Apart from bombing cities, however, during the spring the Allies developed a further strategy that very soon placed the German war machine in serious difficulties. The raids by the Allied air forces in May concentrating on the German hydrogenation plants soon led, as is clear from the Goebbels diaries, to an alarming shortage of fuel. It was only the fact that from June 1944 onward the main task of the Allied air forces was to provide support for the landing in Normandy that prevented the German war machine from grinding to a halt.133 Understandably, this aspect of the Allied air war was not referred to by German propaganda.
The raids on the German civilian population were handled differently. On May 24 Goebbels noted in his dairy that up until then the air war had resulted in a total of 131,000 deaths in the Reich as a whole, a figure that was undoubtedly “worrying.” On the same day he wrote an article whose contents he had discussed in detail with Hitler and which appeared the following day in the Völkischer Beobachter under the title “A Word About the Air War.” According to Goebbels the enemy’s air war was aiming to “break the German civilian population’s morale.” In his article Goebbels expressed sympathy for the fact that the rage and hatred of the population that was directly affected was finding expression in acts of revenge on Allied pilots who had been shot down, and he made it clear that they could no longer claim the protection of the German security forces. “It does not seem to us possible and tolerable to deploy the German police and Wehrmacht against the German people when they are treating child murderers in the way they deserve.”134
After the article had appeared, he hoped that “very soon a big pilot hunt would begin in Germany.”135 By launching—fictitious—reports of actual instances of vigilantism committed against pilots, he hoped to make an impact in the enemy countries.136 He returned to the topic in a speech made in Nuremberg on June 3 announcing that nobody would be “put in prison […] for speaking German” with a pilot who had been shot down.137 In fact there were probably around 350 lynchings of Allied pilots, which were usually carried out by local Party functionaries, SS members, soldiers, and police, almost all of them after the publication of this article.138
The increasing number of Allied air raids in the west suggested that the enemy was trying to cut off links to the Atlantic Wall,139 a clear indication of the Allied landing that was to come. From April onward Goebbels was expecting an invasion “in the very near future.”140 Hitler told him that “the invasion will fail, indeed even that he can repel it with a vengeance.” Hitler was convinced that with its failure, the crisis in Britain would “accelerate” and that this would then lead to an increase in the communist movement, as had happened in Germany in November 1918.141 But if he succeeded in defeating the invasion then “we would have an entirely new war situation.”142
The reports on the public mood prepared by the Party’s Reich propaganda offices were in line with this assessment. They interpreted the fact that large sections of the population were expecting the invasion to decide the outcome of the war “for good or ill” as an anticipation of victory.143 On several occasions in May Goebbels read into these reports that people were “longing for”144 the invasion; indeed on June 3 he noted that the population was really “afraid” that the invasion might not happen. This fear was very soon shown to be completely unjustified.
CHAPTER 28
“Virtually a Wartime Dictatorship on the Home Front”
Between an Apocalyptic Mood and Total War
Credit 28.1
Accomplices and rivals: In summer 1944, Goebbels, together with Himmler and Bormann, succeeded in establishing a “wartime internal dictatorship,” as he called it, and in reducing the inactive Göring to a largely ceremonial role. From left to right, the main protagonists: Göring, Goebbels, Himmler, and Bormann.
On June 5, 1944, Goebbels visited Hitler on the Obersalzberg. The meeting took place against the rather gloomy background created by a German announcement on the same day of the fall of Rome.1 But Hitler wanted to read something positive into the increasing number of failures, since every “military defeat provides us with a political opportunity” and, in particular, “further military successes by the Soviets would have a devastating effect on the western enemies.” During the following months Goebbels was to cling to this peculiar logic like a drowning man clutching at straws.
