The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  In the name of Fritsch and in the name of the whole Army I demanded an immediate legal investigation and, in the event of proven innocence, of which my conviction was as firm as a rock, adequate reparation for Fritsch. After some hesitation, he said that he was prepared to do so.’

  Hitler then went on to say that now there was no War Minister he wanted to assume supreme command of the Wehrmacht himself. He realised that Goering was not acceptable to the Army, but would make him a Field Marshal. He wanted to appoint Keitel as Chief of Staff of the OKW and von Rundstedt agreed with this, but warned that Keitel must not be given command authority since he knew nothing about the Navy and would not dare tangle with Goering’s Luftwaffe. Hitler concurred, but then said that he would like to appoint a Generalissimo in the future. Von Rundstedt proposed von Fritsch for this post after his certain acquittal, but Hitler did not react to this.

  They then went on to discuss the question of von Fritsch’s successor as Commander-in-Chief. Von Rundstedt proposed Beck, which Hitler rejected and came back with von Reichenau. In turn, von Rundstedt turned him down ‘in the name of the entire Army’. Finally, Hitler came up with von Brauchitsch, now commanded Heeresgruppe 4 at Leipzig. To this von Rundstedt responded that he was an excellent choice, ‘a good leader and thoroughly welcome by the Army’. Finally, von Rundstedt broached his own position. He had now held his current command for well over five years and wanted to retire and make way for a younger man. Hitler said that he wanted him to stay on for the sake of the Army and for ‘political reasons’. Von Rundstedt said that he would be prepared to do so until autumn 1938. ‘In the meantime, he told me, he trusted me. I don’t know why.’ This ended the meeting and von Rundstedt immediately went and reported the conversation to both Beck and von Fritsch.37

  Von Brauchitsch himself was an artilleryman, who had, among other posts, served two tours in the Truppenamt during the Weimar era, as well as having been a Wehrkreis and corps commander. Thus, in terms of experience, he was well suited to the job. He was, however, intending to retire for domestic reasons. He wanted to divorce his wife of over 30 years and marry another woman. His wife, with four children on her hands, would only agree to this in return for a financial settlement well beyond von Brauchitsch’s means. Von Brauchitsch therefore tried to bargain with Hitler. He would accept the post of Commander-in-Chief in return for a payment, which turned out to be over 80,000 Reichsmarks. Hitler agreed to this and, in doing so, was able to put von Brauchitsch into an impossible position. First, von Brauchitsch was now personally indebted to him and his second wife, a fervent Nazi, never hesitated to remind him of this. Worse, she herself had a dubious background and he did not need to be reminded of what had happened to von Blomberg. No wonder, then, that Franz Halder described the von Brauchitsch – Hitler relationship as ‘like a little cadet standing before his commandant’.38 Thus, Hitler had got what he wanted, two officers in key positions, Keitel and von Brauchitsch, whom he knew would not stand in his way, but he was not finished yet.

  MAP 5. Wehrkreis Boundaries 1939.

  On the following day, von Rundstedt, at his own request, had another interview with Hitler. He wanted to reiterate the urgent need for von Fritsch to have a proper legal investigation and to warn him once more about allowing Keitel executive power. Hitler then asked his views on certain senior officers, ‘which, of course, I only expressed in a favourable way’.39 Von Rundstedt did not, however, seem to have detected what Hitler’s purpose was in this. Von Brauchitsch was then summoned to see Hitler and the same questions were asked of him.40 Von Rundstedt’s name was mentioned and von Brauchitsch defended him on the grounds that he and Hitler got on well,41 which, considering Hitler’s parting remark to von Rundstedt at their 31 January meeting, must have merely reinforced Hitler’s view of him.

  The next step was taken on 3 February, when von Fritsch was formally removed from his post pending the investigation. The following day, von Brauchitsch’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief was made public. Simultaneously, a list of senior officers was announced as being retired or posted. No less than sixteen of the most senior were retired. They included one group commander (von Leeb), and five corps commanders (von Kluge, Kress von Kressenstein, von Küchler, von Weichs, von Witzleben). All, apart from Kress von Kressenstein, would be recalled to the colours within the next few months. A further 44 officers were reassigned, including Erich von Manstein, Deputy Chief of Staff of OKH, who was appointed to command 18th Infantry Division. Curiously, when the list of those being retired was published in the Berliner Tageblatt on the following day (5 February), von Rundstedt’s name was also on the list.42 Whether this was an assumption on the newspaper’s part or whether von Rundstedt’s name had been on the list and someone had forgotten to delete it, cannot be ascertained, although it is more likely to have been the latter. As it was, confirmation of von Rundstedt’s position came on 1 March when he was promoted Colonel General.

