by Max Hastings
On July 19, Ironside was dismissed as C-in-C Home Forces, and replaced by Sir Alan Brooke. Ironside wanted to meet an invasion with a thin crust of coastal defences, and to rely chiefly upon creating strong lines inland. Brooke, by contrast, proposed swift counterattacks with mobile forces. Brooke and Churchill were surely correct in perceiving that if the Germans secured a lodgement and airfields in southeast England, the battle for Britain would be irretrievably lost. Inland defences were worthless, save for sustaining a sense of purpose among those responsible for building them.
Peter Fleming argued in his later history of the period that although the British went through the motions of anticipating invasion, they did not in their hearts believe in such an eventuality, because they had no historical experience of it: “They paid lip-service136 to reality. They took the precautions which the Government advised, made the sacrifices which it required of them and worked like men possessed … But … they found it impossible, however steadfastly they gazed into the future, to fix in a satisfactory focus the terrible contingencies which invasion was expected to bring forth.” Fleming added a perceptive observation: “The menace of invasion137 was at once a tonic and a drug … The extreme and disheartening bleakness of their long-term prospects was obscured by the melodramatic nature of the predicament in which … the fortunes of war had placed them.”
Churchill understood the need to mobilise the British people to action for its own sake, rather than allowing them time to brood, to contemplate dark realities. He himself thought furiously about the middle distance. “When I look around to see how we can win the war,” he wrote to Beaverbrook on July 10, “I see only one sure path. We have no continental army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw upon. Should he be repulsed here or not try invasion, he will recoil eastward and we have nothing to stop him. But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland.” Likewise, at Chequers on July 14: “Hitler must invade or fail138. If he fails he is bound to go east, and fail he will.” Churchill had no evidential basis in intelligence for his assertion that the Germans might lunge towards Russia. At this time, only a remarkable instinct guided him, shared by few others. Not until March 1941139, three months before the event, did British intelligence decide that a German invasion of the Soviet Union was likely.
As for aircraft production, while fighters were the immediate need, the prime minister urged the creation of the largest possible bomber force. This, a desperate policy born out of desperate circumstances and the absolute lack of any plausible alternative, would achieve destructive maturity only years later, when victory was assured by other means. Churchill appointed Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, the brainless old hero of the 1918 Zeebrugge raid, to become director of combined operations with a brief to prepare to launch raids on the continent of Europe. He wanted no pinprick fiascos, he said, but instead attacks by five to ten thousand men. He ordered the establishment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), under the direction of Hugh Dalton as minister of economic warfare, with a mandate to “set Europe ablaze.” He endorsed de Gaulle as the voice and leader of Free France. Brooke, at Gosport with Churchill on July 17, found him “in wonderful spirits140 and full of offensive plans for next summer.” Most of the commitments made in those days remained ineffectually implemented for years to come. Yet they represented earnests for the future that inspired Churchill’s colleagues, which was, of course, exactly as he intended.
And above all, in those days, there were his words. “Faith is given to us to help and comfort us when we stand in awe before the unfurling scroll of human destiny,” he told the British people in a broadcast on July 14, Bastille Day, in which he recalled attending a magnificent military parade in Paris just a year before. “And I proclaim my faith that some of us will live to see a Fourteenth of July when a liberated France will once again rejoice in her greatness and her glory.” He continued:
Here in this strong City of Refuge which enshrines the title-deeds of human progress and is of deep consequence to Christian civilization; here, girt about by the seas and oceans where the Navy reigns; shielded from above by the prowess and devotion of our airmen—we await undismayed the impending assault. Perhaps it will come tonight. Perhaps it will come next week. Perhaps it will never come. We must show ourselves equally capable of meeting a sudden violent shock or—what is perhaps a harder test—a prolonged vigil. But be the ordeal sharp or long, or both, we shall seek no terms, we shall tolerate no parley; we may show mercy—we shall ask for none.
