In 1932, FDR’s nomination was achieved because of Hearst’s support, and FDR believed his future success depended on keeping that support.
Hearst explained his attitude clearly in a letter to his former wife, Millicent Hearst:
I became alarmed at Gov. Roosevelt’s internationalistic attitude. I feel very deeply and intensely on this subject. I cannot see that entangling ourselves in European affairs is going to do us any good in any way, while there are possibilities of such utter disaster as are terrifying to contemplate.
The possibilities of being involved in a world war, and of being on the losing side, and of having our country subjected to crushing indemnity, and even deprived of some of its territory, is something that should make us hesitate at being overaltruistically interested in European complications.
Hearst decided to support FDR when he “came out with a very fine letter denying any desire to involve our nation in foreign entanglements. This was most reassuring and allayed my fears….”
Hearst’s support assured Roosevelt’s nomination, and he concluded his letter: “I am glad to have had a hand in accomplishing it…. I will work everywhere for him, in our papers and over our radios and in the news reels….”
After 1932, only ER, Lape, and their circle continued their World Court campaign for “ratification now.” By the summer of 1933, “Delay” on the World Court was established bipartisan policy.
FDR’s deal with Hearst—who delivered California and Texas—was faithfully kept. ER knew that it included FDR’s agreement to turn his back on the World Court, all “entangling alliances,” and multilateral efforts. Initially, when she learned of his convention promise, it had made her so furious she did not speak with her husband for days. FDR was so upset by his wife’s stony silence that he called ER’s friend and one of his champions, Agnes Brown Leach, to come for a visit and mollify her. Leach arrived, but supported ER.
For months it was unclear where FDR really stood regarding Europe’s 1933 efforts for disarmament and international economic accord. He insisted only that his options were restrained by “pragmatic” politics: Hearst’s support, Senate support. FDR would take no leadership risks concerning international relations that might threaten his domestic programs.
Daily, ER agonized over the dire headlines of aggression and betrayal out of Germany and Japan. Now her husband’s policy seemed even to depart from Hoover’s “nonrecognition” policy against aggressor states: FDR’s new isolationist sentiments insisted upon absolute neutrality, and a refusal even to name the aggressor.*
In the spring of 1933, the US was silent as Japan moved deeper into China, stopping only thirteen miles from Peking before negotiating a truce on 31 May 1933.
Although FDR frequently recalled his family’s close commercial ties with China, he did not suggest an arms embargo, or any other public response, even when Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in April. The western world was passive while the Soviets worried about their eastern territories, and Japanese militarists announced their “Imperial Destiny,” which included East Asia, the South Seas, and the entire Western Pacific.
At the same time, all the news out of Germany was ghastly. Throughout April and May, ER clipped articles and filled FDR’s basket with horror stories and urgent notes. Hitler made bellicose speeches, decried the punitive, vindictive Treaty of Versailles, and demanded full equality in armaments—either through French arms reduction or through German rearmament.
On 1 April, Nazis announced a national boycott of Jewish businesses and professions. Gangs of Nazis roamed the streets in Berlin and beat women and men seated at cafés and in parks; in other cities they brutalized Jews at random. On 7 April, Hitler obliterated the constitutional government, and henceforth he reigned supreme.
On 2 May, Nazis invaded and destroyed labor union offices, confiscated their funds, files, and property, arrested every union leader, and declared unions (active in Germany for over fifty years) dissolved. On 10 May, Nazi students at the University of Berlin ended a torchlight parade with a massive book burning that included the works of every notable German writer and scholar, including Albert Einstein, Erich Maria Remarque, Thomas Mann, and Stefan Zweig, as well as others, including H. G. Wells and Upton Sinclair.
Also in May, Franz von Papen announced that Germany had obliterated “the term pacifism.” Before a vast Nazi rally, Papen, who as military attaché in Washington during the Great War had been accused of sabotaging U.S. transportation facilities, declared: “The battlefield is for a man what motherhood is for a woman!” Hitler was scheduled to address the Reichstag the next day, 17 May, and many feared he would officially repudiate Versailles and announce full rearmament at that time. England and France had unofficially agreed to declare sanctions if he did.
Finally, to ER’s great relief, FDR ended a month of silence with an “Appeal-to the Nations.” Drafted with the help of Louis Howe and others, it echoed her sentiments for real disarmament and was sent to fifty-four nations and published throughout the world:
Despite “the lessons and tragedies of the World War,” military weapons ”are today a greater burden upon the people of the earth than ever before.” The reason for such insanity was fear of “aggression” and “invasion.” Modern technology changed everything. War planes and heavy tanks threatened civilians everywhere. Therefore, “the ultimate goal of The Disarmament Conference must be peace,” which depended on the “complete elimination of all offensive weapons, and a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression.”
FDR’s speech was received jubilantly by citizens’ groups around the world, and respectfully by national leaders. Hitler even recast his 17 May speech to respond to FDR’s challenge: War represented “unlimited madness,” destruction, the “collapse of the present social and political order.” Confident that England and France were not serious about disarmament, Hitler rhetorically accepted the president’s proposal:
Germany is entirely ready to renounce all offensive weapons if the armed nations, on their side, will destroy their offensive weapons…. Germany would also be perfectly ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her, if the neighboring countries will do the same…. Germany is prepared to agree to any solemn pact of nonaggression, because she does not think of attacking but only of acquiring security.
