by Gus Russo
37 Sam Halpern, interview by Seymour Hersh, 21 February 1997.
38 Joseph Langosch, HSCA testimony, 30 August 1978.
39 CCIR, 175.
40 The name of Cubela’s case officer has been a closely held government secret. According to newly-released CIA documents, confirmed by confidential sources, he was CIA agent Nestor Sanchez. Cubela knew him only by his pseudonym, “Nicolas Sanson.”
41 Richard Schweiker, interview by author, 23 June 1994.
42 Richard Helms, interview by author, 30 July 1994.
43 CIA official, interview by author, 2 January 1995.
44 CIA official, interview by author, 8 February 1995.
45 Alexander Haig, interview by author, 26 February 1998.
46 Johnny Rosselli, Church Committee testimony, 22 September 1975, 4.
47 US. News and World Report, 29 April 1963.
48 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to JFK, Memorandum, Subject: Miro Cardona Statement, 13 April 1963.
49 Johnny Rosselli, Church Committee testimony, 11 September 1975, 5-7.
50 Demaris, The Last Mafioso, 238.
51 Rappleye, 209.
52 Hougan, Spooks, 270.
After many years of working for the family, he went on to become chief investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee (many observers point out that Bellino looked out for Kennedy interests in that investigation when it became known that key Watergate figures such as Howard Hunt, Richard Helms, Richard Nixon and others had inside knowledge of the Kennedys’ secret war against Cuba). Maheu’s relationship with the Kennedys is clearly a sensitive subject for Maheu. In 1971, Will Wilson, assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division, was attempting to gather ammunition for an upcoming prosecution of Sam Giancana. Although Wilson received helpful cooperation from former FBI man Maheu, the mood changed abruptly when the name Kennedy was brought up. “Maheu flatly refused to talk about the Kennedys,” recalls Wilson. (Will Wilson, interview by author, 6 February 1995).
53 Grayston Lynch, interview by author, 20 January 1994.
54 CIA Memo for the Record, 24 April 1975, Rockefeller Commission Records, #1781000210225.
55 Corn, 85.
56 Hal Hendrix, “Backstage With Bobby,” Miami News, 14 July 1963.
57 Furati, 150 (See sample infiltration reports released by Escalante).
58 Ted Shackley, interview by author, 12 December 1997.
59 “Names and Individuals Involved in Assassination Attempts Provided to Senator George McGovern By Prime Minister Fidel Castro,” May 1975, documents provided to author; also McGovern press conference transcript, 30 July 1975.
60 Israel Behar, interview, in Time Machine: The CIA, BBC/U.S. production, broadcast in U.S. on 13 November 1992.
61 Thomas and Isaacson, The Very Best Men, 300.
62 Juan Falaifel, interviewed on “ZR/RIFLE,” 19 November 1993.
63 Miami Field Office to HQ, FBI Memo, 10 October 1963; also Miami SAC to Director, FBI AIRTEL, 5 July 1962.
64 Joseph Langosch, affidavit to HSCA, Exhibit F-512.
65 CCR, bk. V, 17, fn. 32.
66 Ibid, 17.
67 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 300
68 Sam Halpern, interview by author, 15 September 1993.
69 Newsweek, 22 November 1993, 71.
70 Noted in Church Committee review of AM/LASH file at CIA; Johnston to Senator Hart, Memorandum, 27 January 1976.
71 In some instances, Castro was said to be waiting at the airport for the arrival of the “assassins.”
72 Jose Aleman, HSCA testimony, vol. V, 314-315.
73 AARC Quarterly, Winter 1995-96, 4.
74 Santos Trafficante, Jr., HSCA testimony, vol. V, 368.
75 Riebling, 169-170.
76 Jack Anderson’s TV special, “Who Shot JFK?” 1988.
77 Demaris, The Last Mafioso, 235.
78 CIA Inspector General’s Report, 103-104.
79 HSCA, vol. X, 184.
80 Ibid.
81 William Harvey, Rockefeller Commission testimony, 1 May 1975, 5.
82 See CCR, bk. V: 14, fn. 17; 17; 19; 31.
83 Juan Falaifel, interviewed on “ZR/RIFLE,” 19 November 1993.
84 CIA Interim Working Draft, “AM/TRUNK Operation,” 14 February 1977.
85 Corn, 104.
86 “CBS Reports: Who Killed JFK?” 19 November 1993.
