After endless discussion, Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada did his part: he agreed to renounce his own candidacy in order to build a broad-based alignment of regional forces not associated with the coffee sector, including dissident groups like the tenentes who had revolted during the 1920s. The elites of the two states that had joined forces with Minas Gerais in putting forward an opposition candidate – Paraíba and Rio Grande do Sul – did not agree that coffee exportation was the most important issue in Brazil. Instead, they tended to prioritize the domestic market. By the late 1920s the regional elites in Minas Gerias, Rio Grande do Sul and Paraíba had undergone a considerable transformation: their political leaders were younger and better educated, and eager to implement plans for reform in a society bursting with political, social and cultural progress.
After the 1923 federalist revolt, the opposing political forces in Rio Grande do Sul – the liberals (also known as chimangos) and the federalists (maragatos) – both had representatives in the state administration. For twenty years the two parties had been nurturing resentment against the unequal distribution of power among the states. In the eyes of the federal government, Rio Grande de Sul would never put a man in the presidency. After all, the state economy was restricted to the domestic market and the electorate was insignificant compared to those of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Meanwhile, members of an emerging elite in Paraíba (a small state in the northeast) had been gradually curtailing the power of the huge plantation owners – the coronéis. They had big dreams and looked far into the future: their plan was to politically isolate their neighbouring state, Pernambuco, and lead a group of northeastern states onto the central stage of national politics.11
The opposition candidate for president was Getúlio Vargas, from Rio Grande do Sul, and the candidate for vice-president was João Pessoa, from Paraíba. Getúlio Vargas came from a cattle-breeding family in the town of São Borja, in the extreme west of the state. His politics were consistent with those of the gaucho positivists, who were the power behind the republican dictatorship in Rio Grande do Sul. Getúlio Vargas had risen rapidly in public life: he had been a state deputy, a federal deputy, leader of his state’s representatives in the National Congress and Washington Luís’s Finance Minister between 1926 and 1927. João Pessoa was considered an efficient, honest administrator. His family had controlled politics in Paraíba for years – his uncle, Epitácio Pessoa, had been president of the Republic from 1919 to 1922.12
Ever prudent, Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada kept a watchful eye on the Mineiros while he schemed. The association of opposition forces – called the ‘liberal alliance’ – had all the necessary elements to take power. The alliance members represented a wide range of backgrounds and opinions. They thus formed a viable alternative axis of power and were able to garner the support of large segments of society with their refreshing approach to politics.
The name ‘liberal alliance’ became popular, a household word. It suggested not only dissident forces, but also a new political agenda. Members of the alliance used the term ‘liberal’ to underscore their conception of Brazil’s potential, their intention to modernize the country. In this context, the ‘liberal’ agenda included support for industry, for the political rights of hitherto excluded social groups, and for social rights – specifically the eight-hour working day, holidays, a minimum wage, protection for women in the workplace and child labour restrictions.13
By the second half of 1929 the liberal alliance was ready to win the hearts and minds of the Brazilian electorate by taking to the streets, literally. The Caravanas Liberais14 – a complete novelty – were made up of young militants who, with considerable success, reached out to Brazilians in public forums in several of the country’s largest cities. They strategically began with some of the most popular issues: amnesty for the rebel lieutenants and soldiers from the 1922 and 1927 uprisings, workers’ rights, the secret ballot, diversification of the economy and drought policy for the northeast.15
In early January 1930 the candidate for the presidency himself, Getúlio Vargas, disembarked in Rio de Janeiro. He was the star of the liberal alliance and was there to present its platform at a rally.16 Up until that time, political campaigns had been tepid and dull. Candidates would present the electoral programme to a roomful of guests, with a banquet to follow. The idea of breaking with this tradition and mobilizing people in a public square was entirely unheard of, and caused a minor scandal. The rally took place on 2 January in the centre of Rio de Janeiro and attracted a huge crowd. On the platform, alongside the main alliance leaders, stood other popular members of the opposition, including attorney Evaristo de Morais17 and Deputy Maurício de Lacerda,18 an independent-minded journalist who was popularly known as the People’s Tribune. Despite the drizzle, the crowd – estimated at over 100,000 – listened enthusiastically, spellbound as Getúlio Vargas read out the opposition’s complete manifesto: thirty-one pages read by a dull-looking, short, pot-bellied candidate in a continuous, deadpan drone.
