by James Millar
GREGORY L. FREEZE
RENOVATIONISM See LIVING CHURCH MOVEMENT.
REPIN, ILYA YEFIMOVICH
(1844-1930), Russia’s most celebrated realist painter.
The future master of realism, whose genius with the canvas put him on par with the literary and musical luminaries of Russia’s nineteenth century, Ilya Yefimovich Repin arose from truly inauspicious surroundings. His father, a peasant, was a military colonist in the Ukrainian (then, “Little Russia”) town of Chuguev. His talent manifested itself early, and at age twenty, he entered St. Petersburg’s Academy of Arts. His first major piece, The Raising of Jarius’s Daughter, won him the gold medal in academic competition, and with it, a scholarship to study in France and Italy. Although the Impressionists at that time were beginning their critical reappraisal of representation, Repin remained a realist, although his use of light shows that he did not escape the influence of the new style. Upon his return to Russia, he developed a nationalist strain in his paintings that reflected the political mood of his era. In this work, he connected the realism of style with that of politics, bringing his viewers’ attentions to the arduous circumstances under which so many of their fellow citizens labored, reflected in his first major work beyond the Academy, Barge Haulers on the Volga.
Although Repin was never specifically a political activist, he was nonetheless involved with other artists in challenging the conservative, autocratic status quo. For example, he joined with other painters who, calling themselves the peredvizhniki, or “itinerants,” revolted against the system of patronage in the arts and circulated their works throughout the provinces, bringing art to the emergent middle classes. Moreover, they chose compositions that depicted their surroundings, as opposed to the staid classicism of mythology; Repin shifted from Jarius’s Daughter to Russian legends, exemplified by several versions of Sadko, a popular figure from medieval, merchant Novgorod. More impressive, though, were those among his works that evoked the reality of all aspects of contempo1284
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rary life, from the revolutionary movement to Russia’s colonial enterprise, from The Student-Nihilist to The Zaporozhian Cossacks.
Repin also excelled as a portrait painter because he was able to communicate the psychology of his subjects. For example, his portrait of the tortured Modest Mussorgsky stuns with its ability to bring out varied aspects of the composer’s personality. Repin’s oeuvre includes portraits of most prominent liberals of his era, from Leo Tolstoy to Savva Mamantov, as well as the archconservative Kon-stantin Pobedonostsev. His paintings of historical figures, Ivan the Terrible and His Son Ivan and Tsarevna Sophia Alexeevna in the Novodevichy Convent, likewise stand out for their capacity to evoke the emotional.
Repin returned to the Academy of Arts in 1894, directing a studio there until 1907 and serving briefly as director (1898-1899). In 1900 he moved to an estate in the Finnish village of Kuokalla, outside of St. Petersburg, where a constant stream of visitors engendered a famously stimulating atmosphere. When Finland received its independence from the Russian Empire in 1918, Repin chose to remain there. The reacquisition of Kuokalla by the Soviet army in 1939 resulted in the renaming of the village to “Repino,” a museum to the artist. See also: ACADEMY OF ARTS; NATIONALISM IN THE ARTS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Parker, Fan and Parker, Stephen Jan. (1980). Russia on Canvas: Ilya Repin. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Sternin, Grigorii Iurevich, comp. (1987). Ilya Repin. Leningrad: Aurora Publishers, 1987. Valkenier, Elizabeth Kridl. (1990). Ilya Repin and the World of Russian Art. New York: Columbia University Press.
LOUISE MCREYNOLDS
REPRESSED INFLATION
The Soviet State Price Committee (Goskomtsen) set prices for 27 million products during the post World War II era. It compiled data on the unit labor and capital cost of each good, and added a profit mark up. The resulting prime cost-based prices were supposed to be permanently fixed, but many were revised every decade or so to reflect changes in labor and non-labor input costs. These adjustments should have been small, because the state raised wages gradually, and improved technologies reduced material input costs. Some sectors like machine building, where productivity growth was especially rapid, even reported falling unit input costs, creating a condition called “repressed deflation” during the interval between the establishment of the initial price and its revision. Had the Soviet Union been a competitive market economy, characterized by rapid technological progress and state wage fixing, strong deflationary pressures would have caused prices to fall continuously.
However, many prominent Soviet economists such as Grigoriy Khanin contend that it was inflation, not deflation that was repressed by the Soviet brand of price fixing. They argue that while prices were supposed to be fixed, enterprise managers driven by a desire to maximize bonuses tied to profits, circumvented the authorities, causing intermediate input prices and therefore unit costs to rise. Had the Soviet Union been a competitive market economy, strong cost-push inflationary pressures would have forced prices to steadily rise.
Some Soviet economists, such as Igor Birman, have claimed that repressed inflation was exacerbated by weak monetary discipline and soft budgetary constraints, which allowed firms to spend more than they were authorized. The purchasing power of these offending enterprises, and of the public, therefore exceeded the cost of goods supplied. This created inflationary excess demand that was easily observed in empty shop shelves, rapidly increasing savings deposits, and the public conviction that money was worthless because there weren’t enough things to buy.
