After a brief diversion in which they both spoke in Weimar, Hitler and Goebbels returned to Munich to prepare for the rest of the election campaign. Meanwhile, Magda had followed them there from Berlin.97 It was obvious that Goebbels found it difficult to work effectively in close proximity to the Party leader: “Hitler is always full of new ideas. But around him you can’t concentrate on finer details.”98 On March 13 there was a conference of Gauleiters, where it is clear that Goebbels had to take a certain amount of flak for his propaganda work in the previous weeks.99
Goebbels returned to Munich with Hitler for the Easter break, once more accompanied by Magda. A few days were spent on the Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden, working on the finer points of the propaganda campaign to be employed in contesting the second round of voting. But there was time to relax, too: “In the afternoon the women went for a walk, and Hitler demonstrated his new pistol to us. He’s a very good shot.”100
On March 31 Goebbels was back in Berlin to get the propaganda machine there up and running. He had something special in mind for Hitler: He sent him on a campaign tour by air so that the candidate could appear before mass audiences in three or four cities a day. This “flight over Germany” was hailed by his own propaganda as a triumphal progress, proof of Hitler’s closeness to the people. But in a contest with the octogenarian Hindenburg, it also served to reinforce his image as a “modern” politician embracing technological innovations.101
Goebbels embarked on another campaign tour of his own on April 3. He spoke in Wiesbaden and Frankfurt but was then unexpectedly recalled to Berlin by Hitler. Both spoke at a rally approved on short notice by the authorities—a general ban on demonstrations was in place until April 1—to a crowd of 200,000 in the Lustgarten (Pleasure Garden), then to 50,000 in the Potsdam Stadium, and finally to an audience of 20,000 in the Sportpalast.102 The campaign trail took in Weimar, Jena, and Aachen and then finally led back to Berlin.103
Goebbels’s chief election aim was to “break through into the bourgeois part of the Hindenburg front.” To his Party comrades, he recommended detailed work: “Thus individual units must carefully take soundings from bakers, butchers, grocers, in pubs, etc., to establish who voted for Hindenburg for the above-mentioned reasons.” The Reich propaganda office made templates for posters and leaflets available and published the campaign newspaper The Flamethrower as well as a special anti-Hindenburg leaflet.104
Several factors made it a difficult campaign for the NSDAP. On the eve of the first round of voting, large-scale “maneuvers” by the SA in the greater Berlin area gave rise to rumors of a National Socialist putsch.105 In fact, though, Goebbels warned the Reich Chancellery on election day itself about alleged plans on the part of the “Stennes people” to assassinate Brüning. Goebbels’s move was later interpreted as an attempt to intimidate the Reich chancellor.106 A few days after the election, on March 17, the police undertook a big search operation throughout Prussia aimed at SA and SS units. A ban on National Socialist organizations appeared to be in the offing.107 On March 23 Der Angriff was closed down for a further six days.108 The business of Röhm’s homosexuality was putting an increasing strain on the Party: At the beginning of April Goebbels was clear—“the compromising letters are genuine.”109
Although the NSDAP gained over two million more votes in the second round, Hindenburg won comfortably, with more than 53 percent of the total. Goebbels decided to take a positive view of the outcome, interpreting the defeat as a “springboard for the Prussian election.”110 After 1933, too, despite some objections within the Party, he would follow the same line of constructing his election campaign entirely around the person of Hitler as the recipe for gaining power.111
The fact is that in spring 1932 the majority of Germans were not prepared to subscribe to the Führer myth propagated by the NSDAP. But after 1933, in the heady days of “Führer fever” stoked up by all of the propaganda methods at Goebbels’s disposal, this fact would be forgotten.
