The growing threat of the Poznan Army caused von Rundstedt to transfer two corps from von Reichenau to Blaskowitz on the 7th. He also once more asked OKH for cavalry to screen his northern flank, but there was none available. Matters were not helped by the fact that, for some unaccountable reason, Blastowitz had deployed his one mobile element, the SS Leibstandarte, on his right rather than left flank. One might have expected von Rundstedt to have insisted from the outset that the Leibstandarte be used in the extreme north. That he did not could have been an oversight, but was more likely part of his policy of giving his subordinates as free a rein as possible. For the moment, though, all remained relatively quiet on the northern flank, and von Reichenau began to create a pocket around the Polish forces which had withdrawn on Radom, 50 miles south of Warsaw. Reinhardt, however, continued to dash to the capital and reached the suburbs on the 8th. That evening, in his situation report, von Rundstedt claimed to have taken Warsaw and also to have established crossings over the Vistula to the south of the city. Army Group North’s War Diary noted that ‘the drama is approaching its finale’21 but this proved to be premature. Next day, Reinhardt tried to seize Warsaw single-handed, but was bloodily repulsed, losing 57 out of 120 tanks engaged. Apart from starkly illustrating the vulnerability of tanks on their own in built-up areas, it also showed that the Poles were not prepared to surrender their capital at the first sight of the enemy.
On 9 September, before von Rundstedt and von Manstein could decide what to do next about Warsaw, the attack from the north, which had increasingly worried them, suddenly materialised. 30th Infantry Division, advancing north-east and stretched out for almost 20 miles, reported being attacked by a force estimated as two or three divisions and two cavalry brigades. Blaskowitz sent the other two divisions in the corps to assist and, although 30th Division lost ground and suffered casualties, the situation was stabilised by the end of the following day. That the Poznan Army had committed itself to attacking south rather than withdrawing east did, however, present the opportunity of destroying it, something which was quickly spotted by OKH. Accordingly, on 11 September, von Brauchitsch ordered von Rundstedt to use Eighth Army to destroy the Poznan Army by containing it in a pocket centred on Kotno, while elements of Army Group North, which had been advancing on Warsaw from the north, acted as a backstop. In the meantime, von Rundstedt and von Manstein visited Blaskowitz’s headquarters and organised a counterstroke to be mounted by von Leeb’s XI Corps (two infantry divisions) against the eastern flank of the Polish penetration.
Elsewhere, Army Group South was achieving some notable successes. Tenth Army had now eradicated the Radom pocket, which yielded some 60,000 prisoners, while Fourteenth Army, having captured Cracow, had now crossed the River San north and south of the ancient fortress of Przemsyl. During the next week, though, the main focus of von Rundstedt’s attention was on what became called the Battle of the Bzura, the elimination of the Kutno pocket. Twice, on the 12th and 16th, the Poles made determined efforts to break out of the noose but were repulsed. Eventually, on 17 September, the Luftwaffe was unleashed on the Poznan Army. Its commander, General Kutrzeba recalled:
‘In point of the number of aircraft committed, the severity of the individual strikes, and the acrobatic daring displayed, the [enemy air operation] represented a record. Every movement, every troop concentration, and all march routes were taken under annihilating fire from the air. … It was Hell come to earth. The bridges were destroyed, the fords were blocked, the anti-aircraft and part of the other artillery forces were annihilated.’22
Next day the surrenders began, but it took three days of mopping up before the pocket was finally cleared. Even then the equivalent of two divisions managed to escape to the east, leaving 40,000 of their brother Polish soldiers as prisoners, and many others dead.
