by Mark Zuehlke
In Lower Canada, the once great Iroquois presence had largely been expunged by wars and disease. Just three villages remained. Two of these were dependent on “Presents and Supplies from the Government Stores at Montreal.” Gore believed the warriors there, about half the total available, would stand by the Crown. The Iroquois at St. Regis were more dubious, as that village was “placed immediately on the frontier line, which divides Lower Canada, from the United States of America, and receiving from the American Government, an Annual Pension for Lands conceded, which they probably would not wish to forfeit. Some of them are known to be disaffected; we might however rely on half of them. These three Villages can muster 500 Warriors brave and active. They are all Christians, and have a Church in each of their Villages.” Although several other tribes were scattered in small numbers elsewhere in Lower Canada, Gore discounted them as being Christians who had lost their warlike ways.
Things looked much better in Upper Canada. Clustered near York and Niagara were mostly Mohawk and Mississauga that he considered “at the Governor’s devotion.” They had also fought well and hard against the Americans in the Revolutionary War and could provide about 350 warriors for this fight. On the frontier dwelt a great confederacy of peoples including Miami, Wyandot, Shawnee, Potomac, and Delaware that drew “their Annual Presents at the Garrison of Amherstburg despite living on the American side of the border. They have no attachment to the Americans.” This, Gore said, was because of Indiana governor William Harrison’s attack on Tippecanoe. He estimated that the confederacy painstakingly built by Tecumseh could deliver about 3,000 warriors. Added to this were 700 Ottawa warriors—”a very warlike tribe”—living near Lake Huron and Lake Michigan and the Fox and Sac peoples living between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River. The Fox and Sac could raise about 500 warriors. These three tribes all drew supplies and presents from the British at Fort St. Joseph and were judged loyal.
Gore estimated all the warriors in Lower Canada, Upper Canada, and out on the frontier at about 5,300. He also thought it possible to lure the Sioux, who controlled the lands lying between the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, into joining the British in a war against the United States. Their lands, after all, would be next up for occupation by the American pioneers once the Ohio was overrun. The Sioux were “well trained under their War Chiefs,” and could easily provide 3,000 warriors—a potent force indeed.15 Whether they would march so far to make war, however, was uncertain.
While Gore had found comfort in the idea of anywhere up to 8,300 warriors rallying to fight the Americans, Prevost showed no inclination to include them in his plans. The governor intended no offensive operations against the Americans and saw no defensive role for these warriors. Prevost fervently desired to avoid a fight altogether. Having assumed responsibility for governing all British colonies and territories on the western side of the Atlantic on September 13, 1811, Prevost brought to the job a distinguished military record and a reputation as an able administrator. But he was one for conciliation wherever possible and could countenance nothing as rash as America invading Canada for such trivial reasons as Madison had cited in his war declaration. War promised calamity and cost for both belligerents and was to be averted until diplomatic negotiations resolved the current dispute.
Prevost’s parents were Swiss Protestants who came by their British citizenship because of his father’s service as one of the many Swiss officers enlisted for service in the Royal American Regiment of Foot. Born in New Jersey on May 19, 1767, Prevost was raised in a household where French was spoken more than English. Educated at schools in England and on the continent, the already worldly young man took a commission in 1783. War with France brought rapid advancement. Twice wounded in the campaign to repel French invaders from the West Indies island of St. Vincent, then Lieutenant Colonel Prevost was promoted to a colonelcy and granted a wartime appointment to brigadier general. Facility in French contributed to Prevost’s assignment as governor of St. Lucia after its conquest. Adopting a conciliatory manner, Prevost proved a popular governor who ran the island ably until its return to the French with the 1802 Treaty of Amiens. With war’s renewal in 1805, Prevost successfully defended Dominica from French invasion and was promoted to major general and granted a baronetcy. The Chesapeake affair brought his transfer to Nova Scotia in the spring of 1808 to assume command of the troops there and also to take over as the lieutenant governor. From there it was a natural step up the career ladder to his new responsibilities in 1811.16
When war with America threatened the following spring, Prevost thoroughly evaluated his military capability in Canada and was dismayed by what he saw. In a report to newly appointed Secretary of War and the Colonies Henry Bathurst, Prevost struck a sober tone beneath which a note of panic lurked. “If the Americans are determined to attack Canada it would be in vain the General should flatter himself with the hopes of making an effectual defence of the open Country, unless powerfully assisted from Home.” Virtually all the settlements and forts in Upper Canada were imperilled. If the Americans seized Kingston—an event Prevost feared likely—the province would be cut off from Lower Canada and the British would lose contact with their naval forces on the lakes. Things were not much better in Lower Canada. The vital fur-trade centre of Montreal could be defended only by maintaining “an impenetrable line on the South Shore, extending from La Prairie to Chambly, with a sufficient Flotilla to command” the St. Lawrence and Richelieu rivers. His hope for defending Lower Canada was to bleed the Americans slowly to a standstill by forcing them to overcome one fortified position after another when they attempted to break through to Quebec.
