by James Millar
The chronicle information about the semi-legendary Rurik has been interpreted in various ways. For example, the so-called Normanists accept the reliability of the chronicle information showing that the Varangians, or Normans, founded the first Russian state, but the so-called Anti-Norman-ists look upon the chronicle reports as unreliable if not fictitious. Some identify Rurik with Rorik of Jutland, who was based in Frisia. Significantly, other written sources and archaeological evidence neither prove nor disprove the chronicle information. See also: KIEVAN RUS; NOVGOROD THE GREAT; RURIKID DYNASTY; VIKINGS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Franklin, Simon, and Shepard, Jonathan. (1996). The Emergence of Rus 750-1200. London: Longman.
MARTIN DIMNIK
RURIKID DYNASTY
Ruling family of Kievan Rus, the northern Rus principalities, and Muscovy from the ninth century to 1598.
The Rurikid dynasty ruled the lands of Rus from the ninth century until 1598. The dynasty was allegedly founded by Rurik. According to an account in the Primary Chronicle he and his brothers, called Varangian Rus, were invited in 862 by East Slav and Finn tribes of northwestern Russia to rule them. Rurik survived his brothers to rule alone a region stretching from his base in Novgorod northward to Beloozero, eastward along the upper Volga and lower Oka Rivers and southward to the West Dvina River. Although it has been postulated that Rurik was actually Rorik of Jutland, there is no scholarly consensus on his identity, and the account of his arrival is often considered semi- legendary. Varangians or Vikings, however, had been operating in the region as adventurers and merchants. The tale of Rurik represents the stabilization and formalization of the relationship between these groups of adventurers and the indigenous populations.
After Rurik died (879), his kinsman Oleg (r. 882-912), acting as regent for Igor, identified as Rurik’s young son, seized control of Kiev (c. 882), located on the Dnieper River. From Kiev, which became the primary seat of the Rurikid princes until the Mongol invasions between 1237 and 1240, Igor (r. 913-945), his widow Olga (r. 945-c. 964), their son Svyatoslav (r. c. 964-972), and his son Vladimir (r. 980-1015), replacing other Varangian and Khazar overlords, subordinated and exacted regular tribute payments from the East Slav tribes on both sides of the Dnieper River and along the upper Volga River. Their strong ties to Byzantium resulted in Prince Vladimir’s conversion of his people to Christianity in 988. The dynasty and the church combined to provide a common identity to the disparate lands and peoples of the emerging state of Kievan Rus.
The Rurikids enlarged Kievan Rus territory and through diplomacy, war, and marriage established
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ties with other countries and royal houses from Scandinavia to France to Byzantium. But the Rurikids themselves were not always unified. Vladimir as well as his son Yaroslav the Wise gained the Kievan throne through fraticidal wars. To avoid further succession struggles, Yaroslav wrote a testament for his sons before he died in 1054. In it he assigned the central princely seat at Kiev to his eldest, surviving son Izyaslav. He gave other towns, which became centers of principalities within Kievan Rus, to his other sons while admonishing them to respect the seniority of their eldest brother.
Although Yaroslav’s testament did not prevent internecine warfare, it established a dynastic realm shared by the princes of the dynasty. Members of each generation succeeded one another by seniority through a hierarchy of princely seats until each in his turn ruled at Kiev. This system, known as the rota or ladder system of succession, functioned imperfectly. Ongoing discord combined with attacks from the Polovtsy (nomads of the steppe, also known as Kipchaks or Cumans) motivated the princes to meet at Lyubech in 1097; they agreed that each branch of the dynasty would rule one of the principalities within Kievan Rus as its patrimonial domain. Kiev alone remained a dynastic possession.
Under this revised method of succession Svy-atopolk Izyaslavich ruled Kiev to 1113. He was succeeded by his cousin, Vladimir Vsevolodich, also known as Vladimir Monomakh (r. 1113-1125), and subsequently by Monomakh’s sons. Although the system brought order to dynastic relations, it also reinforced division among the dynastic branches, which was paralleled by a weakening in the cohesion among the component principalities of Kievan Rus.
