Goebbels had great hopes of the policy of Octavian Goga, elected prime minister of Romania in December, who during his short term in office was to try to introduce an authoritarian, pro-German, anti-Semitic line.24 When this experiment failed—Goga resigned in February 1938—Goebbels naturally inferred “pressure from the Jews.”25 The propaganda minister took comfort from the thought: “How good it is that we have the people behind us and we’re tough with the Jews. First you have to knock their back teeth out, then negotiate.”26
RESHUFFLING THE STAFF
As head of the Propaganda Ministry, Goebbels developed a leadership style entirely in keeping with his egomaniacal personality structure. The activities of the ministry were supposed to reflect his genius. His sudden brainwaves and changes of course, his direct interventions in departmental work, and his shifting allegiance to different senior colleagues all contributed to an atmosphere of unpredictability and constant turbulence in the building. This suited Goebbels. In a rare moment of self-criticism, he said about his own attitude in the autumn of 1937: “The same old trouble: If I don’t do everything myself, I’m pleased when things go wrong.”27
Goebbels was not only a dedicated and tireless worker, he was also a difficult and unpleasant boss to work for: He loved making coarse jokes at the expense of his underlings and humiliating them in the office;28 hardly any of his senior colleagues escaped his biting and savage criticism, which often hit them completely out of the blue. His dissatisfaction with his colleagues reached its peak in March 1937; they should “spend a few months in the trenches, so as not to lose the smell of the masses in their nostrils.”29 For this purpose he dispatched a large number of senior staff to companies where they had to sign on as laborers, a move he made sure was reported in the press.30 It is no surprise that his ministry—aside from the actual administration, where he depended on bureaucratically trained personnel—was not exactly known for the continuity of its staffing. “Geniuses consume people,” as he wrote in his novel Michael.31
As the transition to an accelerated policy of rearmament and expansion in autumn 1937 kicked off an extensive reshuffle within the regime, Goebbels’s sector took on a leading role. When Reich economics minister Schacht declined to go on accepting responsibility for the risky foreign exchange policy resulting from the breakneck speed of German rearmament, the question of his successor became urgent.32 Goebbels recommended his state secretary, Walther Funk, for the job. He imagined that Funk “would still be available to him” where “economic matters” were concerned; in other words, he expected to be able to exercise a certain amount of influence over the new minister of economics.33
Having been reluctant at first to let Schacht go, Hitler took up Goebbels’s recommendation in November, although the arrangements for the succession would not go into effect until the New Year.34 Nonetheless, Goebbels set about reorganizing the top ranks of his ministry immediately. Funk left the Propaganda Ministry, to be replaced by Goebbels’s personal adviser Karl Hanke. Otto Dietrich, Reich press chief of the NSDAP, became Goebbels’s second state secretary.35 Apart from the changes at the top of the organization, there were a few other new appointments: Werner Naumann, head of the Party’s Reich propaganda office in Breslau, became his new personal adviser; Ernst Leichtenstern took over the film department; and Franz Hofmann, as noted earlier, became responsible for fine art.36 There was a newly created Department for Special Cultural Affairs, whose duties included specifically the “de-jewifying” of German cultural life.37 In the propaganda department, Leopold Gutterer replaced the incumbent head of the department, Wilhelm Haegert, with whom Goebbels had become increasingly dissatisfied.38 Following a suggestion from Otto Dietrich, the press department, now directed by the latter, was divided into separate sections for home and abroad.39
All in all, the ministry now consisted of fourteen departments. In addition to the specializations already noted (propaganda, home and foreign press, film, fine art, literature, special cultural affairs), there were foreign propaganda (under Franz Hasenöhrl, as before), broadcasting (Hans Kriegler), theater (Rainer Schlösser), and music (Heinz Drewes). The relatively large number of departments suited Goebbels’s leadership style: The “flat hierarchy” of the ministry allowed him to intervene at any time in individual areas. He rejected any consolidation into larger departments.40 Apart from the various specializations, under its head of administration (the career bureaucrat Erich Greiner) the Propaganda Ministry possessed departments dealing with the budget and legal matters as well as a personnel department, run from 1937 onward by former Berlin police chief Erich Müller.41
Up until the outbreak of war, there was to be another important new arrangement in the Propaganda Ministry: Hermann Esser, one of the founding members of the NSDAP who had been dismissed as Bavarian economics minister after his involvement in an intrigue, was appointed third state secretary, responsible for a new tourism department. Goebbels had been resisting Esser’s appointment to his Propaganda Ministry since 1935,42 but after much ado he was given his new position in January 1939.43 Goebbels had not been in a position to prevent this senior appointment in his organization.