Nevertheless, the opposition had no realistic chance of winning the election. Julio Prestes was openly supported by Washington Luís and the powerful coffee planters in São Paulo. In addition, the president had garnered support for his candidate from seventeen state presidents, each of whom were free to use their own particular methods for obtaining votes. As usual, both sides resorted to fraud, bribery and electoral coercion in all the states, including those that supported the opposition candidate. Sinhô, one of the most popular singers of the day and an enthusiastic supporter of Júlio Prestes, whom he had met at a party given by Oswald de Andrade and Tarsila do Amaral, satirically commented on the political system, a closed contest with the result of the election a foregone conclusion.19 Everyone conformed, as he sang in a very popular 1930s carnaval song, ‘I hear that/for our own good/Jesus has chosen/Julinho (Prestes) to lead.’ And Sinhô knew what he was singing about. When the votes were counted, Júlio Prestes was declared the winner with 1,091,709 votes, against 742,794 for Getúlio Vargas. In São Paulo the result was scandalous: 350,000 votes for the government candidate, as against 30,000 for the opposition. In Minas Gerais, where the liberal alliance expected good results due to the large electorate, Antônio Carlo Ribeira de Andrada had promised he would deliver 350,000 votes, but only managed 280,000. In Paraíba, where the electorate was small, the opposition led by 20,000 votes, but it made little difference. In Pernambuco, where the oligarchies were determined to put an end to Paraíba’s plans to make an alliance with other states of the northeast, Júlio Prestes received 61,000 votes, as opposed to 9,000 for the liberal alliance. Getúlio Vargas was only victorious in his home state of Rio Grande do Sul, where he received 295,000 votes as against a mere 1,000 for Júlio Prestes.20
Once the winner had been declared, there was little the opposition could do beyond complaining about the electoral fraud, which in most cases was impossible to prove. The victory of Júlio Prestes meant the end of the opposition’s adventure and the regional elites’ return to traditional politics. Even Getúlio Vargas acknowledged his opponent’s victory, returned to Rio Grande do Sul, re-established contact with the new administration, and considered the episode closed.
But the impression that things would go smoothly was an illusion. The liberal alliance was a broad coalition representing the interests of a variety of politicians, ideologies, and at least two generations of regional leaders, many of whom did not think along the same lines as Getúlio Vargas. Among these younger leaders, including Virgílio de Melo Franco and Francisco Campos from Minas Gerais and João Neves da Fontoura and Oswaldo Aranha from Rio Grande do Sul, there was still enthusiasm for the opposition programme. They were also eager to carve out political careers for themselves, from under the shadow of the old generation of leaders. They refused to accept their defeat in the elections and were determined to continue the fight. Júlio Prestes may have won in the ballot box, they muttered, but Getúlio Vargas would win in battle.
The alternative of an arm
ed conflict was not a mere pipe dream of the young civilian leaders – it had the unwavering support of the tenentes. This group of low-ranking officers who had survived the uprisings of the 1920s felt they had been badly treated. They longed for the power they had been denied since the proclamation of the Republic. This time they were not prepared to let it slip through their fingers without a fight. The tenentes were idealists, highly admired by the troops and with the sympathy of the urban middle and working classes. They had military experience and were politically restless. There was also a small group of officers who acted as go-betweens between the three dissident states and key figures inside the army. These were Juarez Távora, Siqueira Campos, Eduardo Gomes, João Alberto, Miguel Costa, Agildo Barata and Juracy Magalhães.
The close ties between young officers and the civilian leaders of the opposition were to prove a catastrophe for Washington Luís’s government, even though the most prestigious of all the tenentes – Luís Carlos Prestes – had turned down the invitation to take military command of the liberal alliance. In 1930, Lieutenant Prestes already had mythical status. He had been the leader of the last column of military guerrillas in the 1920s, had assumed the somewhat messianic role of awakening political awareness among the poor in the depths of the interior, and he had played a cat-and-mouse game in the sertão, evading government troops sent out to capture him. During the time he spent in exile in Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay, his popularity was phenomenal. For the liberal alliance leaders, he was the military commander of their dreams. But in 1930, Lieutenant Prestes surprised everyone. Rejecting both the tenentist movement and the liberal alliance programme, he founded an organization to fight the government – the league for revolutionary action – and he began to sympathize with the communists.21 This was the beginning of a long political career that would first take him to Moscow and would eventually lead to his joining the Brazilian Communist Party, which he did in 1934.
Despite the adherence of almost all the lieutenants and the political will of so many civilian leaders to join an armed struggle, coordination was lacking. Still, there were conspiracies everywhere: in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Montevideo and Buenos Aires it was rumoured that there would be a coup d’état to prevent Júlio Prestes from taking power. Tenentes in exile regularly crossed the border into Rio Grande do Sul to hold meetings with young opposition leaders, and arms and ammunition were smuggled into the country from Argentina. But the main leaders of the liberal alliance remained hesitant. Getúlio Vargas, ever the opportunist, watched and bided his time. Meanwhile Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada, nearing the end of his term, expressed uncertainty regarding support for the rebels in other states. He was soon to pass on the presidency of Minas Gerais to his successor, Olegário Maciel. So, while the conspiracy was kept alive, the military offensive was put on hold. The liberal alliance needed some external pressure to restore their motivation and to serve as the spark to ignite the rebellion.
That event came in the afternoon of 26 July, when the former vice-presidential candidate João Pessoa was murdered with three point-blank shots while in the company of fellow politicians in Recife’s elegant Confeitaria Glória.22 It was not a rival contracted murder – as commonly referred to, even today, in the northeast. The murderer was a lawyer called João Dantas, who was arrested at the scene and confessed he had committed the crime for personal reasons. A few weeks prior, the Paraíba police had searched his office, confiscated documents and, with João Pessoa’s consent, given the material to the local press. The newspaper A União, the official voice of the state government, had published all of it on the front page. The material included erotic love letters exchanged between João Dantas and his lover Anayde Beiriz. Ms Anayde was twenty-five years old, single and an independent-minded teacher – she was a poet, a feminist and smoked cigarettes. She was devastated by the scandal and ended up taking her own life.
