by James Millar
FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS
Fortified lines played a major role in Muscovy’s southern frontier defense strategy. The great scale of these fortifications projects testified to the Muscovite state’s considerable powers of resource mobilization.
The defense of Muscovy’s southern frontier relied heavily upon long fortified lines linking garrison towns and serving as stations for the corps of the southern frontier field army. These lines were never intended to be impermeable walls keeping out the Tatars, but rather a supporting infrastructure for reconnaissance patrols, signaling, and corps movements beyond or behind the defense line. The gradual extension of these defense lines deeper into the steppe over the course of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reflected the Muscovite state’s successes in the military colonization of its southern frontier and in its command and control of much larger field armies.
To stop the Crimean Tatars from invading central Muscovy, it had become necessary by 1512 to See also: CRIMEAN TATARS; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MUSCOVY; THIRTEEN YEARS’ WAR
BRIAN DAVIES
FRUNZE, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH
(1885-1925), military leader and theoretician.
Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze was a native of Semirchesk oblast, the son of an orderly, and a student in the Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, from which he failed to graduate. He joined the social democratic movement (1904) and led strikes in Ivanovo (May 1905). Arrested and twice sentenced to death, he was exiled instead and managed to escape. He did party work in Belorussia (1917), was head of the militia in Minsk, and was a member of the Party committee of the West Front. Frunze was head of the Party Soviet in Shuia (September 1917). Opposed to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, he joined the “Left-Communists.” Frunze
FULL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING
was military commissar of Yaroslavl Military District. From February 1919, he was at the front as commander of the Fourth and Turkestan Armies, then he was commander of the south wing of the East Front, fighting against Kolchak. From July 1919, Frunze was commander of the East Front deployed in the Urals, and from September 1919, he commanded the Turkestan Front. From September 1920, Frunze served as commander of the South Front deployed in Crimea and accepted the surrender of Pyotr Wrangel’s remaining forces in the Crimea, who were later massacred by the Party and Cheka operatives, despite his disapproval. From December 1920, he headed the Revolutionary Military Soviet (RVS) and commanded the Crimea and Ukraine forces, which embarked on various punitive operations. He was elected to the Party Central Committee (1921), appointed as Deputy People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (March 1924), and later (April 1924) served as the Chief of Staff of the Red Army. Frunze was a candidate member of the Politburo (1924). He authored a number of studies, including a guide on reorganizing the Red Army (1921), on military doctrine (1921, 1924), and on Vladimir Lenin and the Red Army (1925). He led the military reforms in 1924-1925. Frunze’s ideas, formed in bruising battles with Leon Trotsky, involved a “unified doctrine” and setting up of a bureaucratically structured Red Army high command to meet wartime as well as peacetime needs. The necessity for an industrial defense base, as well as machinery for rapid mobilization, was also emphasized. These views were opposed by those who favored a militia-type Red Army.
On March 11, 1924, Frunze was appointed as Trotsky’s deputy, and on January 1, 1925, Joseph Stalin named him Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, replacing Trotsky. Frunze’s death, as a result of an operation recommended by Stalin, has given rise to a number of claims that his demise was no accident and that it gave Stalin the opportunity to replace him with Kliment Voroshilov, about whose loyalty there was little doubt. Frunze is buried on Red Square. His son, fighter pilot Timur Frunze, was killed during the Battle of Stalingrad. See also: MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gareev, M.A. (1987). M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s. Von Hagen, Mark (1990). Soldiers in a Proletarian Leadership: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
MICHAEL PARRISH
FULL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING
In the Soviet economy, industrial enterprises were treated as independent units from a financial management and economic accountability perspective. Under the system of full economic accounting (polny khozrachet) introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, each enterprise was to be self-financing in the long run, meeting wage payments and other production costs from sales revenues. Investment requirements identified in the techpromfinplan were to be met from enterprise profits. Full economic accounting was a cornerstone of perestroika, regarded as an important measure to improve enterprise operations.
The khozrachet system used by Soviet enterprises during the 1980s was not new, but the attention paid to enterprise autonomy and accountability during the period of perestroika appeared more serious. Under the system of full economic accounting, unprofitable or “negative-value-added” firms were to go out of business either through a bankruptcy proceeding or by another enterprise taking over the loss-making firm’s assets. Prior to perestroika, the khozrachet system gave lip service to self-financing and economic accountability, but in practice, loss-making firms routinely received subsidies from central authorities or industrial ministries redistributing profits from “winners” to “losers.”
