In the radiograms, Volckmann made clear his intentions to continue the guerrilla war as an extension of the conventional fight against the Japanese. 427 As mentioned previously, he did not subscribe to the notions of guerrilla warfare operating on a localized basis, conducting intermittent raids and ambushes while hoping for the Allies’ eventual return. Instead, he considered the feasibility of an operation that would employ guerrilla tactics and intelligence in conjunction with conventional forces. In doing so, he discovered the martial nexus by which guerrilla warfare was most successfully employed. Guerrillas were capable of going into places that conventional forces could not go, gathering information that conventional forces could not obtain, and employing assets on the ground that the Allied forces did not have.
Each of the three USAFIP-NL combat operation phases made a critical contribution to Yamashita’s defeat in North Luzon. Luzon itself was a vital target for both Axis and Allies. It not only housed the largest of the Japanese occupation force, it was the economic and industrial nerve center of the Philippines. In paving the way for MacArthur and the Sixth Army to land in North Luzon and receive intelligence regarding enemy dispositions, Volckmann and the USAFIP-NL performed an invaluable service to the Allied cause. Through each of USAFIP-NL’s combat phases, Volckmann eroded the Japanese Fourteenth Army until it was virtually useless as a fighting force.
*This process occurred over the late spring and summer of 1944.
The first phase of operations set the tone for the rest of the campaign. Defeating the Japanese obviously required a working knowledge of their strengths and capabilities; Volckmann’s intelligence-gathering methods reflected this. Aside from knowing the enemy’s combat capabilities, one must also understand their logistical and support apparatuses. This is obviously why Volckmann collected information about enemy supply and fuel depots. As Volckmann did not yet have the resources to conduct open warfare against the Japanese, synchronizing strikes and sabotage on key targets had to suffice.
The second phase arguably had the most devastating impact on Yamashita’s forces. Although the third phase marked the termination of hostilities and the Japanese surrender, the second phase saw the breakdown of Yamashita’s formidable defense structure. Within each of the five regimental districts, Volckmann saw an opportunity to close down a vital component of the Japanese war effort in North Luzon. Some of these opportunities were limited in their scope, but others had more strategic implications. For instance, the 11th Infantry—under Blackburn’s command—seized the port of Aparri, the last Japanese naval base in North Luzon. As piecemeal as the Japanese resupply would have been, seizing Aparri meant that Yamashita’s men were now permanently cut off from the motherland. Incoming Japanese ships would no longer have a safe entry point on North Luzon. Capturing the enemy airfield at Gabu gave the Americans an operational landing zone and refuel station for long-range bombers en route to Okinawa. The creation of this Allied airstrip behind enemy lines facilitated the “island hopping” campaign, for it gave bomber pilots a staging area with greater proximity to the Japanese homeland. Finally, the 66th Infantry’s gallant raids in Lepanto-Mankayan wrested from Yamashita’s hands the largest mineral reserve in North Luzon.
The third phase was critical in the sense that it not only brought Yamashita out of the mountains, but it highlighted the efficacy of guerrillas and conventional forces in combined operations. General Kruger gave his Division Commanders in Luzon explicit instructions to offer unconditional support to Volckmann’s guerrillas and coordinate all offensive maneuvers based on Volckmann’s information. 428 This circumstance became one of the intellectual cornerstones for Volckmann’s ideology on the Special Forces. While developing the framework for special operations, Volckmann correctly forecasted that, in future conflicts, guerrilla-style units would operate most effectively when combining and synchronizing their efforts with conventional forces. 429 This observation extended not only to combat operations, but to intelligence sharing as well.