THE BAN ON THE SA AND THE PLOT AGAINST BRÜNING
The searches carried out by the police in several SA offices on March 17 revealed some incriminating evidence. Consequently the minister for defense and the interior, Wilhelm Groener, who had thus far argued against a Reich-wide ban on the SA “for defense policy reasons,” dropped his reservations. As Goebbels and other leading Party comrades had expected, the ban came into effect on April 13 at 5 P.M. precisely. The police occupied the meeting places and offices of the SA and the SS and disbanded the organizations. “We have Groener to thank for this,” commented Goebbels. The action was particularly directed at Schleicher and his close NSDAP connections: “[H]e’s completely shaken. That shit Hindenburg.” Needless to say, the SA and the SS got around the ban by continuing their activities in disguised form, for example by starting up sport clubs or hiking associations.112
Despite the ban, in the Prussian Landtag election on April 24, 1932, the NSDAP once again achieved an outstanding result, lifting its share of the vote from 1.8 percent (1928) to 36.3 percent to become the strongest party in Prussia. But owing to the poor showing of the other right-wing parties, there was no prospect of forming a government with them.
In Bavaria, Württemberg, and Hamburg, the NSDAP achieved similar results—and faced the same dilemma. Only in Anhalt, aided by other parties of the right, did it represent a parliamentary majority able to form a government. It was not the case, therefore, that the NSDAP’s sensational election results betokened a political turning point in the individual states. “Something’s got to happen. We’ve got to get into power. Otherwise our victories will be the death of us,” was Goebbels’s commentary.113 He too had gotten the point: By themselves the NSDAP would never gain power, either through elections or through threatening SA marches. The cabinet lists discussed by Goebbels with Hitler and other leading National Socialists—featuring Goebbels himself as a possible Prussian minister of the interior, an idea to which he was gradually warming—had now become redundant.114 Furthermore, the NSDAP’s results in Berlin were considerably below those of the Party in the Reich as a whole.115
With the “Harzburg Front,” the alliance of the NSDAP, the DNVP, and the Stahlhelm, failing to function in the presidential election—the Stahlhelm and the DNVP had not been able to bring themselves to support Hitler in the second round—the only realistic prospect of gaining power lay in collaboration with the Center Party: “Nothing can be done without the Center Party. Neither in Prussia nor in the Reich.”116
The diary entry of April 27 marks a striking turning point for Goebbels. Whereas in previous years he had always asserted his opposition to any cooperation with the ultra-conservatives that would dilute NSDAP policy, he was now ready to enter into an alliance with the moderate Center Party, of all parties, a staunch pillar of the hated Republic’s constitution. Goebbels, previously always eager to put himself forward as spokesman of the “revolutionary” tendency in the NSDAP, finally fell into line behind Hitler’s tactically oriented policy of negotiation. This policy seemed to yield immediate success: The Berlin SA leader Helldorf told Goebbels that he had learned from a discussion with Schleicher that the general was ready for a “change of approach”: “Under pressure from him, the Center Party is said to have become compliant. Negotiations in the Reich too. Tolerate the Center Party in Prussia.” Schleicher wanted to work with Goebbels, rather than with Strasser and Göring, as Goebbels noted with much satisfaction. Two days later Schleicher received Hitler. Goebbels was told later by Helldorf, who was allowed to accompany Hitler, that the Party leader had “reached an agreement” with Schleicher.117
The plot envisaged a role for the Center Party, but not for Chancellor Brüning, and Schleicher set the ball rolling correspondingly. On the night of May 2–3 he informed Brüning about the putative right-wing solution for Prussia and the Reich he had discussed with the NSDAP leadership. When Brüning replied that he wanted to remain in office as chancellor until his Versailles revision policy had been safely passed, Schleich
er told him plainly that he did not support such a position.118
On May 5, while Goebbels and Magda happened to be visiting Hitler in Berchtesgaden, it was announced that the economics minister, Hermann Warmbold, had stepped down. Goebbels’s diary entry makes it clear that this resignation was substantially due to the dismantling of the Brüning government that Schleicher had begun in the last few days: “Schleicher has detonated the bomb.”119
Goebbels immediately left for Berlin, where on May 7, accompanied by Röhm and Helldorf (both having liaised with Schleicher), Hitler met with Schleicher; the president’s state secretary, Otto Meissner; and Hindenburg’s son and adjutant, Oskar. Goebbels was informed at first hand after the return of the trio: “Brüning is to fall this week. The old man will withdraw his support from him. Schleicher is pressing strongly for it. […] Then there’ll be a presidential cabinet. Reichstag dissolved. The restraining legislation falls. We are free to agitate and deliver our masterstroke.”120
Goebbels’s entry makes plain the role envisaged for the NSDAP in Schleicher’s calculation: It was supposed to tolerate the new government in return for the lifting of the ban on uniforms and the prospect of new elections. In view of the strong performances of the NSDAP in the various states, these concessions were likely to make the NSDAP the biggest party in Parliament.