87 Rafael Nuñez, interview by author, 12 April 1995.
88 Schecter and Luchkoved.
89 Geyer, 299.
90 AP and New Orleans Times-Picayune, 9 September 1963, also Daniel Schorr, Clearing the Air, 165.
91 New York Times, 8 October 1963.
92 Richard Goodwin, Church Committee testimony, 18 July 1975, 4; 11.
93 Alexander Haig, interview by author, 26 February 1998.
94 DOD, Memo for the Record, 13 September 1963, Minutes of Cuban Coordinating Committee; in CCR, bk. V, 15.
95 Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, Memorandum, 27 September 1963, Subject: Contingency Paper Assignments re Possible Retaliatory Actions by Castro Government; in CCR, bk. V, 16.
96 Tad Szulc, “Before Dallas, RFK Formed Covert Unit to Probe Possible Cuban Death Plots,” The Boston Globe, 28 May 1976.
97 Tad Szulc, interview by author, 6 August 1994.
Szulc was not the only New York Times staffer privy to the secrets of the Kennedys. Distinguished Times executive editor, Washington bureau chief, and longtime syndicated columnist James (Scotty) Reston knew both Bobby and Jack well. There was no doubt in Reston’s mind who was behind the Castro assassination plots. In his autobiography, Deadline, Reston stated flatly, “Bobby monkeyed around with amateur plots to assassinate Castro” (James Reston, 377).
98 Manolo Reboso, interview by author, 28 February 1994.
99 Carlos Bringuier, interview by author, 28 February 1994.
100 Des FitzGerald to DCI, “Chronology and Concept of Autonomous Operations and Summary of Financial Support to Manuel Artime,” CIA Memo, 1964.
101 JCS/J5 Report, “Courses of Action Related to Cuba,” 4 October 1963, JCS Papers, JFK Papers, National Archives.
102 Thomas and Isaacson, The Very Best Men, 302-304.
103 Special Group Memo for the Record, 12 November 1963, in FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XI, 885-888.
Chapter Twelve (The Eye of the Hurricane)
1 LBJ to Katzenbach, phone call, 10:45 a.m. 5 December 1966, LBJ tape K66.01, LBJ Library.
2 Merle Miller, Lyndon, 309.
The civil war among the Texas Democratic factions had been caused by a familiar mixture of ideological, political, and personal contention. Rooted in a fundamental split between populist/labor and conservative/commercial interests, it was bloody every way but literally. The feud had vented itself into open expression as long ago as during President Roosevelt’s bid for a third term, which the conservatives opposed. Since then, there had been periods of truce and attempts at reconciliation, but smoldering hatreds—sometimes stronger within the party than against outsiders, as in many families—often erupted into vitriolic words and acts of vengeance against supposedly “fellow” Democrats. Now the chieftains were Senator Yarborough, a smooth-talking liberal, and Governor John Connally, a smooth-talking “moderate” who was much liked by the conservatives. He was Republican, many observed, in everything but name only. Soon in name too, when Connally switched to the GOP. Connally was known to some as “Lyndon’s Boy.” The first big boost to his career came, as Johnson’s had, when he was hired to help in a Washington office—in this case, Johnson’s. More than twenty years before this trip, Connally had been Johnson’s administrative assistant. The protege also roughly followed his mentor’s path in conquering wretched Texas poverty by the power of his ambition and cunning. More recently, he had worked wonders to humiliate and politically emasculate Yarborough, no mean in-fighter himself.
3 John Connally, “Why Kennedy Went To Texas,” Life Magazine, 24 November 1967, 86B.
<
br /> 4 Heymann, 406.
5 O’Donnell and Powers, 10.
6 LBJ to Robert Kintner, phone call, 20 December 1966, LBJ tape K66.01, side B, LBJ Library.
7 John Connally, “Why Kennedy Went To Texas,” Life Magazine, 24 November 1967, 86B.
8 Manchester, The Death of a President, 36.
9 Ibid.
10 Heymann, 408.
11 The details of this planning were thoroughly investigated by the HSCA, which interviewed numerous Kennedy aides, advancemen, Secret Service, Dallas Police, etc; see HSCA vol. XI, 507-531.
12 WC, 737.
13 McMillan, 472.
14 Interview of Leon Lee, 10 May 1993 (FL).
15 McMillan, 479.
16 Interview of Fay Puckett, 12 May 1993 (FL).
17 McMillan, 476.
18 Ibid, 475-478.
Lee Oswald would be dead in a month, continuing a pattern established by his father—dying young, leaving a widow with young children.
19 Kelley, 297.
Ironically, the death of President Kennedy brought about an end to the Third Agency Rule, thus allowing more contact between the agencies, the very kind of contact that would have spared Kennedy on November 22, 1963.
