by Martin Allen
The resources being provided by the Soviet Union gave the Germans an advantage that the British, and particularly Hugh Dalton (who as Minister of Economic Warfare was charged with the responsibility of cutting Germany off from all sources of supply), were determined to end at all costs. SO1’s decision to delude Hitler by peace talks, to ‘encourage the Germans to attack Russia by misleading Hitler … that large sections in Britain [who] preferred to see the overthrow of the Russian rather than the German regime might be prepared to force through a compromise peace between Britain and Germany’,22 undoubtedly took this into consideration. It was too good an opportunity to miss. It would not only give Britain the desperately-needed second front, sucking the German war machine dry of men and materiel, it would also cut off a valuable source of supply to the Reich, while at the same time closing its access to trade from the east via Russia’s rail networks. A double, if not triple, blow against Germany.
A little over a month after Sam Hoare’s visit from the Papal Nuncio, an extraordinary situation began to develop, and Hoare’s role in this whole affair began to be more clearly defined. On 17 December 1940, Captain Hillgarth dispatched a ciphered ‘SECRET’ telegram to London that read: ‘Further to my meeting with Gen[eral] Vigon this morning I can confirm that a safe arrangement for the carriage of my Minister over dangerous territory has been concluded. Gen. Vigon was most helpful and confirmed that both the arrangements for the 20th and return on 21st have been cleared with the relevant parties, and so there should be no problems.’23
General Juan Vigon was chief of the Spanish Supreme General Staff, and head of the Spanish air force. Despite being an important member of Franco’s government, he saw himself as a moderate, and attempted on several occasions to further the cause of peace, being politely but firmly rebuffed by the British.
Within weeks of his meeting with Hillgarth, General Vigon would make his own peaceable attempt between Britain and Germany. The secret British Foreign Office file of the time reads: ‘General Vigon has held the view that the war will be a stalemate for a long time … [and] it may be he who prompted General Franco to raise the question of a possible peace with Sir S. Hoare recently …’24 The Foreign Office civil servant who made this comment, a Mr W.S. Williams, added optimistically: ‘If … we are to bring Spain in on our side we should lose no opportunity of rubbing in to the Spaniards, what many still do not realise, that Germany alone is responsible for the war’s continuance.’25
Despite his attempt to show diplomatic expertise, Mr Williams was evidently not that worldly, nor did he understand the complexities of what was taking place, for his superior, Frank Roberts (working under Assistant Under-Secretary William Strang), stingingly retorted: ‘I am not sure that anything is to be gained by this. After all the Germans would be ready to end the war to-morrow on their own terms, which would probably look not unacceptable to Spain & Portugal. It is we who are for excellent reasons, responsible for the continuation of the war [author’s italics]. I think our propaganda to Spain had better not concentrate on this theme.’26
Vigon, of course, was unaware of this subterfuge behind the closed doors of Whitehall. His meeting with Hillgarth on Tuesday, 17 December had been intended to further the likelihood of peace, although it is almost certain he was not told the true reason for the ‘carriage’ of Hoare ‘over dangerous territory’.
The phrases used in Hillgarth’s telegram were very unusual, and reveal much about the situation existing in the Foreign Office at that time. One need only read some of the other communications emanating from British embassies around the world to realise that diplomats were rarely reticent about saying exactly what they meant, particularly when their comments back to London were protected by complex Foreign Office ciphers. Hillgarth’s covert language must mean that his telegram was only meant to be understood by a select few men in Whitehall; men who already knew exactly what was taking place.
The reference in Hillgarth’s telegram to ‘dangerous territory’ is the strangest phrase of all, for Hoare, in Spain, was already in neutral territory. He could not have been travelling to occupied territory, because Hillgarth specifically states ‘over dangerous territory’. General Vigon’s position as head of the Spanish air force suggests that Hillgarth arranged Spanish air transport for Hoare – hence the use of the word ‘over’. There were few places Hoare could have travelled to from Spain ‘over dangerous territory’ to reach more neutral territory in 1940, other than Switzerland, which would mean he was about to fly over occupied France.
