Contrary to the opinions expressed by both Walker and Macrory, this battle saw one of the finest demonstrations of courage on either side during the siege. It also showed the use of initiative by both Jacobite and Williamite soldiers, the quick reaction by officers of the latter being especially noteworthy. However, comments such as those made by both Walker and Macrory demean the courage and military skills of those who fought on that June night. Walker’s assessment – that this was a simple case of chasing off drunken and superstitious Irish – and Macrory’s – that this was an ‘almost farcical interlude’ – detract from the achievements of the defenders as much as they do from the courage and enterprise of the attackers. Walker was engaged in a propaganda exercise, mostly for personal aggrandisement, and one can understand, to some extent, his attitude. Macrory’s comment is less easy to understand. Here is a man with a reputation as a military historian showing not the slightest understanding of what was happening and accepting Walker’s version as the full truth. Propaganda that seeks to demean an enemy in this fashion can often be self-defeating. During the Second World War, British propaganda sought to demean the Italian forces by depicting them as cowardly. It therefore came as something of a shock to Allied servicemen to find themselves being trounced by Italians, as was 1st Essex Regiment at Gallabat in Abyssinia. And it should be remembered that it was the doughty courage of Italian soldiers, fighting without hope of escape, that allowed Rommel to extricate so many of his German troops from El Alamein. Both Walker and Macrory treat the Jacobites in like fashion but in so doing take away from the achievements of the defenders of the city.
Foiled in this direct attack, Conrad de Rosen had an alternative plan. He would ensure that whatever provisions remained in the city would be consumed more speedily, thus forcing the garrison to surrender or starve to death. A Jacobite account of the siege notes that
When he approached to Londonderry, he seized on three or four hundred Protestants, men and women, relations and friends to the people within the town, whom he brought as prisoners, and, at his arrival about the beginning of July, sent them to the gates of the fortress, in order that they might enter the place (from which they egressed at the commencement of the siege), and live there among their own.55
This is not entirely accurate, for the rounding-up of Protestants did not occur until after the failure of the assault on the half bastion. There are also variations between witnesses in the number of hostages that Rosen took. Ash says that there were about 200, whereas Walker tells us that there ‘were some thousands of them’.56 Once again Walker is probably exaggerating for his own ends. Rosen’s action was intended to ensure that the garrison would run out of provisions quickly if the hostages were allowed into the city. But they would also serve the marshal’s purpose even if they were kept outside the walls since he believed that the sight of them starving would hasten the surrender of the city. One Williamite account states that only women and children were included in the ranks of those marched to the walls; there were no men lest these should join the garrison.57 Whether the latter is entirely accurate is not clear; Mackenzie wrote that the group did include men. Furthermore, a fratricidal tragedy was averted only narrowly and, in Mackenzie’s view, by the hand of God:
When they first appeared, we took them for a body of the enemy, and the guns were discharged at them; but the shot (being directed by an unerring hand) touched none of our friends, but, as we afterwards heard, killed some of those merciless soldiers that were pushing them on.58
That Rosen was able to initiate this plan highlights one of the anomalies of this siege: that so many had been allowed to leave the city and live nearby under the protection of the Jacobite army and with guarantees of safety from General Hamilton. But should Hamilton have allowed them out at all? Had they been kept inside the walls, the city might well have been forced to come to terms before this point. An effective and early circumvallation of the city might have prevented their departure. Hamilton’s chivalrous behaviour may well have cost the Jacobite army the prize they sought: the surrender of Londonderry.
