by Gus Russo
The important 1978 Congressional elections were in the back of its mind, and the Democratic majority was concerned with solidifying alliances, not fracturing them. Investigator Scott Malone introduced the Black Caucus’ Donovan Gay to Rick Feeney of Congressman Thomas Downing’s office. Downing had long maintained a desire to reopen the JFK case. It was determined that the King case would be reopened, and the Kennedy case would be tacked on to the legislation, conveniently assuaging pressure from that camp at the same time.
Consequently, in September 1976, the House, by a margin of 280 to 65, passed HR 1540, establishing the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). With two bills extending its life span, the Committee operated until January of 1979, and spent a total of $5.4 million for both the Kennedy and King investigations. The first year found the committee mired in political infighting and procedural matters. Its first Chief Counsel was Richard Sprague.
Sprague had earned his reputation as a tough, tenacious, and independent Philadelphia prosecutor—he had compiled a record of 69 homicide convictions in 70 cases brought to trial. His approach was to use hard-line techniques such as lie-detectors, voice-stress analysis, and concealed tape recorders. In an effort to unearth its best-kept secrets, Sprague planed a full assault on the CIA. The Sprague strategy clearly cut against the Congressional grain—most of those in Congress who had approved the Committee’s formation did so only as a nod to the Black Caucus. They never intended to wage war against the CIA. Staff investigator Gaeton Fonzi recently stated, “Every member of the HSCA didn’t want to even be there.”91
Before the first year was out, Sprague was forced from his position. He was quoted as saying that during his tenure, the staff spent “point zero one percent” of its time examining the actual evidence. With this setback, serious investigation didn’t commence until December 1978, giving the investigators just one year to solve the crimes and write a twenty-seven volume report.
With Sprague’s departure came the appointment of a new Chief Counsel, G. Robert Blakey. Blakey, a 41 year-old law professor at Cornell University, had toiled in the early 1960s a junior attorney in the Organized Crime division of Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department. Although Blakey is clearly an honorable and well-intentioned man, there is no doubt that his previous experiences would slant his investigative strategy towards the Mafia and away from his friend Bobby Kennedy and his possible, negligent instigation of JFK’s assassination.
Blakey’s key mistake may have been accepting the impossible position in the first place. He was given one year to investigate and issue an in-depth report on what was arguably the most complicated crime in history—with less money than the D.C. Police Department later allotted to the sting operation against Mayor Marion Barry. In addition, Blakey knew what the Congressional Chairman Louis Stokes knew, and said: “There was absolutely no will in the Congress to further extend the life of the Committee. Congress was not remotely interested in dealing with this issue.”92 That realistically left no time or money for the staff to even consider making a dent in the voluminous and arcane wilderness of top secret CIA/White House projects and files.
At that point, Blakey made a bold, if unwise, decision: he would focus the committee’s limited resources on a group which had threatened Kennedy, and which had “means, motive, and opportunity” to kill him—the Mafia (surprise). Blakey knew that there were truckloads of paperwork already available on organized crime. He knew of rumors that Jack Ruby had had contact with criminals— not unlike many other Dallas nightclub owners. He knew as well that Oswald’s uncle occasionally worked for someone who knew Carlos Marcello, the mob boss, who, according to one dubious source, had threatened a Kennedy’s life (most likely Bobby’s). The point was never made that virtually everyone in New Orleans knew someone who knew Marcello.
Blakey’s first accomplishment was appointing Mafia experts to key investigative positions. Once again, the deck was stacked, the findings a foregone conclusion. Interviewed by HSCA investigators in New Orleans, Layton Martens quickly perceived the committee’s bias. “They kept trying to lead me—to get me to say the mob did it,” recalls Martens. “It was unconscionable.”
