The term ‘cold case’ has been attached to historic cases that are in some instances many years old and have been subject to a number of these reviews. Effectively they are ‘case closed’ because experience has shown that they are unlikely to benefit from simply re-examining the incident room documentation. Recent developments in forensic science have been the single most important factor in successful cold case reviews, providing new opportunities for investigators. The scientist works on the principle that every contact leaves a trace, and as science has developed the recovery of trace evidence has become extremely sensitive, resulting in some spectacular successes across the UK.
The recommendations to ACPO were, for me, quite simple. We had a public and moral duty to conduct a formal review of the Pembrokeshire offences. The Cooper issue was more complex. If he was in fact responsible for the murders (and that was a big if) we had to know what work had been done in the past to implicate or eliminate him. The local Detective Inspector Jim Morris who’d worked on the Huntsman case was of the view that he was a prime suspect and had placed his thoughts on the record. But little had been done to really test this view or interview Cooper in any meaningful manner. The reason was quite simple. During Operation Huntsman, even faced with some damming circumstantial evidence, Cooper had refused to make any sort of admission. Based on this, the heads of CID at the time, DCS Jeff Thomas and then DCS John Lewis, had decided that there would have to be substantial evidence, probably forensic, to connect him to the offences.
Over the years a number of items had been provided for examination for trace evidence, in particular DNA, but the process for selecting these items appeared to lack any external objectivity and involved people who had worked on the original investigations. There were still items in storage including forensic slides that had not been examined for fear that the process would destroy any potential evidence. I entered initial discussions with the Forensic Science Service, who were of the view that it was unlikely that there would be any significant advances in forensic science over the next five years, particularly in relation to DNA. I decided there was no logical reason to delay a review. In August 2005 I submitted a report to Chief Officers recommending we undertake a thematic forensic review on undetected serious crime in Pembrokeshire, including the double murders at Scoveston Park and Little Haven. Most importantly we needed to establish what material we had, where it was stored and what condition it was in before any attempts were made to recover it. The Chief Constable at the time was Terry Grange, a very serious man for whom I had a great deal of time. If he thought you were in the right he would support you through thick or thin. His view was clear: “Whatever it takes, I want it done properly.”
The initial action was to engage members of the National Centre for Policing Excellence, NCPE (latterly known as the National Police Improvement Agency, NPIA) to establish national best practice and a clear way forward. I have always learnt more from studying investigations that have made errors than from looking back at perfect inquiries seen through rose-tinted spectacles. From our meetings it was clear that when an historical case came to court based on forensic evidence, the integrity of the physical evidence was always the focus of attack for the defence. Unfortunately some review teams, in their haste to submit material for examination, had not paid enough attention to the provenance of their evidence and had subsequently been savaged in court. I suspected that in our case the exhibits from the offences were likely to be stored and deposited in many locations. It would be vital that we established exactly what we had before any efforts were made to recover it for forensic evaluation and examination.
In the background, like a ticking clock, was the knowledge that Cooper could soon be released. I sat for many hours with my boss DCS Steve Mears to consider what we should do next. There was a pressing need to identify an SIO and a small team to carry out the initial scoping of the review. During this initial fact-finding process a so-called ‘sterile corridor’ needed to be maintained between the review and Cooper. I did not want to be accused at any stage in the future of having tailored an investigation towards a single individual. The forensic review needed to be impartial in its search for evidence and at this stage we decided we would do no more than monitor John Cooper through the Pembrokeshire Division. I was comfortable in the knowledge that this process was being handled on a local basis by Superintendent Euros Lewis who was probably the most committed police officer I have ever known. His working hours were simple, light o’clock until dark o’clock every day. Superintendent Lewis sat on a multi-agency group that considered and managed the risks that dangerous offenders posed to the public. There was no doubt that he would do his job with his customary enthusiasm and attention to detail.
Detective Chief Inspector Andy John was identified as the officer to lead the initial phase. I would act as a mentor. Andy was a quiet, unassuming man, a gentleman who always delivered high quality work. I knew he would be ideal for the task. At this early stage it was essential that he had clear terms of reference. This is what I drafted:
• To trace all non-documentary exhibits in respect of the undetected investigations into the murders of Richard and Helen Thomas and Peter and Gwenda Dixon.
• To establish what, if any, exhibits are missing and to conduct searches as necessary to retrieve any outstanding exhibits.
• To review the submission of items to date and to make recommendations on any further forensic submissions that should be considered in view of advancement in forensic techniques.
• To make recommendations on the submission of items for forensic analysis which have not previously been submitted.
On 17 January 2006 Assistant Chief Constable Andy Edwards agreed the terms of reference. The review was given a code name and Operation Ottawa was born.