there is a difference between soldiers defending a place for their king against another prince or state (as to matter of obstinacy in holding out), and between rebellious citizens maintaining their town against their own king, into whose hands they dread to fall. The first think it enough to do their duty according to the usual manner of garrisons. The latter are apt to go beyond all mean, so sometimes they will choose to see their wives and children perish before their eyes, rather than give themselves up to the power of their sovereign lord and master. As for the particular rebels of the city of Londonderry, this plot of Rosen gave them a greater conturbation than anything which had happened to them since the dawn of that beleaguer; for, though hitherto they have remained so resolute in the defence of the town against their king, that in their nourriture they are wonderfully suffered, yet now they are extremely moved at the dismal condition of their flesh and blood a-perishing before their gates.59
Those within the walls were shocked at Rosen’s plan. They seem to have expected the chivalry of Hamilton to continue and not to have contemplated the pragmatic approach taken by the Livonian. Now they faced a dilemma: to bring these unfortunates inside the walls and thereby increase the problems of the city, placing a greater drain on food stores and increasing the incidence of disease, since the newcomers might be more likely to succumb to the illnesses prevalent in the city, or keep them, their own kin, outside the walls and watch them starve to death. ‘It was dismal to us to hear their cries,’ wrote Mackenzie, but the hostages appealed to the garrison ‘not to surrender out of pity to them’.60
It was not long before the garrison found that their commanders could match Jacobite ruthlessness with Williamite ruthlessness. The sight of the hostages not only ‘did move great compassion in us’ but also caused great anger.61 A reprisal was planned and a gallows, the work of five carpenters, was erected in full sight of the Jacobite camp.62 This was to signal to the Jacobites that, if the hostages were not allowed to return to their homes, the garrison would hang those Jacobite prisoners held within the walls. So far, the latter had been treated well, but now a message was sent to the besiegers to send priests to prepare the Jacobite prisoners for death. Walker comments, ‘but none came’. This provided the opportunity to accuse the Jacobites of ‘breach of promises’ – although what promises they were in breach of is not clear: was it a breach of the guarantees of safety, or a failure to send priests to administer the last rites? – while the Jacobite prisoners allegedly declared that they ‘could not blame us to put them to death, seeing their people exercised such severity and cruelty upon our poor friends, that were under their protections’.63
The Jacobite prisoners now sought permission to write to Hamilton. This was given, and a messenger was sent out to deliver their appeal, for such it was. Walker retained a copy. The prisoners wrote:
My Lord,
Upon the hard dealing the protected (as well as other Protestants) have met withal in being sent under the walls, you have so incensed the Governor and others of this garrison that we are all condemned by a court martial to [die] tomorrow, unless these poor people be withdrawn. We have made application to Marshal General de Rosen; but having received no answer, we make it our request to you (as knowing you are a person that does not delight in shedding innocent blood) that you will represent our [condition] to the [Marshal] General. The lives of 20 prisoners [lie at stake, and therefore require your diligence and care. We are all willing to die (with our swords in our hands) for His Majesty: but to suffer like malefactors is hard, nor can we lay our blood to the charge of the garrison, the Governor and the rest having used and treated us with all civility imaginable.64
The letter was signed by Netterville, Butler, Aylmer, MacDonnel and Darcy in the name of all the prisoners, although it was noted that Netterville’s name was ‘writ by another hand’ since he had lost the fingers of his right hand.65 A Jacobite commentator described it as ‘a
lamentable request’ but suggests that it was made to Rosen rather than to Hamilton.66
Hamilton’s reply did not hold out much hope for the Jacobite prisoners.
What these poor people are like to suffer, they may thank themselves for, being their own fault; which they may prevent by accepting the conditions have been offered them; and if you suffer in this it cannot be helped, but shall be revenged on many thousands of those people (as well innocent as others) within or without that city.67
It would appear from this letter that some of Rosen’s steel had entered Hamilton’s soul and that he was prepared to accept the marshal general’s plan. But neither side had the heart to go through with its threats. Although the Jacobite prisoners were paraded on the walls by the gallows where they were to be executed, the threatened date passed without any hangings. In the meantime, Hamilton thought better of his original response and, on 4 July, ordered that the hostages be allowed to return to their homes. It was believed that ‘some feeble persons of the town went along with them undiscovered’.68
Another plan had failed. It seems that Hamilton may have sent a despatch to King James in Dublin and that the latter’s response brought about Hamilton’s change of heart. James referred to Conrad de Rosen as a ‘bloody Muscovite’ because of his plan which did not sit well with James’ desire to win the hearts and minds of his Protestant people.
