The National Democratic Union had a great deal of support in the media.56 Newspapers and radios, especially in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, had backed the candidacy of Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, both in 1945 and in 1950, and were fiercely opposed to President Vargas’s proposals. Until that time, João Goulart had been seen as a provincial politician – young, wealthy and inexperienced. But his appointment as minister revealed his political skills. It was only then that the National Democratic Union understood the significance of President Vargas’s choice of the younger man as his chosen successor. From then on the press frequently denounced him, accused him of organizing strikes in an attempt to create a ‘Trade Unionist Republic’: a union-controlled dictatorship, sustained by a new constitution, protected from its adversaries by the mass mobilization of the trade union movement, and legitimized by a worker-controlled Parliament.
Of course, members of the National Democratic Union were appalled at the prospect of a ‘Trade Union Republic’. In reality, however, no such project existed. Nevertheless, Mr Goulart never managed to escape the notoriety of being the greatest proponent and beneficiary of such a plan. On the eve of the 1964 military coup, this much-repeated accusation was used against him – and became somewhat threatening, due to the polarization of the country and the broad mobilization of the masses. Carlos Lacerda, for his part, never missed an opportunity to maliciously mock João Goulart in the pages of the Tribuna da Imprensa. After all, João Goulart was not only Getúlio Vargas’s protegé, but he was also thirty-four years old, single, handsome, a ladies’ man and a bohemian! ‘Little, slick João should should leave the ministry and go back to the cabaret, which is his university, his barracks and his sanctuary […] Being a minister is not the same as dancing the tango.’57
João Goulart managed to hold onto the post for eight months. In January 1954, in reply to a demand from the trade unions, and with President Vargas’s approval, he introduced a proposal to double the minimum wage, which, if approved, would rise to 2,400 cruzeiros.58 Members of the National Democratic Union were in uproar in Congress, opposition newspapers had a field day, but the threat to democratic stability came from neither of these quarters. It came from the armed forces. In mid-February, forty-two colonels and thirty-nine lieutenant-colonels from the army delivered a manifesto severely criticizing the government to their commanding officers, who in turn publicly released the documents, which were in turn taken up by the National Democratic Union and the opposition newspapers.
The Colonels’ Manifesto revealed the discontent in the army and was clearly seditious in intent.59 It accused the Vargas government of accepting the ‘atmosphere of illicit deals, fraudulent negotiations and mismanagement of public funds’, stated that the crisis in leadership was affecting the armed forces, warned of riots in the streets, and condemned João Goulart’s proposal for doubling the minimum wage which, they said, would put an excessive burden on the Treasury and invert the current status between civilians and the military. In hindsight, the manifesto is a clear indication that the armed forces already constituted a risk to Brazil’s democratic institutions. It had been drawn up by the then Colonel Golbery do Couto e Silva, who, ten years later, would be one of the masterminds behind the coup d’état. It was also signed by other hardline officers who participated in planning the coup and running the military regime: Sylvio Frota, Ednardo d’Ávila Melo, Antônio Carlos Muricy, Adalberto Pereira dos Santos, Sizeno Sarmento and Amauri Kruel.
In 1954 there was no way that President Vargas could have foreseen what would happen ten years later, but he was in no doubt that the armed forces wanted more than just salaries and equipment. The Colonels’ Manifesto expressed dissatisfaction and resentment, and worst of all, it was a flagrant act of indiscipline – its authors were one step away from conspiracy. Given the gravity of the situation, President Vargas took action. He dismissed his Minister of War, General Espírito Santo Cardoso, and made an agreement with Mr Goulart that he should resign. With João Goulart ousted and in the belief that he had neutralized the colonels’ opposition, Getúlio Vargas now felt free to act. On the workers’ day holiday, 1 May, when he always made a public pronouncement, President Vargas gave a further example of his way of doing politics: calculated moves, playing his cards very close to his chest, and always ahead of the game. He announced the doubling of the minimum wage as João Goulart had proposed. In his speech to the workers, after praising the work of his former labour minister, he went in for the counterattack: ‘As citizens you have weight in the ballot boxes. As a class your votes will be decisive due to their force in numbers. You are the majority. Today you stand with the government. Tomorrow you will be the government.’60
GETÚLIO IS DEAD. LONG LIVE GETÚLIO!