Finally, the National Socialist leadership contacted Schleicher the same evening by telephone and arranged with him that Brüning’s downfall should be speeded up so that he would not have time to put a vote of confidence to the Reichstag. It was agreed that Hitler should leave Berlin in order to avoid speculation about the background of the imminent toppling of the chancellor. The Severin estate seemed a suitable retreat, and Goebbels, Magda, Hitler, Harald, and a few attendants made their way there the same evening. The following day they held discussions about organizing the next election campaign.121
On May 12 Goebbels participated in a Reichstag session which took a sensational turn: After a group of National Socialist members had beaten up the journalist Helmuth Klotz—the former National Socialist, who had switched to the SPD, had published the incriminating Röhm letters—in the Reichstag restaurant, Paul Löbe, president of the Reichstag, alerted the police and had four NSDAP members removed from the session. When the latter refused to leave the building, a police squad led by Deputy Police Commissioner Bernhard Weiss arrived to arrest the four. The NSDAP benches erupted, and amid the howling of the NSDAP faction Goebbels could be heard saying: “That Jewish swine, Weiss, comes in here provoking us with his presence.” The session was abandoned, and Parliament adjourned until June.122
Groener resigned as defense minister the same day. Goebbels registered this as “a success for Schleicher,” who had indeed put Groener under enormous pressure.123 The next day, after Helldorf had visited Schleicher, he noted: “The crisis continues according to plan. That’s good!”124
THE FALL OF BRÜNING
On May 18 and 19, Werner von Alvensleben, a close confidant of Schleicher’s, provided Goebbels with further information about the increasing isolation of Brüning engineered by Schleicher.125 This is how he learned on May 24 of the chancellor’s imminent fall: “Schleicher is doing good work. Alvensleben has his list of ministers: Chancellor v. Papen, Foreign [Konstantin von] Neurath.” However, there were two points that meant more to Goebbels than these appointments: new elections and the prospect of forming a coalition with the Center Party, the prize held out to the NSDAP in return for tolerating the new government.126
Schleicher’s candidate, Franz von Papen, was scarcely known to the public at large. The conservative estate owner from Westphalia, a diplomat and officer under the Kaiser, was a rather inconspicuous Center Party backbencher who also chaired the board of the party newspaper Germania. His combination of a highly conservative outlook, aristocratic origins, a career history appropriate to his class, and membership in the Catholic Center Party all led Schleicher to believe that von Papen was the right man to present to Hindenburg as Brüning’s successor.
In accordance with the calculations made by Schleicher, Hindenburg informed Brüning at this time, through his state secretary, Otto Meissner, that he was aiming for a more right-wing government tolerated as much as possible by the National Socialists, whose participation in a Prussian government he thought desirable.127
While Schleicher continued to work for Brüning to be replaced, on May 25 Goebbels participated in the inaugural meeting of the newly elected Prussian Landtag. Thanks to Center Party abstentions, the NSDAP managed to get its representative Hanns Kerrl elected president of the Parliament; otherwise, however, no progress was made toward brown (Nazi)–black (Center Party) cooperation in Parliament. On this day in the Prussian Landtag, there were violent disturbances as well. After a dispute with the communists, the NSDAP members brawled, rapidly emptying the chamber. “Briefly but boldly, with inkwells and chairs,” observed Goebbels, with barely suppressed pride: “The Party members were singing the Horst Wessel song. 8 badly injured from different parties. That was a warning example. Creates respect.”128
The next day he left for a campaigning trip to Oldenburg, where on May 29 Landtag elections were likewise due to be held. En route, he met up with Hitler, who told him that Brüning’s political fate was to be decided on the following Sunday.129 Once again Hitler turned out to be extremely well informed: On Sunday May 29 the president received Brüning and told him, much to the chancellor’s surprise, that he did not intend to issue any further emergency decrees on behalf of the Brüning government. Since this was tantamount to completely demolishing the legitimacy of his government, Brüning was left with no choice but to offer the resignation of his cabinet.130