A Force the size of Dyfed Powys does not have a massive pool of resources and many of our officers carry out a number of different functions. Our team would be small but dedicated and it was essential that none of the officers had ever been involved in the original investigations or previous reviews. The reason for this was simple: I did not want Ottawa to follow the path of any previous work or be influenced by any previously held views. We needed a fresh, untainted approach. Those involved in previous investigations would at a later stage be very important to Ottawa as a way of testing previous hypothesis and to provide context when appropriate. Andy John still had a busy day job as a senior detective and he needed a deputy, someone who he could trust to get into the detail, someone who was organised and committed, and we had just the perfect man. Detective Inspector Lynne Harries was head of the West Coast Ports Offices that policed the ferry terminals of Pembroke Dock and Fishguard. He was a local man and an office manager for major incident rooms. Lynne was an experienced detective and knew his way around complex investigations. He was supported by DS Glyn Johnson, another local officer, who had an exceptional knowledge of IT systems. He could create the computer programmes to record and track data. They were an ideal pairing, but to support them we needed someone who had the corporate memory of the murders but was not too close to be influenced. DC Nigel John was also trained in HOLMES computerised incident rooms and would be just what we wanted. Finally we needed a workhorse, who could be tasked to dig deep and find things, and DC Steve Rowe was the obvious choice to complete this small but perfectly formed team. At this stage I wanted to keep the first phase very low key, away from public gaze and local police interest. Our first home was to be Fishguard Port Office, an empty suite of rooms owned by the Port and occupied by HM Customs and Excise. They were grey, unwelcoming offices with little character but they were out of the way and provided the perfect solution. Ottawa was up and running and it was time to get down to work.
Operation Ottawa
THE ATTITUDE OF THE POLICE towards the media has significantly changed over the years. I had policed in a time when the media was treated with total mistrust and kept very much at arm’s length. Thankfully this view has changed and there
is now a far more sophisticated working relationship based on the fact that we need one another. I can remember being the SIO on a murder case when a Chief Officer made it clear that I was not to engage with one particular TV station because they had criticised the force. I asked him to sign my incident policy book to this effect as it went against my media strategy and would result in certain parts of the public not hearing my public appeal; a decision we might need to explain if reviewed. He quickly reconsidered: I never did get a signature and we did engage with the TV journalists. The decision not to involve the media in Ottawa at this stage was tactical: any news release would need to be controlled to achieve maximum impact. Now was not the right time.
By February 2006 the team had made arrangements with their line managers and I had informed them that this would probably be a six month project. Little did we know then that six months would in fact become six years for some of them. The first job was to upgrade office security and allocate the rooms for the review. Some would be used to store exhibits after they had been recovered, another would become the briefing room and the largest would be our incident room. The small team quickly got to work and created a pictorial timeline around the walls with copies of original scene photographs and plans. The pictures we had of Richard and Helen Thomas and Peter and Gwenda Dixon dominated the room and gave us a clear focus. The images of the Thomases were grainy, black and white photos and had obviously been taken at a family gathering. Richard looked smart in collar and tie and Helen was wearing her Sunday best. Further along the wall of the office were the imposing images of the burnt out remains of Scoveston Park. The gunshot wounds on the bodies were clearly visible in the photographs, as was the rope that had been used by the killer to tie them up.
In contrast, the images of Peter and Gwenda were in colour and the couple looked happy and relaxed. They had been taken outdoors, probably on a country walk, something that they loved doing so much. Both were casually dressed in shorts and walking boots and they gave the appearance of contentment. They seemed comfortable with each other and very much in love. For me, looking at the photographs was the first time I had had a personal connection to the victims; before they had just been names. Now though they became real people, full of life. A life cut short. Then something struck me about the pictures of Peter Dixon’s body. He was dressed almost exactly as he was in the lovely photograph with Gwenda, only this time he was lifeless, murdered in cold blood.
In the incident room computers, shelving, and creature comforts such as a kettle had now been installed. Like any good police team we quickly identified the best and cheapest place to eat. A small café looking out over Fishguard Harbour became our unofficial HQ, hosting many team meetings and debriefings. At this stage we needed to get to grips with the scale of the task in hand and the initial steps would require careful consideration in order to avoid potential pitfalls at a later date. The SIO leads the investigation but should consult widely and be receptive to sound advice. Our style in Dyfed Powys CID was to discuss and talk through problems in a trusted environment, making everyone feel valued and able to contribute. Ottawa would be no different and at the first management meeting we all agreed the way forward.
It is of vital importance that the first steps and actions on a major crime review, particularly in those where a considerable time period has passed, are made with the mindset that the process will end up in a court of law. This might appear to be an obvious statement to make, but in some cases those leading an investigation can start from a negative viewpoint of just going through the motions. This approach is doomed to fail because the investigator tends to look only for those elements that support their view. In thirty-two years service I have never been involved in an investigation in which I have not been convinced that we will find the truth and prove or disprove the offence. The influence of the SIO on his or her team cannot therefore be underestimated: they can be a positive or negative force. My approach was simple: if you do not believe we will find the truth, wherever it lies, then you have no place on the team or the right to represent the victim or their family.
I knew that both my boss Steve Mears and my colleague Andy John thought the same. This was a thematic forensic review, a forensic assessment of all available material in order to potentially identify an offender or offenders. If it was going to end up in the Crown Court, or ‘Big House’ as we affectionately called it, we needed even at this early stage to imagine where the attacks on the evidence were likely to come from. The answer was simple; it would be the integrity of the original material on which those forensic conclusions were based.