The evidence for this position is inconclusive, because goods were often distributed in worker canteens instead of shops, and there could have been many alternative reasons why bank savings rose. Nonetheless, the consensus holds that the USSR was, in some important sense, an economy of shortage, in a state of monetary disequilibrium that subverted effective planning and contributed to the system’s undoing. Although repressed inflation may have seemed innocuous because Soviet growth between 1950 and 1989 was always positive, most specialists consider it to have been an insidious source of destabilization.
Repressed inflation was specific to the Soviet period, and has not carried over into the post-communist epoch, because prices are no longer
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fixed or controlled. Price liberalization produced a bout of hyper-inflation in 1992, only partly explained by the so-called Soviet “ruble overhang,” but the problem subsequently subsided. See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS; MONETARY OVERHANG; RATCHET EFFECT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bornstein, Morris. (October 1978). “The Administration of the Soviet Price System,” Soviet Studies 30(4): 466-490. Grossman, Gregory. (1977). “Price Controls, Incentives and Innovation in the Soviet Economy.” In The Socialist Price Mechanism, ed. Alan Abouchar. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
STEVEN ROSEFIELDE
REVOLUTION OF 1905
The immediate background to the first Russian revolution, which, despite its designation as the “Revolution of 1905,” actually began in 1904 and ended in 1907, was the unexpected and humiliating defeat of Russia by the Japanese. The defeat emboldened the liberals, who in the fall and winter of 1904-1905 unleashed the so-called banquet campaign for constitutional change. Meeting in twenty-six cities, the liberals called for civil liberties, amnesty for political prisoners, and a democratically elected constituent assembly. The banquets were a prelude to the dramatic events of Bloody Sunday (January 9, 1905), when government troops fired on peaceful marchers (organized by Father Gapon, founder of the Assembly of the Russian Factory and Mill Workers of the City of St. Petersburg) who wished to present Tsar Nicholas II (r. 1894-1917) with a petition for political and social reforms similar to those advocated by liberals (significantly, without any demand for abolition of the monarchy or introduction of socialism).
In light of the peaceful tactics and reformist plat
form of the marchers, it is not surprising that the massacre of 130 people and the wounding of some three hundred provoked widespread outrage. Within a few weeks, many industrial workers throughout the empire went on strike to protest the government’s conduct, assuming the role of a viable political force for the first time. Students at universities and high schools followed suit soon afterward, disorders broke out among minorities seeking cultural autonomy and political rights, peasants attacked landlords’ estates, members of the middle class defied governmental restrictions on public meetings and the press, and on several occasions soldiers and sailors mutinied. The entire structure of society appeared on the verge of collapse.
Incapable of coping with the growing unrest, the government alternated between strident assertions of the autocratic principle and vague promises of reform, satisfying no one. The revolution peaked in October, when a general strike, spontaneous and unorganized, brought the government to its knees. Once workers in Moscow walked off their jobs, the strike spread quickly throughout the country, even drawing support from various middle-class groups. Numerous cities came to a standstill. After about ten days, in mid-October, Tsar Nicholas, fearing total collapse of his regime, reluctantly issued the October Manifesto, which promised civil liberties and the establishment of a legislature (duma) with substantial powers. Most significantly, the tsar agreed not to enact any law without the approval of the legislature. In conceding that he was no longer the sole repository of political power, Nicholas did what he had vowed never to do: He abandoned the principle of autocracy.
During the Days of Liberty, the period immediately succeeding the issuance of the October Manifesto, the press could publish whatever it pleased, workers could form trade unions, and political parties could operate freely. It was a great victory for the opposition, but in a matter of days it became evident that the revolutionary crisis had not been overcome. The tsar made every effort to undo his concessions. Large numbers of supporters of the monarchy, enraged at the government’s concessions, violently and indiscriminately attacked Jews and anyone else deemed hostile to the old regime. In the opposition, the St. Petersburg Soviet (council of workers’ deputies) grew increasingly militant. The upshot was that the Days of Liberty came to an end within two months in a torrent of government repression provoked by the uprising of Moscow workers. Led by Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries, this uprising was brutally quashed by the authorities within ten days.
Nevertheless, the elections to the duma took place. On the whole they proceeded fairly, with some twenty to twenty-five million participant voters. To the government’s surprise, the over1286
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Massacre at Tiflis Municipal Council, October 1905. THE ART ARCHIVE/DOMENICA DEL CORRIERE/DAGLI ORTI (A) whelming majority of the elected deputies belonged to opposition parties. The newly formed Octobrist Party, satisfied with the political changes introduced by the October Manifesto, held only thirteen seats; the extreme pro-tsarist right held none. On the other hand, the Kadets, or Constitutional Democrats, who favored a parliamentary system of government, held 185 seats, more than any other
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party, and dominated the proceedings of the legislature. Predictably, relations between the Duma and the government quickly soured because of the legislature’s demands for a constitutional order and for agrarian measures involving compulsory distribution of privately owned land to land-hungry peasants. On July 1906 the government dissolved the Duma. The deputies protested the action at a meeting in Vyborg, Finland, and called for passive resistance, but to no avail. The Second Duma, which met on February 20, 1907, and was more radical than the first, met a similar fate on June 3 of that year. This marked the end of the Revolution of 1905. At this point the authorities changed the electoral law by depriving many peasants and minorities of the vote, ensuring the election of a conservative Duma.
