Goliad was especially crucial strategically because it lay on the main route that linked San Antonio to the little gulf port town of Copano on the Aransas Bay that led to the Gulf. Much of U.S. manpower, supplies, and munitions for waging war were brought through Copano. While San Antonio was located too far inland to benefit from a quick resupply or reinforcements from east of the Sabine, Goliad was ideally situated for such timely assistance necessary for the revolution’s survival. 88
Even the editor of the New Orleans True American knew as much, writing, “the fort at Goliad [was] a very strong position, well supplied with munitions and provisions,” in preparation for meeting an invasion from Mexico—unlike the Alamo. 89 Quite simply, therefore, Goliad was “the strongest fortification in the Mexican sub-province of Texas,” even though Bowie and Neill overlooked that common, widespread view, even among non-military men. 90
As Houston had advocated, the Alamo garrison should have evacuated San Antonio and the Alamo to combine with Fannin’s troops at Goliad for a united stand. However, as throughout the 1836 campaign, Texas leaders got it exactly reversed: Fannin’s forces attempted to march to San Antonio to assist in defending a place that was indefensible, while leaving behind the strongest fortress in Texas. The predictable result was a double disaster, with Texan forces at both Goliad and San Antonio fated to be wiped out with relative ease.
It should also be noted that the Alamo, as an advanced outpost on the southwestern frontier, would have made an ideal cavalry post. Every Texan owned a good horse, just like he carried a well-maintained rifle; both were necessary means of survival on a frontier vulnerable to sudden Indian strikes. However, both “Army of the People” volunteers who had captured San Antonio, and the Matamoros Expedition troops took almost all the horses in the town and surrounding area. This widespread pilfering of resources left the Alamo garrison stranded at a remote post located far from the populated areas of east Texas not only abandoned, but also far out on a limb by early 1836.
If horses had been available the Alamo garrison could have ridden east, bringing the guns with them as Houston had desired, perhaps leaving only a small mounted force of observation at the fort. Ironically, this simple solution was overlooked by Bowie and Neill, even though some defenders had served in Texas Ranger companies performing mounted service against the Indians, and knew the importance of mobility on Texas’ prairies.
With a sense of urgency, a desperate Neill described how his small band of soldiers was stranded in the middle of nowhere in a pitiful letter to Houston: “We are in a torpid, defenseless condition and have not and cannot get from all the citizens here horses enough to send out a patrol or spy company [and if not reinforced] we will be over-run by the enemy” in the near future. 91
William Barret Travis would certainly have preferred a mounted command. As it stood, he was not only an accidental but a reluctant officer at the Alamo. In fact, he hated the assignment on the southwestern frontier from the beginning. With romantic dreams of waging war like a chivalric knight of old, he had wrangled a lieutenant colonel’s commission in the Texas regular army from Governor Smith. Travis was then appointed to command a cavalry unit, the Legion of Cavalry, though it existed mainly on paper. Plagued by his own failures and the general apathy among Texans to serve in the 1836 campaign, the young man’s recruiting efforts fell far short. But as a strange fate would have it, he was destined to command the Alamo in time for the final showdown with the largest Mexican Army ever to march north of the Rio Grande. 92
At the Alamo, Travis would find himself in the odd position of commanding infantry and artillerymen rather than cavalry, and more pieces of artillery than he had ever seen before. Like Johnson, Neill, and Bowie, he was simply not experienced enough to command the force he had been given, much less to defend a stationary position.
FATAL ACHILLES HEEL: TURBULENT TEXAS POLITICS
Yet another key factor that loomed large over the Alamo disaster was the tortured course of Texas politics. Mirroring the complex political, social, and class divisions in the United States, the Texas revolutionaries were widely divided along political lines with two opposing governments—the Consultation Convention and the General Council—struggling for power in the yet undeclared Republic of Texas. In striking contrast to early 1836, the successful revolt of 1835 was largely the fruit of a united effort.