Furthermore, Hillgarth was very specific about the dates. Hoare was to fly out on the twentieth – a Friday – and back again on the twenty-first – Saturday. That was a very short stay for which to have flown so far, indicating that Hoare’s mission was both important and extremely secret, for it was being conducted on a weekend, at a time when the likelihood of official Embassy business would be slim, and the chances of his travels being discovered slimmer still.
The biggest question this raises is, who did Hoare fly in secret to Switzerland to meet?
In October 1940 Ernst Bohle, head of the Auslandsorganisation and a close friend of Albrecht Haushofer’s, was invited to Rudolf Hess’s apartment in Berlin. The Deputy-Führer greeted Bohle cordially, then ushered him quickly through to his study. After making sure that the door was firmly shut, Hess informed Bohle that he wanted to discuss a ‘very secret assignment’ which no one, either in Hess’s family – this specifically meant Hess’s brother Alfred, who was Bohle’s assistant – or on his staff, was to be informed about. ‘I chose you,’ Hess confided, ‘because you speak English, know the British, and consider our war with Britain as much a mistake as I do.’27 He explained that he was currently working on a secret project to end this war, and asked Bohle if he was willing to help.
When Bohle was interrogated by Allied Intelligence at the end of the war, he recalled: ‘when I immediately agreed, Hess told me that above all others, my chief, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, must not hear even a breath of this intention as he would sabotage it at once’.28 Hess, Bohle continued, then explained that he wanted to write to the Duke of Hamilton, who he understood had great influence in Britain, to suggest a private meeting in Switzerland. ‘He handed me the draft of the first part of the letter, and asked me to translate it, right away, in an office next door.’29 Over the next three or four months, Bohle asserted, Hess called him in to translate further drafts of the letter, the work of Hess’s political mentor and his friend, Karl and Albrecht Haushofer.30 Fired up with enthusiasm for this important project, Bohle asked the Deputy-Führer, ‘If your plans come to pass, please suggest to the Führer that I accompany you.’31
Under interrogation in 1945, Bohle maintained that he personally had done all the translation work for Hess, which lasted from October 1940 to January or February 1941. He would also testify that:
It was suggested by Professor Haushofer … that I would meet [someone] in a neutral country, possibly Switzerland … It was my firm opinion at the time, which I cannot prove today, that Hitler knew all about this because it seemed impossible to me that Hess would do anything of such importance without asking Hitler … It was [also] my opinion that only three people in Germany knew anything about it, Hitler, Hess, and myself. I had orders to speak to nobody, not even to his [Hess’s] own brother, who was in my own office, not even to his [Hess’s] secretary.32
What is curious about this testimony is that Bohle asserted he had worked translating papers for Hess for several months. This seems odd, firstly because once the text of Hess’s letter had been finalised, its translation into English would not have taken long, and secondly because not only could Hess speak English with reasonable fluency, but his close friend and co-conspirator in the initiative, Albrecht Haushofer, was perfectly fluent.
Perhaps the explanation is that in Germany, just as in Britain, there were those who knew exactly what was taking place, and those who did not. Bohle’s evidence seems to suggest that he was one of those w
ho were not taken into complete confidence. This raises another interesting point. If Ernst Bohle was not in the inner circle of those at the centre of the Messrs HHHH peace initiative, perhaps he translated other important documents; documents that did indeed relate to Switzerland. He may, when questioned by Allied Intelligence five years later, and knowing the story of the Deputy-Führer who had suddenly flown off to Britain, have assumed that Hess was carrying with him the papers he himself had translated, when the reality of the situation could have been quite different.
This does not reveal who Hoare flew to Switzerland to meet, but it is a starting point; and there is other evidence which comes from an interesting source.
It is known that Captain Hillgarth arranged a flight for Sam Hoare on Friday, 20 December, and a return flight on the following day, but on the German side there is clear evidence of another flight as well. The astonishing fact is that Rudolf Hess did not just jump aboard his plane on Saturday, 10 May 1941 and fly to Britain. He made several other flights throughout the autumn of 1940 and the spring of 1941 – but no one knows where he flew to.