Then, on 22 May, Norman Davis, chair of the U.S. Geneva delegation, announced that the United States was willing to consult multilaterally “in case of a threat to peace with a view to averting conflict,” and if in agreement with the determination, then to join in a “collective effort to restore peace.”
ER and her friends were delighted by Davis’s announcement and interpreted it as FDR’s long-awaited commitment of involvement with the League in the interests of peace. For isolationists, it was a declaration of war.
Within days, however, FDR renounced both his own words and those of Norman Davis. He had meant to limit his promises to “consultation,” not to extend them to a “collective effort.” There could be no departure from “longstanding and existing policy.”
For the moment world opinion hung suspended, confused by FDR’s torrent of contradictory words throughout April and May. His “bland statements filled with pious nothings” caused some to believe FDR had no international policy at all. Isolationists were pleased; his internationalist friends were confused.
On 30 May the Disarmament Conference prepared to recess, after fifteen months of acrimony and hope. Attention shifted to the forthcoming London Economic Conference to open on 12 June.
The most immediate source of international tensions was the outstanding war debts virtually all Europe owed to the United States. England, France, Germany, and Russia were broke. Germany could not pay its reparations to the Allies, and the Allies reneged on their payments to the United States. England agreed to make a “token payment.” FDR abhorred the word “token,” and Ramsay MacDonald agreed to dicker about the amount of partial payment. Only
Finland fully paid its World War I debt in 1933.
America’s Depression was part of a worldwide disaster. In 1931, Hoover had declared a one-year moratorium on debt payments. But he also signed the devastating Smoot-Hawley tariff law, which raised U.S. tariffs so high that European goods were no longer viable in the American market. Conditions worsened everywhere.
The London Economic Conference, which FDR also inherited from Hoover, was planned to end economic warfare, reduce tariffs, create a unified program to combat the global Depression, and begin the long journey toward international trade security and currency stabilization, which many believed would create a climate for peace through international commerce and fair market prices.
ER considered these among the most urgent issues on the world’s agenda, and she wanted her husband to assume a leadership role at the London Conference. After all, both Roosevelts had long agreed that nothing happened in isolation: Economically and politically, European events profoundly affected the United States; and U.S. policies concerned Europe, where fear of unstoppable inflation and fiscal havoc predominated. Memories of Germany’s 1923 inflation, when a wheelbarrow of worthless paper might buy milk or eggs, now haunted especially nations still on gold. Also, since 19 April, when FDR had taken the United States off gold and ended gold exports, America’s cheap dollar had wiped out Britain’s competitive advantage in the world trading market. France and Germany, still on gold, their currencies already devalued, faced fiscal disaster. In addition, there was wild speculation in money, stocks, and commodities as the dollar bounced about, in the hope that US prices might rise.
European leaders, both on and off gold, wanted to establish some new ratio, some international stabilization that would avoid wild swings in currency value and market prices. Currency stabilization was more important than the exact ratio or value of the dollar or pound, and FDR sent several delegates to the London Conference who agreed with that position.
In the Women’s Democratic News, ER expressed her own concerns regarding these issues:
Countries which have been impoverished by war are in debt to us. We have the major portion of all the gold in the world in this country. The only way in which other nations can pay their debts is by sending us goods. Our tariffs make this impracticable and in order to prevent our sending them goods, they have begun to build up their tariffs and so our trade is growing less and less.
There were times, during the spring of 1933, when ER and FDR seemed to be two internationalists in total agreement. On occasion, FDR even sounded like a League-loving Wilsonian. In May he wrote Joseph Tumulty, who had been Woodrow Wilson’s personal secretary: “I wonder if you realize how often I think of our old Chief when I go about my daily tasks. Perhaps what we are doing will go a little way toward the fulfillment of his ideals.”
Then he took a firm stand against Hitlerism. On 8 June 1933, he telephoned sixty-three-year-old history professor William E. Dodd at his University of Chicago office: “This is Franklin Roosevelt. I want to know if you will render the government a distinct service. I want you to go to Germany as ambassador.”
Southern and scholarly, Dodd was president-elect of the American Historical Association. Born in North Carolina, he received his Ph.D. from the University of Leipzig in 1900, and spoke German fluently. A liberal Democrat, he was best known for his histories of the old South, biographies of Nathaniel Macon and Jefferson Davis, and a celebratory biography of Woodrow Wilson. With Ray Stannard Baker he also edited The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson.
FDR explained that he selected Dodd because of his reputation as “a liberal and as a scholar,” and especially for his work on Woodrow Wilson: “I want an American liberal in Germany as a standing example.” A dedicated antifascist, Dodd became one of FDR’s most controversial appointments.
On 31 May, Secretary of State Cordell Hull embarked for London with enthusiasm, convinced that his mission was to achieve fiscal stabilization in a world of depression and economic chaos. He believed FDR fully supported his intention “to lower trade barriers and stabilize the currency exchange.”
