by James Millar
Once emancipation had been completed, Alexander proceeded to approve further reforms, often referred to by historians as the Great Reforms. The tsar himself did not participate as much in the changes that came after 1861, but Alexander appointed the men who would be responsible for drafting reforms and gave the final approval on the changes. Between 1864 and 1874 Alexander promulgated a new local government reform (creating the zemstvo), a new judicial reform, educational reforms, a relaxed censorship law, and a new military law. All were carried out in the new spirit of glasnost, or “giving voice,” that Alexander advocated. The tsar relied on officials who had been trained during his father’s years on the throne, and thus the reforms are also associated with the names of Nicholas Milyutin, Petr Valuev, Dmitry Mi-lyutin, and other “enlightened bureaucrats.” Additionally, Russians from all walks of life debated the reforms and their specifics in an atmosphere that contrasted starkly with Nicholas I’s Russia.
This new spirit brought with it a multitude of reactions and opinions. Alexander, a committed autocrat throughout the reform era, had to deal with rebellions and revolutionaries almost immediately after launching his reforms. These reactions were
ALEXANDER II
a natural product of the more relaxed era and of the policies Alexander advocated, even if he did not foresee all of their consequences. In particular, Alexander’s decision to reform Russia helped to fuel a revolt in Poland, then a part of the Russian Empire. Polish nationalism in 1863 led to a Warsaw rebellion that demanded more freedoms. In the face of this opposition, Alexander reacted in the same manner as his father, brutally suppressing the revolt. Unlike his father, however, Alexander did not embark on a policy of Russification in other areas of the Empire, and even allowed the Finnish parliament to meet again in 1863 as a reward for loyalty to the empire.
At home, the reform era only served to embolden Russians who wanted the country to engage in more radical changes. The educated public in the 1850s and 1860s openly debated the details of the Great Reforms and found many of them wanting. As a result of his policies, Alexander helped to spawn a politically radical movement that called for an end to autocracy. A group that called itself “Land and Liberty” formed in Russia’s universities and called for a more violent and total revolution among the Russian peasantry. A similar group known as the Organization made calls for radical change at the same time. On April 6, 1866, a member of this group, Dmitry Karakazov, fired six times at Alexander while he walked in the Summer Garden but spectacularly missed. Although the reform era was not officially over, 1866 marked a watershed in the life of Alexander II and his country. The tsar did not stay committed to the path of reform while the opposition that the era had unleashed only grew.
LATER YEARS
Alexander had let loose the forces that eventually killed him, but between 1866 and 1881 Russia experienced many more significant changes. Karaka-zov’s attempt on Alexander’s life came during a period of domestic turmoil for Alexander. The year before, the tsar’s eldest son, Nicholas, died at the age of twenty-two. Three months after the assassination attempt, Alexander began an affair with an eighteen-year old princess, Ekaterina Dolgo-rukaia, which lasted for the remainder of his life (he later married her). Responding to the growing revolutionary movement, Alexander increased the powers of the Third Section, the notorious secret police formed by Nicholas I. The reform era and the initial spirit associated with it had changed irrevocably by 1866 even if it had not run its course.
Tsar Alexander II. © HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS
Alexander began to concentrate on his role as emperor during the late 1860s and 1870s. In particular, he engaged in empire building and eventually warfare. He oversaw the Russian conquest of Central Asia that brought Turkestan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Khiva, and Kokand under Russian control. The gains in Central Asia came with a diplomatic cost, however. Expansion so near to the borders of India ensured that England looked on with increasing alarm at Russian imperialism, and during this period a “cold war” developed between the two powers.
Russia also pursued a more aggressive stance toward the Ottoman Empire, in part fueled by the rise of pan-Slavism at home. When Orthodox subjects rebelled against Turkey in 1875, numerous Russians called on the tsar to aid their fellow Slavs. Alexander, reluctant at first, eventually gave in to public opinion, particularly after Ottoman forces in 1876 slaughtered nearly thirty thousand Bulgarians who had come to aid the insurgents. Russia declared war on April 12, 1877. Although Russia experienced some difficulty in defeating the Turks, particularly at the fortress of Plevna, the
ALEXANDER III
war was presented to the Russian public as an attempt to liberate Orthodox subjects from Muslim oppression. Alexander’s image as liberator featured prominently in the popular prints, press reports, and other accounts of the war. When Russian forces took Plevna in December 1877, they began a march to Istanbul that brought them to the gates of the Turkish capital. In the Caucasus, the final act took place on February 19, 1878, when Russian forces “liberated” the Turkish city of Erzerum. Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano in March, which guaranteed massive Russian gains in the region. Alexander once more appeared to fulfill the role of Tsar-Liberator.
Alarmed by these developments, the European powers, including Russia’s Prussian and Austrian allies, held an international conference in Berlin. Alexander saw most of his gains whittled away in an effort to prevent Russian hegemony in the Balkans. The resulting confusions helped to sow the seeds for the origins of World War I, but also provoked widespread disillusionment in Russia. Alexander considered the Berlin Treaty to be the worst moment in his career.