One of the prime minister’s listeners wrote: “Radio sets were not then very141 powerful, and there was always static. Families had to sit near the set, with someone always fiddling with the knobs. It was like sitting round a hearth, with someone poking the fire; and to that hearth came the crackling voice of Winston Churchill.” Vere Hodgson, a thirty-nine-year-old London woman, wrote: “Gradually we came under the spell142 of that wonderful voice and inspiration. His stature grew larger and larger, until it filled our sky.” Vita Sackville-West wrote to her husband, Harold Nicolson, saying that one of Churchill’s speeches “sent shivers (not of fear)143 down my spine. I think that one of the reasons why one is stirred by his Elizabethan phrases is that one feels the whole massive backing of power and resolve behind them, like a great fortress: they are never words for words’ sake.” Mollie Panter-Downes told readers of the New Yorker: “Mr. Churchill is the only man144 in England today who consistently interprets the quiet but completely resolute national mood.”
Isaiah Berlin wrote: “Like a great actor145—perhaps the last of his kind—upon the stage of history, he speaks his memorable lines with a large, unhurried, and stately utterance in a blaze of light, as is appropriate to a man who knows that his work and his person will remain the objects of scrutiny and judgement to many generations.” Tory MP Cuthbert Headlam wrote on July 16: “It is certainly his hour146—and the confidence in him is growing on all sides.” Churchill’s sublime achievement was to rouse the most ordinary people to extraordinary perceptions of their own destiny. Eleanor Silsby, an elderly psychology lecturer living in south London, wrote to a friend in America on July 23, 1940: “I won’t go on about the war147. But I just want to say that we are proud to have the honour of fighting alone for the things that matter much more than life and death. It makes me hold my chin high to think, not just of being English, but of having been chosen to come at this hour for this express purpose of saving the world … I should never have thought that I could approve of war … There is surprisingly little anger or hate in this business—it is just a job that has to be done … This is Armageddon.” Churchill was much moved by receiving through the post a box of cigars from a working girl, who said that she had saved her wages148 to buy them for him. One morning at Downing Street, John Martin found himself greeting a woman who had called to offer a £60,000 pearl necklace to the service of the state. Told of this, Churchill quoted Macaulay:
“Romans in Rome’s quarrel149,
Spared neither land nor gold”
On July 19, Hitler addressed the Reichstag and the world, publicly offering Britain a choice between peace and “unending suffering and misery.” Churchill responded, “I don’t propose to say anything in reply to Herr Hitler’s speech, not being on speaking terms with him.” He urged Lord Lothian, Britain’s ambassador in Washington, to press the Americans to fulfil Britain’s earlier request for the “loan” of old destroyers. On August 1, he delivered a magisterial rebuke to the Foreign Office for the elaborate phrasing of its proposed response to a message from the king of Sweden, who was offering to mediate between Britain and Germany. “The draft errs,” he wrote, “in trying to be too clever, and to enter into refinements of policy unsuited to the tragic simplicity and grandeur of the times and the issues at stake.” That day, Hitler issued his Directive No. 17, unl
eashing the Luftwaffe’s massive air campaign against Britain.
FOUR
The Battle of Britain
THUS BEGAN THE events that will define for eternity the image of Britain in the summer of 1940. Massed formations of German bombers with their accompanying fighter escorts droned across blue skies towards Kent and Sussex, to be met by intercepting Hurricanes and Spitfires, tracing white condensation trails through the thin air. The most aesthetically beautiful aircraft the world has ever seen, their grace enhanced in the eyes of posterity by their role as the saviours of freedom, pierced the bomber formations, diving, twisting, banking, hammering fire. Onlookers craned their heads upwards, mesmerised by the spectacle. Shopworkers and housewives, bank clerks and schoolchildren heard the clatter of machine guns and found aircraft fragments and empty cartridge cases tinkling onto their streets and littering suburban gardens; they sometimes even met fallen aircrew of both sides, stumbling to their front doors.
Stricken planes spewing smoke plunged to the ground in cascades of churned-up earth, if their occupants were fortunate enough to crash-land, or exploded into fiery fragments. This was a contest like no other in human experience, witnessed by millions of people continuing humdrum daily lives, bemused by the fact that kettles boiled in kitchens, flowers bloomed in garden borders, newspapers were delivered and honey was served for tea a few thousand feet beneath one of the decisive battlefields of history. Pilots who faced oblivion all day sang in their “locals” that night, if they lived. Their schoolboy slang—“wizard prang” and “gone for a burton”—passed into the language, fulfilling the observation of a French writer quoted by Dr. Johnson: “Il y a beaucoup de puérilités150 dans la guerre.”