20 Interview of Jim Hosty, 22 June 1993 (FL).
Hosty cites Title 18 U.S. Code, Section 781 as the rule which forbade his picking up Oswald ahead of time. Hosty also says, “All the Secret Service wanted were direct threats against the President. Oswald, to my knowledge at the time, never made such a threat. Oswald didn’t fit their criteria for referral. . . Look at what happened to Sara Jane Moore. She in fact made an implied threat against President Ford and they still didn’t arrest her” (Jim Hosty, interview by author, 6 December 1993 (Note: Sara Jane Moore later shot at Ford).
21 McMillan, 495.
22 Senate Intelligence Committee, Performance of Intelligence Agencies, “Appendix B: Hearings on FBI Oversight before House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights,” ser. 2, pt.3, 21 October and 11-12 December 1975.
23 Ibid, 21 October 1975.
24 Robert Gemberling, interview by author, 30 July 1993.
25 Wallechinsky and Wallace, 287-288.
26 Church Committee, “Cuban Threats” file.
27 Hugh Aynesworth, “Oswald Practicing Told,” Dallas Morning News, 9 December 1963.
28 Interview of Dema (Mrs. Howard) Price, 28 July 1993 (FL).
29 LBJ to Robert Kintner, phone call, 20 December 1966, LBJ tape K66.01, side B, LBJ Library.
30 O’Donnell, and Powers, 10; also Hugh Aynesworth, “Oswald Practicing Told,” Dallas Morning News, 9 December 1963.
31 Homer Wood, interviewed by Anthony Summers, in Summers, Conspiracy, 380.
32 Homer Wood, interview by W. Scott Malone, 1 May 1993 (FL).
33 Ken Longley, interview by W. Scott Malone, 2 May 1993 (FL).
34 Solidifying Wood’s fear was his belief (unsubstantiated by the author) that his attacker had been Alan Tippit, the son of the policeman slain by Oswald during his getaway attempt. The author assured Wood that only a handful of the thousands of “mysterious” incidents were really mysterious after all, and that, though Alan Tippit may have had a reputation for this kind of behavior, other alleged victims had no connection with the events of November 22.
35 “Further Oswald Tie To Range Revealed.” Dallas Morning News, 11 December 1963.
36 WC, exhibits 2931 and 2932.
37 Interview of Leon Lee, 10 May 1993 (FL).
In 1964, FBI agents would interview Mrs. Edna Walker, who owned the Oriental Barber Shop, located at the corner of Zangs Boulevard and Beckley Street, barely 50 feet from Oswald’s apartment. Walker reported observing Oswald on several occasions standing in the company of a female, possibly at the bus stop. Curiously, Walker claimed that their appearance indicated that they were “Cuban refugees” (FBI Report of Agents Vernon Mitchem and John Thomas Kesler, 23 January 1964).
38 Lucille Slack, FBI interview by Alfred Neeley, 10 September 1964.
39 Buell Wesley Frazier, interview by author, 16 February 1987.
40 In 1991, the author set up a meeting between Frazier and Oliver Stone, who wanted Frazier’s input for Stone’s movie JFK, which was in pre-production. Unlike the hundreds of people who came out of the woodwork to get a piece of Stone’s “action,” Frazier had only one concern—that no meetings conflicted with his little league practice. When Stone’s people wanted another meeting on the spur of the moment, Frazier declined, citing his team commitment. Stone’s minions were uncomprehending. Didn’t Frazier understand the importance of this high-budget movie? Was he alone immune to the seductive power of Hollywood? For his part, Frazier was confused that the filmmakers didn’t grasp the importance of his commitment. The production assistants called him again and again, offering ever-escalating amounts of money to show up for a meeting. With everyone else fighting for a meeting with Stone, Frazier was a refreshing change. The whole episode disgusted Frazier, who again retreated from interviews.
41 Interview of Hubert Anderson Morrow, 11 June 1993 (FL).
42 Interview of Viola Sapp, 15 July 1993 (FL).
43 Interview of G. Claude Hallmark, 17 July 1993 (FL).
44 Cristobal Espinosa Landivar, FBI interview, 2 December 1963.
45 W. D. Tyra, interview, WC, CD 206, 484.
46 Interview of Jack Cody, 20 June 1993 (FL).
47 The most obvious problem with the Yates story is the fact that Oswald’s time-cards show that he was at work at the time Yates claims to have given him the ride (although Oswald could have conceivably gotten to Beckley Street during the lunch hour, Yates’ worksheet for that day shows him on the road until after the lunch hour). On the other hand, during an FBI interview. Dempsey Jones dearly recalled that on Wednesday, November 20, Yates came in and told him of his strange rider who discussed shooting the President from a building. (FBI interview of Ralph Yates, 26 November 1963; also FBI interview of Dempsey Jones, 28 November 1963).
