In August Goebbels sent the supreme Reich authorities two circulars exhorting them to adapt their operations to the seriousness of the situation. Everybody should work until their task had been completed, at a minimum of sixty hours a week.68 Moreover, in a further circular he urged that they should cultivate a “style appropriate to wartime” that demonstrated that “we are fighting for our lives.” To achieve this, there should be no more events such as receptions, official appointment ceremonies, commemorations, and the like.69
Goebbels wanted his right to request information from the state authorities to be conferred on the Gauleiters but had to be reminded by Bormann that they already possessed this right.70 Finally, following a proposal from Bormann, a directive for the implementation of total war created Gau and district commissions to inspect public authorities and agencies to see whether they contained personnel who could be called up into the Wehrmacht. The Gauleiter was to take the chair in the Gau commissions, and he was to appoint the chairmen of the district commissions within the Gau. These commissions contained representatives of the various state authorities as well as other “suitable men from the Party and the state.”71
By the end of the year Goebbels aimed to have replaced 1.5 million of the workers in the armaments industry who had a dispensation from service in the armed forces with other personnel. To achieve this, against opposition from Sauckel, he raised the upper age limit for the conscription of women for work from forty-five to fifty;72 he set about finding alternative work for the two hundred thousand foreign women employed as maids; and, finally, he endeavored to secure men from the administration, from industries not vital to the war effort, and from the service sector by carrying out closures, cuts, and rationalization on a large scale. During the following weeks he was fully engaged in this work. Among other things he secured a reduction in postal deliveries, the simplification of ticket inspection on the railways, the closing down of newspapers and journals, the closure of technical schools, the abolition of “excessive questionnaires,” the cancelation of all congresses and conferences as well as the simplification of the tax and social security systems.73
Soon, however, Goebbels found obstacles being put in his path, which he could only partially overcome, especially since Hitler, typically, objected to measures that he considered too radical. Goebbels noted, for example, that Hitler had been “very strongly opposed” to the closure of all theaters and music halls. Once the theaters had been closed they could never be reopened during the war, and “once people had gotten used to the lack of theaters then that could become permanent.” In the end the Führer bowed to the exigencies of “total war.” Theaters, orchestras, cabarets, and other cultural institutions were shut, “initially” for six months.74 Goebbels himself considered closing the theaters to be “the most visible measure indicating a commitment to total war,” which “for psychological reasons must be maintained at all costs,” which is why during the following weeks he fought any attempt to reopen them tooth and nail.75
Hitler succeeded in preventing Goebbels’s attempt to stop people sending packages and private telegrams.76 He also opposed stopping the production of beer and candy. Soldiers needed candy on route marches, and a ban on brewing beer would have “a bad psychological effect in Bavaria.” Goebbels went along with this reluctantly. “The Führer sees this in terms of the Bavarian mentality, which is rather a closed book to me.”77 Goebbels was also unable to prevent art journals from continuing to be published until January 1, blaming it on an intervention with Hitler by his photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann.78 And although on August 28 Hitler agreed to raise the age of female conscription yet again, to fifty-five, in fact this was never put into effect.79
Above all, Goebbels was gradually forced to recognize that his original intention of using the excuse of “total war” to introduce a broader reform of the Reich’s administrative structures (“the major reform of the Reich”) could not be carried out.80 He had already failed the previous year. Although he had succeeded in closing down the Prussian Finance Ministry, Lammers and Bormann succeeded in convincing Hitler that Goebbels’s plan to abolish the office of Prussian prime minister would constitute the removal of an indispensable part of the administration.81 He also failed in his attempt to close down the Economics Ministry and several other government bodies.82
When in October State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart presented a memorandum on reform of the Reich administration, Goebbels described his proposals as “logical and correct” but considered them “impossible to implement at the present time.” “The Führer will never be able to bring himself to undertake such a far-reaching reform of our Reich administration and Reich government, and who knows whether that would be the right thing to do in wartime.”83
DEALING WITH THE CONSPIRATORS
Goebbels responded to the attempt on Hitler’s life on July 20 by ordering the Party’s Reich propaganda department to organize a “series of loyal rallies” in every Gau representing “our nation’s spontaneous response to the heinous assassination attempt.” The “national comrades” were “to be invited to participate in the rallies by the Block Wardens.”84 The SD reports duly referred to the population’s rejection of the assassination attempt.85
During the following days, apart from “total war,” Goebbels spent much time discussing with Hitler the sentencing of the July 20 conspirators, as up and down the land “the people” were demanding that they be severely punished. Hitler told Goebbels that they should make a clean sweep of them at the coming trials. They should all be hanged, as “bullets would be wasted on these criminals.” The question of Rommel came up during these discussions, since according to the investigations he had known about the preparations for the assassination. Goebbels commented disparagingly on this national hero whom he had created: “He’s very useful when things are going well, but the moment there’s a serious crisis Rommel lacks any powers of resistance.”86