Alexander’s domestic troubles only increased after 1878. The revolutionaries had not given up their opposition to the progress and scope of reform, and many Russian radicals began to focus their attention on the autocracy as the major impediment to future changes. A new Land and Freedom group emerged in the 1870s that called for all land to be given to the peasants and for a government that listened to “the will of the people.” By the end of the decade, the organization had split into two groups. The Black Repartition focused on the land question, while the People’s Will sought to establish a new political system in Russia by assassinating the tsar. After numerous attempts, they succeeded in their quest on March 1, 1881. As Alexander rode near the Catherine Canal, a bomb went off near the tsar’s carriage, injuring several people. Alexander stepped out to inspect the damage when a second bomb landed at his feet and exploded. He was carried to the Winter Palace, where he died from massive blood loss.
Ironically, or perhaps fittingly, Alexander II was on his way to discuss the possibility of establishing a national assembly and a new constitution. This final reform would not be completed, and Alexander’s era ended with him. The tsar’s son and grandson, the future Alexander III and Nicholas II, were at the deathbed, and the sight of the autocrat dying as a result of his reforms would shape their respective rules. As Larissa Zakharova has concluded, the act of March 1 initiated the bloody trail to Russia’s tragic twentieth century. Alexander II’s tragedy became Russia’s. See also: BERLIN, CONGRESS OF; BLACK REPARTITION; CRIMEAN WAR; EMANCIPATION ACT; NICHOLAS I; PARIS, CONGRESS AND TREATY OF 1856; PEOPLE’S WILL, THE; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; SERFDOM; ZEMSTVO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Eklof, Ben; Bushnell, John; and Zakharova, Larissa, eds. (1994). Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881. Bloom-ington: Indiana University Press. Field, Daniel. (1976). The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1990). The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Moss, Walter. (2002). Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevsky. London: Anthem Press. Mosse, Werner. (1962). Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia. NY: Collier. Rieber, Alfred. (1971). “Alexander II: A Revisionist View” Journal of Modern History. 43: 42-58. Tols
toy, Leo. (1995). Anna Karenina. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Wortman, Richard. (2000). Scnearios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Vol. 2: From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zakharova, Larissa. (1996). “Emperor Alexander II, 1855-1881.” In The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs, ed. Donald Raleigh. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
STEPHEN M. NORRIS
ALEXANDER III
(1845-1894), Alexander Alexandrovich, emperor of Russia from March 1, 1881 to October 20, 1894.
The second son of Alexander Nikolayevich (Alexander II), the heir to the Russian throne, the future Alexander III was born in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg in February 1845. He was one of six brothers and was educated alongside Nicholas (b. 1843) who, after the death of Nicholas I in 1855, became the heir to the throne. One of the most imALEXANDER III portant parts of their education was schooling in military matters. This was especially important for Alexander, who was expected to occupy his time with the army and never to have to undertake anything other than ceremonial duties. His situation changed dramatically in 1865 when Nicholas died from meningitis and Alexander became heir to his father, Alexander II. The prospect of the twenty-year-old Alexander becoming emperor horrified his tutors. He had been a dogged pupil, displaying no great spark of intelligence, and had shown no real maturity during his studies. But after his brother’s death, a major effort was made to enhance Alexander’s education to prepare him properly to become emperor. His contemporaries commented on his honesty and decency, but they also noted Alexander’s obstinacy and his reluctance to change his mind. For Alexander himself, his marriage in 1866 to the Danish princess Dagmar was more important than education. She had been engaged to his brother Nicholas before his death, and marriage to Alexander was seen by both sides as an “alliance,” rather than being a love-match. But the marriage turned out to be extremely happy and Maria Fyo-dorovna (as his wife was known in Russia) became an important support to her husband. Alexander was devoted to his family and enjoyed being with his five children: Nicholas (b.1868), George (b. 1871), Xenia (b. 1875), Mikhail (b. 1878), and Olga (b. 1882).
An assassination attempt on Alexander II in 1866 brought home to the new heir to the throne the gravity of his status. He did not relish the prospect of becoming emperor, but nevertheless engaged in the official duties that were required of him with determination and interest. While his father was implementing the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, the heir to the throne was developing views that conflicted fundamentally with those of Alexander II. The young Alexander believed firmly in the dominance of the Russian autocracy and was deeply opposed to any attempt to weaken the autocrat’s grip on the country. He was especially keen to see Russian interests prevail across the empire and wanted severe treatment for national minority groups, such as the Poles, that tried to assert their autonomy. These views were reinforced by Alexander’s experience of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. He argued strongly in favor of Russian intervention in support of the Slav population of the Ottoman Empire and fought alongside Russian troops. The war strengthened his belief in the danger of weak
Tsar Alexander III. © ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS authority and this was especially relevant to Russia itself at the end of the 1870s. Terrorist activity was increasing and Alexander wrote in his diary of the “horrible and disgusting years” that Russia was going through. There were repeated attempts on the emperor’s life and, in March 1881, terrorists from the People’s Will group threw a bomb at Alexander II and succeeded in killing him. The emperor died, horribly injured, in the arms of his wife and son.