Gorbachev’s full economic accounting system was supposed to end the automatic subsidies provided to loss-makers. It appeared to be the Soviet answer to the question of how to eliminate the “soft budget constraint” described by Janos Kornai as the primary contributing source of scarcity in a planned economy. However, centrally determined prices for inputs received by the firm and output sold by the firm made calculations of cost, revenue, and profit somewhat meaningless from an efficiency or economic accountability perspective. Centrally determined prices did not reflect scarcity, nor did they signal accurate information about the operation or performance of the Soviet industrial enterprise. Consequently, basing the full economic accounting system on these prices, in an environFUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF 1906 ment of persistent and pervasive shortages, provided little opportunity to maneuver Soviet enterprises away from the production of shoddy goods and toward the production of goods that adequately captured the specifications or preferences of customers. Moreover, as planners maintained the bonus system that linked substantial monetary payments to the fulfillment of output targets rather than cost reductions, enterprise managers continued to over-order inputs and hoard labor in order to achieve the planned output targets. As planners continued to set output plan targets high relative to the firm’s productive capacity, enterprise managers continued to disregard cost in efforts to fulfill planned output targets. In short, policies pursued by planners sustained the outcome that the extension to full economic accounting was to replace. The absence of bankruptcy law and established bankruptcy proceedings, plus the lack of a mechanism for one firm to acquire the assets of a second firm, also undermined the effectiveness of full economic accounting in improving enterprise operations. See also: KORNAI, JANOS; PERESTROIKA; TECHPROMFIN-PLAN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gorbachev, Mikhail. (1987). Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New York: Harper amp; Row. Gregory, Paul R. (1990). Restructuring the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
SUSAN J. LINZ
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF 1906
The Fundamental Laws, a 203-article compilation of existing laws on supreme rule, were first published in the Set of Laws of the Russian Empire (Svod zakonov Rossyskoi impery) in 1832. Unchanged since the edition published in 1892, they had to be revised in order to carry out the principles set forth in the October Manifesto of 1905. The revision was based on the principles established by the Manifesto of 1906, which made the State Council a second legislative chamber with the right to veto acts by the State Duma, thereby establishing that the Duma did not have the right to change the Fundamental Laws. The new revision of the Fundame
ntal Laws was hurriedly accepted before the upcoming election of the Duma. Count Sergei Witte, one of the initiators of the October Manifesto and of the introduction of national representatives into Russian politics, warned that if the revision was issued before the election, the Duma would become the Constitutional Assembly, and this would lead to violence and the end of the new order.
There were three drafts of the Fundamental Laws: one liberal, one conservative, and one “moderate” (in fact closer to liberal). The latter, created at the State Chancellery by the deputy state secretary, Peter Kharitonov, was adopted as basis for the future document. The Japanese, Prussian, and Aus-tro-Hungarian constitutions were studied in the process of creating and compiling the laws, as was a draft prepared by the Union of Liberation and published abroad. The draft prepared by the State Chancellery was discussed at five meetings of the Council of Ministers in March of 1906 under the chairmanship of Witte and was completed in a spirit of fortifying conservative principles. Such articles as “the restriction to punish in ways other than the court’s ruling” and “the respected secrecy of private correspondence” were removed, and the tsar’s prerogatives were strengthened. The project and its revisions were discussed at meetings on April 1906 in Tsarskoye Selo under the chairmanship of Tsar Nicholas II. After he approved the new edition of the Fundamental Laws, it was published on May 10 (April 27 O.S.), 1906, the day the State Duma opened. The new edition, containing 223 articles, transformed Russia into a constitutional monarchy.
Whereas the first article of the earlier version of the Fundamental Laws stated that “The Russian emperor is an autocratic monarch with unlimited power,” article 4 now gave the tsar supreme autocratic power. The term “unlimited” was removed, and “autocratic” (samoderzhavnyi) was defined as declaring the independence of the country and the monarch. A special note by the historian Sergei Knazkov proved that the word “autocracy” had been used in this sense during the seventeenth century and had only assumed the meaning of unlimited power during the eighteenth. The new article proclaimed the unity and indivisibility of the Russian Empire. It noted that Finland was an “inseparable part” of Russia, but “was governed by special institutions on the basis of being a special legislative authority.” Russian was declared the official language of the empire, and its use was required in the army, navy, and all state and civil institutions.
FUNDED COMMODITIES
From then on, no law could be passed without the approval of the State Council and the State Duma. Members of the Duma were elected for five years. The State Council and the Duma could legislate on matters not covered by the Fundamental Laws. The chief innovation was the inclusion into the Fundamental Laws of articles that guaranteed identity rights and civil freedoms, specifically the protection of identity and residence, freedom of residence, activity, movement, protection of possessions, freedom of speech, press, unions, assembly, and religion. The declared rights and freedoms did not include Jews, for whom residential restrictions (the Jewish Pale of Settlement) and restrictions on civil service positions still existed.
These concessions notwithstanding, the tsar retained an enormous amount of power. He had the right of the legislative initiative, including the exclusive right to initiate revisions of the Fundamental Laws. Without his approval, laws approved by the legislative chambers could not be passed. Moreover, in emergency situations the tsar could promulgate laws when the Duma was not in session (article 87). These would be nullified, however, unless ratified by the Duma within two months. The tsar had supreme control of the country, including control over foreign policy, the power to declare war and peace, supreme command of the armed forces, the right to mint coins, the appointment and dissolution of the government, and the unlimited right to declare a state of war or emergency. The tsar had power over the Council of Ministers and could hold them accountable.
