40. CCW, 297.
41. OR27/3: 464; Charles Graham account, February 16, 1865, Participant Accounts File 5, GNMP.
42. Frassanito, Early Photography at Gettysburg, 151–152.
43. CCW, 405; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,213; Byrne and Weaver, Haskell of Gettysburg,102. Once again there is an inference from Hancock and supporters that Meade had chosen Gettysburg based upon Hancock’s advice. But for an opposing viewpoint, Henry Hunt, who had a significant personality clash with Hancock, stressed that Hancock’s reports were “not very encouraging” and that Meade’s decision was based on information received from “others.” Historical accuracy is often dependent on which version one chooses to believe. See Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3: 291–292.
44. Meade, Life and Letters,2:41, Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 291–292; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,42; Rollins, “George Gordon Meade and the Defense of Cemetery Ridge,” Gettysburg Magazine19, 73; Byrne and Weaver, Haskell of Gettysburg, 103; Styple, Generals in Bronze, 177.
45. Meade, Life and Letters,2:41, 62–63, Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 291–292; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,58–59; Rollins, “George Gordon Meade and the Defense of Cemetery Ridge,” Gettysburg Magazine19, 73–75; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign,330, 716 (n..34); Styple, Generals in Bronze, 177.
46. Carter, Four Brothers in Blue,317–319. Sickles is frequently taken to task for claiming ignorance of Geary’s July 1st position and for not utilizing the Paine map to place his corps on the morning of July 2nd. But the Paine map copy that is often reprinted, which may not even be the same map that Paine actually prepared that morning, does not place Sickles, Geary, or any other troops on Little Round Top. If Sickles was told to replace Geary’s position on July 2nd, then there is actually evidence to suggest that the Paine map would have offered him no clarity. See Rollins, “George Gordon Meade and the Defense of Cemetery Ridge,” Gettysburg Magazine19, 74–75, including n. 100 on 74.
47. CCW, 389; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,184–185; Meade, Life and Letters,2: 59–60; Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys,188. The doctor was probably either Andrew or Robert Anan of Emmitsburg. See Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,44, 474 (n.44) and Humphreys, 190.
48. CCW, 389; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 185–186; OR27/1: 531.
49. OR27/1: 543; Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys,188, 190; Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion, 5.
50. CCW, 389–390; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,185–186; OR27/1: 531; Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys,191–192; Meade, Life and Letters,2: 56; Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion,5. Humphreys later replayed this story in some detail for the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War because, he said, “to explain why it was that I was so late in getting upon the field.” Humphreys may also have blamed his division’s July 2nd performance on its exhausted condition, and he also probably enjoyed highlighting the breakdown in Sickles’ communication chain.
Chapter 6: In Some Doubt as to Where He Should Go
1. OR27/1: 519; Styple, Our Noble Blood,116; Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry,166–167; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns,100; Toombs, New Jersey Troops,180. Historian Edwin Coddington took Graham, de Trobriand, and Burling to task for not departing Emmitsburg immediately upon receiving their orders. He noted that Meade’s orders did not allow for any delay in departure. See Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 335. But the participant accounts do not indicate that there was any intentional delay; simply that in the darkness it took some time to bring the scattered command back together. Graham said the “troops were immediately withdrawn and took up their march.” See Charles Graham account, February16, 1865, Participant Accounts File 5, GNMP.
2. OR27/1: 914–915, 927–928, 939, 1032; R.L. Murray, E.P Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,45; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,86, 88–89, 97, 105, 131, 485 (n. 53); Petruzzi, “John Buford at Gettysburg,” in America’s Civil War, 37.
3. Tremain, Two Days of War,36–40; Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, 117–118; Scott, History of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers,82.
4. Tremain, Two Days of War,36–40; OR27/1: 498, 500; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg,1: 387, 393; Scott, History of the One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers,82; Georg, “The Sherfy Farm and the Battle of Gettysburg,” 8; Fasnacht, Historical Sketch 99th Pennsylvania, 8–9.
5. Georg, The Sherfy Farm and the Battle of Gettysburg,.2–6; Lossing, Pictorial History of the Civil War, 3:65; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two,8; Coco, A Strange and Blighted Land,38.
