by Barbara Bond
There is, however, documentary evidence which indicates that MI9 had despatched gramophone records to eighteen named individuals in Colditz in May 1941. The despatch list indicated that one record in each box contained ‘a map of the frontier’. While there is no indication that it was actually sheet Y or A2, or indeed that the frontier was the Swiss frontier, the circumstantial evidence is strong. One of those parcels was addressed to Captain P. R. Reid (see page 96). Reid had been appointed in January 1941 by the Colditz SBO to be in charge of escaping. By October of that year, an Escape Committee had been formed and Neave had been appointed as Reid’s deputy and had been placed in charge of the Committee’s Maps Section. It was the Map Officer’s responsibility to hide the maps being held in the camp. It was Reid who closed the door through which Neave and Luteyn escaped from Colditz, and who was subsequently able to escape successfully via the same route.
Neave’s personal papers contain a sketch map showing the route he and Luteyn took once they had arrived in close proximity to the Swiss border. It was surprisingly, however, not drawn by Neave, but was rather sent to him by a Cuban architect, Roberto Pesant, who wrote in the accompanying letter, dated 23 September 1958, that it was his attempt to reconstruct Neave and Luteyn’s crossing of the Swiss frontier from the textual description contained in Neave’s book, published in 1953. He asked that Neave comment on the accuracy of his tracing of the exact escape route. Neave replied to Pesant on 9 October that the sketch map was ‘extremely good’, correcting a couple of aspects and commenting ‘we actually went through the town of Singen travelling westward before we turned south to cross the frontier as your map describes’. Both sheets Y and A2 show the frontier crossing point on the road between Singen and Ramsen, located in the extreme southeast corner of both sheets, but depicted with rather more clarity on A2 than on sheet Y.
The route taken across the frontier by Neave and Luteyn, as reconstructed by Roberto Pesant in 1958, based on Neave’s book, They Have Their Exits.
For MI9, any escape from Colditz was a priority. These were, after all, the men who had repeatedly tried to put the MI9 philosophy of escape-mindedness into action. They had failed to make it back to the UK to date, but they had certainly proved themselves worthy of every aspect of the support mechanism which MI9 could muster. To this end, MI9 had developed a special coded message system, Code V, and proceeded to reserve its use for contact with the Colditz prisoners of war. They managed to send a detailed explanation of the official system through a series of coded messages using the existing private code which one of the prisoners of war, Captain R. F. T. Barry, had had the foresight to set up with his wife prior to deployment. It is also clear that Neave was on MI9’s Special Watch List since the War Diary entry for January 1942, the month in which Neave escaped, noted that during the month ‘one British Officer succeeded in escaping from Germany to Switzerland. He was on the Special Watch List and had received escape material’. Whilst he was not identified in the War Diary entry, it was rare for the War Diary reports to comment on individual escapes; they tended rather to document monthly escape statistics. Since Neave was the first British officer to escape successfully from Colditz, clearly using information with which he had been provided by MI9, it was likely regarded by MI9 as worthy of special mention.
Like all successful escapers, Neave was interviewed on his return to London. The report of his debriefing is of particular interest in itself. The report is not to be found in the general collection of such reports where the vast majority are to be found but rather in the Historical Record of MI9, almost buried from sight. A copy was also subsequently found in the Colditz camp history. The report was also notable for its brevity. Most of the reports carried detailed descriptions of the escape, offering commentary on likely routes, appropriate behaviour, and places to avoid. There is a far more detailed description of the escape in Neave’s published account than there is in the debriefing report. Certainly he made no mention at all in his escape report of any use of maps. It was MI9’s practice to ensure that any information gleaned from returning escapers was relayed back to the camps to help inform and update the planning of the escapes. It was for that reason that a coded message was relayed on 11 November 1944 indicating:
STRANGERS NEAR SCHAFFHAUSEN SALIENT ARE LIABLE TO ARREST FOR QUESTIONING EVEN IF PAPERS ARE IN ORDER
While it is known that the message definitely went to Marlag and Milag Nord camp, such a message would certainly have been relayed to all the camps with which MI9 was in contact. Some detail of the Swiss frontier was also acquired from the Dutch since two of their number had almost succeeded in reaching Switzerland, only to be foiled at the last moment, recaptured and returned to Colditz.