The first trial against eight key members of the conspiracy, which took place in the People’s Court on August 7 and 8, was discussed in detail by Hitler and Goebbels beforehand. Goebbels decided to “receive” the chairman of the judges, Roland Freisler, before the start of the trial and to “spell out in detail how the trial is to proceed.” The reckoning with the conspirators should, as Hitler instructed him, “on no account lead to attacks on the officer corps as a whole, on the generals, on the Army or on the aristocracy.” They would, however, “sort out” the aristocracy, according to Hitler “a cancerous growth on the German people,” “sometime later on.”87
The eight death sentences that had been anticipated were given much publicity and according to Goebbels had “a tremendous impact on the German people.”88 There were further trials in the People’s Court lasting until April 1945 with more than 150 people accused of participating in the conspiracy, of whom over a hundred were sentenced to death and hanged.89
At the end of July Goebbels learned from the head of the Security Police and SD, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, that allegedly his old friend, the police president of Berlin, Count Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf, had been involved in the coup attempt.90 By the middle of August Helldorf was standing before the People’s Court where, as it was reported to Goebbels, he had “performed reasonably well.” He had openly confessed to his participation in the affair.91 A week later, however, Goebbels saw a film of the trial in which it was clear that during the interrogation Helldorf had appeared a broken man whose responses had been “tearful.”92 Two hours after the end of the trial he and five other defendants were executed. Goebbels noted that “on Hitler’s orders” before his own execution Helldorf had been forced to watch the executions of two others. Goebbels’s summation of someone whose career he had actively sponsored from the very beginning (although he continued to spell his name incorrectly, despite having known him since 1931) showed relief but no real satisfaction: “That’s the end of the unpleasant story of Helldorff. It’s probably the worst in the history of the Berlin party.”93
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bsp; SETBACKS
On August 15 American and French forces landed in southern France.94 On August 21 in the north of France the Allies succeeded in surrounding the bulk of the German Normandy army in the Falaise pocket and subsequently destroying it. Paris was liberated on August 25, and German forces began hurriedly retreating from France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In the central sector of the front, Allied forces had reached the borders of Germany.95 Summing up the situation at the beginning of September, Goebbels commented: “The situation on the Western Front has now become more than dramatic.” Goebbels had learned that, in view of the encroaching fronts, Speer had requested that Hitler designate the area “he could reckon on being defended at all costs for the whole length of the war in Europe.” Hitler had then described this area “as running along the Somme in the west, ending in the foothills of the Alps in the south, including parts of Hungary in the southeast and in the east running more or less along the current front line. In the north we shall hold onto southern Norway at all costs.” Goebbels responded to this piece of news by commenting that “in view of the growing crisis in the general war situation” they must “come to terms with a reduced set of war aims” and say “goodbye to the fantasies of 1940 and 1941.” If they could succeed in holding on to the area designated by Hitler, then “we would nevertheless have achieved the greatest victory in German history.”96
On August 23 King Michael of Romania dismissed the prime minister, Ion Antonescu, and announced that he wanted to agree to an armistice with the Allies. The decision to leave the alliance with Germany was supported by a large majority of the army and the population. Goebbels’s contemptuous comment that the king had “undoubtedly” been persuaded to make this decision by his “entourage of fawning courtiers” was a complete misreading of the situation.97 When German forces then tried to occupy Bucharest and the Luftwaffe bombed the capital, Romania declared war on Germany on August 25.98
According to Goebbels the armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union at the beginning of September was “not taken too badly in Führer headquarters.” The military consequences were bearable as the German forces succeeded in pulling back to northern Norway. But he considered that politically the loss of their last ally but one was liable “to reduce our chances in the war.”99
The Goebbels family did not remain unaffected by the large German losses on all fronts. On September 9 Goebbels learned that in central Italy Magda’s son, Harald, had “been wounded and was missing in fighting on the Adriatic and there was no news yet of his having been taken prisoner.”100 He told Magda about it only a fortnight later, and she, despite her poor health, took the news “very calmly.” Perhaps, he thought, Harald had been captured by the British, but only if he had been seriously wounded. For “Harald is not a lad to let himself be taken by the enemy through cowardice.”101 Finally, in the middle of November, Goebbels received the news that Harald had been found in a North African POW camp, in recovery after having been seriously wounded. Magda was greatly relieved, and Goebbels admitted in his diary that he “had already given Harald up for dead.”102
“TOTAL WAR”: “THE BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER”