  Von Brauchitsch’s first task was the disagreeable one of having to organise von Fritsch’s court-martial, which was convened on 11 March and presided over by Goering. But, on the following day, German troops marched into Austria and embodied it into the Greater Reich. Von Brauchitsch, although he was not available when Beck and von Manstein, who had not yet been replaced, were summoned to the Chancellery 48 hours before, to be told by Hitler what he wanted, must have known what was in the wind. Indeed, he told von Rundstedt to deputise for him at the celebrations of 125th anniversary of the institution of the Iron Cross, which were to take place in Breslau at that very time. Either he wanted to get von Rundstedt out of the way in case he objected or, more likely, he himself could not get away from Berlin. In any event, von Rundstedt said later that the first he heard of the Anschluss was in Breslau after it had happened.

  Be that as it may, the von Fritsch court-martial was interrupted and was not re-convened until 17 March. It then transpired that Himmler’s Gestapo had, mistakenly or intentionally, confused von Fritsch with a retired cavalry captain of the same name. He was therefore acquitted and von Rundstedt later stated that Goering, according to von Fritsch, had ‘behaved in a decent way’.44 Even so, von Fritsch was not restored to the active list, although, as a sop, Hitler appointed him to the Colonelcy of the 12th Artillery Regiment. A now very embittered man, he resolved to challenge Himmler to a duel and passed this in writing to von Rundstedt to issue.

  Duelling itself was still officially considered to be an acceptable way of settling affairs of honour. Indeed, on 1 March 1938, von Brauchitsch, perhaps with the von Fritsch case in mind, issued a circular on the subject, which stated that: ‘A challenge to a duel is the ultimate means for the defence of honour. It is only to be employed if personal honour has been gravely injured and if a senior officer is powerless to restore the situation.’45 Certainly, von Fritsch’s case appeared to fulfil these criteria, but von Rundstedt took no action over the challenge. He merely carried it around in his pocket for some weeks and then persuaded von Fritsch to withdraw it. His grounds for this were that ‘on Hitler’s orders, Himmler would have never faced up to a duel and because the whole affair would have only stirred things up at the expense of the Army.’46 Von Rundstedt clearly believed that the honour and integrity of the Army as a whole was not worth risking for the sake of one individual member. He also thought, perhaps, that Hitler’s trust in him was worth cultivating and that to appear as the bearer of von Fritsch’s challenge would put him at odds with him. If this happened, he would be in no position to defend the Army’s integrity.

  Hitler now believed that, as a result of the purge, all possible Wehrmacht opposition to his plans had been removed. His eye was now firmly fixed on the South-East. On 21 April he ordered Keitel to dust off the plans for Case Green, the pre-emptive attack on Czechoslovakia. One officer within the OKH was still prepared to object. Ludwig Beck began to bombard von Brauchitsch with memoranda warning of the dangers of such an operation. On 28 May Hitler told his commanders that Germany’s outstanding problems i
n Europe had to be solved quickly, before Britain could complete rearmament, which would not be until 1941–42. Beck again warned his superior officer that an attack on Czechoslovakia could lead to general war in Europe, which Germany will be ill placed to win. Hitler now declared that Czechoslovakia must be overcome by 1 October at the latest and this served to increase Beck’s protests. Finally, at the end of July, he urged von Brauchitsch to tell Hitler that his generals refused to support him in his madcap expansionist schemes. Von Brauchitsch refused to do this, but did agree to summon the senior commanders to a conference. In the meantime, a revised mobilisation plan was issued on 1 August and training was stepped up.