It was probably already too late for President Vargas to regain the upper hand – the opposition were in a stronger position to overthrow his government than the workers were to protect it. And things were to get even worse for the president. In the early hours of the morning of 5 August, the Minister of Justice, Tancredo Neves, was woken by a telephone call. On the other end of the line a colonel from the police headquarters, Milton Gonçalves, informed him that the journalist Carlos Lacerda had been the victim of an attack and had been slightly wounded in the foot. ‘Is that all? It could be worse,’ was Tancredo Neves’s reaction. But after a short pause the colonel informed him that Carlos Lacerda had been accompanied by an officer from the air force, Major Rubens Vaz, who had been killed. With this information Tancredo Neves’s reaction changed: ‘Nothing could be worse.’61
It is not known whether these were his exact words, but Tancredo Neves was certainly not exaggerating. The attack on Carlos Lacerda’s life was a catastrophe for the government: it could spark off a military crisis without precedent in the history of Brazil, further isolate the president and undermine his authority. And the media would have a field day, as they always did when there was a government crisis.62 Mr Lacerda was an extremely influential figure in the press, and even though his newspaper the Tribuna da Imprensa had a limited daily edition of around 10,000 copies – and never made the slightest attempt at impartiality – Carlos Lacerda held great prestige and a single word from him could create newspaper headlines for days on end.
Carlos Lacerda’s attacks on Getúlio Vargas had become more and more ferocious. Unable to bring about a coup d’état, he invested all his energy in destabilizing the government through the press. He denounced a sequence of scandals, some real and others imaginary, that compromised the Vargas administration – the cronyism and exchanging of favours, illegal loans, government corruption and its anti-Americanism. With constant newspaper and radio coverage, these denunciations created public outrage for weeks and put the government under considerable pressure, corroding its credibility and increasingly contributing to its political and social isolation. Although some of the denunciations were forged, others seriously compromised the government. After 1953, when there was a scandal involving the newspaper Última Hora, President Vagas had lost his battle with the press. Even so, and much to Carlos Lacerda’s frustration, no matter how much effort he put into bringing down the Vargas government, he could not reach the president himself.
The press played a decisive role in weakening Getúlio Vargas’s base of support, above all from the urban middle classes. But after the scandal involving Última Hora, Brazil’s leading newspapers – Correio da Manhã, Diário de Notícias, Diário Carioca, O Globo, O Jornal, O Estado de S. Paulo and the Folha da Manhã – became openly involved in the political crisis that was to topple Getúlio Vargas’s second government. The Última Hora had been founded as per an agreement between President Vargas and the journalist Samuel Wainer – one of the stars of the Diários Associados,63 the most powerful communication group in the country. It was the newspaper that had managed to secure the interview with Getúlio Vargas, on his ranch in São Borja, during which he had announced his candidacy for the presidency.64 During the electoral campaign the two men came to an agreeme
nt on how the newspaper would be run. President Vargas, a great proponent of the Última Hora, was only too aware of the importance of a direct channel for government propaganda and communication with the people. Meanwhile, Mr Wainer constantly took advantage of his position as owner of the newspaper that was, in effect, the spokesperson for the president.
