Early the following day he flew to East Prussia to discuss the situation with Hitler’s innermost circle.122 At first, still not having any concrete information, he went over with Bormann and Himmler all the possible permutations that might lie behind the change of regime in Italy. Goebbels already understood that Farinacci’s criticism of Mussolini had been used by the group around Badoglio in order to force through a real regime change. He brooded to himself: “It’s really shocking to think that a revolution that has after all been in power for 21 years can be liquidated in such a way.”
At ten o’clock, together with Göring, he had a first meeting with Hitler, which Ribbentrop joined half an hour later. In the meantime, Hitler too had reached the conclusion that Mussolini had probably not resigned voluntarily. Hitler believed that “Italian freemasonry” was “behind the whole thing,” for although it had been banned he claimed it was still active. He also announced his intention of “carrying out a great coup,” namely to use a parachute division to surround Rome, take control of the city, and arrest “the king together with his family, as well as Badoglio and comrades” and then bring them to Germany. Ribbentrop and Goebbels had difficulty persuading him not to use the opportunity to occupy the Vatican.
At midday, as Goebbels had anticipated, the first news came in that “the mob is beginning to make itself felt.” Fascist symbols were being removed from public view and streets renamed. Goebbels welcomed the development: “The more things in Italy go topsy-turvy, the better for the measures we’re planning.” Experienced in staging “spontaneous demonstrations” himself, he noted: “That there are demonstrations in favor of Badolgio is a sign that they were probably staged by him.”
During the course of the day Farinacci appeared at Führer’s headquarters. He made an extremely unfavorable impression on Hitler and Goebbels, as he made it clear that he did not support Mussolini. Goebbels concluded that “we can hardly make much use of Farinacci.”123
The situation was made more difficult for Goebbels by the fact that he could not explain to the German people the background to the changes in Italy, although he could already see the danger that in Germany too “some subversive elements” believed that “they could bring about the same thing here that Badoglio and his comrades engineered in Rome.”124 In terms of propaganda Goebbels was confronted with a real dilemma. He had had to abandon the anti-Semitic campaign in June; the anticipated military successes on the Eastern Front had not occurred; in July he had had to play down the theme of retaliation. Initially the regime was at a loss as to how to respond to the new situation in Italy. They could see from correspondence that the population was feeling the lack of a speech by Hitler to clarify the situation. “We can’t neglect the nation for too long,” noted Goebbels. But then in this already difficult situation a new catastrophe occurred.
THE AIR WAR: HAMBURG AND BERLIN
After the series of air raids on the Rhine-Ruhr area, which the RAF had begun in March 1943, Bomber Command found a new target for a spectacular raid: Hamburg, the second-largest city in Germany, which was largely destroyed in Operation Gomorrah between July 24 and August 3. For the first time American bombers participated in a joint raid by both air forces, mounting daylight raids on Hamburg’s industrial districts. In a new tactic, masses of reflective aluminium strips were dropped to block German radar and so limit the number of Allied losses.
Operation Gomorrah was the most devastating air raid carried out on a German city during the Second World War. As a result of the massive bombardment, for the first time firestorms were created covering wide areas and preventing people from leaving the air raid shelters; many suffocated to death in the shelters. The total number of deaths was more than forty thousand. Over 40 percent of the housing stock was destroyed, and nine hundred thousand inhabitants were made homeless. The public life of the city effectively came to a halt.125 “At the moment I don’t quite know how we are going to deal with these problems,” wrote Goebbels after the first nighttime raid.126 The air war was “the Reich’s bleeding wound, so to speak.”127
Goebbels was now worried above all that Berlin could be hit in the same catastrophic way as Hamburg. He considered the preparations made by the Reich Air Defense League, which was responsible for civil defense in the capital, to be inadequate. The Party, he ordered, should become more involved.128 The press prepared the population in unmistakable terms for heavy air raids. It not only appealed to the Berliners’ determination to stick it out but also gave practical tips, for example for the construction of slit trenches and for combating incendiaries.129
Although these measures “made the inhabitants of the capital extremely nervous,” Goebbels believed he had to put up with that.130 Finally, he published an article in the Völkischer Beobachter in which he advocated the evacuation of children from Berlin and appealed to people to maintain their morale: “The watchword of the hour [is] discipline, a steadfast spirit, and a heart of iron.”131 The Goebbels family also took precautions. Artworks and valuable pieces of furniture from the two houses on Schwanenwerder were transported to Lanke and, with the transfer of his daughters Helge and Hilde and his mother, who like them had hitherto lived on the Wannsee island, all the family members had now moved to the Bogensee.132
Goebbels began preparations to move less important departments of his ministry out of the city.133 Above all, however, the evacuation of some eight hundred thousand people was set in motion. Long lines formed in railway stations and post offices, as people wanted to send valuable household goods. “Crowds gathered,” and “somewhat panic-like behavior” occurred. Goebbels, who was now concerned about the city’s image, deployed Hitler Youth and Party members on a large scale to sort it out.134
In an appeal, which for once was made in a sober tone, Goebbels requested that Berliners who were not forced to remain in the city for professional or other reasons leave Berlin.135 Because of his heavy involvement in Berlin matters for three weeks in succession he did not write an editorial for Das Reich, which, he was proud to note, “caused something of a sensation among the German public.”136