During a walk to the Tea House, Hitler then outlined his further plans, which, according to Goebbels, demonstrated “an extraordinarily profound imagination.” “The Führer is now convinced that we can’t do a deal with England. He considers England a lost cause and is thus determined to strike it a lethal blow if there is the slightest opportunity of doing so.” Goebbels, however, was somewhat irritated by this announcement: “At the moment I’m rather puzzled by how he is actually going to do this, but the Führer has so often made plans that at the time appeared absurd but he was then able to carry out.” In fact, however, Goebbels must have been very disappointed with Hitler’s statement. The last time Goebbels raised with Hitler the question of a separate peace with Britain appears to have been in October 1943, and now he was forced to face the fact that since then he had made no progress whatsoever.
Goebbels used the conversation to strongly criticize Ribbentrop, whose diplomatic abilities Hitler “greatly overestimated.” Goebbels disputed the claim that Ribbentrop had a “very effective and constructive policy.” And he was “horrified” when Hitler suggested Rosenberg as a possible successor to Ribbentrop as foreign minister. “Rosenberg instead of Ribbentrop would be going from the frying pan into the fire.”
After this meeting—it was already late at night—Goebbels had been invited to visit the Bormanns. At four o’clock in the morning after an entertaining evening, he headed for Berchtesgaden. There he was informed that the Allied landing in France had begun in the early hours. This did not come as a total surprise to Goebbels because on June 2 he had learned from Göring’s intelligence service (Forschungsamt) that the French resistance had received instructions from Britain that indicated that it must “be going to happen in the next few days.”2
Hitler, who was receiving the Hungarian prime minister, Döme Sztójay, at Schloss Klessheim on that day, asked Goebbels to meet him there. Goebbels found the Führer “full of vim and vigor” since, Hitler reassured him, the invasion had occurred “exactly at the spot” where they had thought it would come, moreover “using precisely the means and methods” that they had prepared for. Both these statements were obviously white lies designed to perk up his propaganda minister. Hitler made it clear he was convinced that the troops that had landed could be wiped out by the available Panzer reserves.3
The Allies were able to link their bridgeheads together relatively quickly and to land considerable numbers of troops and amounts of equipment, but during the following weeks they did not succeed in breaching the German lines, manned by units that had been hurriedly brought together, or to penetrate into the French interior. Thus until the middle of July Goebbels’s diaries contain varying reports of the Normandy battles, as there still seemed to be a chance that the Allied bridgehead could be crushed.
RETALIATION—AND NO ALTERNATIVE
Although Goebbels had banned the use of the term retaliation at the end of 1943,4 during the first months of 1944 propaganda had continually hinted that a massive counterblow was impending, most recently Goebbels on June 4 in a speech at Nuremberg, where he said that they were hoping that the retaliation would have a “decisive impact on the war.”5 During the past months his word-of-mouth propaganda had further strengthened this expectation.6 But Goebbels had to take account of the fact that the longer the retaliation failed to happen, the less credible it became.7 When there was no response to the Allied invasion in the form of huge “retaliatory attacks,” there was a danger that the continual disappointment of people’s expectations would become a problem for domestic propaganda.8
It was not until the night of June 15–16 that London began to be targeted by flying bombs.9 Goebbels
’s response to the news was almost euphoric: “The German people are ecstatic. Without our having to use the word ‘retaliation,’ news of the retaliation is spreading like wildfire among the public.”10 However, he warned against excessive optimism about the new weapon. At his ministerial conference on June 16 he urged restraint on his staff.11 On the same day, however, Dietrich ignored this approach by instructing the press to comment on the attacks in such a way that the reader was left to draw the conclusion that this was the start of the anticipated “retaliation.”12
The following day Goebbels noted that he considered that “this development represented a tremendous danger for us, for if these hopes and illusions are not fulfilled then in the end […] the government will be held responsible.”13 By the word government he meant above all himself, for he was the public figure who had recently been most associated with the topic of retaliation. Goebbels then gave the “strictest instructions effectively to put the brakes on the retaliation propaganda and revert to normal reporting.”14 However, it is clear from the diary that it was not Dietrich but Hitler himself who had instructed that “the German press should make the most of the question of the retaliation weapon.” When Goebbels pointed out “the difficulties that might be anticipated,” the “Führer” agreed with him that “the deployment of the retaliation weapon should be given very thorough coverage in the press but without raising any hopes among the German people that, given the situation, cannot be fulfilled for the time being.”
