On 30 August, Lanzerac, on orders from Joffre, began to withdraw from the Oise. Von Bülow asked von Kluck for assistance in exploiting this success and, that evening, First Army was ordered to wheel to the south-east in order to catch Lanrezac in the flank. This fitted perfectly with von Kluck’s own view of the situation. Besides, although he was aware of French forces south of Amiens, he did not consider them of much significance. Hence First Army began to swing across the front of Maunoury’s French Sixth Army in a path which would take it well to the east of Paris. To guard his right flank, von Kluck detailed just IV Reserve Corps, which had entered Amiens that day, but then fell further and further behind as the other corps headed and crossed the Oise. On 1 September, the German First Army came up against the BEF rearguards once more and von Kluck again saw the chance to annihilate the British. Hence he ordered his corps south once more, but the British were too quick for him and continued back towards the Marne. On the following evening, von Moltke, who had now moved OHL from Koblenz, where it had been situated since the beginning of the campaign, to Luxembourg, issued fresh orders by wireless. Von Kluck was now to ‘follow in echelon behind Second Army and to be responsible for the flank protection of the Armies’.3 This revealed how out of touch von Moltke was with the situation at the Front, for First Army was a day’s march ahead of Second Army and for von Kluck to carry out the OHL order would mean that he would have to halt for two days. If he did this, the object of driving the enemy away from Paris could not be achieved and it would allow the Allies a valuable breathing space. On the other hand, the task of protection of an ever longer flank was weakening his combat power and he was desperate for the return of 22nd Reserve Division’s other brigade, as well as for additional reinforcements. He therefore resolved to continue his advance without halting, leaving IV Reserve Corps to continue to cover any possible threat from the Paris direction, a threat, which, unknown to von Kluck, was about to become reality. For, recognising the increasing vulnerability of the German First Army, the French Sixth Army was preparing to strike.
On 3 September von Kluck sent von Moltke a telegram stating that he had crossed the Marne and that at least part of the enemy in front of him was becoming totally disorganised. It was not, however, until the following evening that von Moltke saw this message and when he did he was aghast. Not only was First Army’s right flank now vulnerable, but that of Second Army as well. The time had come to switch the main effort to the centre. First and Second Armies were now to face west to guard against any thrust from Paris, while the other armies broke through in the Verdun area and then swung westwards. As he made this decision so Sixth Army was beginning to advance towards IV Reserve Corps.
The morning of the 5th found IV Reserve Corps advancing on two parallel routes towards the Marne, the only one of von Kluck’s corps yet to cross the river. 7th Reserve Division, with some cavalry, was on the right and 22nd Reserve Division, still with just one infantry brigade, on the left. Unknown to von Gronau, the corps commander, the leading division of the French Sixth Army was at that moment advancing from the west towards him. At 1000 hours von Gronau ordered his troops to halt, much welcomed since they had been on the march since the early hours, and they set about preparing for a meal. At the same time von Gronau’s cavalry began to bring in reports of French activity in the west. As they did so, the leading French regiment halted for its midday meal in a village less than three miles west of the Germans. Between the two lay a piece of high ground. This von Gronau decided he must occupy and immediately sent 7th Reserve Division to do this. The French regimental commander also thought that he should at least send patrols up on to this high ground, but he was too late. The Germans beat him to it and began to shell his regiment. Both sides had missed their meal and the Battle of the Marne had begun.
The French now tried to drive von Gronau off the high ground, but succeeded only in the north, and were then driven off again by a counter-attack. Von Rundstedt’s division had already been committed and the fighting continued until darkness fell. It was to be some hours, however, before von Kluck knew that IV Reserve Corps was heavily engaged. In the meantime, the remainder of his corps continued south and crossed Le Grand Morin over 15 miles to the south of von Gronau’s position. True, he had received the OHL change of plan at 0700 hours, but dismissed it, considering that von Moltke was making too much of the Paris threat and was out of touch with the real situation. In the evening, though, as reports from von Gronau began to trickle through with urgent requests for reinforcements to be sent to him, the situation suddenly appeared very different. ‘We find ourselves facing a grave crisis’, as von Kluck’s chief of staff commented.4 This was reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, who arrived that evening at von Kluck’s headquarters from Luxembourg to amplify von Moltke’s new orders. For the first time the army commander was made aware of the fact that everywhere along the front the French resistance had hardened and that he was now out on a limb. Accordingly, he halted his advance south and ordered II Corps to retrace its steps in order to assist von Gronau. The other corps, too, were to prepare to fall back to the Marne.
During the night, von Gronau, who, like his adversaries, had suffered significant casualties, withdrew to the east. His reason was that his present position was too vulnerable to an outflanking movement and hence he pulled his troops back to the next ridge to the east, the Multien plateau which stood with its back to the Ourq.
