Nor do the citizens of Londonderry seem to have responded as well as Lundy had hoped to his earlier call to store provisions in anticipation of action against the city. When he sent for the storekeepers to make an inventory of what was in the stores and the quality thereof, he found that the two principal storemen had gone, taking their ledgers with them. So Lundy went to the stores, accompanied by Captain James Hamilton, who had arrived on the Deliverance, to see what was there and was surprised to find nothing approaching the quantity of meal that he had expected. This prompted him to requisition all the provisions in private homes, a move that can have done very little for his popularity among the townspeople. Another proclamation was made, offering ready money for all the hay that might be brought in from the country, since there was little left in the town.
Lundy now issued an order that was to make him equally unpopular in the countryside around the city. He told the commanding officers of four horse or dragoon regiments – Lord Blaney, William Stewart, James Hamilton and Sir Arthur Rawdon – to disperse their men into the countryside and bring to the city’s stores ‘all the meal and oats hay’ that they could find, leaving only sufficient for the use of families. Parties of dragoons and infantry were also sent out from the city on the same task. Since these units could have covered a large area, it seems that many people in outlying areas, certainly as far as Raphoe and Letterkenny, would have had their stocks requisitioned. This order incensed many in the rural areas against Lundy; they claimed that he ‘was worse than the enemy could be’ and reacted by burying grain to preserve it from the governor’s foraging parties. Obviously the landowners and their tenants had a good system of communication that allowed some at least to save much of their crop from the soldiers.
John Mackenzie commented on the availability of food at this time. He notes the goodly supply of food available on 9 April and the prices thereof:
It was providentially arranged that at this time food was exceedingly cheap and plentiful in the North of Ireland. Thus it happened that Derry was supplied with stores, which sustained the inhabitants during the siege. The following account of the prices of various articles about the time when the Irish army sat down before the city is worthy of record. ‘A salmon, about two feet long, may be bought for a penny or twopence. Forty-five eggs for one penny. A fat goose for threepence. A fat turkey for sixpence. A fat hen for threehalfpence. A fat lamb or kid for a groat.13
There was still work to be done in the city, and the early days of April were spent levelling the suburbs and completing the ravelin as well as in bringing in provisions from the surrounding area. Every effort was being made to put the city in the best condition for defence and Lundy wrote a third letter to Shrewsbury. Once more he emphasized the needs of the city, urging that these requirements be sent speedily but especially general officers, provisions, money and tools for working on the defences. Added to the city’s artillery was a great gun from Culmore Fort, while sixty barrels of salmon were brought from Lord Massereene’s fish houses.4
Lundy’s efforts in bolstering the city’s defences had earned him praise. We have already noted what George Walker wrote of him in March, but another, anonymous, witness has left a further glowing testimonial to the man who was to become one of the most despised figures of Irish history. On 10 April, the day before the coronation of William and Mary, an unnamed Ulsterman gave evidence before a committee of the House of Lords about the situation in his native province. He told the committee that
The number of Protestants in the North of Ireland were [estimated at] not much less than 100,000 men, some whereof have left the kingdom, others have taken protections; but generally ill-armed, want arms and ammunition and have no moneys [and] . . . are thronged into a small corner of the country near Londonderry where (without the walls) there is little safety and, within, the room for about 3,000 men at most (when I came away)...
[Colonel Lundy is] very much esteemed not only for his forwardness in their Majesties’ service but for his military knowledge and courage and his extraordinary care and vigilance.5
The witness’s comment that there was ‘room for about 3,000 men at most’ within the walls raises an interesting question: how many people were inside the walls during the siege? This estimate of there being room for no more than 3,000 is obviously far from accurate – there were over 7,000 in the garrison alone – but can Walker’s overall figure of 30,000, including the soldiers of the garrison, be taken as any more accurate? The witness in the House of Lords might have intended his estimate to relate to people in addition to the normal population of the city, but even this leaves a great disparity between the two sets of figures. There is no doubt that the city was vastly overcrowded during the siege but it is all but impossible to imagine 30,000 within the walls, an area of no more than 500 yards by 300 yards. Without taking into consideration the space occupied by buildings, that would have allowed only five square yards per person. When one studies photographs of the crowds that gathered in front of the modern Guildhall on 30 November 1995 for the visit of the US President Clinton, even more doubt is cast on Walker’s figure. (On that occasion the crowd was estimated at more than 20,000.) Walker goes on to say that 10,000 people deserted the city to take advantage of ‘a declaration of the enemy to receive and protect all that would desert us, and return to their dwellings’, while many more left later.6 Even if such a reduction had occurred, the city would still have had an incredible overcrowding problem.
