January 13, 1935, was the date set for a plebiscite in the Saar territory (mandated to the League of Nations by the Versailles Treaty) to decide its future: annexation by Germany, annexation by France, or an independent political entity? Naturally, the Propaganda Ministry had thrown everything into the campaign effort. While the Nazi “German Front,” with huge support from the Propaganda Ministry and other German sources, almost completely dominated the campaign in this tiny area of just 800,000 inhabitants, in the southwest of the Reich, in Trier, Koblenz, and other places, mass rallies were held to back the annexation of the Saarland by Germany. Goebbels himself had spoken at several events.2
Ten days before the vote, a meeting of the “German leadership” was convened in the Berlin State Opera, to which cabinet members, Gauleiters and NSDAP Reich leaders, other top officials of the Party, and high-ranking military personnel were invited. This hastily summoned gathering was a response, on the part of a regime that was evidently rattled, to proliferating rumors of divisions within the government, indeed of an imminent domestic political settling of scores comparable to June 30, 1934.3 After Hess had opened this memorable occasion with a “declaration of loyalty” on behalf of all present, Hitler gave an hour-long speech in which he called for unity, particularly in view of the forthcoming Saarland plebiscite. In conclusion, Göring read out a “loyal address,” which, as its co-author Goebbels recorded, was “received with cheers.”4
An entry the next day in Goebbels’s diary, about a conversation with Hitler, bears witness to the regime’s deep insecurity, which had motivated the dictator to stage such an overt demonstration of the alleged unity of his administration: “After the Saar we’ll be facing extortion from Paris. 1935 another tough year. Keep nerve.”5
On the morning of January 15, two days after the plebiscite ballot on January 13, the preliminary results were announced, indicating an overwhelming victory. Almost 91 percent of the population had voted for the Saar to join the German Reich. Goebbels then gave the signal for celebrations throughout Germany: “In a few minutes the entire country covered in flags. It’s beyond description. Triumph of patriotism!”6
Goebbels had issued the call for flags everywhere that morning on the radio and in the press. In addition, between 12 and 1 o’clock the bells of every church in Germany were to be rung; by order of the education minister a school holiday was also declared. In his capacity as head of propaganda for the Reich, Goebbels ordered that “between about 19 and 21 hours today, Tuesday, January 15, the population will spontaneously [sic] attend mass rallies to celebrate victory in the Saar.”7
In the days that followed, Goebbels had the opportunity to discuss the diplomatic situation with Hitler in depth, as for example on January 20: “Big project re: England. Protection of the Empire, therefore 30-year alliance. Still in progress. He’s working hard on it.” And on Hitler’s view of the situation, he noted: “Poland will stand solidly with us. France and England are getting ready for extortion. But we will stay tough.”
A few days later, during a train journey, Hitler informed him about a visit by the pacifist British politician Clifford Allen, which had just taken place: “The English are having political trouble domestically. That is to our advantage. The Führer hopes to have them in an alliance in 4 years’ time: us superior on land, them at sea, parity in the air. This offer made an impression. Well, we can only wait and rearm.”8
Goebbels was pleased at the outcome of Franco-British discussions at the beginning of February in London: There were proposals for an international air pact and for the replacement of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty by an international arms agreement. And in fact, in the middle of the month the Reich government reacted for the most part positively to the proposals.9 Foreign Secretary Simon and Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden were invited to talks in Berlin for March 7. But when in early March the British government published a “nasty white paper on German rearmament”—as Goebbels put it—“the Führer became hoarse and canceled the English visit.”10 On Goebbels’s advice, Hitler abstained from all official business in the following weeks, went to Bavaria, and recovered from his sore throat in Wiesbaden. It had actually been more than a mere diplomatic indisposition.11 In the end it was agreed that the British visit to Berlin should take place at the end of the month.