There is clearly sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that Neave indeed had access to sheet Y or A2, although he personally never declared that fact in his description of the escape, either in the report he wrote on arrival back in the UK in 1942 or, indeed, in the book he subsequently wrote about his escape. Neave kept his secrets, as he had been briefed to do, and it is understandable that no inkling of what really happened in terms of the maps was ever revealed in his book, published so soon after the war. He certainly made clear in the interview he gave in 1974 that there was a great deal he had never revealed. Sadly, he was murdered by the Irish National Liberation Army in 1979, long before the notions that secrecy about possession of escape and evasion maps would have seemed redundant. Even so, it is worth recalling that Foot remained reticent in discussing the maps until the end of his life.
Airey Neave took most of his knowledge on MI9’s escape maps to the grave when he was murdered by the Irish National Liberation Army with a car bomb that exploded outside the Houses of Parliament in 1979.
This all certainly appeared to mirror the pre-deployment briefings which Foot had described and the order that ‘maps were never discussed’, and the extent to which it reflected his and Langley’s expressed view that to discuss such methods could prove prejudicial to their future deployment. Looking at the statistics produced by MI9 at the end of the war, it is clear that the escape route out of Germany and into Switzerland was not only one of their targeted routes but was also one of the most successful: the total number of escapes through Switzerland was 5,143, almost 20 per cent of all successful escapes from enemy occupied territory by the end of the war. Foot and Langley reasonably drew attention to the fact that wartime statistics ‘cannot be claimed as perfect’, and there are certainly variations in the figures which appear in various sources at the time. The figures do not, however, vary significantly enough for there to be serious concern over their veracity. It is also notable that the figures did emanate from MI9 which, it is known, was keenly and carefully monitoring the numbers of escapes on a monthly basis.
Unravelling the story of Neave’s escape has served to bring into focus the true contribution of the mapping programme to successful escapes and emphasizes the extent to which MI9’s considerable efforts to communicate with the camps and smuggle in the maps paid very real dividends. Escaping from Colditz was, in itself, a significant challenge; travelling successfully through Germany around 650 kilometres (over 400 miles) to the Swiss border and crossing successfully to freedom was arguably only possible with detailed navigational information which the maps and the supporting intelligence provided.
7
ESCAPING THROUGH THE BALTIC PORTS
‘I saw the S.S. BJORN, STOCKHOLM moored in the Swedish dock and being loaded with coal . . . as regards local geography, the flimsy of which I had a copy, proved invaluable . . .’
(Account of the escape of Flight Lieutenant Oliver Philpot)
The route via the Baltic ports was another of MI9’s recommended escape routes and was to prove even more successful than the Schaffhausen route. The Bulletin made clear that it was the most effective route to try to escape from occupied Europe and reach Sweden, a neutral country. Danzig, Gdynia, Stettin and Lübeck were regarded as the key Baltic ports targeted by MI9 a
s potential escape routes and the aim was always that the escapers should be looking to board a ship of the neutral nation, Sweden. In extremis, some escapers resorted to Finnish ships in the hope that they planned to dock in a Swedish port on their return trip to Finland. Large-scale maps of all four ports were produced for incorporation in the Bulletin for training and briefing purposes.
