releasing the memos: Panetta’s discussions with senior CIA officials about the release of the interrogation memos comes from interviews with two American officials involved in the discussions.
winning Emanuel over to his side: The White House discussions, and Emanuel’s decision to side with Panetta, come from two participants in the discussions. The debates over the release of the memos are covered extensively in Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012).
The cable carried a simple message: Ignore Blair’s directive: The account of the conversation between Blair and Panetta comes from two officials in Panetta’s office at the CIA.
covert-action programs usually: Author interview with Dennis Blair.
“the development of stable”: A full list of the Blair/Gates principles was obtained by the author. The list was first published in the endnotes of Obama’s Wars by Bob Woodward.
Leon Panetta and Deputy National Security Advisor: Author interview with Dennis Blair.
a secret war that most believed: Details of the Jones Memo comes from two former senior Obama administration officials.
the CIA couldn’t get legal approval to kill him: Author interview with former Pakistani government official.
“said more Hail Marys”: Leon Panetta, unpublished interview with The New York Times.
“Can you tell me”: Author interview with former senior Obama administration official.
“The CIA gets what it wants”: Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture, 121.
since he assumed control: Petraeus had sought advice from Edmund Hull, the former American ambassador to Yemen. Hull had been following the growth of militancy in the country for several years, and was angry that after counterterrorism successes in the years immediately after the September 11 attacks the country seemed to be sliding into chaos. He told Petraeus that if Yemen continued to be ignored it could become another Afghanistan, a safe haven for attacks in other countries; the assassination attempt on Prince bin Nayef’s life months later made the prediction seem eerily prescient.
before it could successfully: Author interview with former American special-operations commander involved in the discussions about military operations in Yemen.
with John Brennan serving: Ibid.
“Beware of taking the side of America!”: Scott Shane with Mark Mazzetti and Robert Worth, “Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents,” The New York Times (August 14, 2010).
from $67 million to $105 million: Cable from U.S. embassy in Sana’a to the State Department, “General Petraeus Meeting with President Saleh on Security Assistance, AQAP Strikes,” January 4, 2010. The account of the meeting comes entirely from this cable.
his message was clear: Text of Blair’s remarks at the Willard hotel available at dni.gov/speeches/20100406_5_speech.pdf.
CHAPTER 13: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA
a violation of a UN arms embargo: Cable from U.S. embassy to State Department headquarters, “Whither the M/V Faina’s Tanks?” October 2, 2008. The cable described the route by which the arms got to Southern Sudan. After the arms arrived in Mombasa, they were sent via rail lines to Uganda, and then on to Southern Sudan.
so the Faina’s crew: Harun Maruf interview with Michele Ballarin for Voice of America (August 2, 2010).
“. . . she is only giving them false hope”: “Ukraine Ship Owners Object to U.S. Woman’s Role in Pirate Talks,” Russian News Room, December 19, 2008.
“become an intermediary”: Cable from U.S. embassy in Ukraine to State Department headquarters, “Faina: Letter from Foreign Minister Ohryzko,” February 5, 2009.
“to facilitate the exclusion”: Ibid.
“without fingerprint, footprint or flag”: Gulf Security Group letter to Central Intelligence Agency, August 17, 2007. Copy of letter obtained by author.
a law that prohibits: Letter from John L. McPherson to Michele Ballarin, August 27, 2007. Copy of letter obtained by author.
at the headquarters of: The description of Ballarin’s meeting at CTTSO comes from a military official involved in counterterrorism programs who attended the meeting.
a more coveted AK-47 could be purchased: Peter J Pham, “Somali Instability Still Poses Threat Even After Successful Strike on Nabhan,” World Defense Review (September 17, 2009).
to hound him and go after his money: Robert Young Pelton, “An American Commando in Exile,” Men’s Journal (December 2010).
a counterpiracy force: Prince’s involvement in the counterpiracy militia in Puntland is documented in two reports by the United Nations Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea.
a new militia would carry out raids: Information about the Puntland militia comes from three people directly involved in the operations. Separately, the United Nations Monitoring Group did an extensive investigation into both Saracen and Sterling, and confirmed the two companies’ ties to Erik Prince and the UAE.
insisting that each military operation: JSOC’s proposals to strike the al Shabaab camps were confirmed by one retired senior military officer and a former top civilian in the Obama administration. Details about discussions inside the Obama administration over the costs and benefits of striking the camps can be found in Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda (New York: Times Books, 2011). According to the book, most officials believed that hitting the camps wouldn’t be worth the possible benefit of killing a small number of senior al Shabaab leaders.
First prize was an AK-47: “Kids Awarded Guns in Somali Recruitment Game,” Der Spiegel (September 26, 2011).
“old woman Hillary Clinton”: SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Official Offers Rewards for Information on Obama, Clinton,” June 9, 2011.
take him somewhere for interrogation: Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012): 123–124 details the first discussions of the various options presented by Admiral William McRaven. The video teleconference and the options discussed by McRaven were confirmed independently by American government officials.
