On this point I am perfectly clear, that in future as hitherto I shall please no party and no school; but just as certain also am I that this is at least a negative condition for everything important, although this characteristic applies just as well to the fanciful and absurd. Although, however, I may give satisfaction to no party and to no school, yet at least all know precisely and unambiguously where I stand, since what I will and what I mean, I have at all times said straight out, and sometimes perhaps all too clearly. In fact, this frank attitude of mine has made it very easy for the dissident schools to take up on their part likewise a clear position in regard to me, what is displeasing to them to blame and reject, and what is congenial to them to acknowledge with respect.
EDUARD VON HARTMANN.
BERLIN, October 1875.
1 Cf. “Die Gegenwart,” 1875, Nr. 1–3. The article has been reprinted in the “Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze gemeinverständlichen Inhalts.”
1 That to preserve the popular character of my book I have studiously refrained from quoting the authorities for my examples in detail has been largely laid hold of to my disparagement by some of my opponents, wherefore I now in the Appendix and Addenda furnish my vouchers.
AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE EIGHTH EDITION.
ALTHOUGH, since the appearance of the seventh edition the unfavourable circumstances of the times have pressed in an unusual degree on the whole book trade, and scientific literature in particular has been most seriously affected by the contraction of the literary budget of the reading public, yet it is permitted me to issue an eighth edition, and I feel the greater debt of gratitude to the public for this persistent and unusual sympathy, as two years ago it was considered that the demand for the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” in Germany had been sufficiently met for some time to come by the first six editions. If the erroneousness of this conjecture forms, on the one side, for the author a grateful encouragement to his labours, yet, on the other hand, it is also not to be denied that in the extensive sale which the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” has found in the circles of the general public (the first seven editions represent over ten thousand copies) there lies a not inconsiderable danger for the correct estimate of the collective philosophical tendencies of the author, because a historically established judgment on the part of experts, which might serve as a standard to the laity, has not yet been formed, and the judgment of the laity is commonly determined more by what strikes the eye than by the less readily discernible inner nature of things. Only too many of those, who buy or borrow the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” feel their “metaphysical need” satisfied when they have turned over the chapters on Love and the Misery of Existence, and think they may now chime in with a good conscience when the topic of conversation is the “Philosophy of the Unconscious.” “Philosophy of the Unconscious, Continuator of Schopenhauer, fashionable representative of Pessimism,” such onesided and often uncomprehended catchwords are sufficient to legitimate them as connoisseurs; the phrases get attached to the name “Hartmann” like a label, which must henceforth adhere to it as if they were a part of the author’s own signature. Had the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” lived through its two or three instead of eight editions in nine years, and had it not broken through the sphere of a scientific circle of readers in this time, it is probable the fame of its author would have been less in advance of his performances, but in compensation his name would not have been linked with so one-sided a signature, which at present forms a hindrance to the unprejudiced estimation of his later achievements.
My opinion by no means implies that the conquest of the strata of the reading public, who hitherto have stood, aloof from all philosophy, is to be deplored because obtained through the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” but only that the stopping half-way of such readers is to be deplored. The clearness and intelligibility of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” has been abundantly praised; but this is still only very relative, merely conspicuous by comparison with other philosophical works. And no one has ever asserted that for the sake of general intelligibility I have anywhere omitted to dig below the problems as deeply as lay in my power; the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” is thus anything but popular in the sense of the popularisation of scientific results. In fact we hear, even from most laymen, who approach its reading unprepared, that they have not understood the main discussions. What then alone can give the key for judging, remains un-understood; but what also without this key appears in itself clear and intelligible, is, because conceived out of its systematic connection, necessarily mis-understood.
As an introduction to the author’s sphere of thought, are now to be mentioned in the first rank, the “Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze gemeinverständlichen Inhalts,” especially their first three sections, which may serve the purpose of obviating at the outset many errors and misunderstandings with regard to the tendencies of the author. In the second rank, the writings on “The Self-Disintegration of Christianity” [translated in the “Religio-Philosophical Journal,” vols. 29–31, appearing in Chicago], and “Truth and Error in Darwinism” [see p. xviii.], of which the former appears suited to render clear the contrast of the author to the shallow negativity of a D. F. Strauss, and to show, that if he combats Christianity, he does this not to combat religion, but to serve religion, and to bring again to honour and to render possible that which has become impossible through its defenders. The study on Darwinism is certainly only to be recommended to such readers as have already been instructed by a more detailed work on the aims and argumentations of Darwinism; as the knowledge of this burning question, however, belongs at the present time to the elements of a higher culture, this supposition will for the most part be already fulfilled, or if not, yet be readily enough made good. Together with the “natural philosophical contributions” (sec. C.) of the “Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze,” this writing forms a suitable naturalistic preparation for the reading of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious.”