6. Georg, “The Sherfy Farm and the Battle of Gettysburg,” 6; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps,10; Survey Report for Restoration and Rehabilitation of Historic Structures: Wentz Buildings, GNMP, January 31, 1957; Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry, 170–171.
7. Georg, “The Sherfy Farm and the Battle of Gettysburg,” 8–9; Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two, 5–8.
8. Tremain, Two Days of War,40–42. Tremain’s memoirs are obviously biased towards Sickles and against Meade. Upon receipt of Birney’s report, Tremain wrote that he then reported to Meade, who told him that cavalry would be placed as a screen on Sickles’ left. This is a questionable recollection since Buford’s cavalry had already been placed on the Union left flank on the evening of July 1.
9. Meade, Life and Letters,2: 63–64; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign,333; Byrne and Weaver, Haskell of Gettysburg, 103.
10. OR27/1: 592–593, 600; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,3:296; Meade, Life and Letters,2: 63–64. The accounts of both Hunt and Captain George Meade confirm that the Fifth Corps was originally placed in reserve near Rock Creek and the Baltimore Pike to support Twelfth Corps.
11. 11. Bigelow, The Peach Orchard, 51; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 332–333.
12. Tremain, Two Days of War, 42–43.
13. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,106, 167; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 3:297.
14. Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 232–23.
15. OR27/1: 825, 839. The regimental history of the 141st Pennsylvania regiment also states that the 5th Ohio and 147th Pennsylvania occupied Little Round Top during the morning of the 2nd. See Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, 118.
16. OR27/1: 115–116.
17. CCW, 297.
18. OR27/1: 482.
19. Meade, Life and Letters,2: 73; George Meade Jr. to Alexander Webb, December 2, 1885, Alexander Webb Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. There must be some license in Captain Meade’s claim that he considered the Third Corps “posted comfortably” at 7:00 AM, since nearly two hours later Captain Meade would be claiming that he had no knowledge of the position that his father intended Sickles to be in.
20. CCW, 331.
21. Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers,118; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,38, 107; Meade, Life and Letters,2: 354; Carter, Four Brothers in Blue,317–319. Private (later Captain) Carter, of the 22nd Massachusetts (Tilton’s brigade), specifically stated in his memoirs that Sickles did not receive written orders. Carter’s account, published in 1913, was presumably based on second-hand information, perhaps Meade’s own account.
22. Rafferty, in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion,6–8; Fasnacht, Historical Sketch 99th Pennsylvania, 8.
23. New York at Gettysburg, 1: 342–343; Sears, Chancellorsville, 235–237.
24. Meade, Life and Letters, 2:66.
25. Ibid., 2: 66–67.
26. Ibid., 2: 67.
27. Ibid.
28. CCW,297; Charles Graham account,
February 16, 1865, Participants File 5, GNMP; OR 27/1: 519–520, 522; Haynes, A History of the Second Regiment, New Hampshire Volunteer Infantry,167–168; Smith, A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns,101; Rafferty, in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion,6–8; Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys,192; Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign,335–336; Styple, Our Noble Blood,116 . Several accounts, such as Captain Smith’s and the 141st Pennsylvania’s regimental history, timed their arrival around 9:00 a.m. See Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, 118.
29. Rafferty, “Gettysburg,” in Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion,7; OR27/1: 511; Humphreys, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys: A Biography,192; Pennsylvania at Gettysburg,2:606; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,187–188. Historian Bill Hyde thought it “curious that Sickles felt it necessary to issue such a direction to Humphreys, a professional military man. There is no record that Sickles issued a similar order to Birney, a political general.…Birney did not remove the fences in his front, and his negligence created problems for the artillery in the battle, resulting in costly delays.” However, Colonel Benjamin L. Higgins, of the 86th New York in Ward’s brigade (Birney’s division) clearly reported that at 10:00 “I was ordered by General Ward to send forward a sufficient body of men…to demolish all stone walls and fences in our front to the Emmitsburg road.”
