9 Colonel Michael Shupp, interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Way, March 27, 2005; Sattler, Natonski, Tucker interviews, all at USMCHMD; Richard Oppel, Jr., “Early Target of Offensive Is a Hospital,” New York Times, November 8, 2004; Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?”; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 14-19; Matt Matthews, Operation Al Fajr: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), pp. 13-36; David Bellavia with John Bruning, House to House: An Epic Memoir of War (New York: Free Press, 2007), pp. 47-48; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 8-10; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 344-52; West, No True Glory, pp. 257-67. The Americans used several names for the Iraqi Army soldiers who fought with them at Fallujah: Iraqi Intervention Force, Iraqi National Guard, and Iraqi Armed Forces. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to call them the Iraqi Army.
10 Shupp interview, USMCHMD; Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell, interview with the author, January 11, 2008; Task Force 2-2 Infantry, “Operation Phantom Fury,” AAR; Unit Journal and Timeline, copies in author’s possession, courtesy of LTC Newell; Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon to Dad, November 20, 2004, www.thegreenzone.com, copy in author’s possession; Hevezi, “‘They’ve Chosen a Path of Violence,’” pp. 42-43; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 20-23; Patrick O’Donnell, We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines who took Fallujah (New York: DaCapo, 2006), pp. 62-63; Gary Livingston, Fallujah with Honor: First Battalion, Eighth Marines in Operation Phantom Fury (North Topsail Beach, NC: Caisson Press, 2006), pp. 37-38; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, p. 39; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 60-62, 73-75; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 92-94; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 250-52. Command Sergeant Major Faulkenberg was killed on the first night of the battle. He was leading a group of Iraqi soldiers into the city, under intense fire, when a bullet caught him just above the right eye. He later died at the battalion aid station.
11 Gunnery Sergeant Duanne Walters, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 6, 2005; Shupp, Tucker, Natonski interviews, all at USMCHMD; TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, journal and timeline; Newell interview; “Battle for Fallujah,” at www.talkingproud.us; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 73-77; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 352-55; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 74-96; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 39-45; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 9-10, 52-57, 91-95, 144-45; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 229-31, 251-54; Livingston, Fallujah, with Honor, pp. 44-45. For the diagnosis of acoustic trauma, I consulted my wife, Nancy, an audiology clinician with a doctorate (Aud.) in her field. The Americans took significant criticism in world media reports for using white phosphorous, as if they were employing some sort of new and heinous chemical weapon. The criticism only increased when the State Department ignorantly denied that the commanders at Fallujah were using it. Army and Marine spokesmen readily admitted its use, and they were anything but apologetic about it. For those who knew anything about modern American military history, the employment of white phosphorous was nothing new.
12 TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, journal and timeline; Newell interview; Michael Ware, “Into the Hot Zone,” Time, November 22, 2004, p. 35; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 21-22; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-11; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 31-32, 254-57; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 112-27, 144-63; Grossman, On Killing, pp. 87-93, 282-85; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 353-54; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 44-46. By 2004, most squad leaders and team leaders were equipped with portable and/or headset radios to communicate with other leaders at the platoon and company level.
13 Sattler, Natonski, Shupp, Tucker interviews, all at USMCHMD; TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, journal and timeline; Newell interview; Toby Harnden, “70 Insurgents Killed in Mosque Battle,” London Daily Telegraph, November 11, 2004; Toby Harnden, “A Cat Ate the Face of a Corpse,” Spectator, November 20, 2004; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 56-61, 227-28, 302-04; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 32-34, 155-57, 257-60; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 191-201; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 45-47. The senior commanders, Marine and Army, all seemed to appreciate the respective strengths and weaknesses of their units. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Newell fully understood that his mechanized formations would penetrate Fallujah faster than the Marine light infantry and he planned for that. General Sattler understood the very same thing—he had requested the two Army mech battalions because of their capabilities, albeit with the expectation that his Marines would end up clearing most of Fallujah’s buildings. The negative perceptions about Marine and Army capabilities came mainly from junior officers and NCOs who were not as well versed in the big picture.