Prevost speculated that his army might repel the Americans if they launched an invasion “undertaken presumptuously and without sufficient means.” But even then he was unwilling to risk depleting the 2,500-strong garrison with which he intended to hold Quebec. Ensuring possession of this rundown bastion with almost half of his entire regular army strength was paramount, Prevost argued, for Quebec was “the only Post that can be considered tenable at the moment, the preservation of it being of the utmost consequence to the Canadas, as the door of entry for that Force The King’s Government might find it expedient to send for the recovery of both, or either of these provinces.” Prevost envisioned the Quebec garrison besieged by the Americans until reinforcements from Britain could arrive to save the day and retake the rest of Canada.17
Prevost thought the best hope for defending Canada lay in doing nothing to start a fight with the Americans. This led him to worry mightily about his subordinate commanding Upper Canada. Maj. Gen. Isaac Brock had a reputation for tempestuous, even reckless behaviour. “Nothing should be impossible to a soldier; the word impossible should not be found in a soldier’s dictionary,” he once declared.18 As a young officer in Barbados, he had ridden up the steep eastern flank of Mount Hillaby to its 1,115-foot summit, a feat considered impossible by the other horsemen in the garrison.19
Born in St. Peter Port, Guernsey, on October 6, 1769, Brock shared his birth year with Arthur Wellesley and Napoleon Bonaparte. Whereas Wellesley—Viscount Wellington—had gained glory and advancement on the battlefields of India and of late against the French as commander of British forces in Iberia, Brock’s military career had languished in Canada. Entering the service as an ensign in 1785, he managed to purchase a lieutenant colonelcy in 1797. The following year, commanding the 49th Regiment of Foot, Brock was slightly wounded during the battle of Egmont-op-Zee in Holland by a bullet that failed to penetrate a thick black silk cravat and cotton handkerchief he had wrapped around his neck before going into battle. He gained more honour in 1801 when the regiment participated in Lord Nelson’s assault on Copenhagen. But in the spring of 1802, the 49th was ordered to Canada, and there, except for a short leave to Britain in 1805, Brock had been ever since, chafing for a posting where battle and the possibility of winning fame and promotion could be had. “I must see service,” he wrote his brothers, “or I may as well, and indeed much bette
r, quit the army at once, for no one advantage can I reasonably look to hereafter if I remain buried in this inactive, remote corner, without the slightest mention being made of me.”20
Although he liked and respected Brock, Prevost knew restraining a man desperately seeking battle honours was going to be extremely difficult. Particularly at such a distance, for Brock was headquartered at Fort George, which lay a good week away by horse-mounted courier and over a month by regular post. He therefore issued strict instructions in early 1812 designed to deny Brock the ability to act independently. The best way to rein Brock in, Prevost decided, was to leave him woefully short of manpower. To the 1,200 men stationed in Upper Canada, therefore, he added only another 500, and with them came orders that nothing the Americans did was to “justify offensive operations being undertaken, unless they were solely calculated to strengthen a defensive attitude.” He cautioned against “committing any act which may even by construction tend to unite the Eastern and Southern states.”21
Drawing on intelligence reports from Augustus Foster in Washington, Prevost believed that America was anything but united in seeking war with Britain. He therefore thought it “prudent and politic to avoid any measure which can in its effect have a tendency to unite the people in the American States …. Whilst disunion prevails among them, their attempts on these provinces will be feeble.”22