  The conference itself was held on 4 August. Von Brauchitsch informed those present that he had received orders to prepare for an attack on Czechoslovakia. He read out a paper, which they assumed to have been written by Beck, although the Commander-in-Chief did not come clean on this. In essence, the document declared that the Sudetenland was not worth the risk of general war. Von Brauchitsch then invited the assembled company to put this view to Hitler. In turn the corps commanders said that the mood of both soldiers and civilians within their areas was against war and all agreed that, while an attack against Czechoslovakia would be successful, the Army was not strong enough to take on the major powers. According to von Weichs,47 only two generals were against a mass objection to Hitler. Von Reichenau, who was commanding IV Corps, based at Munich, and appeared at the conference on crutches, said that from his personal knowledge of Hitler, it would be much better if officers represented their views individually to him. Nevertheless, von Reichenau did not disagree with the general view, which von Rundstedt said surprised him.48 The other objection came from Ernst Busch, the VIII Corps commander, who said that soldiers should not interfere with politicians. This brought the retort from Beck that trained staff officers had to think in politico-military terms. Von Brauchitsch, however, undertook to represent the views of the meeting to Hitler, although von Rundstedt, according to von Weichs, warned him that he should be careful how he put them across. In Robert O’Neill’s view,49 this was because von Rundstedt was fearful that Hitler might sack von Brauchitsch and replace him with von Reichenau, which, considering von Rundstedt’s constant opposition to this notion, is very likely to have been so. He would not, of course, have known of the circumstances through which von Brauchitsch, whether he liked it not, was bound to Hitler. According to Keitel,50 what had transpired at the conference quickly reached Hitler’s ears, either through von Reichenau or Guderian. The latter was now commanding XVI Corps (the Panzer Divisions) and was forming an increasingly close relationship with Hitler in pursuit of furthering the Panzer arm. Thus, von Brauchitsch received short shrift when he saw Hitler, although he continued to try and influence him throughout September. Hitler then upraided his senior commanders while attending military exercises at Jüterbog. He told them that he would deal with Czechoslovakia by force and that there would be no general European war while Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, with their policy of appeasement, were at the helm in Britain and France. Beck was then invited to tender his resignation, which he did.

  While von Rundstedt supported Beck’s sentiments, he was not prepared to make any personal protest over his forced resignation. He merely relied on the ‘chain of command’ and saw this as von Brauchitsch’s duty, as he would constantly do. He therefore urged von Brauchitsch to keep up the pressure on Hitler.51 In the meantime, he had a role to play in the seizing of the Sudetenland for the Third Reich. Four armies were to be involved. These were, according to the mobilisation plan, to be formed from existing Heeresgruppen. Von Reichenau, now promoted to command Heeresgruppe 4, was to strike at Pilsen from the north-west with the Tenth Army, while the Twelfth Army, under von Leeb, now recalled to active service, and Fourteenth (List-Heeresgruppe 5) would invade from Austria. Von Rundstedt would advance from Silesia in the north with what would become Second Army. His prospects of retiring from active service on 1 October receded into the distance. According to his daughter-in-law, however, the deal that von Rundstedt had made with Hitler during the von Fritsch affair was that he would be recalled in ‘times of emergency’.52 The Sudetenland was clearly such an emergency and hence von Rundstedt accepted the situation.

  If Hitler believed that he had, with Beck’s resignation, finally removed all military opposition to his plans this was not so. Franz Halder had moved across from being Chief of Operations to OKW to Chief of Staff OKH in succession to Beck. A devout Lutheran, Halder was also horrified at Hitler’s policies, but was more circumspect in his opposition than Beck had been. He was already in touch with a circle, both military and civilian, who believed that Hitler must be deposed, although he was careful to use an intermediary, Colonel (later General) Hans Oster, Admiral Canaris’s chief of staff at the Abwehr. Among the civilians involved were Dr Hans Goerdeler, former Lord Mayor of Leipzig, Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and Ulrich von Hassell, who had been deposed as Ambassador to Rome in February 1938. The soldiers included Beck and Erwin von Witzleben, recalled to the Colours and now one of von Rundstedt’s corps commanders and, according to his elder grandson, his closest comrade.53 Another well known to von Rundstedt was Erich Hoepner, his chief of staff in Berlin from 1935, who had recently taken over command of 1st Light Division.