14 Ware, “Into the Hot Zone,” pp. 32-36; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-12, 256-59; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 259-69; Grossman, On Killing, pp. 114-37; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 201-72. Lawson’s quotes are from a CNN interview. Multiple firsthand accounts from Bellavia about this harrowing experience are posted on www.youtube.com. According to Bellavia, the men in the hell house were Palestinians who were affiliated with Hezbollah. He and the other grunts found drug paraphernalia that indicated the insurgents had shot themselves up with atoprine and epinephrine, drugs that produced a stimulant effect roughly similar to PCP (angel dust). This was common in Fallujah and it made the mujahideen especially hard to kill. Bellavia earned a Silver Star and Bronze Star for his actions in Iraq. He also was nominated for the Medal of Honor. The status of his case is pending. He left the Army in 2005.
15 TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, timeline and journal; Ilana Ozernoy, “Taking It to the Mean Streets, Fallujah, Iraq,” U.S. News & World Report, November 22, 2004; Ilana Ozernoy and Julian Barnes, “Taking Fallujah: U.S. Forces Strike Iraq’s Hard-core I nsurgents,” U.S. News & World Report, November 22, 2004; Janet Reitman, “Surviving Fallujah,” Rolling Stone, March 10, 2005; Lieutenant Colonel Scott Rutter, USA (Ret.), interview with the author, February 10, 2008; Newell interview; Camarda’s recollections are posted at www.fallenheroes.com; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 354-57; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 47-57; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-13, 148-53, 244-49; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 116-21; 202-04; 294-300, 306-12. Rutter commanded an infantry company in the Gulf War and an infantry battalion in 2003, during the initial invasion of Iraq. He subsequently retired and covered Fallujah for FoxNews. In that capacity, he was in the middle of the insurgent ambush that claimed Iwan’s life, and he was kind enough to confirm for me many of the details related by other eyewitnesses. Another battalion surgeon, Commander Richard Jadick of 1/8 Marines, also located his aid station close to the fighting in hopes of providing rapid treatment to save as many lives as possible. See his book On Call in Hell: A Doctor’s Iraq War Story (New York: NAL/Caliber, 2007), for many powerful details about his experiences in Fallujah.
16 First Lieutenant Tim Strabbing, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Corporal Matthew Spencer, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 7, 2005; Corporal Frances Wolf, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Shupp, Buhl interviews, all at USMCHMD; Major Joe Winslow, interview with the author, August 4, 2008; Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon to father, November 20, 2004, copy in author’s possession; Colonel Gary Anderson, “Fallujah and the Future of Urban Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 2004, p. 57; Bing West and Owen West, “Victory in Fallujah,” Popular Mechanics, August 2005; Catagnus et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” pp. 80-87; Brad Kasal and Nathaniel Helms, My Men Are My Heroes: The Brad Kasal Story (Des Moines, IA: Meredith Books, 2007), pp. 166-67; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-13, 52-56; West, No True Glory, pp. 268-73; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 79-81, 89-95, 107. The reporter was Kevin Sites, an experienced war correspondent affiliated with NBC News. The shooter was a scout sniper attached to Lieutenant Strabbing’
s platoon. The description of Marine grunts comes from my own observations.
17 First Lieutenant John Jacobs, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 7, 2005; Sergeant Joseph Nazario, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Lance Corporal Justin Boswood, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Tim Crowley, October 21, 2005; Wolf interview, all at USMCHMD; Staff Sergeant Nathaniel Garcia, “Battalion Tells Squad Leader ‘You’ve Done Enough,’ ” Leatherneck, February 2005, pp. 25-26; Jed Babbin, “Forty Minutes in Fallujah,” American Spectator , May 2005, pp. 18-22; Catagnus et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” pp. 82-87; Patrick O’Donnell, multiple conversations with the author, circa 2008-2009; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 82-90, 165-81, 221-23; Kasal and Helms, My Men Are My Heroes, pp. 200-280; West, No True Glory, pp. 293-303.
18 Staff Sergeant Shawn Ryan, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Lieutenant Trustin Connor, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Captain Vaughn, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 7, 2005; Buhl, Strabbing, Shupp, Walters, Boswood interviews, all at USMCHMD; Winslow interview; Bellon letter; “Tanks and Doughboys,” Infantry Journal, July 1945, pp. 8-10; First Lieutenant Carin Calvin, “The Assaultman in the Urban Environment,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, pp. 30-31; West and West, “Victory in Fallujah”; Catagnus et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” pp. 87-89; Kasal, My Men Are My Heroes, pp. 169-80; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 69-70, 107.