30. OR27/1: 585; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,133; Murray, E.Alexander and the Artillery Action in the Peach Orchard,45. Pfanz assumes that someone in authority such as Birney perceived a special threat along the Emmitsburg Road at this early hour. Murray seems to suggest that Clark was positioned to support Berdan’s mid-afternoon reconnaissance. Unfortunately Clark specifically reported the move as occurring about 9:30 A.M., at least ninety minutes earlier than Berdan’s afternoon mission. If this scenario is accurate, then Clark reported the time inaccurately, which unfortunately for historians was not an uncommon practice.
31. CCW, 297–298; Meade, Life and Letters,2:70–71; Johnson, Campfire and Battlefield,263. Sickles’ claim to “not receive any orders” is often misinterpreted as a contention by Sickles that he never received any orders from Meade at any time during the morning. Since there is ample evidence to the contrary, this would be clear proof that much of Sickles’ Congressional testimony was an outright lie. But Sickles’ own earlier testimony clearly admitted that he received orders to relieve Geary earlier that morning, and that he “did not receive any [further] orders” when he expressed confusion over Geary’s position. Sickles may ultimately still have been lying over this latter point, but that fabrication is not nearly as conclusive as it would have been if Sickles claimed to receive no orders of any kind from Meade at any time during the morning. See Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,38–39; Downs, “His Left Was Worth a Glance,” in Gettysburg Magazine7, 39; “Gen. Sickles Speaks Out,” New York Times, August 14, 1886.
32. Meade, Life and Letters, 2:70–71; CCW, 298; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 41, 107.
33. Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3: 301; OR27/1: 232.
34. Meade, Life and Letters,2:70–71; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301; CCW, 298; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak,40–41. Hyde believed that Henry Hunt did not support Sickles’ claim that they were to examine “the best line for us to occupy.” This author disagrees with Hyde’s conclusion, since Hunt clearly wrote that Meade told Hunt, in Sickles’ presence, that he “wished me to examine a new line.”
35. Meade, Life and Letters,2:73–74; CCW, 298; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301. Note that Hunt omits references to this meeting in his Official Report.
36. Quoted in Sauers, Gettysburg: The Meade-Sickles Controversy, 157.
37. Hunt,” The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,3:301; Meade, Life and Letters,2: 74; Powell, “Advance to Disaster,” Gettysburg Magazine28, 40; Busey and Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses, 245; Adelman and Smith, Devil’s Den, 5–6.
38. Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301–302; Powell, “Advance to Disaster,” Gettysburg Magazine28, 40.
39. Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301–302.
40. Meade, Life and Letters,2:73–74; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301–302; Powell, “Advance to Disaster,” in Gettysburg Magazine28, 40.
41. Meade, Life and Letters,2: 73–74; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301–302; CCW, 298.
42. Meade, Life and Letters,2: 73–74; Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301–302.
43. Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3: 302.
44. Ibid.,3: 302–303.
45. Ibid., 3: 302–303; Meade, Life and Letters, 2:73–74.
46. Hunt, “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 303; Meade, Life and Letters, 2: 74–75.
47. Tremain, Two Days of War,44–45; Ladd, The Bachelder Papers, 1:192.
Chapter 7: No Relation to the General Line of Battle
1. OR27/2: 446; Early, “Reply To General Longstreet,” in SHSP,4: 285–286; Taylor, “Second Paper By Colonel Walter H. Taylor,” in SHSP,4: 129; Allan, “Memoranda of Conversations With Lee,” in Lee the Soldier,14; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants,3: 100–105; Pfanz, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill, 82–87.
2 . Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox,362; Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 257; John B. Hood to James Longstreet, June 28, 1875, reprinted in SHSP, 4:147–148; Samuel Johnston to Fitzhugh Lee, February 11, 1878; Johnston to Lafayette McLaws, June 27, 1892. Copies of both letters are on file at GNMP; Hyde, “Did You Get There?,” Gettysburg Magazine29, 86–88. Other reconnaissances were done that morning by Armistead Long and William N. Pendleton. All of these would contribute toward Lee’s decision to attack Meade’s left. See Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 105–107.
