Photo Insert
Erich von Manstein on his way to a field command post
Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1991-015-31A / Heinz Mittelstaedt
Hermann Hoth (left) and Manstein at a conference
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-022-2927-26 / Heinz Mittelstaedt
Hoth observing from a trench
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-218-0530-10 / Geller
Tiger in the field
Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1978-020-01A / Friedrich Zschäckel
German Marder II self-propelled antitank gun
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-197-1238-16 / Henisch
German half-track with 37 mm antiaircraft gun
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-022-2926A / Wolff/Altvater
JU-87G Stuka, showing 37 mm cannon
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-646-5184-26 / Niermann
Infantry of Das Reich advance with Tiger support
Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1973-080-50 / Friedrich Zschäckel
Infantry of Grossdeutschland move forward
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-732-0135-22 / Gottert
Column of Panzer IIIs in open country
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-219-0595-03
Tiger on target!
Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1973-098-48 / Gronert
It was a horse-powered war for both armies on the Eastern Front.
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-578-1950-05 / Bayer
Cigarette break at Prokhorovka
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-219-0553A-10 / Koch
Panzer III crew rests during a halt
Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1981-143-14A / Friedrich Zschäckel
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book has been a long time coming. I wish to thank my family, my colleagues at Colorado College, and my students for putting up with me during its gestation. Particular thanks to Gretchen Boger, whose professionalism and enthusiasm during her two years with the History Department reminded me why I chose that profession; and to our office coordinator, Sandy Papuga, for her goodwill and common sense.
I am grateful to Random House for its patience while the book was in progress and for its expertise once the manuscript was submitted. The copy editor deserves special praise—I would not have believed I could make so many errors of fact and generate so many clumsy sentences! The errors that remain are my responsibility several times over.
I also wish to acknowledge the staff of Tutt Library, especially Diane Armock, the interlibrary loan coordinator. Kathy Barbier and Rob Citino generously shared their knowledge of the subject and provided welcome encouragement. And Sam Lerman was during his Colorado College career a valued associate in a course on terrorism that became a joint enterprise. Sam, this book’s for you. May you write a better one.
GUIDE TO FURTHER READING
This is not a formal bibliography, but instead a guide incorporating some of the material I have found useful and interesting. It is meant to be reader-friendly and is correspondingly weighted toward works in English, written or translated.
The best general introduction is M. K. Barbier, Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 (London: Amber Books, 2002). Noteworthy alike for accuracy, balance, and readability, it presents a seamless overview of Citadel. Will Fowler, Kursk: The Vital 24 Hours (London: Amber Books, 2005), uses a similar format. Despite the title, it is a well-written survey with excellent graphics and useful sidebars. Time-challenged readers may prefer Geoffrey Jukes, Kursk: The Clash of Armour (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969); and Mark Healy, Kursk 1943: The Tide Turns in the East (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1992). Each is part of a distinguished series: Jukes in Ballantine’s Illustrated History of World War II and Healy in Osprey’s Campaign Series. Both books are well written. Both were state-of-the-art scholarship when published. Both are refreshingly brief. Both remain useful, with Healy’s graphics complementing the text.
Outstanding among Kursk’s recent general histories is Lloyd Clark, The Battle of the Tanks: Kursk, 1943 (London: Headline Reviews, 2011), structured heavily around interviews and narratives. Among older works with similar formats, Robin Cross, The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 (London: Penguin Group, 2002), remains a useful narrative, informed by combatants’ accounts. A good balance is the operationally focused Walter S. Dunn Jr., Kursk: Hitler’s Gamble, 1943 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).
Still dominating the scholarly field is the brilliant overview by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), which broke new ground with its sophisticated use of previously unavailable Soviet archives. Its presentation and analysis continue to challenge modification. Its emphasis on numbers and statistics can be a weight, but never a burden. Mark Healy’s Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient, 4–17 July 1943 (Stroud, UK: History Press, 2008) offers a German perspective that balances the Soviet emphasis of Glantz and House.
French military historians have shown recent and worthwhile interest in Kursk. Jean Lopez, Koursk: Les quarante jours qui ont ruiné la Wehrmacht (5 Juillet–20 aout 1943 (Paris: Economia, 2011) is an excellent analysis by a leading French scholar of the Eastern Front. And the high-end, general-audience periodical Champs de Bataille: Seconde Guerre Mondiale published in 2012–2013 a series of three special issues on Koursk 1943. Even for those blind of their French eye, the graphics, tables, and illustrations make their acquisition worthwhile.