During this time Henry Baker, the senior governor of the city, died. He had been ailing for some time and his passing was ‘justly lamented by the garrison, in whose affections his prudent and resolute conduct had given a great interest’.69 Walker praised him, writing that his death was ‘a sensible loss to us, and [he was] generally lamented, being a valiant person; in all his actions among us [he] showed the greatest honour, courage and conduct’.70 Baker was interred in one of the vaults of the cathedral, and his pallbearers included Walker and Mitchelburne, who succeeded him as governor, Colonels Lance, Campsey and Munroe and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell. The eulogy was given by the Reverend Seth Whittle, whom Ash calls White.71
The men of the Jacobite army were also suffering. On 30 June Fumeron wrote that
The troops are very tired and many fall ill. They have been on campaign for four months, without tents and in a country without cover, where it rains almost all the time and where the nights are extremely cold.72
Rosen, who must have been both frustrated and angry that his plans had gone awry, now concluded that starving out the garrison was the only sure road to success for his tired army. He ordered ‘some entrenchments to be cast up for the better preservation of the army’ while they sat out the remainder of the siege.73 No relief could get through, he believed, while his troops held the fort at Culmore and the batteries that protected the boom. It was only a matter of time before the city fell. Although Captain Gregory with some workmen had built a horse-powered mill at the Free School with which to grind malt, this had made little difference to the food problem.74 Walker supports Rosen’s analysis since he notes that, by now, the townspeople and the garrison were reduced ‘to feed upon horse flesh, dogs, cats, rats and mice, greaves of a year old, tallow and starch, of which they had good quantities, as also salted and dried hides’. In spite of this, he says, they were determined to hold out and ‘unanimously resolved to eat the Irish, and then one another, rather than surrender to any but their own King William and Queen Mary’.75
Mitchelburne noted that the dogs fed on the bodies in the graveyards and that the citizens fed on the dogs: ‘We have an excellent way of dressing them, seasoned with pepper and salt, and baking the flesh with decayed wine we get in merchants’ cellars’.76 But, as the bombardment continued, the resolution of the defenders was being tried to the extreme. They did have one opportunity to show defiance when, according to Walker, a ‘dead shell’ among the bombs thrown into the town on or about 1 July was found to contain a letter addressed to the soldiers of the garrison. Details of Hamilton’s surrender proposals were included in the belief, wrote Walker, that the garrison’s officers had not acquainted the soldiers with these, but the men of the garrison would ‘not entertain the least thought of surrendering, and it would cost a man’s life to speak of it, it was so much abhorred’.77 The shell containing those proposals may be seen today in the vestibule of St Columb’s Cathedral.
Notes
Information for that section of this chapter dealing with Captain Jacob Richards’ expedition to the Foyle in HMS Greyhound is gleaned from Witherow’s Two Diaries of Derry in 1689 and is, accordingly, not annotated.
1: Ash, op cit, p. 68
2: Simpson, op cit, p. 127; Ash, op cit, p. 75
3: Simpson, op cit, p. 127; Walker, op cit, pp. 42–3; Ash, op cit, pp. 75–6
4: Simpson, op cit, p. 127; Walker, op cit, p. 43
5: Simpson, op cit, p. 127; Walker, op cit, pp. 42–3; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 46
6: Walker, op cit, pp. 42–3
7: Walker, op cit, p. 43; Simpson, op cit, p. 127
8: Loeber, Engineers in Ireland, 1600–1730, IS, vol xiii, p. 44 (von Bodt) and p. 231 (de Bodt)
9: Young, Fighters of Derry, p. 172
10: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 47
11: HLRO, HoCJ, 9 Oct 1690
12: See Chandler, op cit, p. 180 for a table showing the English and French field artillery in general use from 1688 to 1730.