Volckmann’s legacy, therefore, is one of exceptional leadership and foresight; the impact of his actions stretch far beyond their immediate consequences. Volckmann’s ability to synthesize the realities and necessities of guerrilla warfare led to a campaign that eroded a formidable adversary and paved the way for an Allied victory. Had it not been for Volckmann, the Americans would have gone into North Luzon without solid intelligence, thereby reducing their efforts to a “trial-and-error” campaign that would have cost more lives, materiel, and potentially stalled the pace of the entire Pacific War. His actions in this regard saved more lives and facilitated the speed with which the Philippine Campaign was brought to a close. Furthermore, these guerrilla tactics and strategies gave Volckmann a practical foundation upon which to build a cohesive framework for special operations units. Unlike many of our nation’s policy makers and military leaders, Volckmann did not develop his positions based on abstract, theoretical notions of what might work in a given scenario. To the contrary, Volckmann already had the practical experience to know which methods would produce results.
Authoring two Army field manuals: FM 31-20 Operations Against Guerrilla Forces and FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, Volckmann codified the Army’s first doctrine for special warfare and counterguerrilla operations. Taking his argument directly to the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, Volckmann outlined the operational concepts for the Army Special Forces. At a time when U.S. military doctrine was conventional in its outlook, Volckmann marketed the ideas of guerilla warfare as a critical and strategic force multiplier for any future conflict.
In the course of writing this book, fellow historians asked me about a publication known as the Small Wars Manual. Published in 1935 by the United States Marine Corps, its pages contain guidelines on how to combat irregular fighters in operations other than war. The manual described tactical and psychological considerations not dissimilar from Volckmann’s FM 31-20. 430 Accordingly, they asked whether or not Volckmann had referenced the Small Wars Manual while developing Operations Against Guerrilla Forces. It is possible that he had, but more likely that he had not.
Arriving at this conclusion requires a comparative study of the Army and Marine Corps. Both share a certain degree of operational overlap, but the two services often develop their own doctrines independent from one another. As per their original doctrine, the Marine Corps is a light, lean, and agile force not intended for sustained operations too far from the parent fleet. By virtue of their size and agility, the Marines possess neither the firepower nor the logistical wherewithal to project their forces over large areas for an extended period of time. The Army, by contrast, operates within a framework that calls for sustained combat power and the occupation of key terrain across multiple environments. To accomplish this end, the Army employs a greater logistical and supply apparatus.
The distinction between Army and Marine capabilities undoubtedly influenced the concepts written in the Small Wars Manual. “Small wars” represented conflicts that the Marine Corps seemed the most capable of handling. By definition, “small wars” were low-intensity conflicts against asymmetrical opponents and did not require any protracted force commitment. Consisting of small-scale rebellions and punitive expeditions, the Small Wars Manual treated these operations in a vein similar to law enforcement. In fact, the manual’s protocol directed Marine commanders to work closely with the local police. 431
Volckmann, however, did not contextualize counterinsurgency strictly within the realms of low-intensity conflict. He saw counterguerrilla operations as part of a larger conflict wherein enemy guerrillas could either: (1) operate in conjunction with regular forces, or (2) become large-scale forces in their own right, capable of sustained harassment against an occupying army. Both contingencies necessitated a force structure beyond what the Marines could single-handedly provide.
Perhaps the Marine Corps kept the Small Wars Manual within their own doctrinal community while the Army maintained its convention
al outlook. Nonetheless, before FM 31-20, the Army had no established protocol for guerrilla warfare. Reviewing Volckmann’s literature on counterinsurgency, it is apparent that he at least thought he was starting from scratch. In any event, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that Volckmann ever read the Small Wars Manualor even knew of its existence.
As corollary to his work in developing the Special Forces concept, Volckmann made a significant contribution to the development of tactical air support and air control operations. From the practical aspects of his work in Luzon, Volckmann demonstrated the need for coordinated air support to beleaguered ground units. This need was so great that the Air Force not only incorporated the forward air controller concept into its doctrine, but also specifically called on Volckmann to assess the potential of air support in unconventional warfare.* Also, Volckmann was the first to advocate the use of the newly devised helicopter in air-ground warfare. In the wake of the Army Air Forces’ dissolution, Army Aviation became the military’s premiere rotary-winged force. To Volckmann, the helicopter had two advantages that fixed-wing aircraft did not. Unlike the airplanes that had supported him in North Luzon, helicopters could hover. Also, preparing a helicopter landing zone (LZ) was not nearly as difficult. Instead of the mile-long airstrips that required a full contingent of combat engineers to prepare, creating a helicopter LZ required nothing more than an infantry squad with a few pounds of TNT. Expressing the potential of helicopter-based combat in FM 31-20, Volckmann’s ideas paved the way for what is known today as air cavalry.