Once bombs began to fall on Britain’s cities in August, their blasts caused a layer of dust to settle upon every surface, casting over the urban fabric of the country a drab greyness which persisted throughout the blitz. Yet islands of seasonal beauty survived. John Colville was struck by the tortoiseshell butterflies fluttering gaily over the lawn behind Downing Street: “I shall always associate that garden151 in summer, the corner of the Treasury outlined against a china-blue sky, with 1940.” Churchill, intensely vulnerable to sentiment, witnessed many scenes which caused him to succumb. While driving to Chequers one day, he glimpsed a line of people. Motioning the driver to stop, he asked his detective to enquire what they were queuing for. Told that they hoped to buy birdseed, Churchill’s private secretary John Martin noted: “Winston wept.”152
July 10 was later officially designated as the first day of the Battle of Britain, though to the aircrew of both sides it seemed little different from those which preceded and followed it. The next month was characterised by skirmishes over the Channel and south coast, in which the Luftwaffe never lost more than 16 aircraft in a day’s combat—on July 25—and Fighter Command not more than 15. Churchill insisted that coastal convoys should continue to sail the Narrows, partly to assert British rights of navigation, partly to provoke the Luftwaffe into action on what were deemed favourable terms for the RAF. On August 11, attrition sharply increased: 30 British aircraft were shot down for 35 German. In the month thereafter, Göring launched his major assault on Fighter Command, its airfields, control centres and radar stations. Between August 12 and 23, the RAF lost 133 fighters in action and a further 44 to mishaps, while the Luftwaffe lost 299 aircraft to all causes.
By early autumn, British casualties and damage to installations had reached critical proportions. Among Dowding’s squadron commanders, 11 out of 46 were killed or wounded in July and August, along with 39 of 97 flight commanders. One Fighter Command pilot, twenty-one-year-old George Barclay of 249 Squadron, a Norfolk parson’s son, wrote after the bitter battles of September 7: “The odds today have been unbelievable153 (and we are all really very shaken!) … There are bombs and things falling around tonight and a terrific gun barrage. Has a blitz begun? The wing-commander’s coolness is amazing and he does a lot to keep up our morale—very necessary tonight.” As in every battle, not all participants showed the stuff of heroes. After repeated German bombings of Manston, one of the RAF’s forward airfields, ground crews huddled in its air-raid shelters and rejected pleas to emerge and service Hurricanes. The work was done by off-duty Blenheim night-fighter crews.
The prime minister intently followed the progress of each day’s clashes. The Secret Intelligence Service warned that a German landing in Britain was imminent. Yet it was not easy to maintain the British people at the highest pitch of expectancy. On August 3, Churchill felt obliged to issue this statement: “The Prime Minister wishes it to be known that the possibility of German attempts at invasion has by no means passed away.” He carried this spirit into his own household. Downing Street and the underground Central War Rooms were protected by Royal Marine pensioners, Chequers by a Guards company. The prime minister took personal charge of several practise alerts, against the possibility of German paratroop landings in St. James’s Park. “This sounds very peculiar today154, but was taken quite seriously by us all in the summer of 1940,” a War Cabinet Secretariat officer recalled.
Churchill practised with a revolver and with his own Mannlicher on a rifle range at Chequers, entirely in earnest and not without pleasurable anticipation. It was odd that the Germans, having used special forces effectively in the May blitzkrieg on the Continent, never thereafter showed much interest in their possibilities. A direct assault on Churchill in 1940, most plausibly by a paratroop landing at Chequers, could have paid handsome dividends. Britain was fortunate that such piratical ventures loomed far less prominently in Hitler’s mind, and in Wehrmacht doctrine, than in Churchill’s imagination. In the summer of 1940, the Germans had yet to understand how pivotal to Britain’s war effort was the person of the prime minister.