By the end of the twelfth century the dynasty had divided into approximately a dozen branches, each ruling its own principality. The princes of four dynastic lines, Vladimir-Suzdal, Volynia, Smolensk, and Chernigov, remained in the Kievan rotational cycle and engaged in fierce competition particularly when the norms of succession were challenged. One campaign, launched by Andrei Bogolyubsky of Vladimir, resulted in the sack of Kiev in 1169. Although fought to defend the traditional succession system, this campaign is often cited as evidence of the fragmentation of the dynasty and Kievan Rus.
When the Mongols invaded and destroyed Kievan Rus, many members of the Rurikid dynasty were killed in battle. Nevertheless, with the approval of their new overlords, surviving princes continued to rule the lands of Rus. By the mid-fourteenth century, however, the dynasty lost possession of Kiev and other western lands to Poland and Lithuania. But in the northeast the princes of Moscow, a branch of the dynasty descended from Vladimir Monomakh’s grandson Vsevolod and his grandson Alexander Nevsky, gained control over the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal. Symbolized by Dmitry Donskoy’s victory at the Battle of Kulikovo (1380), they cast off Mongol suzerainty and expanded their realm to create the state of Muscovy.
The Moscow princes also reordered internal dynastic relations. After an unsuccessful challenge to Basil II (ruled 1425-1462) by his uncle and cousins that resulted in an extended civil war (1430-1453), a vertical pattern of succession firmly replaced the traditional collateral one. Ivan III (ruled 1462-1505), selecting his second son over his grandson (the son of his eldest but deceased son), defined the heir to the Muscovite throne as the eldest surviving son of the ruling prince. Basil III (ruled 1505-1533) divorced his barren wife after a twenty-year marriage in order to remarry and produce a son rather than allow the throne to pass to his brother.
Dynastic reorganization enhanced the power and prestige of the monarchs, who formally adopted the title “tsar” in 1547. But when Fyodor, the son of Ivan IV “the Terrible,” died in 1598, and left no direct heirs, the Rurikids’ seven-century rule came to an end. After a fifteen-year interregnum, known as the Time of Troubles, the Romanov dynasty, related to the Rurikids through Fyodor’s mother, replaced the Rurikid dynasty as the tsars of Russia. See also: ALEXANDER YAROSLAVICH; BASIL I; BASIL II; BASIL III; DONSKOY, DMITRY IVANOVICH; FYODOR IVANO-VICH; IVAN III; IVAN IV; OLEG; OLGA; RURIK; VLADIMIR MONOMAKH; VLADIMIR, ST; VIKINGS; YAROSLAV VLADIMIROVICH; YURY VLADIMIROVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dimnik, Martin. (1978). “Russian Princes and their Identities in the First Half of the Thirteenth Century.” Mediaeval Studies 40:157-185. Kollmann, Nancy Shields. (1990). “Collateral Succession in Kievan Rus.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 14(3/4): 377-387.
JANET MARTIN
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RUSSIA-BELARUS UNION
RUSSIA-BELARUS UNION
Belarus and Russia were constituent republics of the Soviet Union and became independent in 1991, with the collapse of the USSR. Both countries were founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The traditionally close ties between Russia and Belarus and a relatively weak Belarusian national identity led to a drive toward reunification, which started already in the early 1990s. A preliminary agreement (which remained only on paper) on the establishment of a monetary union between Russia and Belarus was negotiated between the end of 1993 and 1994. While the two countries retained their own currencies, the integration process became high on the agenda after Alexander Lukashenko, a supporter of the “unification of all Slavic peoples,” became the new president of Belarus in July 1994.
In April 1996 a “Treaty on Forming a Community” was signed by Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation. The agreement promoted the coordin
ation of the two countries’ foreign and economic policies, created a Supreme Council and an Executive Committee of the community (both with little or no real powers), and led to the establishment of a Russia-Belarus parliamentary assembly. On April 2, 1997, Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed a second treaty establishing a union between Russia and Belarus and pledging further cooperation in the security and economic spheres, reiterating the final goal of creating a single currency. Yeltsin’s resistance, however, prevented the two sides from defining concrete measures strengthening the integration between Russia and Belarus.