The HSCA’s original Deputy Counsel, a hard-nosed homicide attorney from the New York District Attorney’s Office named Robert Tanenbaum, resigned in disgust. Tanenbaum told the author, “I didn’t want my kids to know that their father participated in a fabrication of history.”93 New Orleans-based HSCA investigator L.J. Delsa recently remarked:
It was very frustrating. Coming from law enforcement, we were used to following our leads. When Blakey came in, that pretty much ended—and we had some strong leads. Had we been allowed to play this thing out, we would have probably found out what really happened. Sprague and Tanenbaum were more traditional, using standard police techniques. Sprague ran the investigation like a normal homicide. Blakey, on the other hand, acted just like a professor, a director, or a teacher. Near the end, it was terrible. We had to fight to be allowed to interview people.94
In his book, The Last Investigation, HSCA investigator Gaeton Fonzi expanded on this theme:
At that initial staff meeting, [Blakey], in clear and carefully defined terms reminiscent of a Political Science 101 lecture to a class of frosh, explained the differences between the functions of a legislative body and the goals of a law enforcement agency. Our primary duty, he pointed out, was not to conduct a criminal investigation. . . Our goals were to gather evidence to be presented at public hearings and, after that, produce a final report.95
During the next year, approximately 5,000 interviews were conducted, with 335 witnesses formally deposed. Although the volume of interviews seems impressive, the staff knew the 335 live witnesses were just the tip of the iceberg. By the time the staff had gotten up to speed on the case, it was time to wind the investigation down. Fonzi recalls, “There were only seven months of actual investigation. Then most investigators were fired. Writing the report became the priority. . . Blakey was giving the Congressmen what they wanted—a report. Not a single investigator on the HSCA staff believes there was a complete investigation. In fact, most were left bitter and frustrated.”96 Staff investigator Leslie Wizelman agreed: “It was the most frustrating experience of my life.”97
In 1978, the HSCA took the testimony of Sergio Arcacha Smith, but never asked him about his relationship with Robert Kennedy or other Washington officials—nor did Arcacha volunteer any information on the subject.98
The CIA, for its part, was true to form: it wasn’t going to give up its information willingly. After all, the very nature of its job is to ferret out and keep secrets. Fonzi had a revealing discussion with a former high-ranking CIA officer who wasn’t one to mince words. He explained to the investigator that the “clandestine mentality that is drilled into CIA operatives until it is instinctual would permit most of them to commit perjury because, in their view, their secrecy oath supersedes any other.” The officer told Fonzi, “You represent the United States Congress. What the hell is that to the CIA?”99
Another oft-noted CIA rationale is the Agency’s unwritten mandate to protect its relationship with the White House, especially a Kennedy White House which still had allies at Langley. In addition, the CIA, which debriefed Lee Harvey Oswald, may have felt there was nothing to be gained from acknowledging its benign contact with Kennedy’s killer. Worse still is the possibility that the CIA learned in advance of Oswald’s threat against JFK, but failed to give it significance. Consequently, the Committee’s request for the CIA’s voluminous files on the Kennedy assassination was stonewalled for months—so many months, in fact, that when the truckload of files finally arrived at the eleventh hour of the Committee’s life, there was no time left to read or evaluate them— the written report had already been completed.
The CIA Director at the time of the HSCA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, recently attempted to explain the Agency’s performance: “We gave [Chairman] Stokes everything we had. There was no attempt to impede the Co
mmittee by stalling on the document delivery. The problem was that the [CIA] guys at the lower level didn’t want to do the work.”100
Whatever the motive, this last-minute document delivery had a chilling effect on serious scholars. After the HSCA went out of business, it sealed its records, as most committees do, for 50 years. This was done because Blakey and Chairman Stokes had anticipated a follow-up investigation by the Department of Justice, and wanted to maintain the chain of evidence. The anticipated investigation never occurred. However, the document-sealing had the effect of making hundreds of thousands of government documents immune to public requests under the Freedom of Information Act.