On June 24, Prevost learned from two Montreal fur traders that the American president had declared war. The following day, Brock received like news at Fort George from an American source. His first thought was to immediately attack Fort Niagara and other American forts near the border. But he was too faithful and responsible a soldier to flagrantly disobey Prevost’s orders. On July 3, Brock sent a note to his superior confessing his natural offensive inclinations but adding that, upon reflection, “I relinquished my original intention, and attended only to defensive measures.”23 This consisted of ordering a hastening of efforts by Lt. Col. Thomas Blight St. George to improve the defensive works at Fort Malden, next to Amherstburg, which he believed would most likely face attack when Hull’s column crossed into Canada. Tecumseh, whom Brock had yet to meet, was already at the fort and had brought with him some 300 warriors. St. George had an equal number of regulars, and some 850 militiamen had responded to a call-up.24“Every exertion is made by us all,” St. George reported on July 8, and as a consequence the fort was ready as could be to withstand the expected American onslaught.25
South of the border, the Americans muddled forward. Although back in April Madison had urged that Brigadier General Hull make haste to Detroit and ready his army for an immediate crossing of the narrow neck of the Detroit River into Upper Canada at war’s outbreak, the reluctant Hull had dallied for weeks in Ohio. Only on June 15 did he finally muster out from Urbana, about 185 miles south of Fort Detroit, at the head of a powerful army numbering 2,000 men. The march soon resembled more a retreat as the soldiers and their long pack train and cattle herd wallowed through unceasing rain that clogged the rough tracks with thick mud. On June 26, just short of the aptly named fifty-mile-wide morass of Black Swamp, Hull received a message from Secretary of War Eustis that urged him to greater speed but failed to mention that America was now at war. Five days later his bedraggled troops straggled out of the worst of the swamp and regrouped on the banks of the Maumee River near where Maj. Gen. “Mad Anthony” Wayne had defeated the Shawnee at Fallen Timbers in 1794. A little farther on, at Frenchtown on the River Raisin, Hull chanced upon the captain of the American schooner Cuyahoga and arranged to load his sick, his exhausted young bandsmen, and all the baggage of his officers and his own personal papers aboard the vessel to be carried up Lake Erie to Fort Detroit. With his column lightened of this extra weight and the prospect of easier going ahead, Hull expected to complete the journey quickly. He was spurred to increase the pace when a follow-up letter from Eustis arrived on July 2 informing him that the nation was at war.26
Unfortunately for the ill-starred brigadier general, this was the same day that Cuyahoga was overtaken by Provincial Marine Lt. Charles Frédéric Rolette aboard a longboat being rowed by “a dozen sailors armed with sabers and pickaxes.” The schooner captain surrendered without a fight and Rolette “ran up the British flag,” ordered the bandsmen to play “God Save the King,” and then directed the ship into captivity at Fort Malden. St. George was soon happily sorting through Hull’s papers, which contained his entire invasion plan and details on the strength and composition of his army.27
Three days later Hull’s column trailed into Fort Detroit and he learned of Cuyahoga’s capture. Realizing the disaster that capture of his personal papers entailed, Hull attempted to salvage the situation by sending an envoy under flag of truce to Fort Malden with a politely worded note asking St. George as a matter of gentlemanly honour to return all officer baggage and papers. The implication was that a gentleman would not stoop to reading another’s private documents. Responding with equal politeness, St. George advised that he could not comply without authorization from higher command.
Not that the capture of his plans provided the British anything they had not already surmised. Hull’s strategic options were restricted. On July 12, he duly conformed to them by crossing the Detroit River and occupying Sandwich, a pleasant French-Canadian village of houses each surrounded by a small orchard. First ashore was Col. Lewis Cass, commander of one of Hull’s three Ohio militia regiments, who unfurled the Stars and Stripes from around his waist and ran it up the tallest available pole.28 The landing was unopposed, Brock wisely deciding it was impossible to defend the village with Fort Detroit’s guns looming just across the river.