Accepting this view made the first decisions easy. Having located the material and assessed how and where it was stored we needed to recover it in a methodical manner, under forensic conditions. When recovered it would then need to be assessed in order to establish its provenance, what had happened to it, what forensic examinations it had been subjected to and what new forensic opportunities were available. DCI Andy John was deliberate in his policy and clear in his direction. The process required a detailed forensic strategy for each location and this needed to be constructed in such a way that it provided protection from any future attack by defence lawyers. These strategy documents needed to be crafted by an experienced Crime Scene Manager and we had the ideal person. Glan Thomas was a jolly character marked out by his total commitment, and he relished the opportunity to join the Ottawa team. I knew him well and once sold him a car for his daughter. Doing him a favour I told him he could have the car for at least £700 below its book price. We met in a car park near to Laugharne Castle. “Do you like it Glan?” I asked. “It’s lovely boss, just what she wants and at such a good price,” he replied. “Let’s do the deal then Glan,” I said. “I will if you knock £50 off,” he replied with a big grin. How could I refuse!
Each location where relevant exhibits had been stored was treated like a crime scene. Invariably the exhibits were still on police premises but the areas concerned were still sectioned off and all those who entered did so with full and appropriate protective clothing. The strategies produced by Glan Thomas were highly detailed and meticulous, and left nothing to chance. The recovery of each item was recorded and photographed, including its proximity to other exhibits, how it was packaged and its general condition. They were taken from their individual locations to a more permanent store. In addition the areas used to photograph, record and repackage the items were forensically sterilised. I wanted to be confident that from the minute the Ottawa team identified the location of an exhibit the handling and continuity thereafter was beyond question. If there was to be a flaw in the integrity of any exhibit I wanted to know about it, assess its value and impact on other material. If any exhibit were to be contaminated we would have to accept it and ensure we were the ones to find and reveal any frailties. I didn’t want any surprises in court! There is nothing worse, or capable of undermining a jury’s confidence in the police, than when the defence manage to drive holes through the integrity of a key exhibit or process. This is particularly destructive when it is clear the police have not done their job properly or have failed to disclose a weakness. Andy John and the team needed to implement a process that allowed us to record each exhibit and its history. It would then be up to Lynne Harries and Glyn Johnson to provide the answers.
Lynne Harries ‘did detail’, he was painstaking in his approach. Never a man to cut corners he was the ideal person to oversee the recovery phase, and when paired with systems man Glyn Johnson it was a winning combination. In addition to this, Lynne was careful with money as he was from Cardigan in West Wales. Tradition suggests that men from Cardigan have long pockets and short arms; this would come in handy when challenging escalating forensic costs. Of course, in reality Lynne is a generous man, he just hasn’t realised it yet.
In any major crime investigation it is very important to audit trail the decision-making process. Complex cases require oversight arrangements to support the SIO at a strategic and tactical level
. In this case strategic oversight came from the ‘Gold Group’ chaired by Deputy Chief Constable Andy Edwards. It helps take pressure off the SIO and provides accountability. The Operational Management Group, chaired by my boss DCS Steve Mears and including myself, DCI Andy John, DI Lynne Harries and DI Glan Thomas also provided practical advice and guidance to the investigation team.
Andy John and his team were now up and running and quickly started to locate relevant material, and in turn Glan Thomas prepared detailed documents that allowed their forensic recovery. The items were handled in a professional and transparent manner and then stored in rooms at Fishguard Port. The team started to meticulously record the life of each item on custom-made electronic spreadsheets, and so the process went on. Recovering all of the incident room material was a mammoth task, and it felt like we were ancient explorers uncovering all sorts of treasures. As the team sifted statements and reports, the time difference between the offences and the present day hit home. It was like being in the TV series Life on Mars!
We were now into March 2006 and it was becoming increasingly evident that exhibits and material from Operation Huntsman were becoming more and more relevant to our review and needed to be considered alongside material recovered from the murder scenes. As we scrutinised the case a very interesting picture began to emerge. From the early 1980s up to 1996, a number of burglaries were committed at homes within the Milford Haven area. In addition to this, a small number of robberies were also committed within the same tight geographical area in North Pembrokeshire. There was an obvious cluster around Milford Haven, Neyland, Rosemarket and Llanstadwell. Research indicated that there were in excess of sixty burglaries that fitted the same modus operandi, or MO. Persistent offenders usually have a trademark; it is their ‘thumbprint of offending’ which they repeat because it works for them. They will display consistent behaviour at scenes, select similar types of property to attack and steal similar items from each of them. The location also provides good clues about how an offender targets a property: how they approach the scene, gain entry and how long they remain at that location. Geographical profiles also provide clues on the likely area that an offender comes from. Do they travel by foot or in a vehicle, and do they have links to an area that gives them a degree of comfort because they know their surroundings?
The Pembrokeshire Murders: Catching the Bullseye Killer Page 6