As every philosophical system is the product of its time, and its historical and scientific significance can only be rightly estimated in its connection with the history of philosophy, the most important preparation for the understanding of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” is an acquaintance with the preceding systems of German speculation, and with the position which the former, according to the author’s aim, is intended to occupy as regards the latter. To afford this historical introduction is the function of sect. D. of the “Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze.” entitled “The philosophical starry triad of the nineteenth century.” Here, without doubt, the layman will encounter many a difficulty; but if he allows himself to be deterred thereby, he has no prospect of overcoming the like difficulties in the still more condensed hints of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” whilst that which remains obscure in the reading of that introduction can very well be cleared up subsequently by acquaintance with the author’s circle of ideas in their systematic connection.
If the above-mentioned natural-philosophical preparation serves the purpose of making intelligible to the reader the reconciliation and fusion of modern physical science and philosophy attempted by me, this historical introduction will enable him to comprehend the synthesis accomplished by my philosophy of two philosophical mental tendencies apparently so antipathetic, which have been fruitful and decisive for the mental life of Germany in the last two generations: Hegelianism and Schopenhauerianism. The historical significance of my philosophy must essentially be sought in the two mentioned syntheses; which of the two in an historical point of view deserves the pre-eminence, might be difficult for contemporaries to determine. From the historical point of view the chief value of the Principle of the Unconscious may have to be sought in this, that only by this principle are those two syntheses rendered possible.
The most important test for the verifying of philosophical systems in real life is to be seen in the solution of the ethical problems resulting from them. The author of a highly defective theoretical ph
ilosophy obtains, if not a justification, yet to a certain extent an excuse and personal rehabilitation, if he—at whatever cost of philosophical consistency—advances a powerful and valuable moral cosmic theory. But when such an one makes good its claim in a form possessing certain advantages over all earlier moral standpoints as a natural consequence of the theoretical principles, then the latter obtain thereby a highly-important indirect confirmation, and the whole system acquires in such a case a far higher philosophical and practical value. The exposition of the ethical standpoint will be the more important for a philosopher, and he will the more urgently wish the cognisance of the same before the pronouncing of a general judgment on his point of view, the more original his theoretic cosmic theory is, the more it contains elements deviating from current opinion, i.e., paradoxical, and the more occasion it gives on this ground to erroneous inferences respecting the practical consequences flowing therefrom. That the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” particularly in consequence of the incoherent apprehension of its pessimism and confusion with the system of Schopenhauer, has led to the grossest misunderstandings as regards its practical consequences, and has thereby called forth reproaches as severe as groundless, is sufficiently well known; and in order that such mistakes may be avoided for the future, I would emphatically advise that, where it is practicable, my readers should make themselves previously acquainted with my ethical views before they undertake the reading of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious.” The “Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins,” now in the press, in which those views are expounded, is an altogether popular work, which, in contrast to the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” requires no previous knowledge in a philosophical or scientific reference, is independently constructed from its foundation, and is therefore very suitable for being read without any previous acquaintance with the rest of my philosophical efforts. Whoever has first made acquaintance with my second chief work will without doubt regard my first main work with quite other eyes, because he brings with him at starting a definite opinion on the practical fertility of the ideas developed therein, which may be described as the counterpart of the paradoxical impression commonly received by unprepared readers.
However much weight may be assigned, in judging a system, to the sides hitherto discussed, it will yet remain indisputable that the decisive point for the theoretical estimation of such must be sought in the fundamental theory of knowledge. The theory of knowledge is the true philosophia prima; with the right or wrong attitude to the problems of the theory of knowledge the decision is already made, whether the particular thinker is on the right or wrong road in his efforts to solve the metaphysical problems, and this holds more than ever good of a system of the present time, which has brought to full consciousness the importance of the theory of knowledge, first placed in the right light by Kant, after its treatment had been pushed on one side by the great successors of Kant as a matter already settled by Kant. The whole reach of the theoretical contrast, in which I find myself with respect to Schopenhauer as to all others standing theoretically on Kantian ground, he alone is able to appreciate who has taken the trouble to go through my writings specially devoted to these questions. Such an one will, however, no longer be able to misunderstand the relation of my system, merely hinted at in the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” to the problems of the theory of knowledge, as has happened on the part of those readers of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” who imagined they could characterise me, despite that diametrical opposition to Schopenhauer, simply as his continuator. All readers, who stand substantially on the ground of the Kantian transcendental Idealism, as represented by Fichte, by Schelling in his youth, by Schopenhauer, and by a part of the Hegelian school, I must beg to read my writings concerning the theory of Cognition before the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” and the same holds good in a metaphysical respect of my memoir “on the Dialectical Method” for all adherents of Hegel, who still see in his method an essential and inseparable element of his philosophical achievements. For laymen, on the contrary, who have hitherto kept off the mistaken paths of subjective Idealism and the Hegelian Dialectic, the reading of the specified writings may be less necessary and not even recommendable before acquaintance with the Philosophy of the Unconscious, because the material difficulties to be overcome in them might easily deter from further philosophical studies. Only the preface to the second edition of the “Kritische Grundlegung des transcendentalen Realismus” I could wish to see read also by laymen before the Philosophy of the Unconscious, because they will get therefrom at any rate an inkling, that I raise the claim, to have made the first decided step in the Theory of Knowledge since Kant.