Somali pirates were currently holding: The crew of the Faina was released just days after the Ukrainian minister sent the letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but there is no evidence that Ballarin’s involvement in the discussions led to the pirates releasing the crew. The pirates ended up pocketing more than $3 million in ransom money from the ship’s owners. The interview in which she discussed “unwinding” all of the hostage cases appeared in an article on Military.com on November 25, 2008. It is difficult to discern how much, if any, money Ballarin made from being involved in the negotiations.
failed to deliver: Author interview with eight different former employees of Ballarin’s companies.
“It’s not the way forward”: Voice of America interview with Michele Ballarin.
All they needed, she said: The story that follows comes from an author interview with Michele Ballarin. Her story was corroborated by a former American official who knew about her efforts to get the Pentagon to embrace the plan to use Somali hit men to kill the al Shabaab operatives.
“It is forbidden to make graves into shrines”: BBC World Service, “Somali Rage at Grave Destruction,” June 8, 2009.
the age’s defining struggle of good versus evil: Author interview with Michele Ballarin.
It was a game of catch-up: “Hundreds of intelligence analysts” comes from a former senior American intelligence official with direct knowledge about the movements of analysts within the intelligence community after the beginning of the Arab Spring.
thanking the Libyan spymaster: Ben Wedeman, “Documents Shed Light on CIA, Gadhafi Spy Ties,” CNN.com, September 3, 2011.
“encompass the majority of the Islamic world”: Letter from Osama bin Laden to Atiyah Abd al-Rahman dated April 26, 2011. Text of letter released by Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.
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CHAPTER 14: THE UNRAVELING
checking that it had not been: Description of conditions comes from an American official with knowledge of Davis’s circumstances in prison.
named for the gap: Matthew Teague, “Black Ops and Blood Money,” Men’s Journal (June 1, 2011), and Mark Mazzetti, et al., “American Held in Pakistan Worked with CIA,” The New York Times (February 21, 2011).
earning upward of: Information about Davis’s CIA salary comes from documents released by Pakistan’s Foreign Office after Davis was arrested.
using an allied organization: Background on the operations of Lashkar-e-Taiba comes from an interview with C. Christine Fair of Georgetown University, an expert on the group.
Pakistan’s pro-American ambassador: The system of American visas for Pakistan was described by an American official in Islamabad with direct knowledge of the process.
even the U.S. embassy in Pakistan: Ibid.
the hundreds of thousands who had come: For the best account of the 1979 embassy burning see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.
the new chief did not come to Pakistan: The CIA station chief in Islamabad remains undercover.
he was skeptical about the long-term value: The dynamics between the CIA station chief in Islamabad and Ambassador Cameron Munter were described by five American officials. Much of the account of the fights between the two men, and the broader description of the deliberations over the Raymond Davis episode, come from these officials.
“then they are not subject to”: Press conference of President Barack Obama, February 15, 2011.
The United States had just lost its chance: Details of the meeting between Panetta and Pasha come from two Pakistani officials and from the contents of an internal memorandum of the private intelligence firm Stratfor, made public by WikiLeaks. The memorandum is available at http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1664671_re-alpha-insight-afghanistan-pakistan-isi-chief-not-for.html.
North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bajaur: Classified CIA paper described by two senior American intelligence officials.
“Well, why don’t you go in and get them?” Gates asked: Author interview with a senior military official who attended the briefing.
“I’ve had enough”: Bush’s response to the CIA briefing can be found in Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010): 4–5. The most detailed account of the CIA briefing in July 2008 is in Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda (New York: Times Books, 2011).
Pakistani troops and policemen: Account of the Mullah Baradar capture comes from five different American and Pakistani intelligence officials.
a personal courier for Osama bin Laden: Author interview with two American intelligence officials, and from Peter Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden—from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New York: Crown, 2012): 122–124.
“I’m back with the people I was with before”: Peter Bergen, Manhunt, 123.
it had only small, opaque slits for windows: Peter Bergen, Manhunt, 4.
the telephoto lens was useless: Author interview with two senior American intelligence officials.
He must not be allowed: Ahtishamul Haq, “Raymond Davis Case: Wife of Man Killed Commits Suicide,” The Express Tribune (February 7, 2011).
Davis would be released from jail: Details about the discussions between Munter and Pasha, and the subsequent narrative of the events leading to Davis’s release come from interviews with both American and Pakistani officials.
to offer “forgiveness”: As the talks dragged on, American officials developed a backup plan: appealing the matter to an international arbitration panel in Switzerland. The American officials in Geneva began consulting Swiss lawyers but all the while figuring it was a long shot that a panel in Switzerland would get Ray Davis out of jail.
locked inside an iron cage: Carlotta Gall and Mark Mazzetti, “Hushed Deal Frees CIA Contractor in Pakistan,” The New York Times (March 16, 2011).
that he was safe: Author interview with two American officials.
a fifty-year-old minister: Sara Burnett, “Charges Upgraded Against Ex-CIA Contractor in Parking-Spot Dispute,” The Denver Post (October 4, 2011).
