Pointis finally had his boom in place on 4 June, the day on which another battle occurred at Windmill Hill. This was a major encounter and was much more serious than the first battle almost a month earlier. Its genesis lay in that earlier defeat for the Jacobites, which was described as ‘a great vexation to the army, through the loss of so many persons of worth’.143 Hamilton thus resolved to avenge the defeat. Once again the battle began with a Jacobite advance, using both cavalry and infantry against the defensive line between bog and river. In the van of the attack, on the Jacobite left flank, were two columns of grenadiers advancing on the trenches between the windmill and the bog. These men, drawn from all the grenadier, or right flank, companies of the army were led by Captain John Plunkett, youngest son of Nicholas Plunkett, of County Dublin. Cavalry and dragoons commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels Edmund Butler and McDonald were on the right flank, along the river. Butler was Lord Mountgarrett’s second son. These advanced along the river strand, the tide being out, in the face of a heavy fire from the defending Williamite infantry. As the first clash occurred here, a strong party of Jacobite infantry, the ‘greatest part of the foot’, attacked the defensive positions between the windmill and the river.144
As the Jacobite cavalry and dragoons closed on the defenders’ trenches, the infantry there left their positions ‘and received them with such determined bravery, that the enemy soon got into confusion and retired’.145 At first the Williamites fired at the soldiers but their rounds failed to penetrate the buff, or leather, coats worn by the horsemen. This is described as armour by Walker with subsequent writers accepting this as meaning metal breastplates, but such armour had gone out of fashion and very few would have been wearing it still. Ash, a soldier himself, correctly identifies the cavalrymen as being ‘all clad in buff’. The leather coat, however, offered protection against small-arms fire at all but very close range and gave the effect of armour without the weight of metal. Thus it was that only when their officers ordered them to fire at the horses did the defenders achieve success.146 The attack was broken, and Edmund Butler was among those captured, being taken prisoner by Captain John Gladstanes. Butler had attempted to rally his men.
the said lieutenant-colonel Butler, being extraordinarily well mounted, resolved to show the way, if possible. At which, clapping spurs to his charger, he flies over but was immediately taken prisoner. Cornet Purcell, of Thurles in the county of Tipperary, followed, but his horse was killed, and he leaped back in his armour, and so saved himself. A private man and an old gentleman, Edward Butler, of Tinnahinch, in the county of Carlow, attempted and gained the ditch, but he and his horse were both slain.147
At the same time the infantry, headed by ‘the line of colonels, their pikes13 in hand’, attacking in the centre of the Jacobite line also met determined resistance with the defending soldiers keeping up a steady fire. This was described by one Williamite writer as ‘successive, or what is called file-firing’. Walker presents a more accurate description, noting that the defenders had placed themselves in three ranks so that one rank was always able to ‘march up and relieve the other, and discharge successively upon the enemy’. This suggests that the defenders had been given some effective training since the battle of the fords. The Jacobite infantry had advanced using bundles of rods, or fascines, described as bundles of faggots, to act as body armour and deflect musket balls which worked well enough until they reached the earth bank behind which the defenders were ensconced.148 This was much higher than had been appreciated and, in the absence of scaling ladders, presented an insurmountable obstacle to the attackers. The attack broke down into mayhem, but the question remains: if the defenders’ fire was so effective, how did the Jacobites reach the line at all? Analysis of this encounter indicates that the Williamites prevailed because they had the protection of an earth wall, about twelve feet high, and the ranks of soldiers were able to load, move up to the wall and then fall back to allow the next rank to take over. There is a certain similarity to the situation of Jacobite infantry at Aughrim two years later when they fought well with the protection of earth banks but were unable to react effectively when attacked from the flank by Williamite cavalry. A Jacobite account of the infantry attack in the centre is probably the most accurate available:
Notwithstanding this great check . . . they went on boldly, and attempted to mount the entrenchment; but their endeavours proved all in vain, by reason the [earth] was so high that they had need of ladders to carry it suddenly. Otherwise a small delay would slaughter them all, by reason that the rebels were very numerous withinside, and, being wholly covered, could not be lessened by the fire of the assailants; for what harm could the assailants do when they could not lay sight on their foes?149
The only element of the Jacobite attack that met with any degree of success was that by the grenadiers on the left flank. Here the defensive line was hinged back at a right angle to cover the approach from the bog to the west of the walls, and it was from the west that the grenadiers attacked. These were men drawn from all the infantry regiments in the Jacobite army. Each regiment had a grenadier company, also known as the right flank company, which included the tallest and strongest men in the regiment. Their task was to throw grenades, small bombs about the size of a cricket ball, which were pitched overarm, thus necessitating a special hat, similar to an old-fashioned sleeping cap, without a brim that would interfere with the act of throwing. A mustering of grenadier companies such as this was an indication of a determined attack; the Jacobites were hoping to break into the city.