That the British described it as purely a terror weapon persuaded Goebbels that it would be inadvisable to retain its original name of “hell hound.”15 Hitler finally decided—Goebbels claimed to have been the originator16—to call it the V-1 (for Vergeltung, “retaliation”) in order to make it clear that it was the first in a series of weapons of retaliation, each of which would be more effective than its predecessor.17
In the meantime, the impact of the V-1 propaganda was in danger of getting out of control. On June 20 Goebbels noted: “Some people still believe that retaliation will play a decisive role in a very short time. Naturally there’s no question of that.”18 The “hangover”19 that he had been afraid of soon kicked in. He learned from the reports of the Party’s Reich propaganda offices that “after the sudden improvement brought about by the deployment of the retaliation weapon the mood has significantly deteriorated.”20
Meanwhile, Goebbels tried to collect all the information he could about the impact of the bombs, which, given the British ban on news reports, was extremely difficult. His diary entries were thus inevitably speculation.21 He was completely wrong about their accuracy, believing that 80 to 90 percent of the bombs reached their target; in fact just over 20 percent reached the Greater London area.22
He reached the provisional conclusion that “our retaliation weapon is not having the huge success that some of our hard-liners assumed it would, but it has had a fairly devastating effect on English morale and strength of purpose as well as on English military potential.”23 But despite such supposed “successes” of retaliation, he had no doubt that the “overall picture of military developments” was extremely negative. As he wrote on June 21, if he “bore this in mind, both as regards the west, the south, as well as the Karelia front, and in the air, then it makes me feel rather dizzy. One only needs to consider where such a development, if it went on for a year, might lead in order to see how critical the situation currently is.” Then once again he tried to reassure himself. There was a whole series of positive factors in the current situation and, above all, one should not forget that “every military crisis is extraordinarily beneficial for political developments because they increasingly sharpen the differences in the enemy camp, which can only work to our advantage.” In other words, Goebbels had completely adopted Hitler’s logic.
In fact he saw another way of at least prolonging the war. On June 21 he outlined to Hitler on the Obersalzberg his view that so far “total war” had just been “a slogan.” It was vital to “reform the Wehrmacht from top to bottom.” He told Hitler that “by using drastic measures” he was “prepared and in a position to provide him with a million soldiers and this would be done by ruthlessly screening the Wehrmacht’s organization as well as the civilian sector.”
As he told his propaganda minister, however, Hitler believed that the moment for “a big appeal for total war in the real sense of the word” had not yet come. Goebbels took the opposite view but failed to get his way, concluding that Hitler wanted “to follow the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary path,” which he could “not quite see the point of.”
As far as further political developments were concerned, he was obliged to recognize that Hitler was “further away than ever from believing or hoping that he could come to an arrangement with England.” England, according to Hitler, “would be totally destroyed in this war.” He preferred to leave aside the question of whether, on the other hand, “at some time in the future we shall be able to reach a deal with the Soviet Union.” He thought that in view of the current military situation he was unable to answer this question. Once again Goebbels’s attempt to raise the issue of a separate peace had come to nothing. “This conversation,” he concluded, “was one of the most serious that I have ever had with the Führer. But it was completely harmonious. I believe that the Führer has inscribed in his memory many of the things I have said to him. Sooner or later he will undoubtedly return to them.”