48 Interview of Hugh Slough, 6 June 1993 (FL); also interview of Jerry Duncan, 2 July 1993 (FL).
49 “Oswald’s Room Yields Map of Bullets’ Path,” Dallas Morning News, 25 November 1963.
50 Interview of Elmo Cunningham, 8 December 1993 (FL).
51 McMillan, 521.
52 McMillan, 523.
53 The Warren Commission decided to not include psychiatric conclusions in its report on Oswald. In executive session, however, three eminent psychiatrists told the commissioners that Marina unknowingly held it in her power to alter the course of history. One of the doctors, Dr. Dale Cameron, testified, “I think what Marina had a chance to do unconsciously that night was to veto his plan without ever knowing of its existence, but she didn’t. She really stamped it down hard. . . At any rate, she was capable of fitting into his pathology.”(WC executive session transcript, 9 July 1964, in Posner, 221-222, fn. *).
The Warren Commission hired several psychiatrists to explore the Oswalds’ relationship, and much has been said about Marina’s inadvertent blame for the Kennedy assassination. One doctor of psychiatry, Dr. David Rothstein, concluded: “[Marina] is what psychiatrists would often call a castrating woman. . . who is building up her own importance, her own feeling of importance by depreciating him.” Applying Freudian logic, Dr. Dale Cameron concluded, “Oswald was unconsciously assassinating both his mother and his wife” when he shot the President.
54 For example, see Dawkins (The Selfish Gene).
55 Crimmons to Joseph Califano, “The Future of Cuba,” State Department Memorandum, 7 November 1963, Joseph Califano Papers, JFK Papers, National Archives.
56 Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 667.
57 Hinckle and Turner, 166-167.
58 Hinckle and Turner, 167.
59 Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 666-667.
60 “Robert G. O’Connor, Memo for the Record,” U.S. Army file, National Archives.
61 Ted Shackley, interview by author, 12 December 1997.
62 Fr
om the CIA’s AM/TRUNK file, summarized in “AM/TRUNK Chronology dispatch.”
63 CCR, bk. V, 19.
Chapter Thirteen (Die by the Sword)
1 John Davis, interview by Peter Korn, as related to the author, 10 April 1994.
2 Guthman, 244.
3 Knowing his advice would not sit well with Kennedy, who put a high premium on courage, Stevenson withdrew it. This saddened him deeply after the assassination, when he spoke of “how right my first instinct was.”
4 Manchester, The Death of a President, 34.
5 Harry Williams, interview by author, 22 December 1993.
6 CCR, bk. V, 20.
7 James Johnston (congressional investigator), interview by Seymour Hersh, in Seymour Hersh (The Dark Side of Camelot, 440, fn.).
8 It is a well-established fact that the CIA regularly plants stories in newspapers to relay intelligence messages (Grose, 365).
9 Tom Wicker, Kennedy Without Tears, 39.
10 Manchester, The Death of a President, 35.
11 New York Times, 13 May 1976.
12 Marty Underwood, interview by author, 10 May 1993.
13 O’Donnell and Powers, 22.
14 Ibid, 25.
15 Ibid, 404.
16 So far, there had been little progress toward mending the feud between Johnson and Ralph Yarborough, despite attempts by Kennedy staffer Bill Moyers and others. Calculated insults and bruised feelings continued to be the order of the day following the president’s arrival in San Antonio. Stung by more evidence of foul play, Yarborough, although he promised a few concessions, still refused to ride with Johnson. Bitter wrangling followed over who would sit where in the Dallas motorcade the following morning. Kennedy tried to pressure Yarborough and placate Connally in an attempt to avoid an airing of grievances that would have dredged up old wounds. The common good demanded that the split be mended now; good politics required reason. But this meeting with Johnson was no reasoned exchange between the top national leaders or even an “active discussion” about the party’s future. First, there was the business of Yarborough. Johnson proposed, “Let’s kick the sonovabitch out.” The next day, Kennedy was overheard by Mike Howard, of the Secret Service, telling Yarborough, “If you don’t ride with Johnson, you’ll walk.” Yarborough relented (Mike Howard, interview by author, 7 December 1993; also in Merle Miller, Lyndon, 311).