The German treatment of captured Polish troops would also be laid at von Rundstedt’s door after the war. Indeed, with regard to atrocities as a whole, Halder had noted in his diary as early as 11 September the ‘enemy propaganda campaign’ to this effect and the need for an officer to be sent to investigate ‘the accusations’ so that the propaganda could be effectively countered.23 The acts on which the atrocity accusations were based took several different forms. There was, for a start, the treatment of the franc-tireurs. The German Quartermaster-General, General Eduard Wagner, reinforced the Army Group South War Diary entry of 1 September with an entry in his personal diary three days later. ‘Brutal guerrilla war has broken out everywhere and we are ruthlessly stamping it out. We won’t be reasoned with. We have already sent out emergency courts, and they are in continual session. The harder we strike, the quicker there will be peace again.’24 Not surprisingly, in the light of this, German troops over-reacted and, if shots were fired at them from a village, houses were set alight and innocents as well as guilty found themselves facing firing squads. Looting, too, was widespread. Just as serious were the numerous occurrences cited by the Poles after the war in their case against von Rundstedt and von Manstein of surrendered Polish soldiers in uniform being shot.25 These varied from the shooting of individuals to what appeared to be virtually mass murder.
There is certainly no evidence that von Rundstedt ever condoned, let alone encouraged these acts. It would have been totally out of character for him to have done so. Indeed, at the end of the campaign he and Blaskowitz complained personally to Halder about Hitler’s edict pardoning all soldiers who had been found guilty of looting and other offences.26 Even so, their complaint was not acted upon. What, how-ever, must be understood is that the German soldiers fighting in Poland were almost all experiencing combat for the first time and, in spite of the traditional discipline of their army, they were understandably nervous. Furthermore, there was no love lost between the Germans and the Poles. The Versailles creation of the Polish Corridor, with resultant isolation of East Prussia, and the Polish attempt, with French encouragement, to take over Upper Silesia in 1921 are but two examples of why this should be so. Even so, von Rundstedt was responsible in the eyes of international law for the conduct of his troops and cannot be totally absolved of the atrocities they committed. Nervous tension arising from inexperience and traditional enmities can never constitute any excuse for breaches of the Geneva Convention or normal military discipline. They are, however, good reasons why a commander must be especially vigilant over the conduct of his troops and why he should issue firm warnings against the perpetration of such excesses before the soldiers are committed to battle.
More sinister were the activities of the SS. The military arm, the SS-VT (later Waffen-SS), was represented in the front line by the SS Leibstandarte, SS Deutschland, SS Germania and SS Artillery Regiments, and a reconnaissance battalion, engineer battalion and a reinforced infantry battalion. In the Army’s view, they were lacking in discipline and military skills and also had atrocity charges levelled against them. Thus Halder noted in his diary on 10 September that members of the SS Artillery Regiment, which was under von Küchler’s Third Army, had herded Jews into a church and massacred them. They had been sentenced by court-martial to one year’s penitentiary, but von Küchler had not confirmed this because ‘more severe punishment is due’.27 Behind the SS-VT, however, came the SS Totenkopfverbände under the notorious Theodor Eicke. These were deployed on 7 September in three regiments. They were briefed by Reinhard Heydrich, leader of the SD and Himmler’s deputy, that the Polish ruling classes were to be eradicated and the lower classes ‘kept down in one way or another’. Furthermore, Hitler told von Brauchitsch that the Army was not to interfere.28 Since Eicke’s men were largely to operate in von Rundstedt’s area of responsibility, it is likely that Hitler told him the same thing when von Rundstedt reported to him on his train at Iltenau on 9 September.29 Eicke’s men quickly got to work and it immediately became apparent that the Jews were also a prime target. Admiral Canaris was an early witness. On 10 September he went to view the fighting and was told of numerous incidents of murders of civilians. When he tried to
remonstrate with Keitel he was advised not to become involved since it was Hitler’s policy.30 Even so, the Army did not remain a totally passive bystander. One of Eicke’s Einsatzgruppen (Action Groups) under Udo von Worysch was operating in Fourteenth Army’s area. The soldiers were disgusted by its operations and the Army’s Operations Section complained to von Rundstedt. He immediately banned von Worysch’s action group from the war zone and ordered anti-Jewish measures in the Katowice area to cease forthwith.31 Unfortunately, this did little to deter Himmler’s henchmen. On 21 September, they received fresh instructions from Heydrich ordering them to clear the Jews from the land and to concentrate them in ghettos in the cities.