THE BLOMBERG-FRITSCH AFFAIR
By the time State Secretary Funk officially took up his new position early in February 1938, the political scene had changed completely.44 At the beginning of the year the regime suffered one of its most serious internal crises since 1934, from which, however, Hitler was to escape with a sensational personnel-management coup.
In January 1938, Reich War Minister Blomberg had married a much younger woman. “Everyone’s taken aback,” was Goebbels’s comment on the matter: He had arranged “as requested” that the newspapers should play down the wedding (at which Hitler and Göring had been witnesses).45
Just two weeks later, it emerged that Blomberg’s wife had multiple convictions for “immoral conduct” and had been registered with the Berlin police since 1937 as a prostitute.46 The matter was treated by the Nazi leadership as an affair of state: “The regime’s worst crisis since the Röhm affair,” wrote Goebbels, and—referring to Blomberg—he added: “There’s no way out of this. Nothing for it but a revolver.”47
What is more, at the end of January Göring, who fancied himself as Blomberg’s successor and was the first to inform Hitler about the scandal, presented incriminating material against the head of the army, Werner von Fritsch—his most powerful rival for the succession to Blomberg. Gestapo documents shown by Göring to Hitler led to an accusation of homosexuality against Fritsch.
Goebbels was highly alarmed, even slightly confused, despite Fritsch’s emphatic denials: “He swears on his honor that it’s not true. But who can believe it now? Did Blomberg know? About his own wife? And how can he let the Führer down like this? The honor of an officer? Where is it now? All unresolved questions.”48 Hitler summoned Fritsch to the Reich Chancellery and confronted him with the sole witness for the prosecution, a young man with convictions for blackmailing his sexual partners. The witness claimed to identify Fritsch as a former client, which Fritsch strenuously denied. Further investigations were left to the Gestapo.49
Goebbels’s notes from that time contradict any tendency to assume that Hitler immediately welcomed the Blomberg-Fritsch affair as a great opportunity to reshape the top echelons of the army in view of the coming war. On the contrary, Hitler was “very serious and almost sad” about the affair.50 Goebbels, too, was depressed about the chaotic situation.51
On January 31 Hitler called Goebbels in for a private discussion: “He’s a bit more composed, but still very pale, gray-faced and shattered. […] Blomberg marries a hooker and sticks with her and doesn’t give a damn about the state. The Führer thinks he knew all about this beforehand.”52 Fritsch, said Hitler, had “almost been unmasked as a 175er [a homosexual].” Hitler now wanted “to take over the armed forces himself.”53 “In order to cover the whole business with a smokescreen,” Hitler continued, there should be a wholesale reorganization. “I’m hoping we�
��ll get off fairly lightly,” commented Goebbels. Over the following days he was obliged to look on while the crisis deepened and Hitler could not bring himself to make a decision. There was more and more speculation in the foreign press; rumors were spreading throughout the Reich.54
By February 4 Hitler had a plan: “Blomberg and Fritsch retired on ‘health’ grounds. Führer takes over command of the forces personally. Immediately beneath him Wilhelm Keitel as Supreme Commander of the armed forces with ministerial rank. Göring appointed field marshal. [Walter] Brauchitsch succeeds Fritsch.” Hitler’s foreign affairs adviser, Ribbentrop, replaced Neurath as foreign minister; Neurath was fobbed off with the presidency of a newly formed “Cabinet Privy Council,” an international policy committee to which Goebbels was also supposed to belong but which never actually met.55 Ribbentrop was appointed against Goebbels’s advice; he had openly told Hitler on January 31 that he thought he was a “flop.”56 In addition, there were far-reaching changes of personnel in the officer corps, the Foreign Office, and the Economics Ministry.57 In a single stroke, Hitler had succeeded in overcoming a grave internal crisis and turning the situation to his advantage by strengthening his own position. All the key positions that mattered for his transition to an aggressive foreign policy were now in the hands of reliable Party supporters. The preconditions for implementing the proposed expansionist policy were all in place.