Although Samuel Wainer was partial to government priorities and the relationship between the newspaper and the administration was dubious, the Última Hora was also the most innovative newspaper of its time. It was modern, creative – with coloured printing, and published pithy articles and photographs of the daily life in the big cities. It also paid high salaries. Its success was immediate and circulation was extraordinary. The small group of entrepreneurs who controlled the country’s leading communications vehicles felt threatened: they blamed President Vargas for intervening directly in the communications market and changing the rules of the game in his favour. As a result they joined forces and confronted the government. With the vast majority of the press against him, Samuel Wainer came under heavy attack and a Congressional Enquiry (CPI) was set up to investigate him. It was established at the request of the National Democratic Union with the aim of proving illicit use of government funds. Carlos Lacerda also accused Samuel Wainer – who was Jewish and had been born in Bessarabia, then a part of the Russian Empire – of having falsified his nationality. According to the 1946 Constitution, it was illegal for foreigners to own newspapers. The Congressional Enquiry found Mr Wainer guilty. It was determined that the loans the newspaper had received were the result of the traffic of influence. The illegal loans could be traced as far as Ricardo Jafet, the president of the Banco do Brasil – but no further. The National Democratic Union’s minute investigations and Carlos Lacerda’s determination to involve the president were all in vain: neither the press nor the parliamentary inquiry’s final report were able to establish any direct connection to the president.
However, the above-mentioned crisis that began on 5 August was a far more serious matter. The attack on Carlos Lacerda occurred outside his apartment building, on Rua Tonelero, in Copacabana.65 Major Rubens Florentino Vaz, mortally wounded in the attempt, was a part of a group of young air force officers, supporters of the National Democratic Union (udenista),66 who rotated as Mr Lacerda’s bodyguards. Major Vaz’s murder placed the armed forces at the heart of the crisis. The air force opposed President Vargas, and the officers venerated Brigadier Eduardo Gomes. This was an opportunity they could not afford to miss. With little concern for either the constitution or the military hierarchy, they established an inquiry of their own into Major Vaz’s death.
Although Tancredo Neves was the Minister of Justice and the investigation of the crime was the responsibility of the Civil Police, neither he nor his subordinates were able to undertake an autonomous investigation of the crime. Instead, the air force installed a group of officers to study the occurrence at the Galeão airbase. The officers were given full powers, and the air force also organized a military operation to arrest the assassins. The ‘Galeão Republic’, as the group was called by Getúlio Vargas’s supporters (getulistas)67 – initially with irony, but later with dread – was a government within the government. The air force inquiry discovered that the attempted assassination of Carlos Lacerda had been planned by amateurs and carried out by hired gunmen. The getaway vehicle was a taxi from the rank outside the Catete presidential palace, waiting for passengers on a nearby corner. Before the crime, the very same taxi had followed Carlos Lacerda all around town until the gunmen finally decided where the ambush would take place. The air force had no difficulty in locating the driver and discovering who had ordered the crime. The demise of Getúlio Vargas’s government began with the gunmen’s confession that they had been hired by the head of the presidential guard, Gregório Fortunato. The coup de grâce came when officers from the air force entered the presidential palace, removed all of Gregório Fortunato’s files and sent the contents to the press. The files revealed the extent of the corruption that surrounded President Vargas. There were large-scale illegal transactions recorded involving numerous advisers and leading government figures, as well as a member of Getúlio Vargas’s family – his son Manuel Vargas.
Carlos Lacerda became obsessed with the idea that Getúlio Vargas had been directly or indirectly involved in the attempt to kill him, and was vociferous in making his view known before the police investigation began. ‘Before God, I accuse just one man for this crime – the protector of thieves Getúlio Vargas,’68 he thundered in the Tribuna da Imprensa the day after the attack. It is probable that Gregório Fortunato, a vain man with little education, and blindly devoted to Getúlio Vargas, had allowed himself to be corrupted. This is not surprising, given his proximity to the president. He was able to establish a kind of parallel power structure within the palace and had taken matters into his own hands. It is possible – as even the opposition and Carlos Lacerda might concede – that the president was an honest man, that he had not been involved in any of the misconduct. But there can be no doubt that corruption was rife in the government and that President Vargas, even if he was unaware of his bodyguard’s criminal enterprise, was not exempt from personal responsibility.
