by James Millar
Although Obruchev’s scheme for a lightning war against Turkey was never realized, he was posted to the Caucasus theater in July 1877, where he successfully planned the rout of the Turkish army. Several months later in the Balkan theater, he devised a plan for winter operations across the Balkan divide that led to Turkish capitulation in early 1878. After Alexander II’s assassination in 1881, Obruchev became War Minister Peter Se-menovich Vannovsky’s chief of the Main Staff. In this capacity Obruchev oversaw the rearmament of the Russian Army, the fortification of the western military frontier, and preparations for a possible amphibious operation against the Bosporus. He assumed an especially important role in working out the Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892. Despite Nicholas II’s inclinations, he opposed Russian military intervention in the Far East during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Obruchev retired from active service in 1897 and died in his wife’s native France in June 1904. An outstanding planner and an adroit soldier-diplomat, Obruchev left his stamp during the last quarter of the nineteenth century on virtually every important facet of Russian preparation for future war. See also: MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; MILYUTIN, DMITRY ALEXEYEVICH; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kennan, George F. (1984). The Fateful Alliance. New York: Pantheon. Rich, David Alan. (1998). The Tsar’s Colonels: Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in Late Imperial Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
OLEG R. AIRAPETOV
OBSHCHINA
Usually translated as “community,” this term refers primarily to a landholding group of peasants in pre-1917 Russia.
Pre-emancipation serfs, in common with state and other nonbound peasants, still had a large degree of freedom to organize their own affairs within the limits of the village itself. The obshchina represents the village as it looked inward-an economic unit based on the land it worked. It differed from what might be called the peasant mir (literally, “world” or “society”), representing the village as it looked outward. The mir assembly carried out the administrative, legal, and fiscal affairs of the village.
While not modern in its outlook, for many, if not most peasants, the obshchina was fairly well suited to carry out the necessary, limited functions of distributing land (and thus taxes and other dues) among people whose society was based largely, though implicitly, on a labor theory of value. The common but not universal obshchina practice of periodic redistribution of land, based on manpower and thus taxpaying ability, gave rise to much discussion among Russian intellectuals. The subject of widespread Romantic, philosophical, religious, economic, and political theorizing throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the real-life obshchina was never the idealized, optimally Christian body of the Slavophiles nor the proto-communist organization of the peasant-oriented revolutionaries known as narodniki (populists). It was often guilty (from majority self-interest) of stymieing rational agrarian practices, but not always the culprit that Marxists blamed for peasant immiserization, socioeconomic inequality, and the obstructed development of a progressive class mentality. Living in an institution with social strengths and some economic weaknesses, most obshchina peasants sought not to maximize earnings or prof-its-as liberal economists would have them-nor
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to escape Marx’s “idiocy of rural life,” but to “sat-isfise” their lives (in H. Simon’s concept), that is, to achieve and maintain a satisfactory standard of living. See also: MIR; PEASANT ECONOMY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bartlett, R., ed. (1990). Land Commune and Peasant Community in Russia. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Mironov, Boris, and Eklof, Ben. (2000). A Social History of Imperial Russia, 1700-1917. Boulder, CO: West-view.
STEVEN A. GRANT
OCCULTISM
Occult books of fortune-telling, dreams, spells, astrology, and speculative mysticism entered medieval Russia as translations of Greek, Byzantine, European, Arabic, and Persian “secret books.” Their prohibition by the Council of a Hundred Chapters (Stoglav) in 1551 enhanced rather than diminished their popularity, and many have circulated into our own day.
The Age of Reason did not extirpate Russia’s occult interests. During the eighteenth century more than 100 occult books were printed, mostly translations of European alchemical, mystical, Masonic, Rosicrucian, and oriental wisdom texts. Many were published by the author and Freemason Nikolai Novikov.
As the nineteenth century began, Tsar Alexander I encouraged Swedenborgians, Freemasons, mystical sectarians, and the questionable “Bible Society,” before suddenly banning occult books and secret societies in 1822. The autocracy and the church countered the occultism and supernatural-ism of German Romanticism with an increasingly restrictive system of church censorship, viewing the occult as “spiritual sedition.”
Nevertheless, Spiritualism managed to penetrate Russia in the late 1850s, introduced by Count Grigory Kushelev-Bezborodko, a friend of Daniel Dunglas Home (1833-1886), the famous medium who gave seances for the court of Alexander II. Their coterie included the writers and philosophers Alexei Tolstoy, Vladimir Soloviev, Vladimir Dal, Alexander Aksakov, and faculty from Moscow and St. Petersburg Universities.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Russia, like Europe, experienced the French “Occult Revival,” a reaction against prevailing scientific positivism. Spiritualism, theosophy, hermeticism, mystery cults, and Freemasonry attracted the interest of upper- and middle-class Russian society and configured decadence and symbolism in the arts.