Hitler called the cabinet together on February 5 to make a statement on the affair. Goebbels’s report brings out the drama of the occasion: “As he speaks he sometimes chokes back tears. That he was too ashamed to step out onto the balcony on January 30.” Hitler said they would all have to stand by a communiqué to be compiled by Goebbels after the meeting.58 Incidentally, this was the last cabinet meeting in the history of the Third Reich.
Goebbels was told by Helldorf, who had already complained to him a week earlier about the Gestapo’s “snooping methods,” that the treatment of Fritsch had “not been very decent.”59 Fritsch’s case was tried in March before a court martial chaired by Göring. The prosecution witness was forced to admit that he had mixed the general up with somebody else and Fritsch was acquitted.60 “Very bad, especially for Himmler,” commented Goebbels. “He’s too hasty and too prejudiced. The Führer is quite angry.”61
THE ANNEXATION OF AUSTRIA
Nazi Germany had been systematically increasing its political and economic pressure on Austria since the end of 1937. In German leadership circles, there was open talk of the imminent “annexation” of the country.62 A further press agreement negotiated by Ambassador von Papen in the summer of 1937 (once again Goebbels had been taken completely by surprise on his very own territory) had somewhat eased the way for Nazi propaganda in the country.63 It is a fair reflection of the deliberations going on at this time around Hitler that Goebbels records in December 1937 a lunchtime conversation in which von Papen mentioned a plan he had devised to bring down Schuschnigg.64 The big reshuffle of personnel in February was about to have a direct impact on the regime’s foreign policy.
On February 12, 1938, Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg was invited by Hitler to the Berghof. The dictator put immense pressure on him, threatening him with German troops marching into Austria, thus extorting from him his signature to an agreement stipulating freedom of operation for the Austrian NSDAP and the appointment of the National Socialist Arthur Seyss-Inquart as minister of the interior.65
As so often with foreign affairs initiatives taken by Hitler, it was only after the event that Goebbels was informed about these developments. Not until February 15 did Hitler, now back in Berlin, tell him about his discussion with Schuschnigg.66 And according to Hitler, the discussion in Berchtesgaden constituted a threat of war.67 “The world press is outraged,” noted Goebbels, “talking about rape. And they’re not wrong. But no one’s lifting a finger to do anything about it.”68
Goebbels’s main preoccupation in these days was with shifting the German press, enjoined to exercise restraint over the Austrian question since the end of 1937, onto the footing of a “press feud with Austria.”69 On February 20 Hitler gave a three-hour speech to the Reichstag about the latest events. With reference to Austria and Czechoslovakia he declared, “Among the interests of the German Reich is the protection of those national comrades who […] are not in a position along our borders to ensure their right to human, political, and ideological freedom!”70
Schuschnigg replied in a speech to the Austrian Federal Parliament on February 24, where he stressed the sovereignty of his country: “Bis in den Tod Rot-Weiss-Rot” (red, white, red until we’re dead). He prohibited out of hand Nazi demonstrations intended as a prelude to annexation. Hitler was “furious” about Schuschnigg’s speech.71 When there was a “popular uprising” in Graz stage-managed by the Nazis and the government in Vienna sent in troops, Goebbels (who, like many, had hoped that Schuschnigg would gradually surrender power to the Austrian Nazis) dubbed the Austrian chancellor “schwarzes Schweinchen.”*, 72 But the German press were ordered to go on observing a degree of restraint toward Schuschnigg personally.73
