As Goebbels had previously assumed, Hitler too adopted an uncompromising position on the “Jewish question.” “He agrees that we should introduce a large visible Jewish badge for all Jews in the Reich” so that “the danger of Jews being grumblers and malcontents without people recognizing them as Jews is removed.” Moreover, Hitler had promised “to deport the Berlin Jews as quickly as possible to the east as soon as the first transportation becomes available. There they will be subjected to a harsher climate.” Later Hitler once more returned to the topic and expressed his conviction that “the prophecy that he had made to the Reichstag back then that, if the Jews succeeded once again in provoking a world war, the final annihilation of the Jews would be assured. During these weeks and months, that was coming true with a certainty that was almost uncanny. The Jews must pay the bill in the east; in Germany they had almost paid it and would have to pay still more in the future.”
Hitler was referring to the increasing number of mass shootings of Jewish civilians by SS and police units, sometimes with the support of indigenous forces, that had been carried out in the east since the beginning of the war. Based on the diaries, it can be shown that at this point Goebbels was already aware of the massacres and during the coming weeks discovered concrete details about them.68
On August 22 Goebbels discussed the “church question” with the Westphalian Gauleiter, Dr. Alfred Meyer.69 He advised moderation: “The church question can be solved after the war with a stroke of the pen. During the war it’s better not to touch it; it can only become a hot potato. […] Whether it was a good idea to set the euthanasia ball rolling in such a major way as has been done in recent months is an open question.” At the time of this conversation Goebbels already knew that the mass murder of patients in the context of the “T4 action” was coming to an end.70 On August 24 the “euthanasia program” was then officially ended by an order from Hitler. This was partly because of the discontent and the protests on the part of the churches and partly because at this point those responsible for the “euthanasia” considered that they had achieved the goal they had set themselves at the start of the war, namely the murder of seventy thousand people.71 The murder of patients in mental institutions was to continue during the coming years but in a decentralized and more carefully disguised manner.
Goebbels attempted to avoid unnecessary attacks on the churches in other spheres as well. Around this time he told Gauleiter Albert Forster that he was opposed to further interference with church life. All “the hard-liners who just at this critical time want to take up all these tricky problems should be brought to heel.”72 In this connection he was not at all happy about an edict issued by the Gauleiter of Munich/Upper Bavaria and Bavarian Interior Minister Adolf Wagner ordering the removal of crucifixes from all school buildings in Bavaria. “Whether or not crucifixes hang in schools is probably unlikely to have much impact on the outcome of the war. But the fact that the removal of the crucifixes is likely to produce conflict and discord among our people is of very considerable importance.” According to Goebbels he succeeded in securing the withdrawal of Wagner’s edict in August after it had led to protests and even to public demonstrations.73
In the coming months Goebbels continued to stick to this cautious, but always tactically determined, line on church issues. Typical of his real opinion was the malicious way in which he continued to gather material against von Galen, who in his opinion was an “impudent liar and agitator” whom they should “deal with at the next favorable opportunity.” Goebbels kept bemoaning the fact that nothing could be done about the bishop so long as the war in the east was continuing.74 On the other hand, when in October, through the mediation of Ambassador Attolico, his sister Maria managed to secure a private audience with the Pope, and Pius used the opportunity to “pass on his blessing to him personally,” Goebbels noted this gesture with obvious satisfaction and a certain pride, even if he added that he could “not buy much with it.”75
Whereas he was anxious to maintain a trouble-free relationship with the churches, his views on the “Jewish question” were quite different. Two days after Hitler promised him the introduction of the “Jewish badge” on August 20, 1941, Goebbels expressed his opinion in another diary entry that “with the help of this identification of the Jews [he would] very quickly be able to carry out the necessary reforms without [the need for] legal documents.” Thus the introduction of the badge served in the first instance to enable him to push through further restrictions on the life of the Jews, who had now been made “visible,” through simple administrative regulations instead of having to get involved in laborious legislative procedures. In fact, between July and September 1941 the regulations for Jewish forced labor in Berlin were toughened and the movement of Jews to the capital was completely stopped.76 “Even if it is at the moment impossible to make Berlin a completely Jew-free city,” Goebbels further noted on August 20, “in any case Jews will no longer be allowed to appear in public.” In the medium term, however, the Jewish “problem” would be solved in an even more radical way, for Hitler had promised him that “I can deport the Jews to the east immediately the eastern campaign is over.”77
While he was dealing with the practical aspects of introducing the badge,78 Goebbels launched a new anti-Semitic campaign in order to prepare the population for it. He gave the starting signal at the ministerial briefing in the Propaganda Ministry on August 21.79 A central role in this campaign was played by a pamphlet published in the United States in which a certain Theodore N. Kaufman had among other things demanded that the German people be sterilized.80 After this pamphlet had been attacked by the German press in July,81 Goebbels ordered a pamphlet to be printed in which Kaufman’s piece was extensively quoted and commented on, with an afterword written by though not specifically attributed to Goebbels. He had sought Hitler’s express permission for this action.82 In this pamphlet, of which millions of copies were produced,83 Kaufman, who was in fact a private individual completely unconnected to American government circles, was described as a Roosevelt adviser and his pamphlet, which had appeared early in 1941, was linked to the Atlantic Charter. Kaufman was described as “one of the intellectual originators of the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill.”84 In fact, the communiqué that Roosevelt and Churchill signed on August 14 after their meeting on a British battleship off of Newfoundland defined the Allied goals for the postwar world.