After all, FDR had publicly announced that the World Monetary and Economic Conference was of “vital importance to mankind.” Failure at this conference would be, FDR declared, “a catastrophe amounting to a world tragedy.” Ramsay MacDonald believed the “fate of generations” was involved: “We must not fail.”*
At her 15 June press conference ER urged all women to realize they “have a special stake in watching national and international news. Every woman should have a knowledge of what is going on [in London]. It does affect the future amicable relations between the nations of the world. It has been stated that the debt question is not to be discussed. But whatever does come out will be vitally important to every woman in her own home.”
Unknown to his wife, unknown to his secretary of state, throughout May FDR had encouraged Ray Moley to put the brakes on Hull’s efforts. Appointed assistant secretary of state, responsible directly to FDR, Moley was an ardent economic nationalist who deplored free trade. Hull’s State Department resented his presence, and his views. Unlike Hull, Moley argued that tariffs served useful domestic purposes. London must not be allowed to limit America’s fiscal independence.
FDR’s immediate goal in 1933 was to ensure higher prices for American farm products and manufactured goods. To limit cheap goods from abroad, he even raised certain tariffs, most notably on cotton, higher than Smoot-Hawley levels. Fiscal nationalists were delighted. But there was no agreement among FDR’s international team, not among his six official delegates nor among his fifty advisers. FDR had sent them off with no instructions, and there was no clearly established policy. Each delegate sailed away with the illusion that the president supported his own particular interest.
But while they were at sea, FDR suddenly abandoned the reciprocal trade bill before Congress. He had simply decided to request “no action.” Cordell Hull’s hopes for international agreement based on reduced tariffs had depended on that bill. It would have provided clear evidence that the United States was sincere in its commitment to positive action. Hull was devastated: “I left for London with the highest of hopes but arrived with empty hands.”
William Bullitt, appointed on 20 April special assistant to the secretary of state and executive officer of the U.S. delegation, was appalled. On 11 June he sent FDR an “ultra-confidential” cable to report Hull’s complete collapse. Bullitt had “rarely seen a man more broken up, and his condition was reflected in that of Mrs. Hull, who literally wept all night.” FDR sent a reassuring cable, which enabled Hull to remain and try to achieve something. After all, delegates from sixty-six nations had assembled to consider alternatives to fiscal chaos, economic despair. The need was great, and for the moment goodwill was in the air.
On 16 June, Congress adjourned, and ER and SDR traveled to Groton for young Franklin’s graduation. In addition to his diploma, he received first prize from the Debating Society and another for combined excellence in scholarship and athletics. Several Roosevelt cousins also graduated, and three of TR’s grandsons also won prizes. But if ER spoke to her relatives, she failed to mention it.
FDR was supposed to attend, but last-minute congressional details and lunch with Dodd prevented his leaving Washington until the next day in time for homecoming festivities. ER had already left for a week at Val-Kill while, from Groton, FDR and his sons embarked on a sailing adventure that would culminate in his first visit to Campobello since 1921—when he contracted polio.
James had chartered a forty-five-foot schooner, Amberjack II. Papa would be skipper; James, FDR, Jr., and John would be crew. FDR charted and piloted his own course. They would sail around Cape Cod and north-northeast to the Bay of Fundy, a total of 360 nautical miles.
The schooner was accompanied and protected by patrolling Navy planes overhead and Navy escorts including two destroyers and the cruiser Indianapolis, each with facilities for telegrams, information, and emergencies. A Coast Guard cutter wit
h White House and Secret Service staff sailed behind, as did two press boats. One carried wire service and motion picture photographers. The other, the Mary Alice, carried four of FDR’s favorite White House correspondents: Ernest Lindley of the New York Herald Tribune, Bill Murphy of the New York World, John Herrick of the Chicago Tribune, and Charles Hurd of The New York Times.
They all had strict orders to keep out of sight, except when invited. The Mary Alice revelers were, however, frequently invited—since they were well stocked with a case of bourbon. FDR’s stores were dry, and the weather was cold and drear.
Hanging over them all, during long days of storm and relentless fog that kept the president’s party idled and off-course, were the events unfolding at the London Economic Conference. FDR kept in touch through the communication facilities on the Indianapolis, both with his official delegation and with various experts he had called together for advice.
Baruch and Herbert Bayard Swope, Baruch’s confidant and former editor of the old New York World, were the most ardent internationalists. One of FDR’s last acts before he left Washington was to write Swope on 16 June:
Would be delighted if you could accompany Raymond Moley for short visit to London. I am sending him soon and feel your presence would be exceedingly helpful to him in many ways. I should be personally grateful to have you do this, having confidence as I do in your judgment and your wide knowledge of international affairs….
Evidently, FDR had second thoughts about Moley’s economic nationalism, and wanted Swope to join the fray. But it is impossible to fathom FDR’s motives, because he rejected every proposal both his London and New York teams, after days of argument and compromise, considered sound. He could not accept any monetary restraint that would adversely affect U.S. commodity prices. On 17 June, he cabled Hull: “We must retain full freedom of action … in order to hold up price level at home.”
Eleanor Roosevelt Page 16