Citadel is best understood in the general context of events in 1943 by Robert M. Citino’s The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012). The author’s reference apparatus is almost as useful as his text. Citino’s work is buttressed by Die Ostfront 1943/44, edited by Karl-Heinz Frieser, volume 8 of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007). It is also one of the best contributions to the series and arguably the most informative source on the lost year on a neglected front. Boris V. Sokolov, “The Battle for Kursk, Orel, and Charkov: Strategic Intentions and Results,” in Gezeitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkrieg?, edited by Roland Foerster (Hamburg: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1996), 69–88, is worth accessing for its post-Soviet critique of the regime’s falsifications.
For traditional studies from the perspective of the participants, see Ernst Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation “Ziti-delle” 1943 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966); and the translated official The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study, edited by David Glantz and Harold S. Ornstein (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).
In the front rank of specialized works on Kursk itself stand Valeriy Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative, translated and edited by Stuart Britton (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2011); and George M. Nipe, Blood, Steel and Myth: The II.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka, July 1943 (Stamford, CT: RZM Publishing, 2011). Each is a mine of detail based on previously unfamiliar material. The extensive translations of archival material in Zamulin make the work especially valuable. Steven H. Newton’s Kursk: The German View (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002) is an equally valuable anthology of postwar reports by senior officer participants, with excellent archivally based editorial commentary. Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), provides numbers and a useful bibliography. David Porter, Das Reich at Kursk: 12 July 1943 (London: Amber Books, 2011), and Fifth Guards Tank Army at Kursk (London: Amber Books, 2011), are parallel works whose texts and graphics provide a coherent overview of these formations that can be applied to their counterparts as well. Roman Töppel, “Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung—Die Schlacht von Kursk,” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 61 (2002): 369–401, is the best analysis of the origins and refutations of Kursk’s major myths.
In the second tier of specialized material, Antonius John, Kursk ’43: Szenen einer Entscheidungsschlacht (Bonn: Konzept Verlag, 1993), has useful primary material from Model’s sector
during Citadel and the shift to the Orel salient. Silvester Stadler, Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943: II.SS-Panzerkorps als Stosskeil im Grosskampf (Osnabrück: Munin Verlag, 1980), reprints many orders and reports. Didier Lodieu, Ill. Pz. Korps at Kursk, translated by Allan McKay (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2007), makes good use of archival material and unit histories. Volume 2 of Helmuth Spaeter, The History of the Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1995), and Hans-Joachim Jung, Panzer Soldiers for “God, Honor, Fatherland”: The History of Panzerregiment Grossdeutschland, translated by David Johnston (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 2000), combine to do well by the army’s showpiece. Volume 2 of Armored Bears: The German 3rd Panzer Division in World War II, compiled by the division’s veterans (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 2013), focuses on personal experiences and anecdotes. Christopher W. Wilbeck’s Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II (Bedford, PA: Aberjona Press, 2004) includes a good analysis of the Tigers’ role with Breith’s corps.
Airpower, whose vital role in Citadel is often marginalized, is well presented in Christer Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle: July 1943 (Hersham, UK: Ian Allan Publishing, 2008). Von Hardesty and Ilya Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), present Citadel in the context of the Red Air Force’s wartime development. Richard Muller, The German Air War in Russia (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992), is a solid counterpoint. And among dozens of aircraft books, Martin Pegg, Hs 129: Panzerjäger! (Burgess Hill, UK: Classic Publications, 1997), covers one of the less familiar types.
Among works addressing wider issues related to Kursk, Geoffrey Jukes, Stalingrad to Kursk: Triumph of the Red Army (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2011), is excellent on the factors underlying the shift in military power on the Eastern Front. Dana V. Sadarananda, Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of Army Group Don (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1990), summarizes the experiences that directly shaped Manstein’s approach to Citadel and its aftermath. George M. Nipe Jr., Decision in the Ukraine, Summer 1943: II SS and III Panzer Korps (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 1996), takes these formations through Kursk and afterward. For details of the post-Kursk fighting, Rolf Hinze, East Front Drama, 1944: The Withdrawal Battle of Army Group Center, translated by Joseph G. Welsh (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 1996), and Crucible of Combat: Germany’s Defensive Battles in the Ukraine, 1943–44, translated and edited by F. P. Steinhardt (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2009), are richly detailed, with minimal “Wehrmacht pathos.”