The 1996 and 1997 documents had little practical consequences. Russian reformers (some of them close to President Yeltsin) had a lukewarm attitude toward a possible confederation with an increasingly authoritarian Belarus. Another obstacle on the way of integration was the Russian authorities’ concern that creating the union could encourage Russian ethnic republics to seek the same status as Belarus in the new confederation. In Russia the main advocates of integration with Belarus were chiefly found among the nationalists and communists, while the Belarusian opposition continued to regard with suspicion the creation of a Russia-Belarus Union (which for many had an old Soviet flavor). In December 1998 Yeltsin and Lukashenko signed new treaties, including a declaration of unification where the two sides agreed to create in 1999 a union state with a single currency. However, in the following months Russia remained cautious about establishing a confederation with Belarus and opposed the creation of the post of a union president. After long negotiations a new union document was signed in December 1999. Once again, the agreement was of declaratory nature and this time set 2005 as the date for the currency union.
Since Vladimir Putin became Russian president in 2000 no other significant formal or concrete steps had been taken as of 2003 to lead the two countries toward some form of reunification. The Belarusian authoritarian regime and Soviet-style economy continued to represent serious obstacles for the integration of Belarus in a common state with Russia. In 2002 there was a crisis in the relations between the two countries, following Putin’s proposals (rejected by Lukashenko) of de facto incorporating Belarus into the Russian Federation or, alternatively, of creating a form of chiefly economic integration based on the European Union model. Officially the Russia-Belarus monetary union remains scheduled to start in 2005, when Belarus is to adopt the Russian ruble as its legal currency. See also: BELARUS AND BELARUSIANS; COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES; LUKASHENKO, ALEXANDER GRIGORIEVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Drakokhrust, Yuri, and Furman, Dmitri. (2002). “Belarus and Russia: The Game of Virtual Integration.” In Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West, eds. Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. Clem, and Lisbeth L. Tarlow. Cambridge MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University. Marples, David R. (1999). Belarus: A Denationalized Nation. Amsterdam: Harwood. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. (2003). “Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report. Previous Issues.” «www .rferl.org/pbureport/archives.html». Rontoyanni, Clelia. (2002). “Belarus and Russia: Ever Closer Allies?” In The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels, ed. Ann Lewis. London: Federal Trust for Education and Research.
OMER FISHER
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RUSSIA COMPANY
RUSSIA COMPANY
In the early modern period, different branches of international trade were controlled by large groups of merchants linked in a single company with its own charter, monopoly rights, membership, directors, and regulations. The Russia Company (also known as the Muscovy Company), founded in the mid-sixteenth century, was one of many such organizations in England. It was the first company to be organized on a joint-stock basis, thus laying the foundations for one of the most important forms of economic association and investment in the West. In addition, through its discovery of a viable water route to Russia (the White Sea or Archangel route) and its establishment of direct, regular trade with Russia, the Russia Company introduced an important new element into Western international trade and relations in general. Prior to the company’s arrival, Russia’s relations with the West were almost nonexistent. Russia was truly at the far periphery of Europe, both physically and conceptually. The Russia Company’s activities brought Russia into the Western orbit.
The Russia Company’s trade revolved around several key commodities. Its main export to Russia was woolen cloth, the staple of English foreign trade for centuries. Because of its cost, the market for English cloth was largely limited to the elite segments of Russian society, beginning with the tsar’s household. Metals were another important export, particularly from the perspective of Russian state interests. England, a major exporter of metals in this period, appears to have provided mine-deficient Russia with substantial quantities of iron, copper, and lead for use in weapons manufacture. These exports were supplemented by armaments of all kinds. Exports of gold and silver went primarily to the Russian treasury, largely for the purpose of minting the country’s currency. Russian commodities handled by the Russia Company revolved heavily around products needed in the construction, outfitting, and refurbishing of ships (i.e., tar, hemp, flax, cordage, and timber). The key commodity for the Russia Company was cordage (ropes), which it produced on site in Russia. The English navy and shipping industry and other trading companies were important customers for Russian cordage. Besides cordage, the company also traded in fine Russian leather (yufti), tallow, and potash. Russian caviar, already a renowned delicacy in the sixteenth century, was shipped by the company to Italian ports and the Ottoman Empire. According to traditionally accepted views, The Russia Company’s considerable success in Russia in the second half of the sixteenth century was followed by decline to near oblivion by the beginning of the seventeenth century, largely as a result of strong Dutch competition in the Russian market. A comprehensive reexamination of company activities, however, challenges this long-held view, providing evidence of a substantial English presence and trade in Russia into the 1640s, Dutch activities notwithstanding. According to this revised view, the company’s very success in an atmosphere of growing Russian merchant opposition to foreign competition accounts for the abrogation of the company’s trade privileges in Russia in 1646 and its expulsion from the country in 1649, events that brought to an end a historic century of Anglo-Russian trade and relations. See also: CAVIAR; FOREIGN TRADE; MERCHANTS; TRADE ROUTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baron, Samuel H. (1980). “The Muscovy Company, the Muscovite Merchants and the Problem of Reciprocity in Russian Foreign Trade.” Forschungen zur os-teuropa?schen Geschichte 27:133-155. Phipps, Geraldine M. (1983). Sir John Merrick, English Merchant-Diplomat in Seventeenth Century Russia. Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners. Salomon Arel, Maria. (1999). “Masters in Their Own House: The Russian Merchant Elite and Complaints against the English in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century,” Slavonic and East European Review 77:401-47. Willan, Thomas S. (1956). The Early History of the Russia Company, 1553-1603. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
MARIA SALOMON AREL
RUSSIAN ASSOCIATION OF PROLETARIAN WRITERS
Better known for its persecution of other writers than for its own literary efforts, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (Rossysskaya as-sotsiatsia proletarskikh pisatelei-RAPP) played a major role in the politicization of the arts in the Soviet Union. RAPP’s members argued that Soviet literature needed to be proletarian literature (i.e.,
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literature written for, though not necessarily by, members of the working class); all other literature was perceived as anti-Soviet. Therefore RAPP’s leaders claimed that the Communist Party should assist RAPP in establishing the dominance of proletarian literature in the Soviet Union. RAPP reached the height of its power during the Cultural Revolution (1928-1932), and it is often viewed as the epitome of the radical artistic movements that characterized this tumultuous perio
d.
The group, founded in 1922, was known variously as the Octobrists, Young-Guardists, or VAPP (the All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers) until May 1928, when it changed its name to RAPP. Its early membership, drawn mostly from the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) and Proletkult (Proletarian Culture) movement, was disappointed with the Party’s retreat from the radical policies of the civil war period, and wished to bring a militant spirit to the “cultural front.” They issued violent diatribes against non-proletarian writers, particularly the so-called fellow travelers, writers with a sympathetic, but ambivalent, attitude towards the Bolshevik cause.
RAPP’s early petitions for party support led to the Central Committee’s highly ambiguous June 1925 resolution “On the Policy of the Party in the Area of Belles Lettres,” which recognized the importance of proletarian literature, but also called for tolerance of the fellow travelers. This was seen as a relative defeat for RAPP, and the group’s claims were muted over the next two years. In 1927, however, RAPP’s willingness to connect literary debates with ongoing party factional struggles won it the backing of the Stalinist faction of the Central Committee. This backing, which included financial subsidies, allowed RAPP to gain control over major literary journals, to gain influence within the Federation of Soviet Writers, and to expand its membership. By extending political categories of deviation to the arts, RAPP helped to create the crisis atmosphere and militant spirit that facilitated Stalin’s rise to power.
RAPP now championed a poorly developed literary style dubbed “psychological realism” and continued to demand that literature be made accessible to working-class readers. Over the next four years, RAPP used its new powers to continue its campaign against any writer or critic who refused to follow its lead. Many of RAPP’s targets, who included Boris Pilniak, Yevgeny Zamiatin, and Alexei Tolstoy, found it difficult to publish their work under these conditions, and some were fired from their jobs or even arrested; Vladimir Mayakovsky’s 1930 suicide was due in part to RAPP’s persecution. RAPP also became a mass movement during this period, its membership growing to ten thousand, as it promised to mentor worker-writers who were expected to create the literature of the future.