The assassination of the Tsar-Liberator confirmed the new Alexander III in his deeply conservative views. He moved very swiftly to distance himself from the policies and ethos of his father. The new emperor showed no mercy toward his father’s killers, rejecting all appeals for clemency for them. In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, legislation was introduced giving the government wide use of emergency powers. At the time of his death, Alexander II had been about to approve the establishment of a national consultative assembly, but the new emperor very quickly made it clear that he would not permit limitations on autocratic rule, and the project was abandoned. The new emperor and his family moved out of St.
ALEXANDER III
Petersburg to live in the palace at Gatchina, a grim fortress-like building associated with Paul I. It was clear that the whole tone of Alexander III’s reign was to be different. Instead of the European-orientated reforms of Alexander II, the new emperor was determined to follow the “Russian path,” which he understood to be a forceful autocracy, proudly national in its actions and with the Orthodox Church providing a link between emperor and the people. Many of Alexander II’s ministers and advisers were rapidly removed from office and were replaced by men with impeccable conservative credentials. Prime amongst them were Konstantin Pobedonos-tsev, officially only procurator-general of the Holy Synod (the lay official who governed the Orthodox Church), but who played a key role in guiding policy across a wide range of areas, and Dmitry Tolstoy, minister of internal affairs for most of the 1880s. The non-Russian nationalities of the empire were subjected to cultural and administrative Rus-sification. This was especially fierce in the Baltic provinces of the empire, where the use of the Russian language was made compulsory in the courts and in local government and where the local German-speaking university was compelled to provide teaching in Russian. This approach also included encouraging non-Orthodox peoples to convert to the Orthodox religion, sometimes by offering them incentives in the form of land grants. In Poland, most education had to be provided in Russian and the Roman Catholic Church could only exist under considerable restrictions.
Alexander III and his ministers also tried to claw back some elements of the Great Reforms of the 1860s that had seemed to set Russia on the path toward a more open political system. The post of justice of the peace, established by the legal reform of 1864, was abolished in most of Russia in 1889 and its legal functions transferred to the new post of land captain. This official had very wide powers over the peasantry and was intended to strengthen the hold that the government had over its rural population. The land captain became a much-disliked figure in much of peasant Russia. The government also limited the powers of the zemstvos that had been established in the 1860s. These elected local councils had been given responsibility for the provision of many local services and “zemstvo liberalism” had become a thorn in the side of the autocracy, as some local councils had pressed for the principle of representative government to be extended to national government. Alexander III acted to narrow the franchise for zemstvo elections and to restrict the amount of taxation that the zem-stvo could levy. These moves were intended to neuter the zemstvo and reduce the influence they could have on the population, but Alexander never dared go so far as to actually abolish the local councils. This typified the problems facing Alexander III. While he wanted to return to the traditional ethos of Russian autocracy, he was forced to recognize that, in practical terms, he could not turn the clock back. The reforms of the 1860s had become so firmly embedded in Russian society that they could not simply be undone. All that the emperor could do was to ensure that the iron fist of autocracy was wielded as effectively as possible.
Some of Alexander’s policies made matters more difficult for the autocracy. At the end of the 1880s, the government’s economic policies became oriented toward stimulating industrial growth. A major part in this was played by Sergei Witte, who had made his career in the railway industry before coming to work in government, and who became minister of finance in 1892. Witte deeply admired Alexander III and believed that Russia could be both an autocracy and a successful industrial power. The government, however, failed to recognize the social and political consequences of the industrial boom that Russia enjoyed during the 1890s and the new industrial working class began to flex its muscles and to demand better working con
ditions and political change. The emperor also had a personal interest in Russia’s foreign policy. His Danish wife helped him develop an instinctive distrust of Germany and the 1880s witnessed Russia’s gradual disengagement from its traditional alliance with Germany and Austria. There were important economic reasons for Russia’s new diplomatic direction: Industrial growth required investment from abroad and the most promising source of capital was France. In 1894 Russia and France signed an alliance that was to be significant both for its part in stimulating Russian industry and for the way in which it began the reshaping of Europe’s diplomatic map as the continent began to divide into the two groups that would sit on opposite sides during World War I. Alexander III did not live long enough to see the results of his work. Despite his large frame and apparent strength, he developed kidney disease and died at the age of forty-nine in October 1894. See also: AUTOCRACY; ALEXANDER II; INDUSTRIALIZATION; NICHOLAS I; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH
ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chernukha, Valentina Chernukha. (1996). “Emperor Alexander III.” In The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs, ed. Donald Raleigh. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Zaionchkovskii, Petr. (1976). The Russian Autocracy under Alexander III. Gulf Breeze, FL: Oriental Research Partners
PETER WALDRON
See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; IVAN I; METROPOLITAN; NOVGOROD THE GREAT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fennell, John L. I. (1968). The Emergence of Moscow 1304-1359. London: Secker amp; Warburg. Martin, Janet. (1995). Medieval Russia 980-1584. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
MARTIN DIMNIK
ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH