were checked and hurled back. I believe that if Birney’s division had been formed originally as Meade said he intended on the general line or ridge running to Round Top, the rebels would have gone through it like an egg shell, and the troops which relieved us might not have been in position, to fill the gap.…6
Haley believed that any criticism directed at Sickles occurred because Sickles had not acted “in the regular [army] or West Point way but rather contrary to it.” Noting that Meade, not Sickles, “smarted under the sting of presidential criticism after he allowed Lee to recross the Potomac,” Haley felt that “to Gen. Dan E. Sickles this country owes a debt of devotion and gratitude only to be gauged by the value of a preserved Union.”7
Frank Moran of the 73rd New York survived his time in captivity and, like so many others, wrote about his Gettysburg experiences. Moran accused Meade of ignoring Little Round Top’s importance by supposedly giving Sickles vague orders to hold the hill “if practicable.” Sickles’ leaving the hill empty was not only proof that Meade’s orders were not practicable, but Meade was at fault again for nearly failing to reinforce it. “Meade left that position without a man or a musket upon it for fully seven hours after Sickles’ warning,” wrote Moran.8
On the other side was Felix Brannigan of the Excelsiors’ 73rd New York. Brannigan did not specify Sickles, or any other general, by name when he wrote to his father: “The army it would appear—as a rule—is made subservient to the interests of political schemers, and as a reward for any extraordinary dirty work they may aspire to the most brilliant positions. It makes one’s blood boil to think of it.… The degradation of being led to slaughter by such infamous scoundrels!” Yet, Brannigan did not favor West Pointers instead of the politicians. He blasted Meade for allowing Lee to retreat to Virginia and even wondered if Lee’s escape had been intentional, thinking that it might be a Republican ploy to prolong the war and keep the Democrats out of Washington. “I hope I am wrong in my views, but the fact of Meade being in command still tends to confirm one’s suspicions.” Brannigan was wrong about Lee’s escape, but it remains a fascinating reminder of the political cynicism that existed within the Union Army, even after the Gettysburg victory, and the divided loyalties over who should command.9
Andrew Humphreys, who led a Third Corps division that afternoon, never fell into the Sickles camp. He visited the battlefield after the war and firmly decided that Meade’s preferred line was the better defensive position, the Peach Orchard salient had been seriously defective, and Sickles had overextended the Third Corps line while being too far from the remainder of the army to be supported. Such differences in assessment highlight the professional chasm that existed between a West Pointer such as Humphreys and the so-called amateurs.10
Monument sculptor James Kelly later knew many of Gettysburg’s generals, including Sickles, whom he most certainly did not support. Kelly’s interview notes suggest that the majority of generals shared his views: “all the officers I interviewed expressed their highest appreciation of Meade’s gallantry; all condemned Gen. Sickles and wondered why Gen. Lee did not flank Round Top.” During one session, Hancock pointed to a large map and laughed, “There is the peach orchard where Sickles went down and got licked.” Alexander Webb thought, “If Sickles had not lost his leg, he would have lost his head.” Although not at Gettysburg, Fitz John Porter knew all of the main players. “Gen. Butterfield always did his duty while Gen. Sickles did not do his duty. Sickles is a braggart.” Oliver Howard, on the other hand, seemed to defend Sickles: “this action from a military standpoint was to be approved, regardless of our opinion of his private character.” Joshua Chamberlain thought he knew why Howard seemed to support Sickles: since both generals “got into trouble at Gettysburg,” Sickles defended Howard, who in turn defended Sickles to repay “his debts.”11
Before the old soldiers passed on, many committed their opinions to paper by publishing memoirs. Regis de Trobriand had been friendly to Sickles, but ultimately didn’t buy Sickles’ notion that July 2 had been a decisive Third Corps victory. After the day’s heavy fighting, Meade had wisely tightened the line on Cemetery Ridge, where he had “intended to await the attack of the Confederates.” The “partial engagement of July 1 [resulted] to our disadvantage, continued with desperate fighting on the 2d, without definite result, and finished on the 3d by a decisive victory.”12
&n
bsp; In his 1882 memoirs, Abner Doubleday perceptively thought that it “would seem” that Lee believed the main Federal line ended on the Emmitsburg Road. “McLaws says that Lee thought turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left.” Regarding the merits of Sickles’ position, Doubleday (using a mathematical diagram to illustrate his point) wrote: “The disadvantages of [Sickles’] position are obvious enough. It is impossible for any force to hold its ground when attacked at once on both sides which constitute the right angle.” As sometimes happened with controversial individuals of the era, criticism of Sickles could have been muted by the fact that he lived for so long afterward. When an edited version of Frank Haskell’s Gettysburg manuscript was published by a Dartmouth classmate in 1898, the editor omitted some of Haskell’s criticism of the still-living Sickles.13
Henry Tremain published his version of the story, Two Days of War, in 1905. Not surprisingly, the work was pro-Sickles. For once, Tremain admitted that July 3 had been important to the battle’s outcome, but it had occurred and owed its ultimate success to Sickles’ movements on the second. Tremain noted that Sickles (like Reynolds on July 1) had engaged “in battle at once for the sake of gaining the time necessary for the concentration of the main body of the army, and thus securing it in the final positions carefully selected to resist the final assaults made on the third and last day.” The notion that Sickles had advanced to buy time for the rest of the army was ridiculous, and Tremain probably knew it, but it was another example of the devotion that Sickles had created in his men.14
Confederate artilleryman Edward Porter Alexander produced no shortage of postwar analysis. Although his artillery had failed to neutralize his Federal counterparts on both the second and third days, he focused much of his written scrutiny on the tactical shortcomings of Generals Lee and Longstreet. Regarding July 2, he was particularly critical of Longstreet’s inability to commit all eight of his brigades at one time. In Military Memoirs of a Confederate (1907), Alexander presumed that Sickles was influenced by Hazel Grove (and Alexander thereby influenced legions of future historians who rely on his analysis), but he still considered it “bad tactics. It exchanged strong ground for weak, and gave the Confederates an opportunity … to crush the isolated 3d corps.”15
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