While the partial evacuation of Berlin was under way,137 Goebbels visited the Hansa city of Hamburg two weeks after Operation Gomorrah.138 It presented him with a “picture of the most appalling devastation.” Goebbels spoke in the Party’s Gau headquarters to around 150 Party functionaries and citizens who had made a name for themselves during the nights of bombing. He tried to set “the air war in the overall context of the problems of the war as a whole, and I believe I succeeded in giving people some encouragement and support.” He would have very much liked to use the theme of retaliation, which he hoped would provide relief and a diversion. But in August he learned from Hitler that the massive retaliation against London using bombers and rockets could not, as originally planned, be carried out at the end of 1943 but only in the following year.139
In view of this timetable any further emphasis on retaliation in propaganda media would prove counterproductive. Goebbels, however, ensured that the topic was taken up in word-of-mouth propaganda and that a very concrete impression of what would be involved was conveyed by spreading rumors of wonder weapons, which in the coming months were in fact to fuel the fantasy of many Germans.140 However, at least in the short term, this was evidently unlikely to produce much in the way of success; the topic of retaliation was a hot potato. Goebbels, therefore, instructed that it could be spoken about in public only in the most exceptional circumstances.141
In August he established “a small organization of activists” who were to “use force in dealing with defeatists in public life.” The Party, according to Goebbels, “has been pushed somewhat onto the defensive by the endless criticism of malcontents, although it now “has much more power and influence than during the years 1931 and 1932, for example, when we would never have put up with things that we are now having to put up with all the time.” They should get back to the methods used in the “time of struggle”: This was once again the message that
Goebbels was sending out, one that he was fond of using when there was a crisis.142
In the middle of August, after a visit to a Hamburg that had now been largely destroyed, Goebbels noted that there were “shady characters on the evacuation trains exploiting the depressed mood of the victims of the bombing in order to agitate against the state. However, all these attempts have failed. But I conclude that we must increase the involvement of the Party not only in Berlin but also in other Gaus and use force.”143
At the ministerial briefing Goebbels announced that he would not use the police against “grumblers” in Berlin but would deploy roughly three thousand Party activists, who would confront anyone who opposes the government, if necessary using force.144 During the following heavy raids on Berlin Goebbels used these bands of thugs on several occasions to control the “mood.” His diaries document that these actions were carried out repeatedly at other times and always with the same satisfactory results.145 After more than ten years of Nazi rule the public image of the Third Reich was under control to such an extent that hardly anyone dared to criticize the regime in front of someone they did not know.
If it proved successful in Berlin Goebbels contemplated introducing this organization throughout the Reich.146 In fact there are a series of indications that gangs of Party activists were deployed in other Gaus in order to suppress public criticism of the regime by force. A separate organization proved unnecessary. Such activities could be linked to the Reich-wide network established by the Nazi Party for word-of-mouth propaganda and on the extensive organization the Party maintained for keeping tabs on the public “mood.” Thus Goebbels’s liaison officer at the Party Chancellery, Walter Tiessler, had already drafted a circular in May, on behalf of Goebbels, which stated: “It is not acceptable for us magnanimously to ignore negative rumors and jokes and even join in without contradicting them. On the contrary, in this situation we must recall the methods of the time of struggle when we responded to such insults with force.”147 Responding to unwelcome “manifestations of people’s mood” with the “methods of the time of struggle” was something that the Reich Propaganda Ministry had been recommending to the Party’s Reich propaganda offices for months.
A message from the head of the Posen Reich propaganda office to the Party’s propaganda headquarters shows that such combative arguments were routine, although in observing the public mood they “consider it important that now and then people should be allowed to speak their mind without us cracking down on them right away so that we can see whether or not they are going to go on doing so. If it really proves necessary we shall ruthlessly gag the person involved.”148 These documents from people associated with Goebbels, together with his relevant diary entries, make it clear that the violent suppression of rash “grumblers” was practiced systematically.
After the raids on the Rhine-Ruhr area and the destruction of Hamburg in the late summer of 1943 the RAF began its third great wave of air raids during that year. Three heavy raids on the capital between August 23 and September 4 began the air battle for Berlin, which Bomber Command was to begin in earnest from November 1943 onward.149
Goebbels watched the first raid on the night of August 23–24 with a degree of optimism because the air defenses, at least as far as he could see, appeared to be functioning. But when he entered the city after the all-clear had been given, he was forced to recognize that a good deal of damage had been done: “The whole of Charlottenburg Station is on fire, there are a large number of roof fires on the Kurfürstendamm, in the Leibnizstrasse, and in Steglitz, and since there is often a lack of water they turn into major house fires.” Goebbels did not hesitate to intervene himself. “I make various interventions, encourage the fire brigade to speed up their work and to go about it more carefully.”150
He devoted the whole of the following day to dealing with the aftermath of the raid. The city was covered by a thick pall of smoke, and in the evening numerous fires were still burning. He visited the parts of the city that had been particularly badly affected: “The population is generally willing, and if one looks after them a bit they are easily satisfied.”