Helmut Kaden, the chief test pilot at Messerschmitt’s headquarters in Augsburg, personally responsible for the Deputy-Führer’s private Messerschmitt 110E, registration VJ-OQ, was later to recall that Hess had made three prior attempts to fly to Britain. According to Kaden, Hess made his first attempt on Saturday, 21 December 1940,
when he took off in clear weather but returned after just over three hours, to make apologies to the staff. He had dropped his signal pistol, the equivalent to the RAF’s Verey pistol … [which] had lodged underneath his seat, out of reach, and jammed the rudder controls. It was freed by the jolt when the Messerschmitt landed, and recovered by Hess before we reached the plane, but it prevented him continuing on that occasion.33
Taken at face value, this statement appears to indicate that in December 1940 Rudolf Hess was ready to fly to Britain to seek out the Duke of Hamilton. However, for several reasons that cannot be true. Hess could on occasion be prone to over-enthusiasm, but he was nevertheless an intelligent man and an astute politician. In the late spring of 1941 he had gone to considerable efforts to ensure the most propitious circumstances for his flight, checking the weather conditions and ordering several improvements to his plane. One of the key things that Hess maintained went wrong on the night of 10 May 1941 was that his plans became unstuck when he found himself plunged into darkness, and this affected his flight. In December, night would have fallen in Scotland before Hess was halfway to Britain, and it would have been a courageous or a foolhardy man indeed who braved the dark North Sea in winter.
A second reason why Kaden has to be incorrect is that information was an extremely dangerous commodity in Nazi Germany. After Hess’s flight on 10 May 1941, everyone who had had personal, political or professional dealings with him was rounded up by the Reich’s internal security and questioned. All of them, including Helmut Kaden, expressed shock and surprise on discovering Hess’s destination. Hitler, Hess and Albrecht Haushofer were engaged in extremely sensitive peace negotiations with an enemy power, secret even from the other leading Nazis. Hitler and Hess did not draw Foreign Minister Ribbentrop into their confidence, and Ernst Bohle was only given information on a need-to-know basis – even being instructed not to tell Hess’s own brother what was taking place. No one knew.
Rudolf Hess would certainly not have told Helmut Kaden or any other person at Messerschmitt, particularly in December 1940, about the real purposes of his mysterious flights. They were mere minions, and Germany’s Deputy-Führer would not have felt it necessary to inform them about his plans in any but the vaguest of terms. Thus Kaden’s opinion that Britain was Hess’s objective on Saturday, 21 December 1940 must have been an assumption based on his subsequent knowledge of Hess’s destination.
Finally, Kaden stated that Hess returned because his Verey pistol became stuck under his seat, jamming his rudder controls. This is also very unlikely to be true, particularly since the item miraculously became unstuck before anyone else saw it. However, Kaden’s testimony is valuable, for it tells us several key things. It gives us the date of Hess’s December flight, and it reveals how long he was away from Augsburg.
It was part of Hess’s role as Deputy-Führer of the Reich to travel about, and he did far more than merely sit at his desk from 1939 to 1941. There were several instances when he flew as far afield as the Baltic in the north and the Iberian Peninsula in the south. He thought little of travelling a long way for a brief meeting, for such is the nature of politics.
If the details of Hess’s flight on Saturday, 21 December 1940 are examined and set against the technical specifications of an Me-110E, a very interesting possibility becomes apparent.
The Me-110E was an extremely powerful all-weather capability fighter-bomber. With its twin Daimler Benz DB-601N engines, each producing 1395 horsepower, it was a high-quality machine capable of a top speed of over 360 miles per hour. Let us assume that Hess flew sensibly at the plane’s upper cruising speed of 310 miles per hour. From Augsburg to Zürich is 150 miles, or a flying time of twenty-nine minutes at 310 miles per hour. With the return flight, that gives an overall travelling time of about an hour. According to Kaden, Hess was away from Augsburg for ‘just over three hours’. This means that he could have been in Switzerland for nearly two hours, during which he could have met Sam Hoare, who had travelled at considerable effort to arrive in Switzerland that same day, Saturday, 21 December 1940.