At first the Irish grenadiers made good progress. Possibly intimidated by the size of these men, the defenders abandoned their trenches and fled, pursued by the Jacobites. However, not every Williamite fled; a small boy remained and pelted the Irish soldiers with stones.150 One Williamite account suggests that the grenadier attack was ‘gallantly repulsed’ by the defenders in the trenches, but this is not true. In fact, Henry Baker, watching the developing battle from the walls, ordered troops to sally out of the city and engage the grenadiers. It was this deployment that forced the grenadiers to retreat. They had also lost their commander, Captain Plunkett, who ‘received at the first fire his mortal wound, and being carried off to his tent, he died within an hour later’.151
The entire Irish attack had been thrown into confusion, and Hamilton’s men were now compelled to retreat. Walker claims that some 400 Irish soldiers were killed, whereas Captain Ash puts the figure at sixty with over a hundred wounded or taken prisoner.152 Included in the latter were Butler, as we have seen, Captain McDonnell, Cornets McDonaghy, Watson and Eustace and a number of French officers. Both Watson and Eustace had been wounded and died soon after being captured.153 A Jacobite writer estimates his army’s losses at ‘at least two hundred men killed’. These dead included Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Farrel, Captain Barnewal, of Archerstown, County Meath, Captain Patrick Barnewal, of Kilbrue, County Meath, Captain Richard Grains, Queen’s County, Captain Richard Fleming, Staholmock, County Meath, and Captain William Talbot of Wexford.154 Williamite losses were said to be not more than twelve dead, with one source saying that only six died; a Jacobite source says that the Jacobites did ‘no damage to the defendants’. Among the Williamite dead, however, was Captain Maxwell, who lost an arm to a cannon ball although he did not die until some time later.155
In spite of all the effort that had been put into the attack, the Jacobites had failed once more, prompting the comment: ‘You see here, as you have seen all along, that the tradesmen of Londonderry have more skill in their defence than the great officers of the Irish army in their attacks.’ When King James learned of this disaster he ordered Marshal Conrad de Rosen north once more with orders to reduce the city.156
As for the garrison, they could see that yet another Jacobite attack had been repulsed, which must have raised their spirits considerably. They also enjoyed another bonus: the dead Jacobite horses were dragged into the city to add to the store of food for those inside the walls.
Notes
1: Simpson, op cit, p. 115
2: Ibid; Walker, op cit, p. 29–30; Mackenzie, op cit, pp. 34–5
3: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 41
4: Walker, op cit, p. 30
5: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 38
6: Quoted in full in Milligan, op cit, pp. 163–4
7: Milligan, op cit, p. 165
8: Walker, op cit, p. 14. He describes all the heavier weapons as culverins.