On that same day, 10 April, a council of war was held in the city at which a defence strategy was drawn up. The senior officer present was Robert Lundy. At the meeting it was agreed that the council’s decisions should be posted at the town house for all to see and should also be read out to the soldiers of the battalions in the city. Clearly stated were the duties of the officers of the garrison, while it was noted that a ‘thousand men shall be chosen to be part of this garrison, and joined with the soldiers already herein, to defend the city’. Further defensive works were to be undertaken which included the demolition of all houses and ditches outside the walls; this was in addition to the levelling of buildings close to the walls which had already taken place. That discipline was to be enforced was made clear by the order to erect ‘a pair of gallows . . . in one of the bastions upon the south-west of the City, whereupon all mutinous or treacherous persons of this garrison shall be executed, who shall be condemned thereunto by a court martial’. In contrast, generous provisions were made for feeding the garrison with
every soldier of the garrison, and non-commissioned officer, . . . weekly allowed out of the magazines eight quarts of meal, four pounds of fish, and three pounds of flesh for his weekly subsistence.
. . . every soldier and non-commissioned officer . . . allowed a quart of small beer per day, as soon as the same can be provided, until some money shall come to allow them pay.2 7
It was on that day, also, that David Cairnes returned from London, bringing with him a letter containing instructions for Governor Lundy.8
Meanwhile Lundy was deploying some of his new troops on tasks that were part of the city’s preparations. Some of the cavalry from Coleraine and elsewhere in the county had arrived at the Waterside on the 9th; Lundy ordered these men to Strabane in County Tyrone, the neighbouring town of Lifford in County Donegal, and Letterkenny, also in County Donegal. These horse soldiers subsequently returned to the city with stores of meal and other provisions from the foraging expeditions earlier ordered by Lundy. On the 13th, and shortly before some Jacobite troops, described as ‘a considerable body of King James’s troops’, arrived at the Waterside, Lundy ordered the destruction of houses there; these were to be set alight. The Jacobites who appeared at the Waterside that day were the first soldiers of James’ army, other than Antrim’s Regiment in December, to approach the city. Lundy comments that there were three squadrons of horse and that he supposed that he had a gun fired at them which caused them to retreat. Although some of the Jacobites, presumably those Lundy ordered to b
e fired at, found boats, they made no attempt to cross the river and withdrew that evening to Ballyowen on the road to Newtownlimavady. There they set up camp for the night. In contrast to this account, the House of Commons committee was told by Daniel Sherrard, on 12 August, that, when the enemy first appeared at the city on 13 April, the gunner, Mr Watson, had no ammunition.9 Sherrard commented that it had been the gunner himself who had given him this information, which seems not only to contradict Lundy’s evidence but much of what we know about the state of preparedness of the city. None of the local accounts mentions the shot or shots that Lundy ordered to be fired, although Ash recounts that the Jacobites fired on the city.10 However, in the light of subsequent events it seems implausible that the city’s artillery could have been without ammunition at this time. There are two possible explanations for Sherrard’s comment. The first is that he was indirectly accusing Lundy of incompetence, or worse, while the second is that the guns facing the river might have had ammunition of the wrong calibre. Of the two suggestions the former is the more likely; Daniel Sherrard was one of the apprentices who shut the gates in December 1688 and he was later commissioned as ensign in Captain Jemmet’s company, one of those formed by David Cairnes.
Those behind the city walls realized that their situation was at its most serious. A further council of war was called which appointed Lundy to the post of commander in the field.11 This appointment was made in spite of the fact that some in the city were now opposing him. Later it would be argued that some were already beginning to doubt his loyalty to the Williamite cause. One writer noted that:
Lundy . . . was at this time encouraging the principal officers to leave, telling them that the city was untenable and the belief became current that he had designs to give it up. It was because of this that many people, discerning his treacherous intentions, were unwilling to remain and be betrayed into the hands of the enemy.12
Such retrospective wisdom must be treated with scepticism and it is more likely that Lundy continued to enjoy the confidence of most of the townspeople and of his colleagues, although the confiscation of supplies would not have helped his popularity. It was this council of war also that made the decision that the local forces should take the field against the Jacobites before the latter could close on the city. In fact, this decision was made on Lundy’s advice. Speaking to all the officers he told them that they were ‘all drive[n] in to a little place’ where, due to the great numbers present, they must perish by starvation but there was still the opportunity to drive off the Irish army. This could be done at the pass of the Finn water, ‘which had always been fatal to the Irish’ and since this was the last chance to beat the Irish ‘we ought to venture all rather than suffer them to pass’. Lundy said that he would accompany the army as it tried its fortune in a battle, and this was approved by all. It was resolved that:
on Monday next, by 10 o’clock, all officers and soldiers, horse and foot, and all other armed men whatsoever, of our forces and friends enlisted or not enlisted, that can or will fight for their country and religion, against a common enemy, shall appear on the fittest ground, near Claudy ford, Lifford and Long-Causeway, as shall be nearest to their several and respective quarters; there to draw up, in battalions, to be ready to fight the enemy, and to preserve our lives and all that is dear to us, from the enemy.13
Each officer and soldier was to bring with him a week’s provisions and ‘as much as they can’ for the horses, indicating that a quick battle was not expected. The other armed men, described as ‘enlisted or not enlisted’, were to include ‘all from sixteen to sixty’ years old.