But João Pessoa’s murder was also political. João Dantas was an ally of Colonel José Pereira, the powerful chief of the hinterland municipality of Princesa, on the border between Paraíba and Pernambuco. Colonel Pereira had led an armed revolt against measures adopted by João Pessoa to restrict the autonomy of the powerful coronéis (oligarchs).23 The Princesa Revolt, as it became known, began in February 1930 – five months before João Pessoa was murdered – and attracted a large following. Under Colonel Pereira’s command, the rebels occupied the whole area and declared independence from Paraíba. They repelled repeated attacks by the public force – as the military police was called at the time – sent by the state president to suppress the revolt, and José Pereira appointed himself governor of the ‘Free Territory of Princesa’.
Not only did the rebels occupy the sertão, they also received outside support. Financial backing, weapons and information flowed into Princesa from Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte and, most significantly, from São Paulo where there was great interest in destabilizing João Pessoa’s government. Washington Luís observed these events carefully, waiting for the ideal moment to decree federal intervention in the state and send government troops to crush the liberal alliance base in the northeast. At the same time groups in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre were planning to intervene on João Pessoa’s behalf. Both Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul found ways to send ammunition to strengthen the public force troops in Paraíba: thousands of cartridges were hidden inside cans of prunes and peaches, barrels of suet and packages of beef jerky. Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada even went as far as to send the single-engine plane Garoto, which belonged to the Minaws Gerais public force of Minas Gerais, to drop homemade bombs on Princesa, along with pamphlets urging the rebels to surrender.
With João Pessoa’s murder, the regional crisis suddenly took on national importance. The liberal alliance seized the opportunity to accuse the federal government of inciting the rebellion as an excuse to intervene in Paraíba. They claimed that, out of revenge, Washington Luís had planned the murder from afar. João Pessoa’s murder shocked the country and his death left the state virtually ungovernable – a situation the opposition immediately realized could be used to further their cause. João Pessoa’s body was displayed in Paraíba adorned with the state presidential sash and then taken by ship to Rio de Janeiro, where dozens of members of the liberal alliance lined up to pay their last respects, in a direct affront to Washington Luís. Before the funeral cortege set off, Deputy Maurício de Lacerda jumped onto a cart beside the coffin and, seizing a megaphone, addressed the excited crowd: ‘In the coffin you see before you, lies not the body of a great citizen, but the corpse of a nation! […] Gaúchos, Mineiros, the time has come to fulfil your promise. The people are ready to die for freedom!’24
The civil and military revolt began on 3 October 1930. The military campaign was launched simultaneously in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, followed a few hours later by Paraíba. The campaign was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, an officer highly respected within the military. Among his colleagues, he was considered a competent leader, but he was little known to the public at large. The first phase of his plan was to neutralize the federal troops – by winning them over to his side or by attacking their garrisons.25 His strategy was simple: take barracks loyal to the federal government by surprise and, with widespread support among the subaltern officers, win over the sergeants – who controlled the troops. It worked: from captain downwards, the majority of the army supported the liberal alliance. But the greatest military support for the alliance came from the powerful state public forces. These were small but very well-equipped autonomous armies that took orders from the state presidents. And they were soon joined by battalions of armed civilian volunteers.
In Minas Gerais, all of the army garrisons resisted the rebels. In Belo Horizante, from 3 to 8 October, the twelfth infantry regiment was the state stronghold and was bombarded, day and night, by 4,000 public force men. They finally surrendered in the afternoon of 8 October, the confrontation having spread panic througho
ut the city. With the strategic position of the barracks, the constant firing from the trenches and the explosion of hand grenades, rumours began to circulate that the twelfth regiment had the artillery power to bombard the city. Panic increased when the São Paulo public force dropped two bombs from a military plane aimed at the seat of the Minas Gerais state government, the Palácio da Liberdade. Both missed their target. The first fell into a washtub in a house adjoining the palace, and the second, into the main square, the Praça da Liberdade, just opposite the police secretariat (Secretaria de Segurança). To the relief of the townspeople, neither bomb exploded.26
From its base in Paraíba, the liberal alliance launched attacks on the other states in the northeast. The commander of military operations in the region was Juarez Távora, who had participated in the tenente revolts in the 1920s. In March 1930 he had made a spectacular escape from the Fort of Santa Cruz in Guanabara Bay, where he had been imprisoned. In the middle of the night, accompanied by two other officers, he had descended the fortress walls using an improvised rope, swum out to a boat anchored offshore and disappeared out to sea. He reappeared two months later at the head of a group of rebel soldiers in a series of successful surprise attacks on public buildings in Recife.27 In three weeks the rebels managed to take control of the states of Pernambuco, Alagoas, Ceará, Piauí, Maranhão and Rio Grande do Norte. The only state that still adhered to the federal government was Bahia, even though Salvador was under siege by the forces of the alliance.
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