Before the movement could spread, the military commanders sent troops into the streets of Brasília and suppressed the rebellion. But the political ramifications were to be disastrous for the government. For the army command, the incident came as a shock, both for its infringement of military discipline and for the ease with which the sergeants had virtually isolated the capital. But they were even more astounded at President Goulart’s reaction: he remained neutral, neither defending nor attacking the rebels. Nor did he respond to the left-wing parties that had supported the sergeants. His silence allowed the conspirators to take on the role of guarantors of legality, which in turn lent credibility to the Research and Social Studies Institute sponsored anti-Goulart campaign. As from October the Goulart government’s political and administrative instability became increasingly evident. The Executive virtually came to a halt due to the constant replacement of ministers, the absence of a majority in Congress, and the heightened radicalization of political forces on both sides of the political spectrum. Annual inflation reached 79.9 per cent, economic growth was 1.5 per cent a year, and there was a generalized feeling that the government had lost control. Brazil’s international creditors stopped all further loans while the American government tipped money into the pockets of the state governors of Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Guanabara, who were planning a coup d’état.19
As the Ides of March of 1964 approached, President Goulart brought things to a head. The first unequivocal sign that his government was on a collision course with the National Congress came on a Friday the 13th. O Comício da Central – the political rally held outside Rio de Janeiro’s central train station – was carefully planned, even down to the symbolism. The stage was set up in the same location where Getúlio Vargas had held ceremonies during the Estado Novo, in a show of unity between all the left-wing forces, the workers’ movements and the government. It attracted a multitude, estimated between 150,000 and 200,000 people, and lasted for more than four hours. Thirteen speeches were given in all. João Goulart was the last to speak, beside his beautiful young wife, Maria Thereza, who appeared nervous. The president gave an improvised, emotional speech in which he declared that the time for the reforms had come and the time for compromise was over.20
Two days later President Goulart sent the president’s annual address to Congress. Therein were his agenda for reforms, a proposed referendum for their approval, a request to delegate legislative powers to the Executive, and recommended alterations to the text of the 1946 Constitution.21 The presidential message terrified Congress. For many it confirmed the worst fears of the Research and Social Studies Institute and of the National Democratic Union, that sooner or later the president would impose his policies, dissolve Congress, grant special powers to the Executive, change the election rules for his own benefit, and permit Leonel Brizola to run for office. (Under the 1946 Constitution, as João Goulart’s brother-in-law, Mr Brizola was not allowed to stand as a candidate.) In fact, Leonel Brizola made no secret of his ambition to rule the country, and João Goulart probably did covet re-election. It is also true that the two of them planned significant alterations to the constitution. But until then, there had only been rhetoric, a political game. But with the annual address to Congress, everything changed. People began to focus on Leonel Brizola and President Goulart’s activities, realizing there was nothing to prevent the two of them from carrying out the president’s plans. At any moment President Goulart could annul the legislation that sustained his presidency. There was widespread suspicion, in the press and public opinion, as to the government’s intentions.