Most of the accessible biographies and memoirs are of Germans. The best critical analysis, by a substantial distance, of Manstein’s careeer and character is Mungo Melvin, Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010). Benoît Lemay, Erich von Manstein: Hitler’s Master Strategist, translated by Pierce Heyward (Havertown, PA: Casement Publishers, 2010), runs an honorable second. The German original of Manstein’s memoir, Verlorene Siege (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1955), includes relevant material omitted from Lost Victories (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958). Alexander Stahlberg, Bounden Duty: The Memoirs of a German Officer, 1932–45, translated by Patricia Crampton (London: Brassey’s, 1990), presents the ambiguities confronting a personal aide involved with the resistance to Hitler. Among the rest, Steven H. Newton, Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walther Model—Hitler’s Favorite General (New York: Da Capo Press, 2006), is solid on Model. F. W. von Mellenthin was XLVIII Panzer Corps’s chief of staff during Citadel. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956) includes his perspective on the operation.
Senior Russian commanders’ memoirs include Konstantin Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, translated by Vladimir Talny (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970); and Pavel Rotmistrov’s swashbuckling Stal’naya gvardiya (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984). The more accessible Stalin’s Generals, edited by Harold Shukman (New York: Grove Press, 1993), includes excellent chapters on Novikov, Vatutin, Vasilevsky, and Rokossovsky. Richard N. Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders: The Armored Guards (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1994), includes chapters on Katukov and Rotmistrov.
On the questions of motives and behaviors, Roger R. Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), and Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), are a definitive combination. Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Stephen G. Fritz, Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), and Thomas Kühne, Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s Community, 1918–1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), are no less persuasive for the Wehrmacht. Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer’s Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012) uses tape recordings of low-ranking German POWs to convey an unfiltered version of the unreflective hardness that informed their behavior in Russia.
NOTES
Note: These references are intended primarily to serve as a guide to further reading for nonspecialists on this complex subject. As such they have been kept to a minimum, cite the most accessible sources on each subject, and take account of readers’ probable language limitations by citing translations when possible. Those seeking to probe more deeply into the masses of archival data are encouraged to consult the Guide to Further Reading (this page) as an intermediate step.
INTRODUCTION
1 Fostering myth as much as history Roman Töppel, “Kursk: Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 57, no. 3 (2009): 349–384, and “Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung: Die Schlacht um Kursk,” Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 61 (2002): 369–401, are perceptive and comprehensive on this subject.
2 In terms of page counts Norman Davies, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939–1945 (London: Penguin Books, 2008), is a useful corrective for the imbalance.
3 “Forgotten year” Karl-Heinz Frieser et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 8, Die Ostfront, 1943–44 (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007), p. 277.
4 Two master narratives emerged See as typical English-language versions, and from opposite poles of the presentation spectrum, Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Operation Citadel: Kursk and Orel: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War, trans. Michaela Nierhaus (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987), and David M. Glantz and Harold L. Orenstein, eds., The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999). One features heroic narratives and evocative photos. The other exemplifies Carlyle’s “Dryasdust.” Though dated, each remains useful as a portal into the former combatants’ respective mentalities in the Cold War era.
5 German monopoly of Eastern Front narratives Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), is comprehensive and perceptive.
CHAPTER 1: GENESIS
1 Operation Barbarossa The invasion has generated enough discussion and analysis to justify a monograph on its historiography alone. As an introduction, Geoffrey Megargee, War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Lanham, MD: Rowman, 2006), stands out. For analysis, David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), is balanced and reader-friendly. Most detailed, albeit principally from a German perspective, is Horst Boog et al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. 4, The Attack on the Soviet Union, trans. Ewald Osers et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk, 10 July–10 September 1941, 2 vols. (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2011–12), is exhaustingly superlative on the tactical/operational dynamics of co
mbat in a crucial sector and time frame. Alex J. Kay et al., eds., Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2012), is an anthology of well-executed case studies.
2 Hitler issued Directive 41 The basic outline of Operation Blue is reprinted in Walther Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1962), pp. 183–191.
3 A secondary objective was Stalingrad For a strategic/operational overview of the Stalingrad campaign, the best combination of narrative and analysis is Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). Joel S. A. Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East, 1942–1943 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), complements Citino’s ground-oriented presentation. Bernd Wegner, “The War Against the Soviet Union,” in Horst Boog et al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. 6, The Global War, trans. Ewald Osers et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 853–1158, is also essential.
4 Expected the Germans to attack For the general background of Soviet strategic planning, see most recently Peter Mezhiritsky, On the Precipice: Stalin, the Red Army Leadership and the Road to Stalingrad, 1931–1942, trans. Stuart Britton (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2012).
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