In spite of all this, Blakey did achieve some noteworthy accomplishments. His decision to throw hard, state-of-the-art science at the assassination was inspired. The best scientific minds available were brought to bear on the physical remnants of the crime, and, with one exception, their work settled a number of nagging questions. Some issues will never be settled in everyone’s mind, but for those who take the time to read and evaluate the HSCA’s work, the overwhelming majority of professionals agree that these issues have now been finally resolved. Among the issues that were cleared up:
The famous backyard photos were found to be authentic, and not an attempt to frame Oswald. Critics had pointed to strange shadows and other artifacts in the photos that seemed to hint at forgery. Even experts from Scotland Yard and the Canadian Department of Defense supported the critics’ view. However, when the HSCA photo team showed the experts the lack of unusual artifacts in the original prints and negatives, previously unavailable to them, they retracted their criticism, agreeing that the photos were genuine.
Likewise, early critics saw sinister implications in the number of “mysterious” deaths in the wake of the Kennedy assassination. They had pointed to the fact that The London Sunday Times had hired an actuary who concluded that the odds of 18 people—related to the Kennedy case—dying by unnatural causes within three years was one hundred thousand trillion to one. Not only had the sum of unnatural deaths (18) been carelessly compiled and submitted by an amateur researcher, but The Times was not informed that the list was culled from over 10,000 names cited in the Warren Commission Report. When so informed by the HSCA, The Times retracted its absurd calculation, calling it “a careless journalistic mistake.” In fact, only 14 of the deaths were unnatural, and actuarial tables show that 14 such deaths over three years from a pool of 10,000 is well below the norm. Therefore, one could infer that a connection to the Kennedy case would actually tend to increase one’s longevity.
During the HSCA’s investigation, the recovered bullets and bullet fragments, through sophisticated nuclear technology, were traced to a rifle that proved to be owned by Oswald. This reality was further confirmed in 1993, when the author obtained the Dallas Police’s high-contrast photos of the rifle (dusted-for-prints)—photos not reviewed by the FBI in 1963, or by the HSCA. The pictures were analyzed in the 1993 Frontline production, “Who Was Lee Harvey Oswald?” The results were dramatic: previously unseen fingerprints were located two inches from the trigger and were positively matched to Lee Oswald.
Kennedy’s autopsy was also reviewed by the HSCA, and, although it had been far from ideal, it was nonetheless proven to have accurately determined the cause of death—one shot to the back of the head, with another shot, which entered the upper back, traversing the president’s body. Like the backyard photos, the autopsy photos were also determined untampered-with and authentic.
Lastly, the HSCA also determined that the trajectory of the shots through the victims could be traced back to the southeast sixth floor window of the Texas School Book Depository, an area from which three spent shells were recovered, and an area literally blanketed with Oswald’s prints. The trajectory study also showed that Governor Connally was in direct line to receive the bullet that exited Kennedy’s throat—the governor was not, as had been popularly depicted, sitting out of range of the projectile. (For further proof of this, see Appendix A: “The Shooting of the President.”)
Blakey’s one scientific misstep occurred when he attempted to have static-filled audio tapes analyzed. The tapes were recorded by the Dallas Police Department on the afternoon of the assassination, and were the product of raw recordings (“dictabelts”) of police communications made while motorcycles traveled the parade route. On one tape made that afternoon are the distinct sounds of police sirens. Assuming that these tapes were made at the time of the assassination, the Committee sought to determine if gunshots could be heard on the recordings. If so, one could possibly determine the source and number of the shots fired at the president.
To the human ear, there were no gunshots audible on the recording. However, two scientists testified that four sub-sonic sound wave patterns could be detected that had a high probability of being gunshots. When the echo patterns of Dealey Plaza were analyzed, three of these impulse patterns appeared to emanate from Oswald’s window, and one from the infamous grassy knoll.