I conclude with some words from my preface to the French Translation, p. iii., “La philosophè de l’Inconscient n’est pas un système: elle se borne à tracer les linéaments principaux d’un système. Elle n’est pas la conclusion, mais le programme d’une vie entière de travail: pour achever l’œuvre, la santé et une longue vie seraient nécessaires.” May there be found in the sum of my other publications the honest attempt at a payment on account of the assumed obligation, and the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” be henceforth read and judged as an integral part of the totality of my philosophical works.
EDUARD VON HARTMANN.
BERLIN, January 1878.
AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE NINTH EDITION.
AS the eighth edition of this work appeared simultaneously with my second principal work, so I issue the ninth simultaneously with my third principal work. If at the close of the preface of the eighth edition I described the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” as the programme of my life, the two other extant chief works yield the proof that hitherto at any rate good will has not been wanting to carry out the programme.
The “Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins,” which appeared at the end of the year 1878, is no complete system of Ethics, but only the first introductory part of such, and therefore described by its title as “Prolegomena to every future Ethics.” The System of Ethics would with me embrace, besides this introductory ethical doctrine of Principles, a Social Ethic and an Individual Ethic. The working out of an Individual Ethic appeared to me least urgent, that of Social Ethic, on the contrary, very desirable indeed, but yet bound up with considerable material difficulties, which it is hoped will receive some illumination by the progress of social-political legislation. Accordingly, while for the treatment of Social Ethics some delay might appear desirable, I had excellent reasons for the speedy presentation of my “Religious Philosophy;” for, for the treatment which Social Ethics might eventually experience at my hands there were numerous hints to be found, both in the “Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins” as well as in other of my writings; but my attitude towards Religious Philosophy could on the basis of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” and the little monograph on the Self-disintegration of Christianity hardly even approximately be rightly estimated.
The “Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewesstseins” turned the polemic of the philosophers and theologians against me into a new phase. Hitherto I had been met with the argument that Pessimism must be intrinsically without an Ethic; but now, when the Ethics of Pessimism had in principle come to light, that argument could no longer hold water, and it was now contended that this Ethics was worth nothing, because it was the Ethics of Pessimism. Thereby the contest concerning Pessimism was renewed, but also at the same time carried over to a new battlefield. I felt moved to plunge into this discussion with some journalistic disquisitions and essays, which, at the end of 1880, were collected, and appeared in pamphlet form under the title “Zur Geschichte und Begründung des Pessimismus.” The first shows that not Schopenhauer but Kant is the father of the Pessimism advocated by me, whereas Schopenhauer has one-sidedly disfigured and spoilt the Kantian Pessimism; the second refutes the objections which deny that Pessimism is a problem of science, or soluble by science; the third has the task of sharply separating the ethically valuable Pessimism advocated by
me from sundry ethically questionable and injurious varieties of Pessimism, and the fourth gives a phenomenology of Suffering, as it were, which already serves as a transitional chord from Ethics to the Philosophy of Religion.
The effects of my “Phänomenologie” on the public reach manifestly less widely and more deeply than those of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious;” the polemic called forth by the former is, it is true, not yet free from obliquities and misunderstandings, but it is far more scientific, more intelligent and thorough than that, which, in the first four years after the appearance of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” saw the light. The polemic on the “Phänomenologie” has manifestly not a little contributed to correct the previous judgment of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” and to silence much superficial chatter. I hope that this will be the case in still higher degree with my “Philosophy of Religion,” which yields the proof that my philosophy is just as little non-religious as non-ethical, but in both respects stands in perfect continuity with the previous course of development of the consciousness of humanity.
In the “Philosophy of Religion” my standpoint, as I have already indicated in the closing section of the “Self-disintegration of Christianity,” specially represents a synthesis of the Christian and Indian Religions, or a synthesis of Hegelianism and Schopenhauerism. For that purpose it was important to me to come to terms with the present leading representatives of a speculative Christian Theology, as this has been developed from the twofold starting-point of Hegel and Schleiermacher. I have done this in the memoir: “Die Krisis des Christenthums in der mo-dernen Theologie.” As in the “Self-disintegration” I had criticised the vulgar liberal Protestantism, so here speculative Protestantism, and by how much the latter is philosophically more considerable and of greater religious worth than the former, so much the more important is also the critique of the latter than that of the former. But as the subject is more difficult and requires a subtler handling, the later writing has by no means received the same amount of notice as the former; it may be that this is owing in part to the circumstances of the times.
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