President Jackson had been America’s leader for eight years by 1836, leading a powerful political machine. In opposition to “Old Hickory,” another national political party finally emerged in 1836 to challenge the Jacksonites for supremacy: the Whig Party. In general, the Whigs disagreed with the Jackson Democrats on almost all issues, but especially in regard to race relations, sectional rivalries, economic philosophies, and class. The Jackson Democrats strengthened economic ties—and hence dependency—on Europe to create a “negative, liberal state,” while the more traditional, conservative Whigs stressed the importance of the common man. Reflecting the traditional beliefs of most Alamo defenders, the Whig Party represented the view that the common man deserved an equal opportunity to advance and rise ever higher in American society, supporting all citizens, especially the small farmer, small businessman, and even the menial laborer. 93
This split grew so wide between the conservative Whig Party and the Jackson Democrats that transplanted Americans in Texas were essentially wagering a war among themselves for supremacy. Consequently, both the Texas government and the war effort against a resurgent Mexico found themselves divided by two political factions bitterly at odds, and unity had veritably collapsed by the time Santa Anna marched into Texas.
For the most part, the men of the Alamo were fundamentally of the Whig Party and supportive of the General Council, which was to form the provisional government, direct the revolt, and establish the Constitutional Convention. This governing body of Whig sentiment had risen to the fore in opposition to the previous authority, the Consultation Convention of Jackson Democrats, who had named Houston as commander-in-chief. Not surprisingly, then, the San Antonio garrison refused to accept Houston’s authority and urged his replacement. A Jackson Democrat, Houston simply refused to relinquish command when the General Council, which had been appointed by the Consultation Convention, rose to power.
And as if this chaotic situation was not bad enough, the Texans were divided on overall strategic thinking. While the ever-radical Houston and Governor Smith sought to declare Texas independence, the conservative General Council was dominated by those, including the lieutenant governor, who desired to remain within the Republic of Mexico under the Constitution of 1824. They also wanted to ally themselves to like-minded Mexican liberals, convinced that a united front against Santa Anna was best for Texas. Fundamentally, the roots of this pervasive sentiment lay in the pre-revolution “Peace Party” consisting of the propertied, successful “Old Texians.” These were the longtime citizens who had far more to lose than the opportunistic newcomers, like most Alamo garrison members, who had more to gain from a declaration of independence and a complete break with Mexico.
Consisting mostly of United States citizens, the Alamo garrison and its Whig leaders were in opposition to Houston, who was pro-Jackson, and supported Governor Henry Smith in opposition to the General Council. Therefore, while General Houston envisioned a defensive line east of San Antonio centered on the much more strategic points of Goliad and Refugio, the mostly volunteer Alamo garrison—in the timehonored, citizen-soldier tradition—decided for political reasons that San Antonio should be held.
Some historians have even speculated that because of self-destructive Texas politics, David Crockett, a Whig, “took a stand, not against Mexico, but once more against the Jacksonites,” just as he had in the United States, though it had cost him his Congressional seat. In the beginning, this motivation served as a primary catalyst for the Tennessean’s decision to go to San Antonio to join the garrison. Most likely, Crockett decided not to proceed on the ill-fated Matamoros Expedition because the San A
ntonio garrison was not only antiHouston, but also anti-Jackson. The close link between Jackson and Houston went back to Horseshoe Bend, where Houston’s courage garnered Jackson’s not-easily-won respect, and forged a lifelong friendship between the two Scotch-Irish men. Evidently both Crockett and Houston, the two most popular Americans in Texas, were in the process of positioning themselves for the possibility of becoming the first president of the new Republic of Texas once independence was declared, which was only a matter of time, or so it seemed. 94
Yet another reason—long overlooked by historians—why Crockett needed to be eliminated so as to never become Texas’ president was because of his strong anti-slavery views. With the possibility of an antislavery and perhaps eventually even abolitionist Crockett elected to the head of the future Texas republic, he might well become a threat as ominous to slave-owners as Santa Anna. In this scenario, Houston was hardly the only one in Texas who wanted to see Crockett eliminated. Other of his politically-minded and more Machiavellian peers might have wished for the Alamo garrison’s demise, especially if it included the ever-popular Crockett, a representative voice of the western frontier, who not only opposed slavery, but the wealthy planters and speculators who sought to get rich at the expense of the common man. Crockett remained true to his humble Scotch-Irish roots, and if he had become the first president of Texas, he would perhaps become a dangerous populist, one who had already condemned the hypocrisy of the United States by saying, “our boast land of liberty [was dominated by] the Yoke of Bondage,” or the slave interests of the powerful Jackson political machine. 95