3. McLaws, “Gettysburg,” in SHSP, 4: 68–69; Sorrel, At the Right Hand of Longstreet,167.
4. Samuel Johnston to Fitzhugh Lee, February 11, 1878; Johnston to Lafayette McLaws, June 27, 1892, both copies on file at GNMP.
5 . Longstreet, “Lee’s Right Wing at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 340; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox,363–365; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants,3: 114–115; Sorrel, At the Right Hand of Longstreet,167; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,111–113; Hyde, “Did You get There?,” Gettysburg Magazine29, 86–91. Hyde speculated that Johnston reached Big Round Top (this author agrees that Big Round Top is a more likely scenario than Little Round Top) around 5:30 a.m., and given the time of his trip, it was actually not so mysterious that Johnston missed seeing or hearing Federal troops in that locale. Hyde also believed that Johnston could have easily slipped through Buford’s cavalry line, which might have stretched 2800–2900 exhausted men for as long as nine miles.
6. Alexander, “The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders, 3:359; Alexander, “Letter From General E. P. Alexander,” in SHSP,4: 101–102; Alexander, Military Memoirs,392; McLaws, “Gettysburg,” in SHSP,7:69; Kershaw, “Kershaw’s Brigade at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3:331; Longstreet, “Lee’s Right Wing at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3:340; Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox,366; Johnston to Lafayette McLaws, June 27, 1892, copy on file at GNMP; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants,3: 116; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,118–119. Taking a route today from the intersection of Black Horse Tavern and Fairfield Roads to Willoughby Run Road, and then following the road past Pitzer’s Schoolhouse to the Millerstown Road, and then onto Seminary Ridge covers 2.3 miles.
7. Meade, Life and Letters, 2: 73–74; Hunt,”The Second Day at Gettysburg,” in Battles and Leaders,3: 301–302; Tremain, Two Days of War,45–48; OR27/1: 482, 515–516; OR25/1: 386; Marcot, “Berdan Sharpshooters at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magaz
ine1, 39.
8. OR27/1: 482, 516–517; Murray, Letters from Gettysburg,82; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 98–99; Marcot, “Berdan Sharpshooters at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine1, 37–39.
9. Tremain, Two Days of War,49–50; OR27/3: 1086. Writing his memoirs over forty years later, Tremain claimed that he had several meetings with Meade that afternoon. In Tremain’s narrative, additional artillery support was discussed at a meeting after Berdan’s reconnaissance, and it is plausible that the above referenced order was issued at that time. However, based on the time of this message, and for reasons that will be discussed later, I question whether the later meetings actually occurred as he described. See Tremain, Two Days of War,54–61 and Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 138–139.
10. OR27/1: 482, 507, 515–517; 27/2: 613, 617; Marcot, “Berdan Sharpshooters at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine1, 37; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,98–101; Murray, Letters from Gettysburg, 82.
11. OR27/3: 487–488.
12. Ibid., 27/1: 914–915, 927–928, 939, 1032; 27/3: 1086; Meade, Life and Letters,2:71; Wittenberg, “The Truth About the Withdrawal of Brig. Gen. John Buford’s Cavalry,” Gettysburg Magazine37, 71–77; Petruzzi, “John Buford at Gettysburg,” America’s Civil War,37; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day,86, 97, 105, 131, 485 (n. 53). Buford’s division suffered approximately 176 total casualties out of 4, 073 engaged, for a less than 5% casualty rate, but that included forty-nine casualties of Wesley Merritt’s 1, 321-man brigade. The epilogue of the motion picture Gettysburghas helped popularize the notion that Buford suffered significant casualties on July 1. In the film, his “shattered” division is withdrawn to guard the supply trains.
13. OR27/1: 914–915, 927–928, 939, 1032; 27/3: 490; Meade, Life and Letters2:71; Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, 86, 97, 105, 131, 485 (n. 53).
14. OR27/3: 487–488.
15. Ibid., 27/1: 116; Hyde, The Union Generals Speak, 253–254.
16. OR27/1: 482–483, 515 – 516; Marcot, “Berdan Sharpshooters at Gettysburg,” Gettysburg Magazine1, 37.
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