There is also separate evidence to support the contention that MI9 produced escape and evasion versions of the port plans. A large-scale map of Danzig harbour (A4) at approximately 1:16,000 scale was produced in relatively small numbers in October 1942, some 300 copies in total, half of which were printed on silk and half on paper (see page 50). Analysis of the detail has shown that it was based directly on British Admiralty (BA) chart 2377. The BA chart actually comprised two large-scale port plans of Danzig and Gdynia harbours. The Danzig plan indicated its primary source as a 1933 German Government Chart. Sheet A4 was a small section of just the BA Danzig port plan, centred on the railway terminal and timber wharves at Wechselmünde, but oriented differently, being significantly east of a true north bearing, and it was void of all soundings information. The basic topographic detail was retained and enhanced with what can only be described as field intelligence annotations.
The Danzig map was produced in various forms by MI9. At least three have been identified: there may have been more. The different versions, varying in geographical extent, content, scale and sheet numbering identification, are listed at Appendices 1 and 9. Close scrutiny of the detail revealed the maps’ true purpose. Almost in the centre of sheet A4 were two annotations: ‘Swedish ships load coal here’ and ‘Swedish ships unload ore here’, while sheet A3 has two shortened annotations at the same point saying ‘Swedish ships’. If an escaper could board the ship of a neutral nation, his escape had virtually succeeded. Should the escaper get as far as the port, there was sufficient information on the map not only to locate ships of a neutral nation but also to show the most accessible route to the wharves where those ships would have docked. Additional annotations showed ‘open farm land intersected by ditches’, ‘impassable marshy ground’, ‘large lone bush’, the location of sentries and searchlights, with even the extent of ‘the possible arc of light’ being drawn in the area of the railway sidings. Such detailed intelligence could only have been acquired from returning escapers who had successfully navigated that escape route. All who successfully returned to the UK were questioned closely on their experiences. The resulting reports described the initial escape from the camp and the route to freedom, and offered advice based on the successful escaper’s experience. All relevant intelligence was fed back directly to the camps, through the coded letter system, was included in the training lectures and the Bulletin and almost certainly reflected in relevant escape and evasion mapping whenever possible.
Detail from the escape and evasion map of Danzig, (sheet A4) identifying where Swedish boats loaded coal and unloaded ore. For an image of the complete map see page 50.
The small numbers produced of the Danzig port plan appeared to indicate that MI9’s intention was never to issue them directly to potential escapers during escape training or pre-deployment briefing but rather to use them as briefing aids and also to send them directly to the camps for targeted escapes. Certainly, of the four port plans which appeared in the Bulletin, surviving escape and evasion copies of only one of the port plans, Danzig, have been discovered to date. No copies of Lübeck, Gdynia or Stettin produced on fabric have yet been found and none of the production records identified to date has any indication of their production on fabric or paper media as escape and evasion maps. However, entries in the War Diary do indicate that escape and evasion versions of some of the port plans were produced. For example, in December 1942, the War Diary entry indicated that a sketch map of Stettin Docks had been passed for reproduction prior to being sent to the German camps. Similarly, in February 1944, the War Diary entry reported that a plan of Gdynia, described as being ‘maps for prisoners of war’, had been passed for reproduction. It is, therefore, clear that the port plans were being produced as escape and evasion maps to be sent directly to the camps in Germany to support planned escapes.
A 1:25,000 scale map of Stettin, produced for the Bulletin. Stettin was one of the four Baltic ports recommended by MI9 as exit points for escape to Sweden.
At least three maps of the port of Danzig were produced by MI9. This is sheet A3, from the Bulletin.
It should be recalled that those being briefed prior to operational deployment or during training at the Training School were not allowed to make copies of any maps which appeared in the Bulletin. Those intelligence officers who were briefed on these potential escape routes were allowed only to use the maps for briefing purposes and those being briefed were expected to memorize, and not copy, the map detail. The evidence of the War Diary entries does, however, appear to indicate that the large-scale plans of the Baltic ports were being produced and sent to the camps, although there is no indication of the numbers being printed. It is beyond question that these routes out of captivity to freedom were an integral part of MI9’s plans. They were well used by escapers and many succeeded in gaining freedom through the Baltic ports.