The self-assurance of the head of state was boosted not least by the “liberation festivities” that had celebrated the annexation of the Saar on March 1. Goebbels had insisted on personally overseeing the final preparations for the main rally in Saarbrücken. The annexation was officially completed with the ceremonial hoisting of the swastika flag in Saarbrücken; howling sirens throughout the Reich; and the official handover of authority in Saarbrücken Town Hall to the Reich governor, Gauleiter Josef Bürckel, who was responsible for incorporating the Saarland into the Reich. In Saarbrücken, Hess, Goebbels, Bürckel, and finally Hitler all gave speeches that were broadcast across Germany. In his address, Goebbels called the Saar population “soldiers of peace” and said that the vote gave Hitler the opportunity “to shape this declaration into the basis of a new European understanding and a better order in Europe.”12
In an interview for the Daily Mail on March 10 Göring revealed, more or less in passing, the existence of a new German air force—another breach of the Versailles Treaty. Goebbels’s reaction to this news was conspicuously relaxed. He had little choice, since Göring had obviously given him no opportunity in advance to devise a propaganda presentation of the move. So, on the afternoon of the day when Göring’s interview appeared in the German press, Goebbels decided to take the day off and visit the Berlin Boat Show, where he viewed a motorboat he was thinking of buying.13
Equally unexpected for Goebbels was the announcement Hitler made to him three days later. The Führer had decided to introduce universal conscription. Hitler justified his decision by saying that he wanted to create a fait accompli before the visit by the British delegation later in March.14 In an editorial in Der Angriff, titled “Clarity and Logic,” Goebbels praised this violation of the Versailles Treaty—which became law on March 1615—as an “open and unrestrained presentation of German intentions,” representing, as such, an “element of reassurance” meant to further the preservation of peace.16
No serious repercussions for the regime stemmed from this move.17 On March 24 Simon and Eden arrived in Berlin as planned, to spend the next two days—though without managing to extract any promises from the German leadership—discussing with Hitler the topic of arms limitation and the possible inclusion of Germany in international treaty agreements. Goebbels was told retrospectively by Hitler about the most important results of these talks; he himself took no part in the visit except to arrange the accompanying social agenda.18
After the British visit, Goebbels went over various aspects of the foreign relations situation with Hitler. He thought Mussolini was bluffing when he said, as reported by Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell, that he believed war was inevitable, but in Goebbels’s estimation there was a danger that “the ball might be set rolling by some sudden stupid action.”19 Hitler, stated Goebbels, did not believe in a war, either, but “if it should happen, it would be dreadful,” because Germany had very limited stocks of raw materials.20 When the Italian, French, and British heads of government declared in Stresa in the middle of April that they would “oppose with all appropriate means the unilateral cancellation of treaties,” Goebbels was unconcerned: “We don’t care, as long as they don’t attack us. Just keep on rearming.”21 He was equally relaxed in his comment on a further reaction to Germany’s remilitarizing policy, the signing of a Franco-Soviet military pact on May 2, 1935: In his view it was nothing more than a “legal anomaly.”22
DISAPPOINTMENT
At the beginning of April Goebbels flew to the Danzig Free State to support the Danzig election campaign by attending a mass rally of the local Nazi Party, for which sixty thousand people turned out.23
But it was a great disappoin
tment to find that the outcome of the Danzig election on April 7 was nowhere near the high level of approval the NSDAP now routinely expected in the Reich. The election target announced beforehand was a majority of two thirds, but the NSDAP gained only 59.3 percent of the vote. Only with some difficulty was Goebbels able to restrain Gauleiter Albert Forster from announcing a result of 67 percent on the radio. “We’re all very disappointed. People have become quite sullen here and there. We’ve got to pull ourselves together. We’ve played too well and too often on the ‘soul of the Volk.’ Less pomp and speeches, more simplicity and work.”