It appears highly likely that Crockett indeed wanted to revive his sagging political fortunes in Texas. Along with his popularity, however, he also needed a distinguished war record and a defiant stance against his old enemies, the Jacksonites, both in Texas and the United States. Hence, Crockett joined the Texas army with high hopes, even if he was on a collision course while evidently aspiring to become the president of a new Texas republic—Houston’s ambitious quest as well. 96
The serious divisions that rent the infant Texas government, endless political maneuvering, pursuit of selfish interests, and deliberate attempts to sabotage both military and political careers of leading Texas officers might well explain why the Alamo garrison was eventually left on its own to be sacrificed. Before the rise of the legend of Houston as Texas’ savior, it was widely believed that he “had deliberately allowed Bowie and the others to be destroyed” at the Alamo for selfish political reasons. 97 Indeed, not long after the Alamo’s fall, Houston would be widely criticized for not taking serious efforts to relieve and reinforce the Alamo. But his negligence was nothing new. In regard to Austin’s homespun “Army of the People” during the siege of Béxar in late 1835, the Council itself accused Houston of harboring “desires the defeat of our army that he may be appointed to the command of the next” army of Texas. 98
Running true to his non-compliance form, Houston would believe that Travis’ repeated, increasingly desperate appeals for assistance when besieged by Santa Anna’s Army were simply “lies.” The former Tennessee governor considered the pleas a mere ruse that was part of larger political “electioneering schemes” cleverly orchestrated by Travis to enhance his “own popularity” across Texas. Consequently, rumors circulated widely that Houston deliberately allowed the Alamo garrison to be sacrificed, especially his popular political rivals and future opponents for high office—Crockett, Bowie, and Travis—to ensure that his position as commander-in-chief remained secure, paving the way for the future presidency of the Republic of Texas. 99
The deep divide between the regular and volunteer forces of Texas also proved grounds for Houston’s apathy toward the Alamo’s fate. After Houston was appointed by the Consultation Convention as commander-in-chief of the Texas regular army, which he believed was essential for success because of his past experience as a U.S. regular during the Creek War, he was fanatically pro-regular in sentiment. Unfortunately for the Alamo garrison consisting mostly of volunteers, only Travis and a handful of men were regulars. These volunteers, who had played the key role in San Antonio’s capture, were not part of the regular army that Houston had been appointed to command. In this sense perhaps, as far as Houston was concerned, these independentminded, unruly Alamo volunteers and their ambitious leaders, who also just happened to be political opponents—Whigs instead of Jackson Democrats like himself, and who openly defied, even mocked, his authority—were expendable to the Tennessean for fundamental military and political reasons. Ironically, the Mexican threat was underestimated and even ignored, in part because the Anglo-Celts were more focused on their own personal animosities and jealousies, waging a political war among themselves rather than uniting and adequately preparing to meet Santa Anna’s Army. 100
Not unlike Crockett, who knew the political value of military service, Travis also aspired to a politician’s career. Ever ambitious, the Alabamian correctly believed that he could gain popularity as a successful soldier in the field. Travis had already been chosen as one of seven representatives to the Consultation from San Felipe de Austin, while Crockett planned to represent St. Augustine. Consequently, two members of the famed Alamo triumvirate were not only seeking their fortunes in Texas by way of land acquisition, but also by pursuing their personal political fortunes, which would soon be cut short by Santa Anna’s own soaring ambitions and political priorities. 101
In the art of war, nothing has been more guaranteed to pave the way to certain disaster than military decisions based not upon sound strategy, but upon political and personal factors. As much as Santa Anna’s Army crossing the Rio Grande, Texas politics and political ambitions doomed the Alamo’s common soldiers, who fell victim to the evils of personal intrigue long before Mexican bullets and bayonets. Not aspiring to lofty political and military positions like their inexperienced leaders, these young men and boys only wanted to survive the war to collect their rightful reward for Texas military service—all of those irresistible acres of fertile Texas land, to provide for themselves and their families.