A new situation arose when the Austrian cabinet, prompted by Schuschnigg, decided during the night of March 8 to 9 to hold a referendum on the issue of sovereignty. Seyss-Inquart was not present when this decision was made.74 On the evening of March 9 Hitler called Goebbels in to discuss this “extremely low, sly trick” of Schuschnigg’s: “We consider: either [Nazi] abstention from voting, or send 1,000 planes over Austria to drop leaflets, then actively intervene.” Goebbels went off to his ministry to assemble a team to work on the propaganda angles of the coup. Later that evening Hitler summoned him again, and they deliberated until early morning: “Italy and England won’t do anything. Maybe France, but probably not. Risk not as great as with the occupation of the Rhineland.”75
The next day he again discussed the situation with Hitler, who had still not ruled out Nazi participation in Schuschnigg’s referendum. The alternative was to demand a change in the terms of the plebiscite and march in if the Austrian government refused to comply. Toward midnight Goebbels was summoned once more by Hitler, who told him of his decision: The invasion would take place the day after next. Goebbels promptly busied himself making sure that from the following day onward the whole of the German press was focused on annexation.76
The next day Hitler and Goebbels worked together composing leaflets: “Terrific, inflammatory language.” But in the course of the day the text had to be altered several times to keep up with the changing situation. Under enormous pressure from German threats and ultimatums, that afternoon Schuschnigg stood down, and later the Austrian president, Wilhelm Miklas, named Seyss-Inquart as the chancellor’s successor. Although all German demands had now been met, Hitler refused to be deprived of his invasion. An Austrian “plea for help” was quickly put together: “We dictate a telegram to Seyss-Inquart77 asking the German government for help. It arrives quickly. This gives us legitimation.”78
The next day, March 12, Goebbels reveled in reports of the “revolution for Austria.” During the late morning he read out a “proclamation” from Hitler, broadcast on all stations, justifying the invasion. Three days of flag-flying were decreed for the whole Reich territory.79 The international reaction remained low-key, as Goebbels noted with some relief. Only the British government issued a sharp protest, but Goebbels thought “Chamberlain has to do that for the sake of the opposition.”
On March 14 reports arrived in rapid succession from Austria: The Seyss-Inquart government decreed “reunification” with the Reich, Federal President Miklas resigned, and the Austrian armed forces had to swear allegiance to Hitler personally. He arrived in Vienna that evening. Goebbels had a Reich propaganda bureau set up in Vienna80 and sent Otto Dietrich to the Austrian capital armed with instructions about “the reform of the Austrian press.”81 On March 15 Hitler gave a speech in the Heldenplatz [Heroes’ Square] in which he celebrated before a crowd of 250,000 people “the greatest report of an aim accompl
ished” in his life: the “entry of my homeland into the German Reich.”82
In Berlin Goebbels prepared a “triumphal reception” for Hitler that was to put “all earlier events of the kind in the shade.” (The complication was that all “stocks of flags and bunting” had been lent to Austria in aid of the celebrations there.)83 In the Völkischer Beobachter he urged the population forcefully:
Nobody must be absent from the streets when the Führer arrives.
Berliners! Shut the factories, shut the shops.
Be in place on time.
March along the streets as commanded by Party and German Labor Front
officials […].
All homes, buildings, shops to be decorated with flags and garlands.84
On the morning of March 16, he “set the Volk-machine in motion,” as he put it. After a telephone conversation with Hitler, he noted: “Exhilarating feeling of commanding the masses.” Hitler’s plane landed punctually at 5 P.M. at Tempelhof, where he was greeted by Göring and Goebbels, who were allowed to accompany him on his “triumphal drive” through the city.85
On March 18, the Reichstag having been convened on short notice, Hitler announced the dissolution of Parliament and new elections.86 Goebbels commented that, with this ballot, “we’ll throw off the last bits of democratic-parliamentary eggshell.” It was definitely to be the last visit to the polls in the Third Reich, after which—as Hitler put it to his circle—there would be “unity, no more troublemaking, and no religious conflicts.”87
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