Lundy’s name appears as the first signatory of this order. This would be expected from the man who was now commander in the field as well as governor of the city but, since he had the greatest military experience of anyone present at the council, it is also clear that the entire plan was his. (Only Henry Baker and Jonathan Mitchelburne would have had military experience that matched Lundy’s but neither was at the council of war, although the latter, who arrived in the city about a week before the siege began, was at the subsequent battle.) The first battle for Derry was to be fought some dozen or so miles from the city’s walls; Lundy obviously believed in the concept that the best form of defence is attack, and that forward defence is preferable to close defence.
The deployment to Claudy-ford, which is at the modern village of Clady on the Tyrone–Donegal border, Lifford and Long-Causeway, north of Lifford near Porthall, may seem strange to modern eyes but it must be remembered that there was no bridge across the Foyle at the city, nor was the river fordable. An attacker would have had to use boats to cross, and this would have been too dangerous, even if boats had been available. The closest point to the city at which a large force of troops, with their weaponry and impedimenta, could cross the river was in the area of Strabane, close to where the rivers Mourne and Finn converge to form the Foyle. This was the logic behind the southward deployment, a logic proved on 14 April when a large Jacobite force passed the city on the other side of the Foyle en route to Strabane.
Lundy had already given orders to demolish the bridge at Clady, and some of its arches had been knocked down the week before while a breastwork had been built on the Donegal side, probably from the rubble of the bridge. With this and his deployments of troops, Lundy hoped to secure the crossing points along the Finn, and ‘Major Crofton and Captain Hamilton, with a party at Lifford, were engaged all night, and repulsed the enemy in every attempt they made to cross the ford.’14 These clashes occurred between advance parties from both armies and, at this stage at least, the Williamites were holding their own. On the 15th Lundy led out of the city the main body of the troops who were to meet the Jacobites at Lifford and the other fords. Several accounts put the strength of Lundy’s force at 10,000 men, it having been reinforced on its march south to Lifford when ‘great numbers of other Protestants did meet thereabouts’.15 However, the overall figure of 10,000 is probably an exaggeration: a contemporary Jacobite account puts its strength at 7,000 and even that must be treated with some caution since it is in the nature of warfare that the strength of opponents be exaggerated so that the achievements of one’s own side may be enhanced.16 Mitchelburne reckoned the Jacobite army to be about 5,000 or 6,000 strong.17
As the Williamite force was setting out on its march to Lifford, the promised relief fleet from Liverpool arrived in Lough Foyle and dropped anchor off Redcastle.18 The fleet included eleven ships and carried 1,600 infantrymen; these were ten merchant ships escorted by the Royal Navy 40-gun frigate HMS Swallow,3 commanded by Captain Wolfranc Cornwall.19 Captain Ash wrote that they dropped anchor at Ture, which is much closer to the city than Redcastle, and further commented that when the two commanding officers eventually returned to their ships these were then near Culmore; Ture is less than three miles north of Culmore.20 Mitchelburne suggested that, at one point, the ships were at Quigley’s Point, between Redcastle and Ture.21 Obviously, the vessels were making their way up the lough and closer to the city. Three messengers, Major Zachariah Tiffin, who would later command an Inniskilling regiment, with Captains Lyndon and Cornwall, came ashore at different times to ride to Derry to meet Lundy with the news that reinforcements had arrived. These officers were to obtain Lundy’s instructions for the landing and deployment of the troops.22 When it was appreciated that Lundy had already quit the city to lead a field force, Colonel Cunningham, the senior of the commanding officers with the relief force (the other was Colonel Richards), wrote a despatch for direct delivery to the governor offering Cunningham’s two well-disciplined regiments to support the local garrison at the fords, stating that:
I am sure they will be of great use, on any occasion, but especially for the encouragement of raw men, as I judge most of yours are; therefore it is my opinion, that you can only stop the passes at the ford of the Finn until I can join you, and afterwards if giving battle be necessary, you will be in a much better posture for it than before. 23
The despatch was
received by Lundy at 9 o’clock that evening by which time any reinforcement of his force at the fords was out of the question. By then Lundy’s command had been broken and was in retreat towards the city. Lundy replied to Cunningham:
I am come back much sooner than I expected when I went; for, having numbers placed on Finn water, as I went to a pass where a few might oppose a greater number than came to the place, I found them on the run before the enemy, who pursued them with great vigour, and, I fear, will march on with their forces, so that I wish your men would march all night in good order, lest they should be surprised; here they shall have all the accommodation the place will afford. In this hurry, pardon me for this brevity; the rest the bearer will inform you.24
In a postscript Lundy added the exhortation, ‘If the men be not landed, let ’em land and march immediately.’ The letter had already been sealed when Lundy decided to add that postscript; he opened the missive again with his own hand to add the additional words.25
What had happened to Lundy’s soldiers? He certainly had the numbers to meet the Jacobites at the fords and, in and near the city, he had strong defences; but even the best of the engineer’s science and the choicest of equipment make up only part of a commander’s needs. In a later century Napoleon was to assess the value of morale to an army; but this was a truth already known. The French army of the late-seventeenth century knew the value of morale as did Robert Lundy, but he had now seen the morale of his army shattered in quick time in the area of Strabane and Lifford. And as the esprit of his command collapsed so, too, did that of Lundy.
The Siege of Derry 1689 Page 9