9: Milligan, op cit, p. 165
10: Hughes, op cit, p. 70
11: Walker, op cit, p. 64; Simpson, op cit, p. 111
12: Gilbert, op cit, p. 65
13: Ibid
14: Walker, op cit, pp. 34–5; Gilbert, op cit, p. 65
15: Gilbert, op cit, p. 65
16: Milligan, op cit, p. 163
17: Simpson, op cit, pp. 115–6
18: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 40
19: Ibid
20: Simpson, op cit, p. 115
21: Walker, op cit, p. 31
22: Ibid, pp. 95–6
23: Dwyer, The Siege of Londonderry in 1689, p. 83
24: Walker, op cit, p. 31
25: Ibid, pp. 31–2
26: Colledge & Warlow, Ships of The Royal Navy, pp. 44 & 275
27: NA Kew, ADM52/9, Captain’s log of HMS Bonadventure
28: Ibid
29: Ibid
30: Kelly, The Sieges of Derry, p. 54
31: Quoted in ibid, p. 53
32: Kelly, op cit, p. 57
33: Ibid, p. 58
34: Ibid, p. 60
35: Powley, op cit, p. 241
36: Ibid, p. 63
37: Franco-Irish Correspondence, pp. 89–90: letter and report, dated 29 April, from Maumont to Louvois. The date is from the Gregorian calendar then in use on the continent rather than the Julian calendar still in use in Britain and Ireland.
38: NA Scotland, GD26/8/15. A letter, dated 17 May 1689, from James to Dundee assuring the latter of support ‘as soon as the siege of Derry is over’.
39: Simpson, op cit, p. 116
40: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 38
41: Gilbert, op cit, p. 63
42: Simpson, op cit, pp. 117–8; Walker, op cit, p. 34; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 39
43: Simpson, op cit, p. 117–8; Walker, op cit, pp. 34–5; Mackenzie, op cit, pp. 39–40
44: Simpson, p. 118
45: Ibid
46: Ibid; Gilbert, op cit, pp. 68–9; Mackenzie, op cit, pp. 39–40; Milligan, op cit, pp. 175–6; Avaux, p. 117
47: Simpson, op cit, p. 118n
48: Ibid, p. 118
49: Ibid; Gilbert, op cit, p. 68; Walker, op cit, p. 89
50: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 39; Walker, op cit, p. 34
51: Macrory, op cit, p. 232
52: Aickin, Londerias
53: Walker, op cit, p. 35
54: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 40; Walker, op cit, p. 35
55: Simpson, op cit, p. 118
56: Ibid, p. 119
57: Gilbert, op cit, p. 68 (he claims that Pusignan was killed in the same action as Maumont); Walker (p. 89) and Mackenzie (p. 40) also believed Pusignan to have died in the first action.
58: Ash, op cit, p. 63
59: Avaux, op cit, p. 136–7 comments that Pusignan would not have died had the army had a competent surgeon.
60: London Gazette, 23–27 May 1689
61: Young, op cit, p. 265
62: See Milligan, op cit, p. 369, note 17
63: Witherow, Derry and Enniskillen, p. 133; Aickin, Londerias
64: Ibid
65: Walker, op cit, p. 30
66: London Gazette, 13–16 May 1689
67: Mitchelburne, op cit
68: Ash, op cit, p. 84. In his inimitably refreshing manner, Ash again includes this information in his diary long after it had occurred; in this case the entry is made for 1 July although he emphasizes that the fort fell within a fortnight of the siege starting.
69: Witherow, op cit, p. 127
70: Derriana, p. 23
71: Ibid
72: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 40; Simpson, op cit, p. 119
73: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 41
74: Ibid
75: Ibid
76: Quoted in Chandler, The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough, p. 183
77: Ash, op cit, p. 64; Simpson, op cit, p. 120
78: Simpson, op cit, p. 120
79: Ibid, p. 121; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 42; Walker, op cit, pp. 36–7; Ash, op cit, p. 65.