Furthermore, as America’s involvement in Vietnam grew deeper, the Army distilled Volckmann’s manuals into one comprehensive guide for fighting the Communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia. This subsequent field manual underwent several iterations, and became the operational guideline for tactical forces on the ground. His Rand Corporation and FM 31-20 discussions of helicopter support sold the Army on the need for airmobile units. Subsequently, air cavalry saw widespread implementation during Vietnam.
In light of his many accomplishments, however, Volckmann was not infallible. An innovator of any type is bound to make mistakes, and Volckmann was certainly no exception. For instance, killing enemy spies was necessary to survive the war, but Volckmann’s methods often went too far. Instead of simply shooting collaborators, Volckmann gave his guerrillas a “blank check” to dispose of them in whatever manner they pleased. Many informers were hanged, mutilated, dismembered, decapitated, and burned alive—one was even beaten to death with a crowbar. Although Volckmann did not participate in any of these atrocities, after the war, some Filipinos lobbied their government to put Volckmann and Blackburn on trial for war crimes. However, the official decree from Philippine President Manuel Roxas—which currently hangs on the wall in Blackburn’s home office—exonerated USAFIP-NL and accepted the elimination of spies as a necessary evil in war. 432
* In 1963, the U.S. Air Force tapped Volckmann (by then a retired Brigadier General) to lead the Rand Corporation’s study panel on the feasibility of air support tactics in counterinsurgency warfare.
Volckmann also didn’t understand the Filipinos’ cultural inclinations for vengeance. Often, the indigenous guerrillas would settle their vendettas by claiming that their personal enemies were spies, thereby providing a justification for murder. Volckmann tried to control this by seeking multiple sources to verify someone as a spy, but personal vendettas still accounted for a significant number of deaths. 433 In addition, at times, Volckmann also proved himself as not being the best judge of character. His appointment of Captain John O’Day stands as a testament to this. O’Day had been a miner before the war and held various positions throughout USAFIP-NL, including a brief stint as the commander of the 66th Infantry. On one occasion, he nearly got Volckmann killed as a result of false reporting—for example when he claimed a particular area had been secured when in fact, it had not. When O’Day burned and plundered an entire village because one of the residents was thought to be a collaborator, a fed-up Volckmann relieved him of command. 434 Although Volckmann conceded that eliminating spies was a necessary evil, his termination of O’Day’s command indicated that there were boundaries that he would not cross. Clearing the area of spies and collaborators was a priority mission, but Volckmann sought to minimize collateral damage against the innocent.
Robert Lapham emerges as Volckmann’s strongest critic. Lapham, a 1939 graduate of the University of Iowa, was an officer in the Army Reserve until his activation in June 1941. Originally assigned as a company commander in the 45th Infantry (Philippine Scouts), Lapham, too, fled the Japanese onslaught in Bataan. Building his group of raiders, the Luzon Guerrilla Army Force (LGAF), Lapham began conducting a few small-scale raids in the Central Plains area of Luzon. He and Volckmann had met previously during the latter’s trek to North Luzon. At the time, Lapham was bedridden at his base camp with a high-grade fever. Volckmann indicated that he was on his way north to begin coordinating with the remaining USAFFE elements in Mountain Province. When Volckmann assumed command of USAFIP-NL, he tried to absorb LGAF and organize them into another military district with Lapham as the district commander. Lapham, however, solidly rebuffed him. But instead of punishing Lapham or attempting to force his compliance, Volckmann simply let the matter pass and focused his energies on Yamashita. 435
Although some of Lapham’s grievances against Volckmann are legitimate (i.e. allowing brutal treatment of collaborators and his failure to control subordinates like O’Day), many of them appear to stem from petty jealousies. For example, he castigated Volckmann for keeping his base of operations in the cordillera of North Luzon. 436 He claims that his base of operations in the Central Plains produced better results, but this appears not to have been the case. The Central Plains did give Lapham greater overall mobility but, by the same token, it did likewise for the Japanese. Lapham constantly had to relocate his command posts to avoid the threat of enemy patrols.