On June 22, the day after this conversation, the major Soviet summer offensive against Army Group Center was launched and soon produced important advances leading to large German units being outmaneuvered, surrounded, and then destroyed.24 Goebbels, who in contrast to Hitler had not reckoned with a Russian offensive on the third anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union,25 noted on June 27 that “a real crisis has developed.”26
At the end of June the 3rd Panzer Army was largely wiped out near Witebsk, as was the 9th Army, which had been surrounded near Bobruisk. On July 3 the Red Army succeeded in taking Minsk.27 During the following days the 4th Army, which was surrounded east of Minsk, was also, bit by bit, almost completely destroyed.28 But the Soviet advance went farther: Vilnius was surrounded on July 8 and had to be surrendered on the 14th.29
Goebbels’s diary entries reflect his increasing helplessness, indeed despair at this situation. “It must after all be possible to hold the front at some point,” he noted on July 9. “If things go on like this the Soviets will very soon be on our East Prussian border. I keep asking myself in despair what the Führer is doing about it.” At the same time, in view of these events, he was preoccupied with a somewhat macabre idea: “I can only hope that if the Soviets really do reach our Reich frontier, then at last total war will be realized. Why it isn’t happening already is completely beyond my comprehension.” Sometimes he even began to doubt Hitler’s leadership skills. “At the moment the Führer’s playing a very risky game. It would be wonderful if he won it because then we would rescue the Baltic states and the Baltic Sea, but equally it would be terrible if he lost the game.”30 Goebbels was somewhat relieved when, in the middle of July, he learned that after almost four months Hitler had returned from the Obersalzberg to the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia.31
In view of the bad news coming from every front as well as Hitler’s unwillingness either to declare total war or to seek a political conclusion to the war, Goebbels decided to concentrate propaganda entirely on the theme of retaliation. Although he had had to accept the fact that so far this had been rather counterproductive as far as the German population was concerned, he now hoped that a new V weapon campaign could bridge the gap until the arrival of the V-2 weapon. At the meeting on June 22 Hitler had told him that the V-2 would be deployed starting in August, and while it would “not achieve an immediately decisive impact on the war,” it would bring “a decision closer.”32 Moreover, in writing “retaliation is our number one weapon,”33 he was making the point that at that moment there were no other alternatives eithe
r in terms of propaganda or in terms of politics.
Thus at the beginning of July Goebbels instructed the media “to emphasize even more than before the retaliatory character of our weapon.”34 He considered the speech that Churchill made to the British Parliament on July 6, 1944, concerning the effects of the V weapons as simply an attempt to play them down, and he was pleased to note that the evacuation of women and children from London was being restarted.35
On July 23 in an article in Das Reich dealing with “The Question of Retaliation,” Goebbels stated that it “was not coming to an end but had only just begun.” But he emphasized that in the end technological superiority was decisive only when linked to superior “morale.”36 In his speech broadcast on July 26, Goebbels attempted to sustain people’s hopes about the decisive effects of the new technology by announcing further V weapons. They had “not only caught up with the enemy but overtaken them.” And to emphasize the point he added a personal experience: “Recently, I saw some German weapons, and looking at them not only made my heart beat faster but for a moment it stopped altogether.”37
PREPARATIONS FOR “TOTAL WAR”
Goebbels, however, knew only too well that retaliation propaganda would be insufficient on its own to transform the popular mood. As in the previous year, by renewing the proclamation of “total war” he was banking on sending out a signal to try to mobilize the whole population and thereby gear the public sphere in the Third Reich to the grave wartime conditions. In the middle of July he interpreted the generally very pessimistic reports on the public mood as a “cry for total war,” which he ascribed above all to a speech he had made in Breslau on July 7 as well as to his most recent newspaper articles.38 As in the previous year, in his struggle for the introduction of tougher measures for “total war” Goebbels turned for support to the armaments minister, Speer. On the evening of July 10 he had a long conversation with Speer. Afterward he noted that the armaments minister also thought that “the German people were capable of providing another few million workers and soldiers.”39 Speer and Goebbels agreed that each would send a memorandum to Hitler.
Goebbels: A Biography Page 77