But things were to get even worse: The opposition contested the result. However, the League of Nations could not bring itself to revoke the election, despite the Danzig High Court’s finding of wide-scale manipulation. While funding from the Reich had enabled the NSDAP to mount a comprehensive campaign, the opposition parties’ campaigns—the Communist Party had been banned since 1934—had been largely suppressed. They had scarcely been able to hold public meetings; press bans were in place; and the authorities had massively favored the NSDAP in other ways. Finally, there was the outright falsification of results, particularly in rural areas. The court, under great pressure from the Nazi local government, did not propose that the election should be held again, but it did retroactively reduce the NSDAP’s share of the vote. What is more, its sober findings brought to light the terror tactics and manipulation employed by the Danzig Nazis, thus giving a glimpse of the reality behind the facade of the supposedly irresistible and unstoppable process of mobilizing mass sentiments by National Socialism.24
It should be borne in mind that the NSDAP in the Danzig Free State, despite huge interference in the democratic voting process, had only managed an increase of nine points on its above-average result of 50.1 percent in 1933. Taking the manipulation into account, this means that the Party enjoyed scarcely more support from the voters than in 1933, arguably less. The judicial exposure of the extensive manipulations in Danzig also throws light on the state of affairs in the Reich. If we take Danzig as a model, it becomes clear that the much-vaunted solidarity of the “national community” was to a very large extent an illusion created by the regime, produced by the celebrations, orgies of flag-flying, and mass marches decreed by Goebbels and reinforced by the everyday use of intimidation and terror on the part of the regime. This is all the more evident when we take into account that both terror and propaganda were even less constrained in the Reich than in the “Free State” on the Baltic.
It is not really surprising that the NSDAP had not succeeded by 1935 in raising its standing with the public. For by that date the regime had not actually achieved any grand-scale successes. Internationally, despite some important progress, the Reich was as isolated as ever; the economic upturn had certainly had a beneficial effect on employment, but the financial circumstances of most Germans were just as modest as before. In addition, there were several negative factors: the anticlerical policy; the aggressive attitude toward “reactionaries,” that is to say, that section of the population that voted for the nationalist parties; the terror tactics used against political opponents and other undesirables; and the arbitrary, self-important, and officious manner of many Party functionaries toward their fellow citizens. At the same time, the euphoric honeymoon period of the early days was a thing of the past.25
Goebbels had his eye on this uncertain public mood in spring 1935, when he became preoccupied with another great event. “Göring is marrying Frau Sonnemann on April 11,” wrote Goebbels in his diary in March, adding with a sigh: “Why should he have it better than me.”26 Actually there had been a long-term relaxation in Goebbels’s relationship with Göring. After Goebbels, on Hitler’s recommendation, had included some praise of Göring in his Kaiserhof book, Göring approached him in June 1934 to make “a renewed offer of friendship.”27 Yet now, in April 1935, he took a somewhat jaundiced view of the ostentatious wedding planned by Göring and the actress Emmy Sonnemann: He feared that “this will do us no good at all among the little people.”28 The great day finally came: He and Magda took part in the solemnities in Berlin Cathedral as well as the banquet in the Kaiserhof to follow: “7 courses. Uplifting sight for the hungry. Best forget it.”29
SPRING 1935: FIRST STEPS TO END INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION
When Marshal Józef Piłsudski—the man whose authoritarian regime had ruled Poland since 1926 and who was responsible for the rapprochement with Nazi Germany since 1934—died on May 12, 1935, Goebbels was highly alarmed: “Poland is losing its best man, and we’re losing the most important figure in the great game.”30 On May 13 he talked to Hitler about the situation arising from Piłsudski’s death,31 and the two men continued the debate the next day, this time accompanied by Göring and by Hitler’s foreign policy adviser Joachim von Ribbentrop (whom Goebbels did not rate highly):32 “Poland decisive. Year 1936 and especially 1937 dangerous. We prepare for all eventualities. For most extreme possibility, too. Rearm, rearm!”33 These remarks show how unstable Germany’s foreign policy situation seemed to the leading figures of the regime in spring 1935. They were somewhat reassured when Göring returned from the funeral ceremony in Warsaw to report that Józef Beck, now securely ensconced in office, had promised him that “Poland would stand by its treaty with us.”34