President Vargas passed his final days confined to the presidential palace. Public opinion was against him, demands for his resignation were increasing, and his traditional supporters were beginning to abandon him. In the early hours of 24 August the president called a meeting of his ministers. If he still nurtured any hopes for resistance, they now disappeared. All his ministers – with the exception of Tancredo Neves – suggested that he either resign or temporarily vacate the presidency.69 The alternatives were even worse. The president could no longer count on the support of the army as he had in 1937, nor on the mobilization of the workers who had come to his aid in 1945. If he negotiated his resignation, he would be demoralized; if he resisted, he would be deposed. When the meeting was over and he had withdrawn to his private quarters, his brother Benjamin came to inform him that a subpoena had been issued for him to appear before the Committee of Inquiry at Galeão. It was only then that he knew it was over. He closed the door and lay down on the bed. At some point between 8:30 and 8:40 on the morning of 24 August 1954, Getúlio Vargas put a pistol to the left side of his chest and pulled the trigger.
About an hour later, Repórter Esso – the most important news programme on Brazilian radio – went on the air in a special edition to inform the Brazilian people of Getúlio Vargas’s suicide. The country went mad. People were stunned. They left their houses and embraced each other in tears. Gradually the situation spun out of control. In Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador and São Paulo angry, bitter crowds marched through the streets armed with stones, clubs and their fury.70 Thousands of protesters occupied the centre of Rio de Janeiro and converged on Cinelândia,71 destroying everything along the way that had any connection to the opposition against Getúlio Vargas.
The crowd tore National Democratic Union (UDN) propaganda off the lamp posts, smashed the Standard Oil building windows, threw stones at the façade of the American Embassy and at the buildings that housed the newspapers O Globo and Tribuna da Imprensa. They also attacked the newpaper delivery trucks – the following day only the Última Hora appeared. And the crowd did not forget Carlos Lacerda; they chased him down and he took refuge in the American Embassy. Luckily for him, when they threatened to invade the building, the air force sent a helicopter that managed to make a rooftop rescue and take him to safety aboard the navy cruiser Barroso, anchored in Guanabara Bay.
Around one million people gathered in front of the Catete presidential palace in an attempt to see the body. Many were weeping and some actually fainted. Others, after entering the room where the wake was taking place, clung to the coffin. At 8:30 on the morning of 25 August the crowd that accompanied Getúlio Vargas’s body to Santos Dumont airport formed an immense funeral cortege filling the streets from Flamengo beach to the city centre. Wh
en the plane carrying the president’s body back to his ranch in São Borja had taken off, the crowd suddenly realized that they were gathered right in front of the general headquarters of the Third Air Zone. It was unavoidable: grief turned into fury. As the multitude advanced, the terrified air force soldiers and officers opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The firing went on for fifteen minutes. In the panic, women and children were trampled underfoot, one person was killed and many others were wounded by grenade splinters, sabres and gunfire. The crowd fled, but regrouped in the city centre, where it was joined by thousands more protesters, and the conflicts continued throughout the night.
Getúlio Vargas’s suicide frustrated the opposition. They were left without direction, thwarted in their attempt to worsen the political crisis, demoralize the president and force him to resign, thereby making way for a military coup. It was President Vargas’s final political triumph. His epistolary will left no doubt as to how he intended his suicide to be understood: international groups, in alliance with Brazilian partners, were conducting an underground campaign to block his programme for development. ‘If the birds of prey want someone’s blood, if they want to continue sucking the Brazilian people’s, I offer my own life in sacrifice,’72 he declared. Otávio Mangabeira, one of the leading lights of the National Democratic Union, still in a state of shock, recognized that the opposition’s political gains had now slipped through their fingers: ‘He has beaten us once again,’ he said.73 Before committing suicide Getúlio Vargas had written: ‘I have chosen this means to always be with you. […] I fear nothing. I serenely take the first step on the path of eternity and exit life to enter history.’ Taking his own life was a powerful gesture that managed to immobilize the opposition. But it was the people in the streets who kept fighting for democracy and managed to prevent a coup d’état.74
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