80: Simpson, op cit, p. 121
81: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 42
82: Walker, op cit, p. 36
83: Ibid, p. 37
84: Ibid, p. 37; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 42; Ash, op cit, pp. 65–6; Mitchelburne, op cit; Londerias
85: Simpson, op cit, pp. 121–2; Walker, op cit, pp. 37–8; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 42; Ash, op cit, p. 66; Mitchelburne, op cit; Londerias
86: Simpson, op cit, p. 122
87: Ash, op cit, p. 66; Simpson, op cit, p. 122n
88: Simpson, op cit, p. 121
89: St Columb’s Cathedral
90: Walker, op cit, p. 38; Ash, op cit, p. 66
91: Ash, op cit, p. 67
92: Ibid
93: Ibid
94: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 41
95: Simpson, op cit, p. 123; Ash, op cit, p. 67
96: Witherow, Two Diaries of Derry in 1689: Richards’ Diary of the Fleet (Hereafter Witherow: Richards’), p. 1
97: London Gazette, 18 – 22 April 1689
98: Witherow: Richards, op cit, pp. 1–2
99: Ibid, p. 2
100: Chicester & Burges-Short, Records and Badges of the British Army, 1900, p. 196
101: Ibid
102: Witherow: Richards, op cit, p. 2
103: Hogg, The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Artillery, p. 18
104: Walker, op cit, pp. 35–6; Ash, op cit, pp. 63–4; Simpson, op cit, pp. 119–120
105: Simpson, op cit, p. 120; Ash, op cit, p. 64
106: Simpson, op cit, p. 120; Walker, op cit, p. 36
107: Simpson, op cit, pp. 122–3; Mackenzie, p. 42
108: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 42; Simpson, op cit, p. 123
109: Simpson, op cit, p. 123; Mackenzie, p. 42
110: Simpson, op cit, p. 123; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 43; Ash, op cit, p. 67
111: Ash, op cit, p. 68; Simpson, op cit, p. 123
112: Simpson, op cit, pp. 123–4; Walker, op cit, p. 40; Mackenzie, pp. 42–3
113: Walker, op cit, p. 40: Simpson, op cit, p. 124
114: Ash, op cit, p. 68
115: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 43; Simpson, op cit, p. 124
116: Witherow, Derry and Enniskillen, op cit, pp. 236–7; Derriana, op cit, p. 7
117: Simpson, op cit, p. 124
118: Ibid; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 43
119: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 41; Ash, op cit, p. 68; Mitchelburne, op cit
120: Macrory, op cit, p. 243
121: Ibid
122: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 45
123: Ibid
124: Ibid
125: Ash, op cit, pp. 69–70; Simpson, op cit, p. 124; Mackenzie, op cit, pp. 42–3
126: Ash, op cit, p. 71; Simpson, op cit, p. 124
127: Ash, op cit, p. 69
128: Simpson, op cit, p. 125; Ash, op cit, p. 71
129: Simpson, op cit, p. 125
130: Ibid; Ash, op cit, pp. 71–2
131: Simpson, op cit, p. 125
132: Mackenzie, op cit, pp. 46–7
133: Simpson, op cit, p. 125; Walker, op cit, p. 42; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 46. Simpson provides the detail included in this paragraph while the other diarists note the effects of these and other bombardments at this time.
134: NA Kew, State Papers Ireland, de Pointis to Seignelay; Powley, op cit, p. 218
135: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 46; Powley, op cit, p. 219
136: NA Kew, State Papers Ireland, de Pointis to Seignelay
137: Powley, op cit, p. 220
138: Ibid
139: Ibid, p. 220;
NA Kew, State Papers Ireland, de Pointis to Seignelay
140: NA Kew, State Papers Ireland, de Pointis to Seignelay
141: Ibid
142: Powley, op cit, p. 220
143: Gilbert, op cit, p. 76
144: Ibid
145: Simpson, op cit, pp. 125–6; Walker, op cit, pp. 41–2; Ash, op cit, pp. 73–5
146: Ash, op cit, p. 74
147: Gilbert, op cit, p. 77
148: Ibid; Simpson, op cit, p. 126; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 43
149: Gilbert, op cit, p. 77
150: Ash, op cit, p. 74
151: Gilbert, op cit, pp. 76–7; Mackenzie, op cit, pp. 43–4; Simpson, op cit, p. 127
152: Walker, op cit, p. 42; Ash, op cit, p. 74
153: Simpson, op cit, p. 126; Ash, op cit, p. 74; Walker, op cit, p. 42 & p. 90
154: Gilbert, op cit, p. 77
155: Simpson, op cit, pp. 126–7; Walker, op cit, p. 42; Ash, op cit, p. 75
156: Gilbert, op cit, pp. 77–9
__________
1 This is the contemporary spelling used in the ship’s log. Built as HMS President in 1650, the ship was renamed Bonadventure in 1660 and rebuilt six years later. It was broken up in 1711.26
The Siege of Derry 1689 Page 17