The supply of aircraft to Fighter Command was a critical factor. While propaganda lauded the achievements of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the conduct of its leader, Lord Beaverbrook, provoked bitter criticism in Whitehall. For some weeks, he ran the department from his private residence, Stornoway House, in Arlington Street, behind the Ritz Hotel. It is easy to perceive why many people, Clementine Churchill prominent among them, deplored the press baron, then sixty-one. He was a former appeaser who had secretly subsidised the prewar political career of Sir Samuel Hoare, most egregious of Chamberlain’s ministers. In January 1940, Beaverbrook addressed the Duke of Windsor—the former King Edward VIII—about a possible peace offer to Germany. On May 6, he asserted in his own Daily Express that London would not be bombed, and that the Germans would not attack the Maginot Line. Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess later told the press baron: “Hitler likes you very much.” It was once said of Beaverbrook’s newspapers that they never espoused a cause which was both honourable and successful. The king opposed his inclusion in the Cabinet, but among all men Churchill chose this old colleague from the 1917–18 Lloyd George government as his luncheon companion on May 10, 1940.
Beaverbrook cast a spell over Churchill which remained unbroken by his old friend’s petulance, disloyalty and outrageous mischief-making. The Canadian-born magnate’s command of wealth, such as the prime minister himself had always craved, impressed him almost mystically. Churchill recognised in “dear Max” a fellow original, full of impish fun which was scantily available in Downing Street that summer. It is often remarked that Churchill had acolytes, but few intimates. More than any other person save his wife, Beaverbrook eased the loneliness of the prime minister’s predicament and responsibilities. Churchill’s belief in his old comrade’s fitness for government was excessive. But who among Beaverbrook’s Cabinet colleagues was more blessed with dynamism and decision, such as seemed vital to meet the challenges of 1940?
Daily pressures upon the prime minister were unrelenting. The War Cabinet met 108 times in the ninety-two days between May 10 and July 31. His black dispatch box contained a pile of papers which seemed never to diminish, “a farrago of operational155, civil, political and scientific matters.” Overridi
ng War Office objections, he promoted Maj. Millis Jefferis, a clever soldier engaged in weapons experimental work, and ordered that he should report directly to Lindemann at the Cabinet Office. He insisted that the maverick armoured enthusiast Maj. Gen. Percy Hobart should be given suitable employment, overruling Dill’s objections with the assertion that he should remember that not only good boys help to win wars: “It is the sneaks and stinkers156 as well.” He harassed the service chiefs in support of one of “the Prof’s” most foolish personal initiatives, aerial rocket deployments against enemy aircraft. Sir Hugh Dowding of Fighter Command wanted his pilots to kill German aircrew who took to their parachutes. Churchill, recoiling from what he perceived as dishonourable conduct, would have none of this. Travelling with Roger Keyes at the end of July, he told the admiral that he had “many detractors” as chief of combined operations. Keyes responded tartly, “So had you, but you are now there in spite of it.” Churchill said, “There are no competitors for my job now—I didn’t get it until they had got into a mess.”
Beyond pressing the urgency of fighter production, Churchill made few tactical interventions in the Battle of Britain, but one of the most justly celebrated took place in the Downing Street Cabinet Room on June 21. There was fierce controversy between Lindemann and Sir Henry Tizard, chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee, about a suggestion from air intelligence that the Luftwaffe intended to use electronic beams to guide its night raiders to British targets. Tizard dismissed the feasibility of such a technique. Churchill summoned him, together with Lindemann and senior airmen, to a meeting attended by the twenty-eight-year-old scientific intelligence officer R. V. Jones. It soon became obvious that Jones alone understood the issue. Though awed by finding himself in such company, he said to the prime minister, “Would it help, sir, if I told you the story right from the start?” Churchill was initially taken aback, then said, “Well, yes, it would!” Jones spent twenty minutes157 explaining how his own researches, aided by “Ultra”—German signals decrypted by the code breakers at Bletchley Park, which were still fragmentary at this stage of the war—had led him to an understanding of the Luftwaffe’s navigational aids. Churchill, characteristically, found himself paraphrasing in his mind lines from The Ingoldsby Legends: “But now one Mr. Jones / Comes forth and depones / That fifteen years since, he had heard certain groans.”