Theosophy, founded in New York in 1875 by Russian expatriate Elena Blavatsky (1831-1891), was a pseudo-religious, neo-Buddhist movement that claimed to be a “synthesis of Science, Religion, and Philosophy.” It appealed to the god-seeking Russian intelligentsia (including, at various times, Vladimir Soloviev, Max Voloshin, Konstantin Bal-mont, Alexander Skryabin, Maxim Gorky). A Christianized, Western form of theosophy, Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophy, attracted the intellectuals Andrey Bely, Nikolai Berdyayev, and Vyacheslav Ivanov.
Russian Freemasonry revived at the end of the nineteenth century. Masons, Martinists, and Rosi-crucians preceded the mystical sectarian Grigory Rasputin (1872-1916) as “friends” to the court of Tsar Nicholas II. After the Revolution of 1905-1906, Russian Freemasonry became increasingly politicized, eventually playing a role in the events of 1916-1917.
The least documented of Russia’s occult movements was the elitist hermeticism (loosely including philosophical alchemy, gnosticism, kabbalism, mystical Freemasonry, and magic), heir of the Occult Revival. Finally, sensational (or “boulevard”) mysticism was popular among all classes: magic, astrology, Tarot, fortune-telling, dream interpretation, chiromancy, phrenology, witchcraft, hypnotism.
More than forty occult journals and papers and eight hundred books on occultism appeared in Russia between 1881 and 1922, most of them after the censorship-easing Manifesto of October 17, 1905. After the Bolshevik coup, occult societies were proscribed. All were closed by official decree in 1922; in the 1930s those members who had not emigrated or ceased activity were arrested.
In the Soviet Union, occultists and ekstra-sensy existed underground (and occasionally within in the Kremlin walls). The post-1991 period saw the return of theosophy and anthroposophy, shaman1083
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ism, Buddhism, Hare Krishnas, Roerich cults, neo-paganism, the White Brotherhood, UFOlogy, and other occult trends. See also: FREEMASONRY; PAGANSIM; RELIGION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carlson, Maria. (1993). “No Religion Higher Than Truth”: A History of the Theosophical Movement in Russia, 1875-1922. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rosenthal, Bernice Glatzer, ed. (1997). The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
MARIA CARLSON
OCTOBER 1993 EVENTS
During the October 1993 events, Boris Yeltsin’s forcible dissolution of parliament took Russia to the edge of civil war. Seen as decisive and essential by his supporters, the d
issolution was a radically divisive action, the consequences of which continued to reverberate through Russian society in the early twenty-first century.
In 1992 and 1993 a deep divide developed between the executive and legislative branches of government. The root cause of this was President Yeltsin’s decision to adopt a radical economic reform strategy, urged on him by the West, for which he and his government were not able to generate sustained parliamentary support. Faced with resistance from the legislators, Yeltsin made only minimal concessions and on most issues chose to confront them. This subjected Russia’s new political and judicial institutions to strains that they could not adequately handle. In addition, the confrontation became highly personalized, with the principal figures forcefully manipulating institutions to benefit themselves and their causes.
Apart from Yeltsin, key individuals on the executive side of the confrontation were Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. They were the ministers most responsible for launching and implementing the radical economic reforms known as shock therapy. Leading the majority in parliament was its speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, a former ally of Yeltsin and an inexperienced and manipulative politician of high ambition. Over time, he was increasingly joined by Yeltsin’s similarly ambitious and inexperienced vice-president, former air force general Alexander Rutskoi.
On March 20, 1993, Yeltsin made a first attempt to rid himself of parliament’s opposition. Declaring the imposition of emergency rule, he said that henceforth no decisions of the legislature that negated decrees from the executive branch would have juridical force. However, the Constitutional Court ruled his action unconstitutional, some of his ministers declined to back him, and the parliament came close to impeaching him. Yeltsin backed off.
At this time, Khasbulatov and the Constitutional Court’s chairman, Valery Zorkin, separately sought to engage Yeltsin in a compromise resolution of the “dual power” conflict. The proposed basis was the so-called zero option. The centerpiece of this approach was simultaneous early elections to both the presidency and the parliament. However, Yeltsin had no desire to share power sub-stantively, even with a newly elected parliament.
In taking this stance, he sought and obtained the support of Western governments by repeatedly inflating the negligible threat of a communist revanche. He also got some qualified backing from the Russian public, when an April 1993 referendum showed that a small majority of the population trusted him, and an even smaller majority approved of his socioeconomic policies.
On September 21, Yeltsin announced that to resolve the grave political crisis he had signed decree 1400, which annulled the powers of the legislature. Elections would be held on December 12 for a parliament of a new type. And the same day a referendum would be held on a completely new constitution.
In response, the Supreme Soviet immediately voted to impeach Yeltsin and, in accordance with the constitution, to install Vice President Alexander Rutskoi as acting president. Rutskoi proceeded to annul decree 1400 (whereupon Yeltsin annulled Rutskoi’s decree) and precipitously appointed senior ministers of nationalist and communist views to his own government, thus alienating many centrists. On September 23, with pro-government deputies boycotting the proceedings, the congress confirmed Yeltsin’s impeachment by a vote of 636 to 2.