MAP 2. Battle of the Marne.
Maunoury’s men occupied the ground surrended by IV Reserve Corps and by mid-morning on the 6th the French were pushing against von Gronau’s new line. Once again, the fighting was heavy, but von Gronau’s men, cheered by the knowledge that II Corps was on its way, held their ground. One concern was that the British were involved in the attack, the khaki uniforms of the Moroccans in the French Sixth Army being confused with those of the BEF. Von Kluck was alarmed enough by this mistaken report to order IV Corps to move back that night to lend its weight on the Ourcq. Next day, the fighting grew even more in intensity. By now the Germans knew, thanks to a captured French order, that the Allies were mounting a general offensive, and this was confirmed when the French Fifth and Seventh Armies began to pressure von Kluck’s remaining corps in the south (III, XI) and the German Second Army. Maunoury, now reinforced with additional elements sent to him by taxi from Paris, continued to batter his head against the Ourcq position, which still held. IV Reserve Corps continued to bear the brunt of this, but the situation was becoming desperate. In von Gronau’s words, his men had now been fighting for three days against ‘an obviously superior enemy … without reserves, under a burning sun throughout the day, without water and without provision’. Behind the front line, chaos was growing, as regimental supply columns ‘roamed about in search of their units, the wounded flowed back towards the rear and eventually filled the churches … at cross-roads staff officers were detaining deserters … many were roving about looking for food.’ Permeating all was ‘the acrid smell of smoke’, to which was added ‘the stench of dead horses’.5 Von Rundstedt’s divisional commander, von Reimann, was severely wounded during this time, which left him running the division. However, his calm leadership apparently proved an ‘inspiration’ to all.6 Von Kluck now felt forced to withdraw his two remaining corps in the south, which he had temporarily given over to von Bülow, and these began to withdraw on the 7th, leaving Second Army’s flank in the air much to von Bülow’s chagrin. The bulk were directed to withdraw north and then swing round and attack Maunoury on his left flank, but Bloem’s division was directed to relieve the hard pressed IV Reserve Corps. Bloem’s own regiment was detailed to relieve von Rundstedt’s division, or more precisely the remains of its one brigade:
‘As darkness drew on, the roar of battle suddenly ceased, after a final mad burst of firing, a usual custom apparently, and soon afterwards we were ordered forward to relieve the remnants of the 44th Reserve Brigade, the 32nd and 82nd Regiments, in the front line. We marched on across the holl
ow, then up the hill into the village, which was now gradually crumbling away and burning into a heap of rubble. Dead men lay in the road, shadowy forms passed by our equally shadowy forms, voices asked: “What regiment? Where are you going?” A captain, wandering aimlessly and alone, spoke to me: his speech was confused, and the light of my torch showed a haggard face with the restless shifting eyes of a madman: “I once had a company. I’m all that’s left of it.” On all sides was the tramping of troops, the clatter of horses, the rattle of guns on the march, and the shouting or moaning of human beings.’7
The arrival of Bloem’s division frustrated Maunoury’s attempt to outflank the Ourcq position from the south, although the Germans did surrender some ground. Likewise, Maunoury had been denied success in the north by the arrival of von Kluck’s other forces from the south. He was therefore ordered to cease attacking and go on to the defensive while the BEF struck von Kluck from the south.
During this same day, 8 September, von Moltke had despatched Hentsch on a lightning tour of the armies. Moving from east to west, he found that Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies were reasonably satisfied with the situation. He arrived at von Bülow’s headquarters late that night and the Second Army commander immediately made plain to him his concern over the gap that had appeared between him and von Kluck. Next morning Hentsch had a further discussion with von Bülow’s chief of staff and chief of operations. It was clear that von Kluck, engaged as he was with the French Sixth Army, could do nothing to close the gap and the only answer was for Second Army to withdraw back across the Marne. This was especially urgent since British cavalry had crossed the river in von Kluck’s sector at dawn and the Fifth French Army was also on the move. Hentsch then got into his motor car to travel to von Kluck’s headquarters at Mareuil. He arrived here at midday to find that von Kluck had launched an attack with his IX Corps against Maunoury’s left, but had also, in the face of the BEF threat, ordered his centre and left to wheel so that they faced south. At the same time, news came from Second Army that their withdrawal had begun. Now Hentsch had been told by von Moltke that if he found that one of the right-hand armies was withdrawing the other was to conform. Second Army was to pull back to the line of the River Vesle, a tributary of the Aisne, and First Army to the line of the Veskle and Aisne as far west as Soissons. In this way the gap would be closed. Accordingly, with von Bülow now in retreat, Hentsch told von Kluck that he was to pull back to the line Soissons-Fismes. Von Kluck therefore stopped the IX Corps attack and gave the necessary orders.