There was another glimmer of hope, too, as Goebbels discovered from a conversation with Hitler on May 14: “Mussolini seems to be getting entangled in Abyssinia. […] Looking to us for friendship again.”35 Mussolini’s unmistakable preparations for war against Abyssinia led to increasing friction abroad and, eventually, to a huge international crisis in the summer.36 The Nazi regime, of course, wanted to exploit the situation to break out of the foreign policy isolation of the Third Reich: To this end, the German press was repeatedly warned as early as February 1935 not to criticize Italy’s Abyssinian policy.37
Noting the increasing divisions between Italy and the two other big European powers, Hitler decided in May to take the foreign policy initiative. On May 21 he gave a speech in the Reichstag that German propaganda represented as a “speech for peace.”38 A significant point in the address was Hitler’s promise to preserve the territorial integrity of Austria, which the Italians had long angled for. Mussolini was quick to respond in a friendly manner to this gesture, broaching with the German ambassador the possibility of a German-Italian understanding.39 On May 25 Goebbels directed the press “in future and in all areas to avoid any kind of friction with Italy.”40
Aside from this, Hitler’s speech contained in particular an offer to Britain to negotiate. Among other things, Hitler declared that Germany would agree to limit its naval tonnage to 35 percent of British capacity. At the same time, Hitler used the speech to launch an attack on France, openly stating that his western neighbor was endangering the future of the Locarno Treaties by its military alliance with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he did not hold back when questioning the demilitarization of the Rhineland. The “speech for peace” was therefore in reality an obvious attempt at splitting the “Stresa Front.” Among the audience, Reichstag member Joseph Goebbels listened reverently to the words of his leader: “Our national destiny rests in good hands.”
Goebbels’s diary also establishes that he was not involved in preparations for the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, signed on June 18. On June 4, the day when Hitler’s newly appointed ambassador-at-large, Joachim von Ribbentrop, opened the negotiations in London, there is a first, very brief mention of the pact.41 However, in the preceding weeks, when Hitler frequently discussed the foreign affairs situation with him, and in particular Germany’s relationship with Britain, he does not seem to have raised the naval question in his presence.42 Hitler did not touch on the subject until the negotiations were completed: “As I arrive at the Führer’s office, Naval Agreement just signed in London. Führer very happy. Big success for Ribbentrop and all of us.”43
When Goebbels writes triumphantly about this conversation, “We move closer to the goal: fri
endship with England,” he reveals a basic misreading on the part of the German leadership of the British negotiators’ motives for signing the agreement. The goal of achieving a close bilateral alliance with Hitler’s partner of choice, Great Britain, was in fact not any nearer. The British side saw the treaty with Germany not as a move away from a multilateral system of security but as a first step toward tying Germany once more into a collective European security nexus. Dividing the spheres of interest into a colonial British empire, on the one hand, and German hegemony over the European continent on the other, was not on the agenda as far as the British were concerned. Hitler was as deeply mired in this misconception as his ambassador-at-large and his propaganda minister, and they never tired of compounding one another’s errors in this regard. “Within 5 years,” held Goebbels with respect to Anglo-German relations, “an alliance must be in place.”44
FROM RIOTS ON THE KURFÜRSTENDAMM TO THE NUREMBERG RACE LAWS
At the beginning of June, the Goebbels family left for a vacation, once more in the Baltic resort of Heiligendamm.45 The break gave Goebbels the rare opportunity to become more intensively involved in Helga’s education as a father. When she occasionally became cheeky, he applied what he thought was the best possible corrective: “Sometimes she gets a spanking. But then she behaves herself again.”46 A few weeks later he records that after a few “strokes” Helga was “a model of charm and friendliness.”47
Goebbels: A Biography Page 37