While the battle of the Bzura was being fought, Fourteenth Army had captured Przemysl and had invested Lvov. Tenth Army had been ordered to secure Lublin and Guderian’s XIX Motorised Corps had been unleashed from East Prussia in order to link up with von Reichenau and trap the bulk of the remaining Polish forces east of the Vistula. In addition, attention was being devoted to the capture of Warsaw, which the Poles had declared a fortress. By the 16th the capital was surrounded, with elements of Eighth Army covering the west, Tenth Army the south and Third Army the east. The Luftwaffe, which had been making attacks solely on military targets in and around the city since the first day of the war, now dropped leaflets proposing that negotiations should be opened for its surrender and for the evacuation of its civilian population and foreign embassies. On the following morning, under a flag of truce, an officer from Third Army made direct contact with the Poles, but the commander of the Warsaw garrison, General Rommel (not to be confused with Erwin Rommel) refused to speak to him or accept his written demand to surrender. Further leaflets were dropped that afternoon calling on the civilian population to evacuate the city and guaranteeing a 12 hours ceasefire for them to do this. Polish batteries, however, ignored this and the German guns replied. Next day the Poles broadcast a request that they be permitted to send emissaries to discuss the civilian evacuation. The Germans expressed themselves happy to receive them, but none appeared.
It is now clear that the Polish garrison, strong and largely made up of regular troops, was determined on resistance. Von Rundstedt and other commanders, fearing the heavy casualties that protracted street fighting would produce, were content to starve the city into submission, but Hitler would have none of this. Apart from viewing the continued resistance of Warsaw as an affront to German arms, Hitler had another reason for wanting the capital to be secured quickly. On the 17th, the Russians had invaded Poland from the East and he was keen that Warsaw should be in German hands before the Russians advanced too far to the west. Accordingly, on 18 September the Germans began a continuous artillery bombardment while dive-bombers attacked the water works and other public utilities. Probing attacks confirmed the fears that resistance would be fierce and made little progress. This situation continued for the next few days.
By now Hitler, acting through OKH, had taken personal control of the Warsaw operations and laid down that the city should be attacked from the west. This would drive the civilian population eastwards into the hands of the Russians and save the Germans from having to look after them. After much discussion, OKH eventually decided that Eighth Army, having finally reduced the Kutno pocket, should be responsible for the assault. This was finally mounted on the 26th, but Blaskowitz was told that he must not allow any civilian evacuation, on the grounds that the worsening food situation would hasten surrender. By then the only source of water available to the inhabitants was the Vistula and the other utilities were hardly functioning. That evening, two Polish envoys crossed the lines north of Warsaw and requested a 24 hours ceasefire and surrender negotiations. The Germans would not agree to the former and OKH directed that any surrender must be unconditional. The following morning the Poles accepted this and hostilities ended at 1400 hours. No less than 140,000 Polish troops laid down their arms.
Warsaw occupied a good deal of von Rundstedt’s attention, but the Russian invasion created complications in Galicia and east of the Vistula. On 21 September, he was ordered to withdraw his forces west of the Vistula-San line since it was agreed that this would be the boundary between Russian and German occupied Poland. Fourteenth Army was still besieging Lvov, but was ordered to hand this task over to the Russians. As the Germans prepared to withdraw, the garrison, not wanting to fall into Russian hands, suddenly surrendered. This was not the case at Chelm, north of Lvov and also close to the River Bug, and which elements of Tenth Army were trying to reduce. Another complication was local clashes between the Red Army and Fourteenth Army. These were largely cases of mistaken identity, especially since Polish forces were still active in the area, but were resolved on the spot, although there were casualties on both sides.
No sooner had von Rundstedt’s troops completed their withdrawal than the demarcation line was changed. On 1 October he was told that henceforth the line would be along the Bug to a point east of Tomaszow, where it was to run west to the San and then down that river to the Slovakian border. Thus he had to advance east again, meeting further pockets of Polish resistance. The most significant of these was at Kock, 80 miles south-east of Warsaw. This did not fall to elements of Tenth Army, which had already been warned off for withdrawal to Germany, until 6 October. Only then could Army Group South’s part in the Polish campaign be considered to have ended.