  In August 1938, the plotters sent an emissary, Major Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, a cousin of the General Ewald von Kleist, to London in order to warn the British Government of Hitler’s intentions towards Czechoslovakia and to enlist its support for a coup. While Winston Churchill, then still in the political wilderness, received him warmly, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain merely noted that von Kleist reminded him of ‘the Jacobites at the Court of France in King William’s time and I think that we must discount a good deal of what he says.’54 Thus von Kleist-Schmenzin returned virtually empty-handed, but the plotters were undeterred. As soon as Hitler gave the order to invade Czechoslovakia, von Witzleben, whose headquarters was in Berlin, was to arrest Hitler and secure the capital while Hoepner prevented SS units from advancing from Bavaria. Halder had not, however, approached those who would be commanding armies during the attack.

  ‘I knew that at that moment when the veil was removed I could rely on Adam, Bock and also on von Rundstedt. This gave me the conviction to act; I well know that many comrades said it would be impossible to set the Army in motion against Hitler. Anyway it was the last moment when it was possible.’54

  Certainly, von Bock and von Rundstedt were well placed, while Wilhelm Adam was commandant of the Wehrmacht Academy, and Beck, on 1 September, was placed in temporary command of the First Army on Germany’s border with France. Von Rundstedt himself later confirmed that he knew nothing of the plot, telling Liddell Hart that he had already retired by this time.56 Yet, apart from this not being so, it is surprising when officers as close to him as von Witzleben and Hoepner were involved in the plot that no approach was made or hint given to him. But Halder stated that Adam, von Bock and von Rundstedt had all warned him that they could not be entirely confident of their troops being prepared to act against Hitler.57 This was to be one of von Rundstedt’s justifications for not becoming involved in future plots against the régime, as we shall see.

  As it was, Neville Chamberlain’s intercessions in September, which culminated in the Munich Pact, swept the carpet from under both the Czechs and the plotters. The German armies crossed the border on 1 October and the Sudetenland was bloodlessly incorporated into the Third Reich. Von Rundstedt recalled that Hitler spent the day with him during the occupation and told him how ‘free and liberated’ he felt. This, von Rundstedt said, made him believe that Hitler had never wanted war with the Czechs and that finally the ‘nightmare was lifted off the German people and also off the Führer’.58 This was reinforced when, on 1 November, von Rundstedt was finally permitted to retire. Some, notably von Hassell, were, however, convinced that von Rundstedt had been sacked for ‘cold feet’ over the Sudeten
land and believed that, with the retirements of Beck and Adam, which were announced at the same time, the Army had ‘suffered enormous losses politically’.59

  As a parting present, Hitler appointed von Rundstedt Honorary Colonel of the 18th Infantry Regiment, which he had commanded in the 1920s. It was an honour that meant much to von Rundstedt and he would wear its uniform throughout much of the war, although, as his biographer Günther Blumentritt commented, ‘it often happened that young officers thus mistook him for a colonel and did not know that it was the Field Marshal standing before them, which Rundstedt always accepted with good humour.’60 His regiment was to fight in France and Russia, although never under his command, and was decimated in the summer of 1944. Reformed as 6th Volksgrenadier Division, it would end the war in Prague. It was, however, equally proud to have von Rundstedt as its Colonel and, on the 50th anniversary of his joining the Army, presented him with a beautifully bound detailed account of its war history, which today is in the possession of his elder grandson.

  The von Rundstedts were now able to return to their beloved Kassel, where they rented an apartment on Skagerrak Platz. ‘It’s good that I’m out of that pig-sty Berlin’, he was supposed to have commented.61 He was, though, still bound by the ‘state of emergency’ agreement with Hitler and his retirement would accordingly be brief.

  5

  Poland

  WHILE VON RUNDSTEDT was enjoying his retirement in Kassel, Hitler had both dealt with the rump of Czechoslovakia and sent his troops to occupy Memel, which lay on the Baltic on the East Prussia – Lithuania border. This done, he now turned his attention to Poland. Early in April 1939, OKW issued Directive for the Uniform Preparation by the Wehrmacht for War in 1939/40. This directive was in three parts, covering Frontier Protection (Part I), Fall Weiss (Case White – Part II), and Danzig (Part III). Part II was the most significant and appeared a week before the other two.1 It concerned Poland. The preamble of the directive, which was written by Hitler himself, warned that force might be the only way to solve the Polish problem once and for all. If this was so, the mission of the Wehrmacht would be to destroy the Polish Armed Forces by surprise attack. The Wehrmacht must be ready to do this by 1 September. All three Services were to produce plans by 1 May.