Never before had any European revolution been spearheaded by four popular movements: the middle class, the industrial proletariat, the peasantry, and national minorities (who demanded autonomy or, in a few cases, independence). But because of the disagreements and lack of coordination among the various sectors of the opposition, and because the government could still rely on the military and on financial support from abroad, the tsarist regime survived. Nevertheless, Russia had changed significantly between 1904 and 1907. The very existence of an elected Duma, whose approval was necessary for the enactment of most laws, diminished the power of the tsar and the bureaucracy. The landed gentry, the business class, and the upper stratum of the peasantry, all of whom continued to participate in the elections of the Duma, now exercised some influence in public affairs. Moreover, trade unions and various associations of cooperatives that had been allowed to form during the revolutionary turbulence remained active, and censorship over the press and other publications was much less stringent. In short, Russia had taken a modest step away from autocracy and toward the creation of a civil society. See also: AUTOCRACY; BLOODY SUNDAY; BOLSHEVISM; CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY; DUMA; LIBERALISM; NICHOLAS II; OCTOBER GENERAL STRIKE OF 1905; OCTOBER MANIFESTO; OCTOBRIST PARTY; WORKERS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ascher, Abraham. (1988-92). The Revolution of 1905. 2 vols. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bushnell, John S. (1985). Mutineers and Repression: Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Emmons, Terence. (1983). The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Engelstein, Laura. (1982). Moscow, 1905: Working-Class Organization and Political Conflict. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Harcave, Sidney. (1964). First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905. New York: Macmillan. Mehlinger, Howard D. and Thompson, John M. (1972). Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Sablinsky, Walter. (1976). The Road to Bloody Sunday: Father Gapon and the St. Petersburg Massacre of 1905. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Surh, Gerald D. (1989). 1905 in St. Petersburg: Labor, Society and Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Verner, Andrew M. (1990). The Crisis of Russian Autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
ABRAHAM ASCHER
REYKJAVIK SUMMIT
A summit meeting of U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986. This second meeting of the two leaders was billed as an “interim summit” and was not carefully prepared and scripted in advance as was customary.
The Reykjavik summit unexpectedly became a remarkable far-reaching exploration of possibilities for drastic reduction or even elimination of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev took the initiative, advancing comprehensive proposals dealing with strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Agreement seemed at hand for reductions of at least 50 percent in strategic offensive arms. When Reagan proposed a subsequent elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles, Gorbachev counterproposed eliminating all strategic nuclear weapons. Reagan then said he would be prepared to eliminate all nuclear weapons-and Gorbachev promptly agreed.
This breathtaking prospect was stymied by disagreement over the issue of strategic defenses. As a condition of his agreement on strategic offensive arms, Gorbachev asked that research on ballistic missile defenses be limited to laboratory testing. Reagan was adamant that nothing be done that would prevent pursuit of his Strategic Defense Ini1288
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tiative (SDI). The meeting ended abruptly, with no agreement reached.
Many saw the failure to reach accord as a spectacular missed opportunity, while others were relieved that what they saw as a near disaster had been averted. Subsequent negotiations built on the tentative areas of agreement explored at Reykjavik and led to agreements eliminating all intermediate-range missiles (the INF Treaty in 1987) and reducing intercontinental missiles (the START I Treaty in 1991). Thus, although the Reykjavik summit end
ed in disarray, in retrospect the exchanges there constituted a breakthrough in strategic arms control. See also: ARMS CONTROL; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Garthoff, Raymond L. (1994). The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Shultz, George P. (1993). Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
RIGA, TREATY OF (1921) See SOVIET-POLISH WAR.
RIGHT OPPOSITION
The Right Opposition, sometimes called Right Deviation, represents a moderate strand of Bolshevism that evolved from the New Economic Policy (NEP). Headed by Nikolai Bukharin, the party’s leading theoretician after Vladimir Ilich Lenin’s death, the Right Opposition also included Alexei Rykov, Mikhail Tomsky, Felix Dzerzhinsky, and A. P. Smirnov. In part reacting against the harsh policies of War Communism, the right urged moderation and cooperation with the peasantry to achieve socialism gradually. It favored industrialization, but at a pace determined by the peasantry, and prioritized the development of light industry over heavy industry.
Until early 1928 the platform of the right coincided with the policies of the Soviet government and the Politburo. This is not surprising given that Rykov was chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) from 1924 to 1930, and Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, and their then ally Josef Stalin held a majority in the Politburo until 1926. Participating in the struggles for power following Lenin’s death, the right opposed Leon Trotsky and his policies, as well as Grigory Zi-noviev, Lev Kamenev, and eventually the United Opposition. Toward the end of the 1920s, as Stalin increasingly secured control over the party apparatus, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev were expelled from the Politburo and replaced by Stalin’s handpicked successors, thereby enhancing the position of the right.