Apart of the capture of territory, Army Group South had reaped some impressive results. No less than 523,156 prisoners of war were captured, together with 1,401 guns and 96 tanks. The cost was 6,554 killed, 20,478 wounded and 4,064 missing. Von Rundstedt’s personal contribution was recognised in the award of the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross which was announced on 30 September. Yet, what satisfaction that he might have got from the successful conclusion of the compaign was soured when, on 5 October, Hitler flew to Warsaw to take the salute at a victory parade. At its conclusion von Brauchitsch, von Rundstedt, Blaskowitz and other commanders took him back to the airfield to meet the commanders of the troops who had taken part in the parade. A table, laid with white table cloth and decorated with flowers, had been laid out in a hangar and, knowing Hitler’s preference for very simple food, it was planned to serve soup from a field kitchen. Hitler, apparently took one look at the table, turned about, and joined the troops outside. After swallowing a little soup at the field kitchen and exchanging a few remarks with the soldiers around it he boarded his aircraft without another word to his generals. The snub, von Manstein later wrote, ‘inevitably set one thinking’.32
By now von Rundstedt had been given another appointment. He was made Commander-in-Chief East and Military Governor of Poland. It was not a job he relished, so he set up his headquarters on a small estate south-west of Warsaw, well clear of the city. Appointed as the head of the Civil Administration was Hans Frank. According to von Rundstedt:
‘The famous “King of Poland”, Frank; Stanislaus the Little as we always called him, was supposed to be Chief of the Civil Administration under me. But that obviously didn’t suit him. At any rate, he went off somewhere, and did no administrative work at all, but stayed in Lodz.’33
Ignored by Frank and powerless to prevent the increasing depredations of the SS Einsatzgruppen, von Rundstedt had little to do. Luckily, salvation was quickly at hand.
Hitler’s attention had now turned to the West and how to deal with France and Britain. Von Rundstedt’s presence and that of his staff were required. On 20 October he thankfully relinquished his position as C-in-C East, handing over his responsibilities to Blaskowitz.
6
Assault in the West
IN BETWEEN leaving Poland and taking up his new appointment, von Rundstedt would have probably been able to call in at Kassel and see Bila. It would, however, have been only a fleeting reunion. On 25 October 1939, only five days after relinquishing his previous command, he assumed the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed Army Group A.
The once-fashionable Hotel Riesen-Für
stenhof in Koblenz was to be his headquarters for the next seven months. He did not arrive here in total ignorance of what his next task would be. On the contrary, on 10 October, after he had remonstrated with Halder over Hitler’s intention to pardon all those found guilty of looting and other offences in Poland, he had attended a Führer conference. During this, Hitler made plain his intentions towards the West. The Wehrmacht was to prepare for a ‘swift and shattering blow’ in order to force the British and French into battle and defeat them. All available forces would be concentrated, especially mechanised forces and air power, to this end.1 At the same time, the first version of Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) was issued. In essence, it was very similar to the von Schlieffen Plan of 25 years before, but this time not just Belgian, but Dutch neutrality as well, was to be disregarded. The main strength, including the bulk of the Panzer divisions, was to be given to von Bock’s Army Group B in the north. This would take on the same role as von Kluck’s First Army had undertaken in 1914, something which must have set alarm bells ringing in von Rundstedt’s mind, given his own experiences in that campaign. Army Group A would conform to von Bock’s movement while von Leeb’s Army Group C masked the Maginot Line. Plan Yellow was to be executed in mid-November.
Von Brauchitsch was apparently aghast. It was not just the timing, which did not take into acount the necessity to assimilate and put into action the lessons of the Polish campaign, as well as the complete transfer of the necessary forces from East to West, but also the prospect of battle with enemies infinitely stronger and better equipped than the Poles had been. He is supposed to have turned to von Rundstedt and asked him to intercede with Hitler.2 If this was so, von Rundstedt took no action. Nevertheless, he shared von Brauchitsch’s concern that the forces currently available were not strong enough and pressed him for additional time so that they could be reinforced.3
The Last Prussian Page 13