Moreover, he claims that Volckmann’s record keeping practices were unwise in the sense that it jeopardized the civilians who worked for him. What Lapham did not realize, however, is that Volckmann used the “call sign” system as a means to safeguard their anonymity. Lapham also claims that Volckmann kept records for the sake of his own aggrandizement after the war. 437 Volckmann, however, was a creature of habit, not egotism. 438 Keeping detailed records is a well established part of military protocol. Volckmann needed to maintain adequate records to validate the claims of his organization, keep track of receipts, and maintain personnel rolls. Finally, even though Lapham indicts Volckmann for his treatment of the Filipino collaborators, he quietly admits that he, too, engaged in similar activities to neutralize threats from the “fifth column.”
Even some within Volckmann’s own circle have criticized him. Rob Arnold, who commanded the Third District, USAFIP-NL, admits that he was not impressed by either Volckmann or his whole operation. His complaints include a lamentation that Volckmann’s GHQ Staff seemed more interested in pursuing relationships with the native women than doing their jobs as guerrillas. 439 But as Ray Hunt (who served with Lapham in LGAF) concedes, “Arnold had a sour nature; he regarded guerrilla operations as senseless; and when he stumbled into Blackburn’s camp in the spring of 1943 he was weak and sick.” 440 Thus, it remains debatable what motivated Arnold to criticize his leader and the North Luzon guerrilla force—especially considering the tactical victories enjoyed by the 15th Infantry throughout 1945.
After Volckmann left OCPW, he completed a course of study at the Army War College and went on to serve as the Director of the Special Operation Division, U.S. European Command. In this capacity he oversaw the development and implementation of training for Special Forces units in Europe. Also, as part of a Cold War diplomatic mission to Iran, Volckmann prepared a brief for the Shah and his top military commanders marketing the efficacy of special operations forces in a time of war. As a consequence, the Iranian Army adopted its own Special Forces apparatus similar to the American design. 441
In 1956, at the age of 45, Volckmann became one of the oldest persons in Army history, up to that point, to complete parachute training at the Basic Airborne Course in Fort Benning, GA. This was a requirement needed to assume his next duty position: the Assistant Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. *As it were, this was Volckmann’s last assignment before retiring. After spending scarcely a year with the 82nd Airborne, Volckmann retired as a Brigadier General in July 1957. Returning to his hometown of Clinton, Iowa, he took over the family business: the Volckmann Furniture Company—a manufacturer and retailer of fine furniture. In 1977, after selling the company’s interests to the Ethan Allen Company, Volckmann retired for good. Splitting his time between two homes—one in Clinton and another at a golfing community in Harlingen, Texas—Volckmann quietly lived out the rest of his years. He died on 30 June 1982 at the age of 70. 442
Overall, despite Volckmann’s missteps in the Philippines and those who have tried to discredit or downplay his accomplishments, he emerges as a forgotten hero whose legacy is one of critical importance. Had it not been for Russell William Volckmann, the Allied resistance movement in North Luzon may have very well collapsed by early 1943, and the isolated guerrillas would have been systematically destroyed by the Japanese. Given the comparative resources of the Japanese and American militaries, the Allies would have retaken Luzon eventually, but not without an extreme loss of life and a Pacific War stalled by a quagmire in the Philippines. Had it not been for Russell William Volckmann, the operational framework for the counterinsurgency doctrine and the Army Special Forces may not have ever surfaced. For these reasons, Russell William Volckmann commands a unique and noteworthy place in America’s military history.
Mike Guardia Page 21