On September 12 Goebbels issued a short press announcement about the impending introduction of the Jewish badge.85 The Völkischer Beobachter of September 13 contained, in addition, a commentary directly inspired by Goebbels86 that made a direct link between the badge and the war in the east: “During the eastern campaign the German soldier has got to know the Jew in all his repulsiveness and cruelty. […] This experience has prompted German soldiers and the German people as a whole to demand that the possibility of Jews disguising their identity at home and so of breaking the regulations that enable German national comrades to avoid coming into contact with them be removed.”87 There were similar commentaries, particularly in the Party press.88 Finally, the Propaganda Ministry had a leaflet89 printed specifically dealing with the badge that was distributed to all German households along with their food ration cards.
The introduction of the “Yellow Star” was thus accompanied by a comprehensive program of propaganda. According to the general line, German Jews were part of a worldwide conspiracy for the destruction of the German people. By visibly identifying Jews living in Germany, this internal enemy would be marked. And, above all, it was intended that the population would express its acceptance of the anti-Jewish policy through its overtly reserved behavior toward this publicly identified minority.
While the badge decree was accompanied by a considerable amount of propaganda, at the end of August a new crisis of morale occurred, which was to last for two or three weeks.90 In Goebbels’s view it was once again caused mainly by a lack of news from the front. He endeavored to clarify this situation in an articl
e with the title “About Silence in War” that was broadcast by all radio stations.91
During the following days he advocated a fundamental change in news policy. They had been “rather too boastful during the first weeks of the eastern campaign.” They should be more open in their news policy, he concluded, and “excessive secrecy” should be avoided.92 In fact the way in which the military situation was developing suggested that, despite all the military successes, the war was not going to end soon.93 Goebbels was already expressing the view that “we must now get the nation gradually used to the idea that the war will go on for some time.”94
REPRESSION AND PROPAGANDA IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Apart from the propaganda linked to the war in the east, Goebbels was continually compelled to deal with the situation in the occupied territories. For after the attack on the Soviet Union, resistance movements began increasingly to emerge everywhere in occupied Europe. Goebbels tried to use propaganda to get on top of this phenomenon. He attempted to take over a propaganda campaign in the occupied territories initiated by the British scheduled to start on July 20. Its aim was to display the V sign for “victory” (or “victoire”) everywhere. Goebbels, however, launched a countercampaign of “V for Victoria,” claiming success for his campaign from the fact that the V could be seen “on all Wehrmacht vehicles;95 it is in all the newspapers in the occupied territories; cinemas, cafés, and restaurants are being renamed ‘Viktoria’; huge banners carrying the V sign are already hanging from the Eiffel Tower; in short I hope that in a few days, through the massive adoption of this fateful letter, we shall succeed in completely crushing the enemy’s propaganda.”96
What Goebbels claimed as a great success was evidently distinctly counterproductive for domestic propaganda. Thus the deputy Gauleiter for Magdeburg-Anhalt reported that “at home the campaign [must be] described as a complete failure.” Millions of people received information concerning it from acquaintances and colleagues in the occupied territories and would “lose faith in German propaganda’s truth and honesty.”97 Significantly, after July 1941 Goebbels never again referred to his V-propaganda.
In the occupied territories the regime did not limit itself to propaganda slogans. During the course of the summer attacks on German soldiers occurred in several countries under German occupation. From the very beginning Goebbels responded to these acts of resistance by advocating that the “enemy [be shown] the armored fist.”98 In response to reports that in the Netherlands the population was waving at British bombers, he threatened that the streets in question should be bombed by the German Luftwaffe.99 From August onward he pressed for assassinations in Paris to be countered with the shooting of hostages and above all advocated publishing the names of those who were liable to be shot beforehand.100 In fact, from September onward, the German authorities in France, Belgium, and Norway carried out shootings of hostages; this had already been going on in Serbia since July, which Goebbels considered exemplary.101
The tough measures immediately adopted by Heydrich after his appointment as deputy protector of the Reich in Prague naturally met with Goebbels’s full approval.102 By the end of November 1931 Heydrich had had 404 men and women shot on the basis of verdicts by drumhead courts martial.103 In addition, the Propaganda Ministry ruthlessly exploited the situation in the protectorate to take “almost all the cultural institutions into the hands of the Reich.” Prague film production was concentrated into a “Prague Film Company,” and the cinemas and bookshops were also taken over by the Reich.104
However, Goebbels was, as so often, flexible in his approach, if this reflected the views of the supreme leadership. In October in occupied France he advocated the shooting of hostages in the proportion announced by the occupation authorities of 50 to 1 and pressed the military authorities to actually carry out the executions they had announced.105 But when Hitler suspended the shooting of fifty hostages in Nantes, initially for a few days and then indefinitely, Goebbels supported the decision unreservedly.106
CONTINUING CONFLICT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
Even after the invasion of the Soviet Union Goebbels continued to spend a not inconsiderable amount of his time maintaining and trying to expand his responsibilities in the fields of propaganda and information, particularly in conflict with the Foreign Ministry.