To his regret he noted that the Party agencies had “not really done their job properly.” He now intervened “extremely energetically,” organized food supplies and the collection of furniture that had been removed from houses, and prepared emergency accommodations. In Steglitz he appointed the Party’s district leader as a sort of special commissioner, making him responsible for all Party organizations and municipal agencies.151 Exceptional situations required exceptional measures. He blamed Oberbürgermeister Ludwig Steeg for the inactivity of the municipal authorities and threatened to dismiss him if matters failed to improve. He sent “researchers” to the various districts to acquire a firsthand impression of what was going on. He gave Heinz Jetter, a member of his staff, “dictatorial powers to sort out the provision of food supplies for the affected districts” and the right to issue instructions to Party and municipal agencies. He appointed twelve Reich Party speakers as “inspectors” to be responsible for inspecting the accommodation of evacuees from the bombing in the Gaus where they had been quartered. Thus Goebbels actively exploited the situation in order to expand the Party’s responsibilities.152
During his various trips around the affected areas he had unsurprisingly acquired “only the very best impressions” of the population’s behavior: “Berliners treat me with a love and affection that could hardly be bettered.” Goebbels had in fact not been idle in taking steps to ensure that the “mood” remained good. On the previous evening he had deployed “ ‘Organization B’ […] in groups of three in the working-class districts.” “It unobtrusively inspected 35 pubs with the aim of beating up anyone who criticized the Führer or the general conduct of the war.” But the mere appearance of these gangs of thugs was evidently sufficient: “It’s significant that during this first ‘raid’ Organization B didn’t have to intervene once.”153
In spite of all these organizational successes, when, during the night of September 1, his home city of Rheydt was severely damaged by a British air raid, Goebbels’s mood was bleak. “My home was spared as if by a miracle.”154 On the following day he learned further details: “My old grammar school is no longer standing, my old elementary school has been destroyed […] the family grave in the cemetery has been quite severely damaged. […] As a result the city of Rheydt, at least as far as its core is concerned, has effectively ceased to exist.” At least when he telephoned the mayor he could comfort him with “the reassurance that when the war is over one of my first tasks will be to start rebuilding the city.”155
The continual air raids had a negative impact on people’s mood: “The masses have become somewhat skeptical or, one could even say, are in the grip of a sense of hopelessness. Above all people are complaining that there is no word from the Führer to explain matters, particularly as far as the air war is concerned. […] Hardly anyone believes in retaliation anymore. We have prophesied it too many times.” Because of the rather “unclear and uncertain, not to say critical situation,” there is “a lot of irritation with our propaganda and information policy.”156 “Allegedly we say too much in public, and that’s what annoys people. In reality people are horrified by the air war and are looking for a scapegoat.”157 The only cure-all for this trend that he could think of was a speech by Hitler.158
Contrary to his expectation that because of their heavy losses the British would not mount any further raids on Berlin, there was another major raid on the evening of September 3. After the all-clear had been given he made a “tour of the affected districts.” Despite the serious amount of destruction, he was happy to note: “At least the Berlin organization has begun to work after the two previous air raids, and at the moment I have no reason to complain.”159 Once again he sought reassurance that his popularity had not suffered through immediate contact with those affected. Thus, on the following day, he was “stopped by a large crowd who greeted me and hosted me with great wa
rmth, questioning me about lots of things and in the process displaying an attitude that’s very moving. I have to go upstairs to the workers’ apartments, go into details, and am able here and there to give help and advice and sort out minor problems for them. In the afternoon I send them cigarettes and a few other luxury foods.” His staffer, Jette, who was responsible for this, reported that evening that “these gifts to the Wedding district were received with absolute delight.”160
For the time being, however, the situation in Berlin settled down again and during the following weeks Berlin was spared further raids.
FURTHER REVERSES ON THE EASTERN AND SOUTHERN FRONTS
In the meantime, after a period of relative calm,161 the military situation in the east had deteriorated. The Soviet offensive that had developed out of the battle to defend Kursk was achieving its initial successes. Orel, north of Kursk, had to be evacuated on August 5, which Goebbels considered a “great blow to prestige.”162 On the same day, to the south of the Kursk battlefield Belgorod was reconquered, and the Red Army then moved on to attack Kharkov.163 Moreover, on August 7 it launched another major offensive around 250 miles further north in the Smolensk area.164
“We must now start using politics,” wrote Goebbels on August 8. “For there are very obvious contradictions between the plutocratic west and the Bolshevist east,” and they would become very strong in the event of communist successes. But unfortunately “for obvious reasons”—Goebbels meant the negative military situation—they were unable to start seeking a political solution to the war. However, given that he was more and more doubtful about pure military success in the war, he became increasingly preoccupied by the notion of a “political solution.”
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