13: NA Kew, State Papers Ireland, de Pointis to Seignelay
14: Simpson, op cit, p. 127; see also Walker, op cit, p. 43
15: Simpson, op cit, p. 128
16: Ibid
17: Walker, op cit, p. 43
18 Powley, op cit, p. 154
19: Ibid, p. 224
20: Walker, op cit, pp. 43–4
21: Macrory, op cit, pp. 268–70; see also Gebler, The Siege of Derry, pp. 237–41
22: Ibid
23: Ibid; Walker, op cit, pp. 44–5; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 48; Ash, op cit, p. 80
24: See Macrory, pp. 268–70 and Gebler, pp. 237–41
25: Ash, op cit, p. 80
26: HLRO, HoCJ, 17 May 1701
27: Walker, op cit, p. 45; Simpson, op cit, p. 132; Ash, p. 80; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 48
28: See Macrory, pp. 268–70 and Gebler, pp 237–41
29: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 46. Walker does not record any panic in the Jacobite ranks but notes that the Irish army intensified its defences along the river.
30: Walker, op cit, p. 44. Macaulay wrote that the river was ‘fringed with forts and batteries which no vessel could pass without great peril.’ He then describes the boom and not only states that ‘several boats of stones were sunk’ but that ‘a row of stakes’ was driven into the riverbed. (History of England, Vol. III, pp. 59–60)
31: Ibid
32: Ibid
33: Mackenzie, op cit, pp. 48–9
34: Ibid, p. 49; Simpson, op cit, p. 132
35: Walker, op cit, p. 48; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 49
36: Ash, op cit, p. 80
37: Ibid, p. 81
38: Ibid
39: Walker, op cit, pp. 48–9
40: Ibid, p. 49
41: Ibid
42: Ibid, pp. 49–50
43: Ibid, p. 50
44: Simpson, op cit, pp. 132–3
45: Walker, op cit, p. 50
46: Ash, op cit, pp. 81–2; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 49; Walker, op cit, pp. 50–1
47: Walker, op cit, pp. 81–2; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 49; Ash, op cit, pp. 80–1; Simpson, op cit, pp. 134–5
48: Simpson, op cit, p. 134; Ash, op cit, p. 81. Simpson notes that Poke was a gunner who had taken part in an operation along the river under Adam Murray’s command. Young suggests that the name may have been Pogue rather than Poke (Fighters of Derry, p. 178.)
49: Ash, op cit, pp. 81–2
50: Ibid; Walker, op cit, pp. 50–1; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 49; Simpson, op cit, pp. 134–5
51: Franco-Irish Correspondence, pp. 140–1
52: Walker, op cit, p. 51
53: Macrory, op cit, p. 277
55: Gilbert, op cit, p. 79
56: Ash, op cit, p. 84; Walker, op cit, p. 54
57: Mitchelburne, op cit
58: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 51
59: Gilbert, op cit, pp. 79–80
60: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 51
61: Ibid
62: Ibid; Mitchelburne, op cit; Walker, op cit, p. 54
63: Walker, op cit, pp. 54–5
64: Ibid, p. 55
65: Ibid; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 51
66: Gilbert, op cit, p. 80
67: Walker, op cit, p. 56; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 51
68: Walker, op cit, p. 56; Mackenzie, op cit, p. 51; Simpson, op cit, p. 140; Gilbert, op cit, p. 80
69: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 49
70: Walker, op cit, p. 51
71: Simpson, op cit, p. 135; Ash, op cit, pp. 82–3
72: Franco-Irish Correspondence, p. 141
73: Gilbert, op cit, p. 80
74: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 47
75: Walker, op cit, p. 52
76: Mitchelburne, op cit
77: Walker, op cit, p. 53
__________
1 de la Barte may really be Jean de Bodt, a French engineer and Huguenot refugee to The Netherlands who accompanied William of Orange to England and is known to have served under Richards in Ireland during the winter of 1690–1. Also with Richards in Ireland during that winter was Johann von Bodt, who was born in Paris, and whose father came from Mecklenburg.8
The Siege of Derry 1689 Page 21