By the end of 11 September First Army was back across the Aisne, with von Rundstedt’s division in the right centre of the line, around Fontenoy. Pressure from the French Fifth Army and the BEF had, however, combined to prevent von Kluck from extending as far east as Fismes and had also forced von Bülow north-east, where he had taken up a position along the River Vesle in the Reims area. All that covered the 30 mile gap was a thin screen of cavalry and other elements equating to one division. It was as well that the British and French were as exhausted as their enemy and were unable to exploit this. Even so, Maunoury’s Sixth Army did try to get round von Kluck’s right flank. However, although he managed to cross the Aisne, the German defences on the heights above the river proved too strong. In the meantime, von Moltke managed to plug the gap between von Kluck and von Bülow, first with a Reserve corps, which had been beseiging Mauberge, and then with Seventh Army, which he brought round from Alsace.
There now began that period known as the Race to the Sea, as the German armies tried to exploit the open Allied left flank. First Army’s role in this was, however, small and purely defensive. This was a shallow hook to the Noyon area during the second half of September in order to frustrate further efforts by Maunoury to outflank the position on the Aisne. Trench warfare now set in.
Von Rundstedt’s personal view of the campaign was that it failed because the strong right flank demanded by von Schlieffen had been fatally weakened. He also considered that von Moltke had not commanded with sufficient firmness and that his headquarters was too far to the rear to be able to influence events. He also condemned von Kluck for his obstinacy and asserted that it was he alone who had created the crisis on the Marne.8 Since his division had come the closest of any to Paris he had some cause to feel strongly about the matter.
Von Rundstedt’s own efforts did not go unrecognised. It was probably at this time that he was awarded the Iron Cross 1st Class. On 28 November 1914 he was also promoted to Major. A few weeks earlier, he had fallen sick with a lung infection, probably caused by the intense strain of the past two months, and was forced to relinquish his post.9 By the beginning of December, however, he had recovered sufficiently to return to duty. He was posted to the Military Government in Antwerp, probably because the doctors considered that to expose him to the rigours of a more active appointment would undermine his health once more.
Von Rundstedt remained at Antwerp throughout the winter and on 1 April 1915 was appointed chief of staff to the 86th Infantry Division.
This was a newly raised formation, with one infantry brigade of three regiments and a field artillery regiment of three battalions, the units being found from existing divisions, which were also reduced to this lower establishment. This was sent to the Eastern Front to join von Gallwitz’s costly offensive to the River Narew which took place in July 1915.
At the beginning of 1915, the Central Powers had launched two offensives with the ultimate aim of trapping the Russian armies by double envelopment. In the south, the Austrians, supported by the Germans, had attacked in the Carpathians and initially made good progress before being flung back in March by Russian reinforcements made available through their capture of the fortress of Przemysl which they had been besieging. In the north, von Hindenburg, with two armies, had attacked from the Masurian Lakes and destroyed the Russian Tenth Army, only to be brought to a halt by the appearance of a fresh Russian army. After some debate, it was decided that a fresh offensive be launched in Galicia. This opened on 2 May and reaped spectacular results. By the end of the month Przemysl had been recaptured and the Russians driven back over 100 miles. Lemberg then fell and by mid July the Austro-Hungarian and German forces were closing up to the River Bug. This left a significant Russian salient around Warsaw and, in order to pinch this out and trap the Russian forces within it, the Germans launched a subsidiary attack from the north on 13 July. This was to involved Gerd’s division. On the 24th the Narew was crossed, but then the Russians began to counter-attack and prevented any immediate further German advance. A German soldier on the Narew described what the fighting was like in a letter home:
‘We were certainly not in an enviable position. Behind us was the Narew, cutting off any communication with the rear. Ammunition was running short. All the time there were shouts: “Careful on the left! Careful on the right! Strong enemy column gathering on the left. Enemy column on the right,” and so on…. Our rags were at last beginning to get dry, but on the second evening it started raining again. And how it poured! The rain lasted the whole night. I was sitting against the back of the trench, wet to the skin, when suddenly I heard loud cheering and trumpet sounds on the left … on the left flank two Russian brigades launched an attack against one of our battalions. Next day I felt pretty awful. My rags were wet again, with sand clinging to them. I was cold and hungry, for apart from the few bites which each of us had brought with him there was nothing to eat. And nothing to drink, only the water of the Narew, in which dead bodies were floating about. The sight of so many dead behind our trench, and the groans of the wounded, were not exactly encouraging, either.’10
The Last Prussian Page 5