Having attained a toehold in Upper Canada, Hull selected Sandwich’s finest Georgian-style red-brick home for his headquarters and ordered no advance beyond its outskirts. Although Hull had embarked upon the crossing, he was still badly shaken by the difficulties encountered during the march to Detroit and events that had unfolded in the days after the column arrived there.
First there had been his failure at a conference convened at Brownstown, near the mouth of the Detroit River, to persuade the tribes in the area to come over to the American side or at least adopt a stance of neutrality. Tecumseh was noteworthy by his absence, but word of the fiery denunciation he gave to the deputation of warriors who had asked him to attend overshadowed Hull’s efforts at conciliation. “Here is a chance presented to us—yes, a chance such as will never occur again—for us Indians of North America to form ourselves into one great combination and cast our lot with the British in this war …. I have taken sides with the King, my father, and I will suffer my bones to bleach upon this shore before I will recross that stream to join in any council of neutrality.”29 Some of the chiefs and their warriors opted to straddle the fence, committing neither to neutrality nor to one of the belligerent sides. But others filtered away, obviously heading for the British lines. None threw in his lot with Hull.
While occupying Sandwich, Hull kept a wary eye open over his shoulder in fearful expectation of an Indian attack on Fort Detroit or his more than 200-mile-long supply line. The crossing was stalled, however, for nearly two days, during which Hull was forced to badger, hector, and plead with many of the Ohio militiamen who invoked their right to not serve outside the United States. Cass and the other militia commanders finally managed to bully sufficient troops into submission to enable the attack to proceed, but Hull could no longer depend on their cooperation. Before launching his boats to cross the border, Hull registered his anxiety in a note to Eustis: “The British command the water and the savages. I do not think the force here equal to the reduction of Amherstburg. You therefore must not be too sanguine.”30
Yet he still firmly believed that most Canadians would welcome the American invaders with open arms. Discovering that the Roman Catholic priest at Detroit had an antiquated printing press, Hull drafted a bombastic proclamation that was then crudely printed and distributed as far afield as possible. “INHABITANTS OF CANADA!” it beg
an, then plunged into a long diatribe regarding the “Tyranny” under which Canadians had suffered so long as British subjects and offered American protection. “The United States are sufficiently powerful to afford you every security consistent with their rights and your expectations. I tender you the invaluable blessings of Civil, Political, & Religious Liberty.” Hull urged everyone to remain at home and not to rise up in resistance. The “arrival of an army of Friends must be hailed by you with a cordial welcome. You will be emancipated from Tyranny and oppression and restored to the dignified status of freemen.” Anyone who opposed the Americans, he warned, would “be considered and treated as enemies and the horrors, and calamities of war will Stalk before you.” And, should the “barbarous and Savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages are let loose to murder our Citizens and butcher our women and children, this war, will be a war of extermination. Scalping Knife will be the Signal for one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by the Side of an Indian will be taken prisoner. Instant destruction will be his Lot.” He then called for volunteers to join his army. The Canadians must choose, he said in closing, “but choose wisely; and may he who knows the justice of our cause, and who holds in his hand the fate of Nations, guide you to a result the most compatible, with your rights and interests, your peace and prosperity.”31
Hull hoped to force the British to either neutralize the Indians or to frighten the militia into refusing to take up arms to avoid being summarily executed if captured fighting alongside them. At first it worked, and Brock reported to Prevost with dismay that “the disaffected [militiamen] became more audacious, and the wavering more intimidated.” Over a three-day period, half his recruits melted away. But the rest remained, and many expressed outrage at Hull’s threat to show them no quarter if it came to a fight. Because one thing was clear: whether the British or Canadian militiamen liked it or not, Tecumseh’s warriors were committed to the fight. So, too, were Brock’s redcoats, few as they might be. In the end, the proclamation rankled as many Canadian settlers as it cowed.