The next ten days were occupied by a war of words between the rival governments, as they
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Pro-Yeltsin soldiers watch the Soviet parliament building as it burns. © PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS sought to build support around Russia, and by official acts of harassment, like switching off the electricity in the parliament’s building, known as “the White House.” Although most Russians remained passive, adopting the attitude “a plague on both your houses,” small groups demonstrated for one or the other camp, or sent messages. According to Yeltsin’s government, 70 percent of the regional soviets supported the parliament. From five locations around Moscow, Kremlin representatives solicited visits from wavering deputies and offered them-if they would change sides-good jobs, cash payments equal to nearly $1,000, and immunity from future prosecution.
On September 27, Yeltsin explicitly rejected the zero option. Three days later the Orthodox patriarch suggested that the church should mediate. The two sides agreed and began talks the next day. However, on October 3, events moved rapidly to their denouement. The exact sequence of events remains murky. A march organized by purported supporters of parliament was mysteriously allowed through a cordon around the White House. Then, apparently, hidden Kremlin snipers fired on it. Then Rutskoi, instead of calling on the crowd to defend the White House, urged it to storm the city hall, the Kremlin, and the Ostankino television center. Thereafter, acts of violence on both sides, and an unexplained episode of the Kremlin not at first defending Ostankino, ensured that events got out of control and many people were killed. Throughout, the Yeltsin team appeared to use cunning methods to create a situation in which it would appear that parliament’s side, not its own, had used violence first.
That night, the Kremlin team, not wanting to order the army in writing to open fire, had great difficulty persuading key military leaders to go take action. However, the next day a light tank bombardment of the White House softened up the by now depleted body of parliamentarians, who soon surrendered. Twenty-seven leaders were arrested, only to be amnestied four months later. According to the Kremlin, a total of 143 people were killed during the confrontation. However, an impartial investigation by the human rights group Memorial gave an estimate of several hundred.
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Over the next three months Yeltsin exercised virtually dictatorial powers. He shut down the Constitutional Court; abolished the entire structure of regional, city, and district legislatures; and banned certain nationalist and communist parties and publications. With minimal public debate, he pushed through a new constitution that was officially approved by referendum on December 12, although widespread charges of falsified results were not answered and the relevant evidence was destroyed. He also broke the promise he gave in September to hold a new presidential election in June 1994, and postponed the event by two years.
Although in September 1993 most of the parliament’s leaders were no less unpopular than Yeltsin and his government, and although Russia would probably have been ruled no better-more likely worse-if they had won, Yeltsin’s resort in October to violence instead of compromise seriously undermined Russia’s infant democracy and the legitimacy of his government. See also: CHUBAIS, ANATOLY BORISOVICH; GAIDAR, YEGOR TIMUROVICH; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; RUTSKOI, ALEXANDER VLADIMIROVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
McFaul, Michael. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Reddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitri. (2001). The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press. Shevtsova, Lilia. (1999). Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Realities. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
PETER REDDAWAY
OCTOBER GENERAL STRIKE OF 1905
The general strike of October was the culminating event of the 1905 Revolution and the most inclusive and consequential of several general strikes that took place in 1905, resulting in the announcement of the Manifesto of October 17. It was initiated first and foremost by workers in larger industrial enterprises, many of whom nursed unsatisfied demands from strikes earlier in the year. Although the ripeness of workers to strike in many diverse working situations across the empire was paramount, the call of the All-Russian Union of Railroad Workers for a national rail strike on October 4 provided a timely impetus. The railroaders’ strike gave them control of Russia’s means of communication, allowing them to spread word of the strike throughout the empire, while their immobilization of rail traffic forcibly idled many trades and industries.
Although workers and the urban publi
c generally found themselves at different stages of organizational and political development in October, a unique synergy arose that stirred them all to greater effort. The spread of the strikes from the generally more unified and mobilized factory workers to artisans, small businesses, and white-collar workers of the city centers lent the October strike its general character and explained its success. In St. Petersburg, the strike’s most important site in terms of its political outcome, the participation of tram drivers, shop clerks, pharmacists, printers, and even insurance, zemstvo, and bank employees, meant that the center of the capital closed down, bringing the strike directly into the lives of most citizens by encompassing the broadest array of occupations and the broadest social spectrum of all the strikes in 1905.
Many of the worker strikes supplemented their factory demands with demands for political rights and liberties, so that the labor strikes blended seamlessly with the broader, ongoing political protests of the democratic opposition. University students in particular, but also secondary schoolers and educated professionals, promoted the strike with gusto and imagination, especially in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other university towns. Students opened their lecture halls to public meetings, where workers met the wider urban public for the first time and where much support for the strike was generated. The volume of this protest gave pause to the police and the government, providing an even greater margin of de facto freedom of speech and assembly. Many craft and service workers took the opportunity to organize their first trade unions. Several political parties, including the Kadet or Constitutional Democratic Party, were organized in this interval. Slower moving populations, such as peasants, soldiers, and policemen, drew inspiration from the widespread protests and began to demand their rights.
The revolutionary organizations prospered from the upsurge of labor militancy in October, recruiting new members and becoming better known among rank-and-file workers. Revolutionary or1086