19 First Sergeant Miller, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Corporal Ricardo Orozco, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Natonski, Shupp, Buhl, Boswood interviews, all at USMCHMD; Winslow interview; Lieutenant General John Sattler, interview with Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “Second Battle of Fallujah: Urban Operations in a New Kind of War,” Field Artillery Journal, March-April 2006, pp. 4-7; Tim Dyhouse, “Fallujah: Battle for the ‘City of Mosques,’” VFW, February 2005, pp. 12-14; Ilana Ozernoy, Amer Saleh, and Julian Barnes, “Destroying It to Save It? With the Insurgents Routed, the Next Task Is to Rebuild Fallujah,” U.S. News & World Report, November 29, 2004; Rod Nordland and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Rules of Engagement,” Newsweek, November 29, 2004; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 22-24; Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?”; Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 55-60; West, No True Glory, pp. 315-24; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 12-16; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 356-58; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 75-79; Bellavia, House to House, p. 273; Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 398-405.
Chapter 10
1 James Cross, “What Is the Army’s Job?” Military Review, June 1956 (although Cross wrote in the 1950s, his words apply very well to the early twenty-first century); David Bolgiano, “Deadly Double Standards,” Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2007; Peter Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 345-46; Tom Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 144; Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 387-88. The Washington Post estimated that IEDs caused 61 percent of American deaths. A French study estimated that they caused 41 percent. As a rough estimate, I have chosen to split the difference.
2 “AIF Cells Operating in Tikrit” (the Americans called the insurgents Anti Iraqi Forces, or AIF); “Enemy Threat”; “Tikrit Tribal Breakdown”; “2-7 Infantry, Dispersion of Forces”; Lieutenant Colonel Todd Wood, personal biography, multiple conversations circa 2004-2006; A/2-7 Infantry Summary of Operations During OIF III; B/2-7 Infantry, After Action Report (AAR), these and all subsequent documents in author’s possession, courtesy of 2-7 Infantry; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s Group Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 22, 2006; Ricks, Fiasco, p. 233. The information on the 7th Infantry Regiment’s lineage comes from my own personal knowledge as the official regimental historian. For more on the unit’s compelling battle history, see my two books on the topic: The 7th Infantry Regiment: Combat in an Age of Terror, the Korean War Through the Present (New York: Forge, 2008), and American Courage, American Carnage: The 7th Infantry Chronicles, the 7th Infantry Regiment’s Combat Experience, 1812 Through World War II (New York: Forge, 2009). During the Iraq War, every company had a nickname, such as “Rage” or “Bushmasters.” To avoid confusion, I have chosen to refer to all of the companies in this chapter by their designated names, rather than their nicknames.
3 D/2-7 Infantry, AAR; E/2-7 Infantry, AAR; F/2-7 Infantry, AAR; B/2-7 Infantry, AAR; A/2-7 Infantry, Summary of Operations; First Lieutenant Jon Godwin to family and friends, July 25, 2005, copy of this and all subsequent letters in author’s possession, courtesy of Lieutenant Godwin; 2-7 Infantry, Enlisted Group Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 23, 2006; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; The Cottonbaler: 7th Infantry Regiment Association, Spring 2005, p. 7; Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” copy of this paper in author’s possession.
4 A/2-7 Infantry, AAR; D/2-7 Infantry, AAR; E/2-7 Infantry, AAR and Memorandum for Easy Co 2-7 IN transition into 2-7 IN and missions in Iraq, May 19, 2006; “2-7 Infantry, Company Mission Set,” “Daily Operations,” and “Troop to Task Schedule”; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; conversation with Specialist Dan Driss, May 2006.
5 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; “7th Infantry Regiment: Fallen Soldiers, 2005”; Captain Diogo Tavares, casualty notifications, 2005; PFC Travis Anderson, Sergeant Kurtis Arcala, Lieutenant David Giaimo, Sergeant Carl Morgain, Private Wesley Riggs, biographies; Godwin to family and friends, September 26, 2005. Tavares was 2-7’s rear detachment commander back at Fort Stewart, Georgia. One of his responsibilities was to notify families and the public of battalion casualties.