Later, the HSCA’s acoustic work was reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences. The Academy appointed a panel of twelve distinguished scientists, chaired by Harvard Professor Norman Ramsey, to conduct the review. It reached its conclusion in 1982 that the HSCA’s work was “seriously flawed,” with no basis for a claim of any shots being recorded on the tape.101
The HSCA scientists, narrowly focusing on just a few seconds of the tape, neglected to notice that the sound of police voices came immediately prior to the suspected “impulses.” Those voices were later traced to events that took place two minutes after the assassination, and miles away. The HSCA scientists also pinpointed the officer whose open microphone made the recording, supposedly only a few feet from the Presidential limousine. However, after the Committee closed shop, this officer would state unequivocally that he was nowhere near the assassination. In fact, the officer who had the open microphone had been at the Dallas Trade Mart, miles from Dealey Plaza at the time of the shooting.
Because the committee did not spend nearly enough time to determine if there was a conspiracy, the acoustical findings, which were arrived at in the last month of its existence, forced its hand. The Committee therefore concluded that the acoustical analysis proved a conspiracy, and that its best guess was that some “individual members” of organized crime may have been involved. The Committee, however, had no names or hard proof to support that conclusion.
1988: Rosselli/Anderson Redux
In the fall of 1988, columnist Jack Anderson submitted a secret report to President-elect George Bush in which he provided more details about his initial 1967 disclosure of the anti-Castro assassination plots and Robert Kennedy’s links to them. Anderson informed the President that his sources included not only Johnny Rosselli, but the CIA’s William Harvey, as well as other high-ranking Agency officers. Anderson also admitted that he was provided with copies of “two memos from the CIA’s most sensitive files, which summarize the whole operation.”
The disclosure of Harvey as a source comes as no surprise, because, according to the CIA’s own documents, Harvey was professionally associated with the law firm of Rosselli’s attorney, Ed Morgan, the acknowledged original source of the Rosselli-hit team story.102 Among the items revealed to President Bush were:
Allen Dulles had proposed that Fidel Castro be assassinated in conjunction with the Bay of Pigs operation, saying that the invaders would stand a better chance of success if Castro was kept from rallying his forces. This suggestion had traditionally been ascribed to E. Howard Hunt.
William Harvey was convinced that Oswald operated as Castro’s agent. He communicated this to his CIA superiors, who had already confirmed this suspicion from “independent sources.”
Santos Trafficante was indeed the mole in the assassination plots, reporting back to Fidel Castro. This was confirmed by other participants such as Sam Giancana, Joe Shimon, and Johnny Rosselli. Referring to Trafficante, Giancana allegedly said, “Frankly, he’s a rat.”103
There is no information regarding what, if anything, Bush did about the Anderson report.
In December of 1991, filmmaker Oliver Stone released his conspiratorial classic, “JFK,” which, regretfully, combined the Garrison lunacy with powerful cinematic imagery. The resultant uproar, created by both the audience which believed the Stone/Garrison thesis, and by the accused conspirators, produced an interesting alliance, with both groups asserting that a total release of government files would vindicate their position.
Congress proceeded to launch a series of public hearings which resulted in the passage of The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. The law mandated the creation of a five-member panel to oversee compliance with the new act, which in turn called for total disclosure by all federal agencies, and private individuals, in possession of relevant material.
In an ironic twist, scrutiny of the over three-million pages released due to the Stone furor virtually demolishes Stone’s hero, Jim Garrison. The documents amplify not only the corrupt nature of the Garrison probe, but also the extent to which he missed the real story: the Kennedy administration’s links to both Castro assassination plots and the exile community in New Orleans, the latter of which Garrison chose to indict for Kennedy’s murder.
But the released papers are also of real historical value. They provide hitherto unavailable insight into the anti-Castro policies of the Kennedy administration, and thus make finally possible an understanding of why no one wanted a complete investigation of the Kennedy assassination’s possible links to Cuban intrigue: if the public had known in 1963 of the Kennedy obsession with replacing the Castro regime (when it already knew a pro-Castroite killed their beloved President), the consequences might have been horrific.