“Relax,” Maes said, “and quit being stupid”: “CIA Contractor in Court Over Felony Assault Charges,” CBS Denver (October 4, 2011). As of this book’s publication, the legal proceedings in the case had not concluded.
a reduction of terrorist violence: “Getting Rid of US Saboteurs,” The Nation (August 11, 2011).
Saeed insisted that night: Author attended the July 2012 rally in Islamabad.
CHAPTER 15: THE DOCTOR AND THE SHEIKH
an American woman he knew: Most of the details about Dr. Shakil Afridi’s meetings with his CIA handlers come from Afridi’s statements to a Pakistani investigative group examining his role in the bin Laden operation. Other details have been filled in by American government officials with knowledge of Afridi’s work for the CIA from 2008 to 2011.
sold hospital medicines: Aryn Baker, “The Murky Past of the Pakistani Doctor Who Helped the CIA,” Time (June 13, 2012).
Islamabad moved to shutter: Declan Walsh, “Pakistan May Be Expelling Aid Group’s Foreign Staff,” The New York Times (September 6, 2012).
“I believe it is unreasonable”: John Deutch’s statement available at http://intellit.muskingum.edu/cia_folder/ciarelations_folder/ciareldcistmt.html.
the CIA paid him: Afridi statement to Pakistani investigative group.
when the transmitter: Ibid.
she agreed to cooperate with Afridi: Sami Yousafzai, “The Doctor’s Grim Reward,” Newsweek (June 11, 2012).
she should call again in the evening: Afridi statement to Pakistani investigative group.
dragged it down the stairs: Mark Bisonette (aka Mark Owen), No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden (New York: Dutton): 254.
Panetta kept one hand in his pocket: Leon Panetta, unpublished interview with The New York Times.
he immediately ordered: Peter Bergen, Manhunt, 235.
There was a downed American helicopter: Details about Mullen’s conversation with Kayani come from two American officials with direct knowledge of what transpired during the phone call.
a “military-aged male”: The rules governing CIA “signature strikes” were described by four American government officials.
give him the chance: Author interview with two American government officials.
“No, Hillary,” Panetta said: Details of the fight during the National Security Council meeting come from two participants in the meeting.
an attack against an American base: Author interview with two American military officials.
a particularly close relationship: Declan Walsh, “US Bomb Warning to Pakistan Ignored,” The Guardian (September 22, 2011).
shrapnel killed an eight-year-old: Ray Rivera and Sangar Rahimi, “Deadly Truck Bomb Hits NATO Outpost in Afghanistan,” The New York Times (September 11, 2011).
Afridi received an urgent call: Afridi statement to Pakistani investigative group. Afridi’s account has been independently confirmed by an American official with direct knowledge of Afridi’s contacts with the CIA after the Abbottabad raid.
the bus driver–cum–drug lord: Court documents included in a memo from an assistant political agent in Khyber Agency to the senior superintendent of police, JIT, Special Branch, Peshawar. Documents obtained by author.
Dr. Afridi was sentenced: Ibid.
because of his history: Agence France Press, “Lashkar-I-Islami Denies Links with Shakil Afridi,” May 31, 2012.
CHAPTER 16: FIRE FROM THE SKY
carve out time to do something else: Author interview with a former senior American official.
“Often I know their background as intimately as I knew my students’”: Harold Koh, speech before the America
n Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Law and National Security, December 2011.
he was picked up multiple times: Scott Shane and Souad Mekhennet, “From Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad,” The New York Times (May 8, 2010).
who both prayed at his mosque: Ibid.
“the bridge between”: Ibid.
he used Internet chat rooms: Ibid.
Abdulmutallab had written an essay: Gregory Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012): 257.
Brennan believed that al-Awlaki: Johnsen, 262.
“dancing in the snake pit”: “U.S. Intelligence on Arab Unrest Draws Criticism,” Associated Press (February 6, 2011).
where he spent hours in surgery: BBC News, “Yemen: Saleh ‘Gravely Wounded’ in Rocket Attack,” June 7, 2011.
in the hope of intercepting e-mail traffic: Author interview with a senior Pentagon official and a retired American counterterrorism official.
“can’t bomb moving targets”: SITE Intelligence Group, “Yemeni Journalist Documents Experiences with AQAP in Abyan,” October 21, 2011.
no human being will die: Johnsen, 276.
they worried that anyone suspected of helping: Author interview with one current and two former American officials with knowledge of how the CIA handled its advanced warning about Inspire.
“I’m going to find my father”: Author interview with Jameel Jaffer and Hina Shamsi, lawyers for the al-Awlaki family.
al-Awlaki was sitting with friends: Filing in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the case of Nasser Al-Aulaqi et al. v. Leon C. Panetta et al., 13.
“blood did not and will not go in vain”: Nasser al-Awlaki’s video message can be seen at www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GHP5Rf7dbE.
“You’ve got an intelligence agency”: Jameson’s comments came during an open session of an American Bar Association conference.
“Or whoever is left out there”: President Barack Obama, presidential press conference, December 8, 2011.
The effort to bring clarity: Scott Shane, “Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy,” The New York Times (November 24, 2012).
The Way of the Knife Page 35