Northern Germany and the Baltic coast, from [Series 43] sheet E. Three of the vitally important Baltic ports, Stettin, Danzig and Gdynia, are shown on this map.
Sweden proved to be the most successful route home for many escapers and evaders: 30 per cent of all returning personnel came home this way and the large proportion had travelled there via the Baltic ports. The advisory notes on escape routes in the Bulletin were regularly updated with fresh intelligence and tips from returning escapers. In February 1944, the Bulletin was revised to indicate that contact with foreign dockers could be made in certain Stettin cafés, and there were many helpful suggestions on the best ways to stow away successfully on board Swedish ships. Coded letters were also used as a means of conveying escape intelligence and advice to the camps. For example, in September 1944, a coded message was sent by MI9 to Lieutenant Commander M. J. A. O’Sullivan RN in the Marlag and Milag Nord camp indicating that four escapers had reached Sweden via Stettin. It described that:
TWO ENTERED GOTZLOW QUAY WHERE WIRE MEETS SE END OF BASIN. TWO GOT SHIP REIHER WERDER HAFEN. HELP RECEIVED FROM FRENCH CAMP JUST E OF ZABELSDORF STATION
Barely a month later, however, a coded message was sent to the camps indicating:
REF ESCAPES NO MORE SWEDISH SHIPS FROM HUN PORTS
a clear indication that, for whatever reason, Swedish ships were no longer calling at German ports. This was likely to have resulted from Swedish anticipation of allied victory over Germany, as they advanced northwards and eastwards from the Normandy landings. Effectively, this meant that the escape route via the Baltic ports was no longer feasible. Although the order that prisoners of war need no longer consider it their duty to escape was not issued until 13 January 1945, the camps certainly knew of the Allied landings on mainland Europe well before that date (not least through regular wireless contact).
ATTEMPTED ESCAPES VIA THE BALTIC PORTS
Three escapes which attempted to use the route via the Baltic ports will now be examined, one unsuccessful and two successful.
Lieutenant John Pryor RN
The first is that of Lieutenant John Pryor RN, who has already been mentioned in Chapter 5, since it was his coded letters which were used as an example to demonstrate their role in MI9’s work. Pryor’s experience also highlights other important aspects of MI9’s escape programme and escape philosophy, and the significance of the Baltic ports as an escape route.
Pryor was educated at Oundle School, Northamptonshire, from 1933 to 1937. He took the military candidate examinations in 1937 and joined the Royal Navy in September that year. As a cadet he trained on HMS Erebos and then served as a midshipman on HMS Vindictive, HMS Hood and HMS Warspite. In 1940 he was ordered to Poole to assist in the small ships’ evacuation from Dunkirk. On Thursday 13 June, he was on b
oard an unarmed Dutch coaster, HMS Hebe, as second lieutenant, and played his part in rescuing men from the Normandy beaches, transferring them to a troop-ship waiting off-shore. On returning to shore to collect a further group, the coaster grounded on an unmarked shoal and came under heavy fire. Everyone on board was forced to disembark and were then captured by the Germans. As a young officer, and in line with German practice to separate officers and men, Pryor was separated from the crew of the Hebe immediately and grouped with some captured British Army officers. Two of these immediately approached him, asking if he would join them in an escape attempt. MI9 always briefed that the best time for prisoners of war to escape was before they finished up behind barbed wire. Sadly the escape attempt did not include Pryor as he was quickly separated from the Army officers and placed in another lorry for transport away from the coast. The group he was in was moved in stages by road, north to Belgium, and by late June they were travelling on Dutch and German waterways deep into the heart of Germany. By 6 July he was in Laufen, southeast of Munich having travelled for some days on board a train crowded with British prisoners of war. In Laufen, close to Austria, he was taken by lorry to Oflag VIIC/H, a camp converted from the Archbishop of Salzburg’s summer residence on the west bank of the River Salz, where some 500 captured British officers were being held.