On 19 March, in São Paulo, a large crowd left the Praça da República and marched to the Praça da Sé carrying banners, flags and a profusion of rosaries, to save Brazil from João Goulart, Leonel Brizola and communism, as they shouted in chorus. The Family with God March for Freedom had been organized by the Research and Social Studies Institute through the Women’s Civic Union, one of the many women’s groups set up by the institute all over Brazil to increase political pressure. The march attracted around half a million people and had two main objectives. It was both a response to the rally at the Central do Brazil as well as a powerful appeal on the part of society for intervention by the armed forces.22 Due to an excess of self-confidence, President Goulart and the coalition of left-wing parties remained unfazed by the fact that half a million people had protested in the streets of Brazil’s most important city. ‘These aren’t “the people”,’ they said disdainfully.23 But they were wrong. The march in São Paulo proved that a strong government opposition coalition had been formed, willing and able to mobilize people from all walks of life. Their shared aversion to the increasing political activity of the trade unions and rural workers was one of their main uniting forces. Furthermore, financial stress and uncertainty with respect to the future had stirred the urban middle classes into action. They were well aware that a radical process of redistribution of income and power would affect their traditional position in that brutally inequitable society. Taking all of this into account facilitates the understanding of the intensity and breadth of the opposition movement. Between 19 March and 8 June 1964 crowds marched with God and against João Goulart – or, after 31 March, to commemorate the coup d’état that had deposed him – in at least fifty cities all around the country, from state capitals to small towns.24
Deposing President Goulart required unification in the barracks. And the armed forces, after all, had promised to uphold the constitution when João Goulart took office in 1961. On 25 March, when the president was spending the Easter weekend on his farm in São Borja, the Minister of the Navy sparked off a crisis that was to have an irrevocable effect on the government’s authority over the military. In fact, it provided justification for the coup. The minister ordered the arrest of forty sailors and corporals who were organizing the commemorations for the second anniversary of the Brazilian Association of Sailors and Marines (AMFNB).25 For all intents and purposes, the association was a trade union whose purpose was to achieve better working conditions for navy personnel, who survived on very low wages and poor food aboard their ships. Furthermore, they had to submit to absurd regulations – they were not allowed to get married without authorization or wear civilian clothing in the streets. As the guest of honour for the event, they had invited João Cândido, who had led the Revolt of the Whip in 1910 in protest against the practice of flogging in the navy. In many ways the sailors’ situation had remained unchanged since the days of the First Republic. After the arrests were ordered, more than 3,600 sailors rebelled. They took refuge in the offices of the Metalworkers Union (Palácio do Aço) in downtown Rio de Janeiro, and for three days refused to come out. They demanded that the navy recognize the association and revoke all punishments. Sailors aboard ship in the bay joined the movement, conducting acts of sabotage that prevented other ships from leaving the port.26 The minister was further demoralized when he sent five hundred Marines and thirteen tanks to invade the building and remove the rebels. Twenty-six of the soldiers put down their weapons, entered the building, and joined the rebels.
In the early hours of 27 March, President Goulart rushed back to Rio de Janeiro, appointed a new naval minister, personally took charge of the negotiations, and put everything on the line. The next morning he organized the rebels’ exit from the building, from where they were taken to army barracks. On the very same day he ordered their release and declared an amnesty. The sight of the delighted sailors marching through the streets of Rio de Janeiro towards the War Ministry came as a shock to the armed forces. The high command was indignant. Their response was unanimous: what had happened in the navy was nothing less than a collapse in discipline, a breach of hierarchy, and the demoralization of the command. The episode caused an uproar in the barracks and members of the Research and Social Studies Institute conceded that a military coup was imminent. The coup was to begin in São Paulo, probably on the night of 10 April. All that was needed to finalize the plans was agreement among the chie
f military commanders. Meanwhile, at the United States military base of Norfolk, Virginia, a naval task force was waiting for authorization to head for Brazil. The task force was part of Operation Brother Sam, which had been prepared in Washington with the complicity of the Brazilian military to provide support for the coup. The plan was for the ships to set sail on 1 April and to divide into three groups upon entering Brazilian waters. The first group would head to the port of Santos, the second to Rio, and the third to Carapebus near Vitória, in Espírito Santo. Their orders were to offer logistical support, above all in the case of prolonged resistance.27
On the night of 30 March, President Goulart left the presidential residence in Rio de Janeiro (Palácio de Laranjeiras) to follow advice expressed in a popular idiom, ‘manda brasa!’ (shoot the works). Leftists had transformed it into a slogan, ‘manda brasa, Presidente!’ And the president did just that. He was to give a speech at a party in honour of the investiture of the new Board of Directors of the Sergeants’ Association, in the auditorium of the Automóvel Clube, in Cinelândia.28 João Goulart entered the room, filled with sergeants, sailors and Marines, and took the stage. At his side was able seaman Corporal Anselmo (José Anselmo dos Santos), the president of the Brazilian Association of Sailors and Marines, who had led the sailors’ revolt – and who later became a notorious double agent, passing information to the navy and the CIA.29
It is not known exactly when Corporal Anselmo became a double agent: whether it was while he was still president of the AMFNB or whether it was after the coup of 1964. What is known is that his activities resulted in the death of a number of militants who were fighting the military dictatorship, including that of his own wife, Soledad Viedma. However, on 30 March his popularity was irrepressible and his photograph was constantly in the newspapers. Corporal Anselmo was twenty-five, with boyish good looks, and had no idea that evening that he was witnessing João Goulart’s last appearance in public as president. At dawn the following morning, General Olímpio Mourão Filho, commander of the Fourth Military Region (based in Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais), having run out of patience awaiting instructions from the Brazilian Association of Sailors and Marines, led his troops towards Rio de Janeiro. He intended to occupy the War Ministry and depose the Goulart government.