6 “Tikrit Tribal Breakdown”; A/2-7 Infantry, AAR; B/2-7 Infantry, AAR; Lieutenant Colonel Todd Wood, update, April 2, 2005; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; Anna Badkhen, “Colonel’s Toughest Duty,” San Francisco Chronicle , October 14, 2005; “Unity Pulls Battalion Through Anxiety, Loss,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 31, 2005; Godwin to family and friends, April 11, 2005.
7 “IA Takes Over”; “IA Conducts Counterinsurgency Ops”; “Iraqi Police Partnership”; “2-7 AO Attacks, Pattern Analysis”; “2-7 AO MSR Attacks”; “Operation Able Delaware (Elections)”; A/2-7 Infantry, AAR, Summary of Operations; B/2-7 Infantry, AAR; C/2-7 Infantry, AAR; D/2-7 Infantry, AAR; E/2-7 Infantry, AAR; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; Godwin to family and friends, April 18, May 8 and 16, 2005; Lieutenant Colonel Todd Wood, comments, The Cottonbaler , Spring 2006, p. 6, Wood conversations. In my group interviews, the enlisted soldiers were significantly more skeptical and cynical than the Cottonbaler officers about the quality of Iraqi Army soldiers and policemen. Thus, in my assessment, I tried to strike a balance between the differing shades of opinion.
8 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Major Ike Sallee; 3-7 Infantry, Officer’s Group Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 22, 2006; 3-7 Infantry, Enlisted Group 1 Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 23, 2006; Lieutenant Reeon Brown and Sergeant First Class Joe Benavides, letter to the author, March 4, 2005; First Sergeant Michael Shirley, e-mail to Father Phil Salois, March 11, 2005, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Fr. Salois; Captain Ike Sallee to Roland and Team Alpha, March 26, 2005, copy in author’s possession as a member of Team Alpha; Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles”; Captain Irvin Oliver, Jr., “Death Before Dismount: A Relic,” Armor, July- August 2006, pp. 11-14.
9 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History; 3-7 Infantry, Enlisted Group 2 Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 24, 2006; Officer’s i
nterview; Enlisted, Group 1 interview; Staff Sergeant Jason Vandegrift, e-mail to author, May 4, 2005; Captain Ike Sallee to Attack Families, June 2, 2005, copy in author’s possession; Sallee to Roland and Team Alpha; Richard Chin, “Army Captain Knows Firepower Alone Won’t Win War,” Knight-Ridder Newspapers, August 20, 2005. Alpha Company’s nickname was “Attack.” As with 2-7 Infantry, the enlisted soldiers of 3-7 were more skeptical than the officers about the usefulness and dedication of the ISF men. Everyone respected the MOI commandos, though.
10 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History; Officer’s interview; Enlisted, Group 2 interview; Lieutenant Colonel Funk, update, circa June 2005; Funk, memorial services speeches; Captain Eric Hooper, casualty notifications, 2005; “7th Infantry Regiment Fallen Soldiers, 2005”; Vandegrift e-mail; Sallee to Attack Families; T. J. Pignataro, “Two Soldiers from Area Are Killed,” Buffalo News, April 22, 2005; First Lieutenant Ken Segelhorst, “Small-Unit Kill Teams and IED Interdiction,” Armor, January- February 2008, pp. 26-33. Hooper was the rear detachment commander for 3-7 during the deployment.
11 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History; Officer’s interview; Enlisted Group 1 interview; Enlisted Group 2 interview; Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles”; Colonel Ed Cardon and Command Sergeant Major Louis Torres, 4th Brigade update, October 17, 2005; Lieutenant Colonel Funk, update, November 8, 2005; Nancy Youssef, “Fatal Shooting of Teacher Illustrates Why Iraqis Fear U.S. Convoys,” Knight-Ridder, June 16, 2005; “Fatal Error Deepens Mistrust of U.S.,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 6, 2005; Captain David Connolly, “Media on the Battlefield: ‘A Nonlethal Fire,’” Infantry, May-June 2004, pp. 31-37. The Youssef story included a heartbreaking portrait photo of the slain teacher and her widowed husband.
Grunts: Inside the American Infantry Combat Experience, World War II Through Iraq Page 64