THE CHOICE OF COMMAND
Another factor that undermined the chances of the men of the Alamo was the sudden departure of Lieutenant Colonel Neill. In modern times the holy trinity of Alamo heroes—Travis, Crockett, and Bowie—has overshadowed the leader who was most responsible not only for the decision to defend the Alamo, but also for keeping the garrison together during its darkest days during the gloomy winter of 1836. The departure of the ever-popular Lieutenant Colonel Neill, who had commanded the Alamo troops far longer than any other leader, comprised a psychological blow to the garrison. Neill’s unexpected departure would leave the Alamo garrison “dejected,” and morale would plummet to a new all-time low exactly when Santa Anna was pushing north toward San Antonio. 102
But what the Alamo men had failed to realize was that it took more than mere popularity and the ability to make friends and tell jokes to win battles. Blessed with a sense of good timing, Neill would depart the Alamo in a hurry, even though he knew that Santa Anna was moving on San Antonio. Interestingly, this was not the first time in his military career that Neill had missed an important battle—during the siege of San Antonio in December 1835, Neill had fallen sick, or so it has been claimed. At that time, he relinquished command of the army’s artillery to Captain Louis B. Franks, who owned a league of land on the Brazos River in Robertson’s Colony, while Lieutenant William R. Carey continued to serve as his dependable top lieutenant. 103
As a regular officer and according to military protocol in midFebruary, Neill would hand over the Alamo’s command to the next highest-ranking officer, Travis of the regular cavalry. This change would be unacceptable to the volunteers who made up the vast majority of the garrison. In the democratic tradition brought across the Sabine with volunteers from the United States, an election would be held at the Alamo. Detesting the thought of serving under a regular officer, the volunteers naturally elected to follow Bowie, while the regulars fo
llowed Travis. Therefore Travis and Bowie would agree to share joint command. Exhibiting rare western frontier diplomacy, especially in Texas, both leaders would thereafter share decision-making, even jointly signing correspondence. However, enough of a rift existed that Travis, in typical independent fashion, would establish his headquarters in San Antonio with the regulars, while Bowie and the volunteers occupied the Alamo. Then when Bowie collapsed with illness, falling victim to a respiratory ailment on the siege’s second day, February 24, barely a month after arriving in San Antonio, Travis would suddenly be thrust into the position as the Alamo’s sole commander by default, after having only reached San Antonio on February 3. 104
As fate would have it, Travis, an inexperienced cavalryman, very experienced ladies man, and aspiring politician with an undeserved (he had not filled his cavalry legion) rank of lieutenant colonel that had been only bestowed for mostly political reasons a month earlier, and a young man who never wanted to serve at the Alamo in the first place, was destined to command the garrison. 105
When given the choice, the Alamo garrison had clearly decided that of Neill, Bowie, and Travis, the young man from Alabama was the leader under whom they least desired to serve. Compared to Bowie and Neill, Travis was the Alamo’s least popular commander, and the garrison’s opinion was only confirmed when Travis would seal the fort’s fate with a defiant cannon shot on the late afternoon of February 23, after Santa Anna’s forces reached San Antonio. As much as Santa Anna, Travis ensured that there would be no quarter for the Alamo garrison. His firing of the 18-pounder—in response to Santa Anna’s demand for an immediate surrender—was the type of flamboyant gesture right out of the popular historical fiction of the day that Travis so loved. 106
Exodus From the Alamo: The Anatomy of the Last Stand Myth Page 17