Between 31 March and 4 April, when João Goulart went into exile in Uruguay, there were still several possible ways he could have dealt with the coup. The first, with a good chance of success, and with little cost and little risk, would have been to prevent General Mourão from advancing. The troops were moving slowly, clearly visible, along the União e Indústria highway. They were badly equipped and many were recent recruits. The second would have been to stay put in Rio de Janeiro, make an announcement to the nation, and take personal command of the resistance, with the support of the garrisons that remained loyal to the government. Instead, his sudden departure from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília confused his supporters, who interpreted it as flight. The third opportunity would have been to then remain in Brasília and mobilize congressional support. He could have proposed democratic elections. In addition to the support of the Brazilian Labour Party and the left-wing coalition, the chances were high of getting the support of the Social Democratic Party. The last possibility – and certainly the most reckless – was proposed by Leonel Brizola when President Goulart was already in Porto Alegre. The plan was based on the 1961 campaign for legality, when Mr Brizola had mobilized civilians and General Ladário Telles, the commander of the Third Army, led the military operations.30
Historians are still debating how the conspirators were so easily victorious. Obviously, one of the reasons was that João Goulart did not lead a resistance. But nor did anyone else from the left take the initiative to resist the coup – neither the Communist Party, the General Workers’ Command (CGT), the Rural Workers’ Leagues (Ligas Camponesas), nor Leonel Brizola. It is probable that all of them, including President Goulart, thought that the coup would follow the pattern of previous military interventions, such as those of 1945, 1954, 1955 and 1961.31 In all these cases the armed forces had acted as both protagonist and moderating power, and after a cooling-off period had called elections and returned power to the civilians. It is also possible that João Goulart saw his position as analogous to that of Getúlio Vargas in 1945. He would retreat to his farm in São Borja from where he would watch events unfold and prepare to stand for re-election in 1965.
After all, General Mourão’s act of insubordination was fairly typical. He was nearing retirement and believed that if he sent the troops out, the military command might be jolted into action. The governor of Minas Gerais in turn, Magalhães Pinto, wanted to run for president in 1965. And he knew that he had very little chance of being his party’s candidate – the National Democratic Union would in all likelihood choose Carlos Lacerda. Magalhães Pinto thus supported General Mourão’s plan with an eye to increasing his own political power. He intended to offer Minas Gerais to the conspirators as a base for their campaign.32 No one, neither Magalhães Pinto nor Carlos Lacerda nor Ademar de Barros, imagined the movement would lead to anything but a short military intervention. Even Juscelino Kubitschek, who had been senator for the state of Goiás since 1962, agreed with them. Typical of his political style, Juscelino Kubitschek declared he was not in favour of the coup d’état, but nor would he support President Goulart – he would not take a stand against his own state, Minas Gerais.33 The president of the Senate, Auro de Moura Andrade, was yet another leader who did not foresee a prolonged military dictatorship. Faced with the disintegration of the government, he decided to anticipate events by deposing President Goulart. In the early hours of 2 April he called a secret session of both Houses and declared the presidency vacant. When Tancredo Neves protested vehemently that João Goulart was still in Brazil and was thus still invested with the full powers of president, Mr Moura Andrade disconnected the sound and turned off the lights. The coup d’état was consummated.34 Nonetheless, everyone believed there would be elections in 1965. They were all wrong. A faction among the conspirators had its own agenda and the military government was to last for twenty-one years. Brazil’s military dictatorship was about to begin.