So long after the event, it may never be discovered exactly where Germany’s Deputy-Führer met Britain’s Ambassador Extraordinary to discuss peace. It is unlikely that their secret meeting was conducted close to Zürich airport, as the risk of discovery by Intelligence or the press would have been considerable. It may, however, be significant that Hess had two aunts living nearby. Frau Emma Rothacker lived in Zürich itself, whilst Frau Helene Hess lived quietly in the countryside near the city. In all likelihood Aunt Helene’s house was the more secure, particularly since she was already known to Albrecht Haushofer, who was, without a doubt, also present in Switzerland that day, as almost certainly was Captain Hillgarth. Significantly for an operation that would come to be known as ‘Messrs HHHH’, the men involved on this occasion were Hess, Hoare, Haushofer and Hillgarth.
The exact details of what was debated at that two-hour meeting on Saturday, 21 December 1940 will probably never be known, except that the terms of a possible peaceable agreement, as imparted to Hoare by the Papal Nuncio, were undoubtedly paramount. It would have been necessary for Hoare and Hess to discuss how such a deal could be implemented, for it would become increasingly clear over the next few months that the German leadership did not believe they were negotiating with the British government, but rather with a powerful faction, headed by Lord Halifax and Hoare, who were poised to usurp power constitutionally from Churchill and his supporters. In May 1940, Lord Halifax had almost become Britain’s Prime Minister instead of Churchill. However, Halifax’s credibility as a war leader had been critically damaged by his support of Chamberlain’s appeasement. He had been charged with being one of the ‘guilty men’, and the mud had stuck. From May until December 1940 he had been a man under siege, consistently sniped at by the press as one of those responsible for Britain’s predicament.
Perhaps the most important question that can be asked about this meeting is how we can be sure that Sir Samuel Hoare did indeed travel all the way from Madrid to Switzerland for a highly secret meeting. After all, the Hillgarth/Vigon evidence is rather tenuous. The answer is that Hoare did not merely travel for one meeting. The whole exercise would be repeated within just a few weeks – only that time the situation would become considerably more complicated when Britain’s Ambassador in Berne, David Kelly, found out.
On Wednesday, 18 December 1940, two days before Hess almost certainly flew to Switzerland, Hitler issued a new military directive that would change the whole nature of the war. Having previously sworn that he would never
again commit Germany to the stupidity of a two-front war, Hitler now ordered that Germany’s armed forces should prepare ‘to crush the Soviet Union in a quick campaign … even before the conclusion of the war against England’. This was the infamous Directive No. 21, Hitler’s order to prepare for Operation Barbarossa. The preparations, Hitler stated, ‘requiring more time to get under way are to be started now – if this has not yet been done – and are to be completed by May 15, 1941’34 – only five months away.
Despite Russia’s substantial contribution to Germany’s war effort, Hitler was becoming increasingly uncomfortable about the opportunistic noises emanating from Moscow. At the same time he was aware that a successful pre-emptive strike against Russia would secure all the Ukrainian wheat and Caucasian oil Germany could ever need.
To all appearances, the Russo–German entente seemed to be proceeding very nicely, particularly on the economic front; yet behind the scenes Germany was beginning to take an increasingly belligerent stance, indicative of its belief that the Reich was attaining the economo-politico-military upper hand. However, much of this was a façade created by the Nazis to hide the reality that Germany’s economic joints were beginning to creak alarmingly under the strains of maintaining a prolonged command economy. Add to this the fact that the Reich’s Economics Ministry was predicting famine in occupied Europe for the winter of 1941, and Germany’s situation had the potential to become untenable very quickly.
In Britain meanwhile, events had taken an unexpected turn. On 12 December, Britain’s Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian (an old friend of Albrecht Haushofer’s), suddenly died, leaving a diplomatic vacuum in Washington at a critical time in Anglo–American relations. This was a key position in Britain’s war effort, and an unsuitable appointment could have had disastrous repercussions. In the event Lord Lothian’s death presented an opportunity for Churchill to kill several birds with one stone. His first and primary objective was to foster ever closer relations between London and Washington; yet he might also have the opportunity to remove a political rival, whilst at the same time furthering the impression of a divided British political hierarchy in the eyes of the German leadership.