In June 1941, shortly before the start of the war in the east, Goebbels made a new approach to the head of the Reich Chancellery, Hans-Heinrich Lammers, in order to try to clarify the vexed question of the responsibility for foreign propaganda. He failed, however, to gain the “Führer decision” he was seeking; instead, Lammers requested that Goebbels seek agreement with Ribbentrop through negotiation.107 The negotiations began in August; Goebbels had great hopes, since he believed that the Foreign Ministry had gone “weak at the knees” in the confrontation with his ministry.108 The core of the agreement reached on October 22 was the combination of all foreign broadcasting stations, including the Seehaus radio listening service established by the Foreign Ministry, into a holding company, the Interradio AG, as well as the establishment of other jointly controlled holding companies to direct publishing houses and marketing companies. Moreover, the Propaganda Ministry was to be permitted to send “experts” to German missions abroad. The agreement was a success for Goebbels insofar as the Foreign Ministry’s right to give instructions to the Propaganda Ministry in matters concerning foreign propaganda, contained in the Führer order of September 8, 1939, was not included. The particularly controversial issue of responsibility for foreign press policy was not, however, resolved.109
At the end of September Goebbels requested Hitler to restrict the right of the Party and state leadership to listen to foreign broadcasts. The foreign radio stations were after all, he argued, “the only source of news that is outside our official news service. The defeatist effect of this news source, he argued, then comes to predominate and in the long run can inflict serious damage.”110
In other words Goebbels wanted to prevent members of the Nazi leadership from being able to refer to other information than that controlled by the Propaganda Ministry; he wanted to establish a monopoly of information for his ministry. Hitler agreed to this proposal in principle.111 Lammers then drafted a “Führer instruction” restricting the right to listen to foreign broadcasts to a few prominent ministers.112 These ministers were permitted to delegate this authority to individual members of their staff, but only with the express approval of the Propaganda Ministry. The Foreign Ministry, however, immediately raised an objection to this interference in its sphere of responsibility and finally, in January, got its way.113
Now Goebbels concentrated on substantially restricting the reports of the Seehaus service, of which hundreds of copies circulated in the ministries. Anyone who did not have permission to listen should also not have the right to read these reports.114 This action, which Goebbels specifically justified by referring to a “Führer command,”115 produced massive objections from the Reich agencies affected, some of which then tried to destroy the Seehaus service by withdrawing its funds or to set up their own listening service.116 Finally, in the middle of February a compromise was reached by which the information was subjected to greater filtering and the distribution list was shortened, although not as much as Goebbels had envisaged.117
HIGH MORALE AND DEPORTATIONS
In the second half of September German propaganda, which was able to announce the capture of Kiev,118 once more succeeded in raising morale. But Goebbels was not looking for a mood of triumphalism but rather “a calm middle position.”119 It was with this in mind that he organized the Party’s big annual winter aid campaign, which this time went under the relatively bland slogan “Germany’s Victory—Bread and Freedom for Our Nation and for Europe.”120 Toward the end of the month, however, “the national mood [was] far in excess of what was really feasible.” Goebbels observed that people were hoping that “the war will come to an end this winter,” but he would “have a lot to do in the next few weeks t
o prevent the mood from going to the other extreme and to bring it back to a normal level.”121
Hitler too, Goebbels noted, was “in an excellent mood” and very confident when he met him at headquarters on September 21. During this visit Goebbels learned of Hitler’s decision, in view of the successes in the east, to begin deporting the German Jews. Before the end of the year they were to be taken off to ghettos in east European cities and the following spring transported to Soviet territory, which by then would be under German occupation, a project that Hitler had been contemplating since the start of the planning for Barbarossa.
During his visit to headquarters Goebbels met Heydrich, whom Hitler had just appointed deputy protector of the Reich in Prague, to “sort out” the rather unstable situation there.122 Heydrich assured Goebbels that he would soon begin deporting the Berlin Jews. They would be “transported […] to the camps established by the Soviets.” Hitler, whom Goebbels met later, confirmed this information: “The first cities that are going to be made Jew-free are Berlin, Vienna, and Prague. Berlin is going to be the first, and I’m hoping that in the course of this year we shall succeed in transporting a substantial number of Berlin Jews to the east.”123
Hitler’s motives for making this decision were complex. They can, however, be summed up in a main motive, namely to conduct the war, which was now expanding into a worldwide conflict, as a “war against the Jews,” a struggle against an alleged world conspiracy that embraced the Anglo-Saxon powers and the weakened but not yet defeated Soviet Union and that was also behind the resistance movements that were springing up all over the occupied territories. In this context the German Jews, as part of this conspiracy, were to be treated as enemies.
Goebbels: A Biography Page 60