WHEN A COUP BECOMES A GOVERNMENT
On the afternoon of 11 April 1964 the National Congress met to elect the new president of Brazil. The deputies of the left-wing coalition were no longer present. The day before, the first list was published of deputies whose mandates had been annulled. The term in Portuguese is actually cassado, a derogatory term for those whose political rights were revoked for a period of ten years. There were to be other lists. By March 1967, four hundred mandates had been annulled. What remained of the Congress participated in the indirect election, for which there was only one candidate – General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco. The deputies were required to announce their votes, one by one – only seventy-two had the courage to abstain, including Tancredo Neves and Santiago Dantas. At the end of the afternoon the general was elected with 361 votes – including Juscelino Kubitschek’s – to complete João Goulart’s term. General Castello Branco took office in Congress a few days later. He swore to defend the 1946 Constitution, promised to hand over the presidency to his successor in 1965, and guaranteed there would be no more annulments of political rights and mandates.35
In his speech the general said what everyone wanted to hear, but he kept none of his promises. The coup that brought General Castello Branco to power had very little in common with the military uprising commanded by General Mourão and Magalhães Pinto, except that both were exceptions, arbitrary and violent. Between 30 March and 11 April military officers and business leaders from the Research and Social Studies Institute (IPES) competed with each other to neutralize the various forces that had acted independently to depose President Goulart. And, as journalists look back on those times in Rio de Janeiro, they note with irony that people could even conduct those discussions safely by telephone!
While the political world was thinking o
f the elections for the next president and ratified general Costa e Silva to hold the post until then, members of the Research and Social Studies Institute were concentrating on how to transform the military uprising into a coup d’état, and the coup d’état into a government. The associates and collaborators of the institute manoeuvred to fill key positions in the ministries and other state administrative departments.36 The main goal was to outline the programme of the new government and define its political economy – with the immediate establishment of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination. Other top priorities included the decision-making bodies in Planalto37 and the various ministries – starting with the Civil and Military Cabinets. Equal importance was given to the control and collection of information on questions of domestic security, which led to the creation of the National Information Service (SNI) in June.
None of this resembled the traditional form of intervention by the armed forces that had occurred so frequently in the history of Brazil. The investiture of General Castello Branco was a prelude to a complete change in Brazil’s political system. This transformation was brought about by collaboration between the military and sectors of civilian society that wanted to implement a modernization project based on industrialization and economic growth, sustained by an openly dictatorial regime. This implied far-reaching changes to the structure of the state. It required the creation of a new legal framework, the implementation of a new model for economic development, the creation of a secret service for political repression and information gathering and, of course, censorship to silence dissent.
The most sensitive area of the new political system was the control of the armed forces over the presidency. The military took over the government by unconstitutional methods. They granted themselves emergency powers and ‘elected’ five army generals in succession to head the Executive – Castello Branco (1964–7), Costa e Silva (1967–9), Garrastazu Médici (1969–74), Ernesto Geisel (1974–9) and João Figueiredo (1979–85). There was also a short period during which the country was governed by a Military Junta (August to October 1969), made up of ministers of the three components of the armed forces. Throughout the dictatorship, however, there were disputes between factions within the armed forces over who should control the Executive. The armed forces had a long tradition of involvement in government and were home to a wide variety of political ideologies. There were also differences of opinion between the three forces, between the generations and within the hierarchy. Furthermore, although the armed forces had the will and the capacity to take power, they had never exercised it for long. In 1964 the situation was very different. The generals considered themselves ready to take over the government. Various groups of rival officers with convictions and strategies of their own intended to intervene during the course of the dictatorship which, after all, they had helped to create, and for which they felt responsible.38 Despite their differences all these groups agreed that domestic security should take priority as the mission of the armed forces. They also insisted that the source of sovereignty of the new political system was military and originated in the armed forces – it did not only stem from the hierarchical authority of the generals.
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