Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2010 by
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Copyright 2010 © Mike Guardia
ISBN 978-1-935149-54-5
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Table of Contents
Introduction
1: The Road to Luzon
2: Rising Sun
3: The Great Escape
4: Northward Bound
5: The New Guerrilla
6: The Waiting Game
7: Master and Commander
Images from American Guerrilla
8: Lifelines
9: Combat Operations
10: After the Fire, 1946–1948
11: A New Kind of Fighting
12: Special Forces
Epilogue: Understanding Volckmann’s Legacy
Appendix A: Citation for the Distinguished Service Cross
Appendix B: The Career Chronology of Russell W. Volckmann
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Map of Lingayen Gulf and the immediate vicinity on the western coast of Luzon. The Lingayen beach—from Dagupan City in the east, to the Agno River delta in the west—marks the site of the 11th Infantry’s first defensive position.
Introduction
With his parting words “I shall return,” General Douglas MacArthur sealed the fate of the last American forces on Bataan. Yet amongst those who capitulated to the Japanese, a young Army Captain named Russell William Volckmann refused to surrender. At the outset of World War II, Volckmann served as the Executive Officer of the 11th Infantry Regiment (11th Division). Rather than surrender,Volckmann disappeared into the jungles of North Luzon and raised a guerrilla army of over 22,000 men. For the next three years, he led a guerrilla war against the Japanese, killing over 50,000 enemy soldiers. During the interim, he established radio contact with MacArthur’s Headquarters in Australia and directed the Allied forces to key enemy positions. Officially designated the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines—North Luzon (USAFIP-NL), Volckmann’s guerrilla unit decimated the Japanese Fourteenth Army. When General Tomiyuki Yamashita—the commander of the Japanese occupation force—finally surrendered, he made the initial surrender overtures not to MacArthur, but to Volckmann.
Volckmann was also the first to develop the Army’s official doctrine of counterinsurgency and to articulate the need for a permanent force capable of unconventional warfare. His diligence in this regard led to the creation of the Army Special Forces. Surprisingly, Volckmann has not received credit for either of these accomplishments. Despite this man’s contributions, he remains virtually forgotten by history.
This book seeks to establish two premises. First, it explores how Volckmann’s leadership was critical to the outcome of the Philippines Campaign. His ability to synthesize the realities and necessities of guerrilla warfare led to a campaign that rendered Yamashita’s forces incapable of repelling the Allied invasion. Had it not been for Russell W. Volckmann, the Allies would not have received the intelligence necessary to launch an effective counterstrike. Had he not funneled his intelligence reports to MacArthur and coordinated an Allied assault on the Japanese enclaves, the Americans would have gone in “blind”— reducing their efforts to a trial-and-error campaign that would have undoubtedly cost more lives, materiel, and potentially stalled the pace of the entire Pacific War.
Second, this book establishes Volckmann as the progenitor of modern counterinsurgency doctrine and the true “Father of Army Special Forces”—a title that history has erroneously awarded to Colonel Aaron Bank.* In 1950, Volckmann authored two Army field manuals: FM 31–20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces and FM 31–21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Together, these manuals became the Army’s first complimentary reference set outlining the precepts for special warfare and counterguerrilla operations. Taking his argument directly to General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, Volckmann outlined the operational concepts for Army Special Forces. At a time when U.S. military doctrine was conventional in its outlook, Volckmann marketed the idea of guerilla warfare as a critical and strategic force multiplier for any future conflict. In doing so, he ultimately won the blessings of the Army Chief of Staff and secured the establishment of the Army’s first special operations unit: the 10th Special Forces Group.
The story of Russell W. Volckmann commands a unique place within the military historiography of World War II. Military histories of the Philippine Campaign are told predominately within the context of conventional warfare. Several books have been written about MacArthur’s triumphant return to the Philippines, the Army Rangers at Cabanatuan, U.S. Sixth Army operations on Luzon, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf. However, the guerrilla war remains largely forgotten. Aside from a few published memoirs, such as Lapham’s Raiders, and official Army publications such as General Charles A. Willoughby’s, Guerrilla Resistance
*Aaron Bank was an Army officer and a former operative in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
Movement in the Philippines, the historiography of the guerrilla war in the Philippines is comparatively narrow. Survey texts on American military history often relegate the guerrilla conflict to only a paragraph or two.
Volckmann himself remains a shadowy figure throughout modern military history. The Oxford Companion to American Military History and Oxford Companion to World War II have no entries for either Volckmann or the USAFIP-NL. His name is absent from every major biography on MacArthur, and what little history there is on Volckmann is often incorrect or misleading.* Many books cite Operations Against Guerrilla Forces and Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, but do not recognize Volckmann as the author. Because field manuals are considered “intellectual property” of the Army, their authors are not credited upon the manuals’ release—although the Army does maintain a record of who writes them. For this reason, few know that Volckmann was the man behind FMs 31–20 and 31–21. My contribution to the broader historical literature, therefore, is an account that not only chronicles the military career of Russell Volckmann, but analyzes how his leadership contributed to the Japanese defeat in the Philippines and paved the way for counterinsurgency and special warfare doctrine.