The State Council and the Duma were to be convened annually. The tsar determined the time span of their yearly activities and the duration of the “holidays” for legislative institutions. He appointed half of the members of the State Council and had the right to dissolve the Duma before the five-year mark. If he did so, he had to announce a date for new elections to the Duma. Nicholas II used this right twice, dissolving the first and second Dumas. In the second case, on June 3 (16), 1907, the electoral law was changed. This was a violation of the Fundamental Laws, because the new electoral law was not presented to the legislative institutions.
Under the second revision of the Fundamental Laws, Russia became a dualistic monarchy (Duma monarchy). See also: DUMA; NICHOLAS II; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; STATE COUNCIL; WITTE, SERGEI YULIEVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ascher, Abraham. (1992). The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Harcave, Sidney, tr. and ed. (1990). The Memoirs of Count Witte. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Mehlinger, Howard D., and Tompson, John M. (1972). Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Szeftel, Marc. (1976). The Russian Constitution of April 23, 1906: Political Institutions of the Duma Monarchy. Brussels: Editions de la Librarie encyclop?dique.
OLEG BUDNITSKII
FUNDED COMMODITIES
Funded commodities were a category of commodities considered so critical to the success of the annual plan that allocation was tightly controlled by Gosplan and the USSR Council of Ministers.
Soviet central planning aspired to comprehensive coverage of the supply and demand of all commodities and services in the economy. As there were millions of transactions in an economy the size of the USSR, this was not a realistic ambition. The system of materials balances was designed to replace market forces of supply and demand in attaining equilibrium in each market. This enormous task was subdivided by category in order to decentralize the burden of achieving balances to various administrative and territorial planning units.
Funded commodities represented a restricted list of critical commodities that were under the direct control and allocation of the Gosplan and required explicit approval by the USSR Council of Ministers. The number of commodities in this category varied considerably over time, reflecting various reorganizations of planning procedures, changes in priorities, and attempts to reform the process. According to Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart, the number of funded commodities varied from 277 in the beginning in 1928 to as many as 2,390. During the 1980s, the number was approximately 2,000. About 75,000 other commodities were also specifically planned and controlled either by Gos-plan in conjunction with various centralized supply organizations, or by the ministries without explicit central oversight. See also: FONDODERZHATELI; GOSPLAN
FYODOR ALEXEYEVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, C. Robert. (1990). Soviet Economic Structure and Performance. New York: HarperCollins. Nove, Alec. (1965). The Soviet Economy, An Introduction, rev. ed. New York: Praeger.
JAMES R. MILLAR
nacharsky, the Soviet commissar of education, and obtained important cultural posts. But by 1930 they had lost influence within the government and within most of the literary community. See also: LUNACHARSKY, ANATOLY VASILIEVICH; MAYA-KOVSKY, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH; OCTOBER REVOLUTION
FUTURISM
A term coined by the Italian poet Filippo Tom-maso Marinetti (1876-1944), Futurism emphasized discarding the static and irrelevant art of the past. It celebrated change, originality, and innovation in culture and society and glorified the new technology of the twentieth century, with emphasis on dynamism, speed, energy, and power. Russian Futurism, founded by Velimir Khlebnikov (1885-1922), a poet and a mystic, and Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893-1930), the leading poet of Russian Revolution of 1917 and of the early Soviet period, went beyond its Italian model with a focus on a revolutionary social and political outlook. In 1912 the Russian Futurists issued the manifesto “A Slap in the Face of Public Taste” that advocated the ideas of Italian futurism and attacked Alexander Pushkin, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, and Leo Tolstoy. With the Revo
lution of 1917, the Russian Futurists attempted to dominate postrevolutionary culture in hopes of creating a new art integrating all aspects of daily life within a vision of total world transformation; artists would respond to a call to transcend and remake reality through a revolutionized aesthetic, to break down the barriers that had heretofore alienated the old art and the old reality. Russian Futurism argued that art, by eliciting predetermined emotions, could organize the will of the masses for action toward desired goals. In 1923 Mayakovsky cofounded with Osip Brik the Dadaistic journal LEF. Soviet avant-garde architects led by Nikolai Ladovsky were also highly influenced by Futurism and the theory that humanity’s “world understanding” becomes a driving force determining human action only when it is fused with world-perception, defined as “the sum of man’s emotional values . . . created by sympathy or revulsion, friendship or animosity, joy or sorrow, fear or courage.” Only by sensing the world through the “feeling of matter” could one understand, and thus be driven to change, the world. The Futurists were initially favored by Anatoly LuBIBLIOGRAPHY Janecek, Gerald. (1996). Zaum: The Transrational Poetry of Russian Futurism. San Diego, CA: San Diego State University Press. Markov, Vladimir. (1968). Russian Futurism: A History. Berkeley: University of California Press.