The final spur for Hindenburg’s decision to withdraw his support from Brüning completely was the chancellor’s proposal to oblige owners of bankrupt estates in eastern Germany to auction them off for resettlement.131 Spokesmen for the Reichslandbund and the DNVP had made forceful representations to Hindenburg over the previous few days, and as a landowner himself he had no taste whatsoever for his chancellor’s “Bolshevist agrarian” line. “The bomb went off yesterday,” noted Goebbels on Brüning’s resignation.132 His euphoria was understandably heightened by the fact that the day before the NSDAP had gained an absolute majority of seats in the Oldenburg elections.133
On May 30 Hitler was already in discussions with Hindenburg, the result of which Hitler passed on to leading Party comrades in Goebbels’s apartment: “Ban on SA dropped. Uniforms permitted and Reichstag dissolved. That’s the most important thing. Everything else will sort itself out. Von Papen is the man. That’s not important either. Voting, voting! Get to the people!”134 The next day, as Goebbels was informed by Hitler, von Papen confirmed the new arrangements.135
REICHSTAG ELECTIONS IN JULY 1932
The von Papen government, composed predominantly of aristocratic, ultra-conservative ministers, had the weakest conceivable power base in the Reichstag. On account of all the intrigue leading to Brüning’s downfall, von Papen’s own party, the Center Party, had withdrawn all cooperation from the chancellor, and von Papen—who had originally accepted the chancellorship with the full confidence that he would have the support of the Center Party—had resigned from the party. He could survive in Parliament only with the support of the NSDAP. Relying on a vague pledge of backing from Hitler, Hindenburg and von Papen accepted with equanimity the increased share of the vote the National Socialists were expected to gain in the new Reichstag elections.136 But in the meantime, for the NSDAP the case was much altered. By breaking with the Center Party, the chancellor had in their eyes lost much of his value.
Meanwhile, Hitler and Goebbels were keeping election appointments in Mecklenburg, where voting was to take place on June 5. Both stayed for some days in secluded Severin, where on the first evening there was a heated debate about the form of a future state, which shows the extent to which Hitler—in keeping with his potential right-wing partners—was still toying with the
idea of restoring the monarchy after seizing power: “Hitler is in favor of a reformed monarchy. I am too. But we don’t have to select Auwi [August Wilhelm, the fourth son of the last German Kaiser] right away as protector of the Reich. […] Hitler overestimates the people’s promonarchy instincts. Thinks he would be defeated in a contest between Hitler and the Crown Prince. Impossible!”137
On Friday June 3 Hitler had a meeting with Schleicher. Immediately afterward, he came back to Severin and reported to Goebbels: “Reichstag is being dissolved immediately. SA ban lifted.”138 The next day the president proclaimed the dissolution and announced July 31, 1932, as the date for new elections.139
Negotiations were going on at the same time concerning the next steps in Prussia. At the top of the agenda was the possible participation of the NSDAP in a coalition government or at least a promise of parliamentary acquiescence. The previous autumn, Schleicher had already been contemplating an alternative solution, the appointment of a governor for Prussia by the Reich government, which now, with the Center Party having lost its old function of linking Prussia and the Reich by virtue of being the ruling party in both parliaments, was on the table again. Goebbels favored this solution.
On the evening of June 4 Hitler telephoned Schleicher from Severin. Goebbels noted: “Prussia question still not settled. Governor or prime minister from us.” One thing was definite, however: “No Bavarian and no Protestant.” This ruled out Gregor Strasser.140 In the next few days, Goebbels found himself strengthened in his opinion that the chance of governing in Prussia should be turned down unless the same could be achieved in the Reich: “We’re remaining in opposition until we have complete power, so that we have complete freedom of action. I talked to Hitler by phone: He fully agrees with me.”141 In the following days Goebbels published two articles in Der Angriff placing the von Papen cabinet firmly at arm’s length.142
Goebbels: A Biography Page 23