Research for this project began in February 2007. When I made the decision to write a biography on Russell Volckmann, I understood that there would be a narrow selection of adequate secondary sources. As such, my book is composed almost entirely of primary source material.
The first step I took in obtaining primary source material was to contact the surviving members of the Volckmann family. At first, I had no indication of how much or what kind of material they possessed— or even how many family members were still living. My first reference to this end was the United States Military Academy’s Registry of Graduates and Former Cadets. This is a directory of every West Point graduate from 1802 until the p
resent day. Included with each graduate’s entry is a paragraph that gives: (a) date of birth, (b) date of death (if applicable), (c) all active duty assignments, (d) time of separation or retirement, and (e) the graduate’s last confirmed address. If a graduate is deceased, the Registry gives the names of any known next of kin.
*For example, there are two books that claim Volckmann was in the OSS. This is not true, however, as neither he nor any of his guerrillas ever fell under OSS jurisdiction.
From this, I discovered that Volckmann’s eldest son, Russell Jr., also attended West Point. With his name and contact information in hand, I began the research process by conducting a series of interviews with Russell Volckmann, Jr. Aside from the wealth of information he gave me concerning his father’s life and career, he informed me that the family had, in fact, retained many of Volckmann’s personal effects. Directing me to his son, Christopher, and half-brother, William, he indicated that the family had kept Volckmann’s personal papers, letters, and several newspaper clippings. The most important resource, however, was Volckmann’s war diary. This well-written and thoroughly documented journal is a day-by-day account of his adventures in the Philippines from 8 December 1941 until 16 June 1944.
When I received the diary from the Volckmann family, they informed me that they had never found any entries beyond 16 June 1944. However, after conducting extensive archival research, I concluded that Volckmann simply stopped writing after this date. By June 1944, his guerrilla force, USAFIP-NL, had an effective record keeping system that contained more details than Volckmann could feasibly fit into a journal.
My next priority was to visit the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. Arriving at Archives in August 2007, I located Record Groups 319, 389, 407, and 496. In doing so, I was pleased to find that there were over twenty boxes of information on Volckmann—including his leadership of USAFIP-NL, his work in creating the Special Forces, and his time as the Director of Special Operations in the U.S. European Command. Record Group 496 included several maps of North Luzon. However, these were drawn from the U.S. Sixth Army Records and, aside from listing Volckmann’s guerrilla positions, did not offer anything in the way of battle plans or situation maps.
Continuing my research, I decided to reference the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. There, I found a wealth of information that, surprisingly, was not present at the National Archives. Under the heading of “The Russell W. Volckmann Papers,” MHI had seven boxes of material relating strictly to his operations in the Philippines. These were in Volckmann’s possession until his death in 1982. Shortly thereafter, the collection was donated by his widow, Helen. Included in this collection are official reports and situation maps of Volckmann’s guerrilla units.
Possibly the most salient items in this collection were the USAFIPNL G-3 Operations Reports, USAFIP-NL G-2 Intelligence Reports, USAFIP-NL G-3 After-Battle Report, and the USAFIP-NL radio logs. USAFIP-NL G-3 Operations Reports are a collection of all combat reports and records pertaining to actions against the enemy. The AfterBattle Report—prepared by General Headquarters, USAFIP-NL— reconstructs the different phases of Volckmann’s guerrilla war by synthesizing the combat and intelligence reports. The radio logs contain some 385 radiograms sent to and from MacArthur in Australia. Collectively, these documents provide a valuable look into the thought process Volckmann undertook while contemplating the course of his guerrilla campaign.
Attempting to balance the perspectives of my primary source material, I referenced a handful of Japanese resources. At MHI, I recovered transcripts of interviews and sworn statements from the Japanese generals and colonels whom Volckmann confronted in the Philippines. Aside from General Yamashita, these officers included the likes of Colonel Sotomu Terau, Chief of Staff–19th Tora Division, Lieutenant General Fukutaro Nishiyama, Commander–23rd Division, and Lieutenant General Yutaka Marauka, Commander–103rd Division. Describing Volckmann as a constant thorn in their sides, these flag officers admittedly stumbled over their own frustrations in a vain attempt to shut down USAFIP-NL. Not only did these men confirm the validity of the USAFIP-NL combat reports, they acknowledged that Yamashita had placed a sizeable bounty on Volckmann’s head.
Another valuable source came from the files of the Rand Corporation. In 1963, six years after his retirement from the U.S. Army, Volckmann participated in the Rand study panel to discuss the viability of close air support for contingency operations. From the Rand Corporation, I secured a transcript of the panel’s proceedings. Volckmann used this opportunity to explain how ground-air operations were indispensable to unconventional warfare. The concepts he articulated on this panel soon found their way into the U.S. Army’s air cavalry doctrine during Vietnam.
Finally, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, I conducted research at the Special Operations Archives at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. While their archives are comparatively smaller than the ones I had visited previously, there was no lack of relevant material. The Special Operations Archives have one file on Volckmann that contains letters he wrote to the Archives—then known as the “History Office”— over a period of time spanning from 1969–1975 explaining his roles in the Philippines and creating the Special Forces. This file also includes some information about Volckmann’s role in developing special operations units for the Eighth Army during the Korean War.
Other primary sources that I encountered included a handful of personal memoirs and Army publications available from the Army Museum System. These included: We Remained and Guerrilla Days in North Luzon: A Brief Historical Narrative of a Brilliant Segment of the Resistance Movement during Enemy Occupation in the Philippines 1941–1945. Guerrilla Days is an 80-page booklet published by USAFIP-NL Headquarters in 1946, and is the official Army document chronicling the rise of Volckmann’s resistance movement. Less than 100 copies of this monograph are known to exist and the master copy rests at the First Division Museum in Fort Riley, Kansas. Memoirs include Robert Lapham’s, Lapham’s Raiders, Ray Hunt’s, Behind Japanese Lines, and other guerrillas who survived the war and have much to say about Volckmann.
After finishing the first round of archival research, I set out to find any of Volckmann’s colleagues that were still living. Simply taking into account Volckmann’s age—95 years old if he was still living in 2007— this part of my research did not promise to yield any significant information. At first, it appeared as though my apprehensions were correct: Volckmann’s sister, Ruth Volckmann Stansbury, tragically passed away the same month that I began researching for this project; Volckmann’s brother-in-law, John Stansbury, declined to be interviewed. Cross-referencing other names that Volckmann mentioned in his diary returned only a handful of obituaries. However, a significant lead developed during my research at MHI.
In the Philippines, Volckmann developed a close relationship with Captain (later Brigadier General) Donald D. “Don” Blackburn. Escaping from Bataan together, Blackburn became Volckmann’s executive officer in USAFIP-NL and later commanded one of its regiments. I had never found anything significant concerning Blackburn until I came across a 400-page transcript of an interview conducted with him in 1983. As part of an oral history project, MHI commissioned Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Smith, USAF, to conduct a series of interviews with Blackburn concerning his life and career. Not only did this interview corroborate the information I had previously gathered on Volckmann, it gave the names of Blackburn’s immediate family members: his son, Donald Jr., and daughter, Susan. I decided to locate Blackburn’s children through a public records search and, in the course of doing so, was shocked to learn that Blackburn himself was still alive and living in Sarasota, Florida.
Contacting the Blackburn family, I secured a visitation in March 2008. Unfortunately, Blackburn had been suffering from Alzheimer’s, which diluted much of his memory. However, his daughter granted me access to all of his records. Comprising nearly two whole filing cabinets, Blackburn’s collection included a wealth of
photographs, letters, war trophies, USAFIP-NL reports, and official duplicates of government documents. I also learned that Blackburn himself kept a diary while in the Philippines. Although his diary started much earlier, it ended at approximately the same time that Volckmann’s did. This, I believe, is a reasonable affirmation of my theory that Volckmann discontinued his diary because adequate records were being maintained by USAFIP-NL. Blackburn tragically passed away on 24 May 2008, nearly two months to the day after completing my visit with him.
Shortly thereafter, Blackburn’s son provided me with the contact information for Edwin P. Ramsey. Ramsey was another American guerrilla who led a small band of raiders in the northern Zambales Mountains. Ramsey was indeed a competent leader, but spent most of his time battling the Hukbalahap, or Philippine Communists. As of 2008, Ramsey is 91 years old. Despite his age, however, he remains mentally sharp and recalls his meetings with Volckmann in excruciating detail.
The secondary sources that I referenced for this project were largely for the sake of understanding the historical context in which Volckmann operated. Highlights include The Fall of the Philippinesand Triumph in the Philippines, both published by the Army Center for Military History in 1953 and 1963, respectively. The Fall of the Philippines provides the background for the American defeat by tracing it to Washington’s political neglect and the subsequent impact it had on the Philippines’ combat readiness. It also provides a detailed look at the Japanese and American military operations from 8 December 1941 until the Fall of Corregidor. Triumph in the Philippines begins with the decision to retake the archipelago and recounts the American conquests of Luzon, Mindanao, and Cebu. Both books are told from a conventional warfare perspective.
Also included is A Study in Command and Control: Special Operations in Korea, 1951–1953. Written by Colonel Rod Paschall, it is another publication from the Army Center for Military History. The book does not mention Volckmann, although it makes several references to FM 31-21 as the nexus between the Army’s disastrous ad hoc approach to special operations in Korea and the establishment of a permanent Special Forces command. Likewise, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War has no references to Volckmann, but tells of the United Nations Partisan Forces in Korea (UNPFK) and the Eighth Army’s Special Activities Group, two organizations in which Volckmann played an integral part.
Mike Guardia Page 1