In the meantime Goebbels was continuing with his efforts to make the war “total.” Shortly after his appointment as Reich Plenipotentiary Goebbels had begun to address the “balance between military and civilian manpower.” He wanted to “squeeze” 1.2 million men from the civilian sector to be deployed “on the front line.” An initial quota of three hundred thousand men was established for the month of August, with each Gau being given a target to meet.103 By the beginning of September, apart from a few thousand, the August quota of three hundred thousand had allegedly been met. However, a comparison with the Wehrmacht statistics shows that once again Goebbels was giving rather an overoptimistic assessment of what he had achieved. At the end of September there was still a shortfall of around 30 percent.104
The mobilization of three hundred thousand men, mainly from the armaments industry, led almost inevitably to a conflict with Speer.105 On September 2 the two adversaries put their cases to Hitler, who, according to Goebbels, supported him and declared that it was not a question of “providing weapons or soldiers but weapons and soldiers.” It was essential to take men from the armaments industry in order to provide new divisions.106
The aim in September was to recruit 450,000 men from the civilian sector.107 A few days later, Goebbels gave a figure of only 250,000108 and for October only 240,000 men.109 Later these quotas appear to have been reduced even further.110 Goebbels has little to say in his diaries about the fulfillment of these quotas. However, there is a reference to the fact that at the beginning of October he was still pressing the Gauleiters to fulfill their September quotas.111 It is clear from a calculation at the end of the year that there was a considerable “shortfall” in the September and October quotas, which had to be “made up” during the coming year.112 According to Wehrmacht statistics, with 500,000 men having been recruited by the end of the year, the aim of securing 700,000 men during the months of August, September, and October had not been nearly reached.113
Also, the provision of substitutes, which Goebbels had wanted to achieve through various measures such as the conscription of older women and administrative rationalization, was, according to his own figures, far less successful than he had anticipated. In the middle of September he noted that a total of 1.3 million people had signed on at the labor exchanges but only 125,000 had as yet been placed in employment.114 The recruitment of the armaments workers who had been released from their plants into the Wehrmacht was also happening slowly. Of the 300,000 released in August, only 191,000 had joined the Wehrmacht by the end of October.115
It is typical of Goebbels’s diary entries that rows of such figures can never be followed over long periods. Instead, he keeps introducing new aspects of “total war.” His notes reveal far more about his volatile work methods than about the concrete results of “total war.” They provide a good impression of how he threw himself with great enthusiasm into carrying out parts of a project, putting maximum pressure on his staff, whom he then blamed for the failure to achieve the overall goal, while he himself preened in the glory of apparent successes. Then the topic would fade into the background of his diary entries, to be replaced by a new task, to which he then devoted the same enthusiasm. In implementing “total war” Goebbels was primarily concerned to ensure that the daily life of citizens and thus the image of the Third Reich as a whole was geared to an overall goal, namely total mobilization for war. In a daily life governed by “total war” there was simply to be no place for disruptive debates about the military situation, the possibilities for peace and talk of the postwar era, discussions about who was politically responsible for the disaster, or complaints about the effects of the war. Moreover, as a result of “total war” the existing structures were being eroded and a radicalizing trend unleashed, enabling him, as the general Plenipotentiary, to intervene in almost every sphere. The more the Third Reich moved toward its downfall, the more powerful Joseph Goebbels became.
THE THREAT FROM THE WEST
In September the bombing campaign against the Reich began again with full force, after the main raids during the previous three months had been directed at targets in France. During the four months between September and December 1944 the RAF dropped more bombs on Germany than in the years 1942 and 1943 combined, and the U.S. Air Force exceeded its total of bombs dropped during 1943 six times over.116 The German hydrogenation plants were a key focus of the Allied bombing offensive, particularly in November, and “transportation targets” were also subjected to heavy raids, especially in the west. However, cities continued to be the main target of the raids during autumn 1944.117 On September 10 Mönchengladbach was badly affected.118 On September 11 the RAF succeeded in creating a firestorm in Darmstadt that killed 12,000 people.119 After that the raids focused particularly on Duisburg on October 14 and 15 (causing more than 2,000 deaths), on Ess
en between October 23 and 25 (over 1,600 victims), on Bochum and Solingen (both raids during the night of October 4–5, each causing more than 2,000 deaths). There were also 2,000 deaths in Freiburg, which was bombed on the night of November 27–28. Heilbronn was hit by a devastating raid on the night of December 4–5, during which 5,000 people died and the old part of the city was almost completely destroyed.120 During the autumn Berlin was also subjected to several daylight air raids by the Americans. By far the worst of these occurred on October 6 and December 5.121
Moreover, the western Allies were also operating close to the German border. On September 17 the largest airborne operation of the war began in the area around Arnhem, although the Germans succeeded in preventing Allied troops from seizing the bridge over the Rhine.122 However, in the meantime the Allied forces had advanced into the area around Aachen, posing a much bigger threat and forcing the partial evacuation of the city.123
Under the impression of this direct threat to the western borders of the Reich, Goebbels began advocating a “scorched earth” policy, an idea which had been mentioned in his diaries since the early summer124 and for which he now believed he was sure of Hitler’s support. For “now it’s a matter of all or nothing, and if the nation is fighting for its life, then we mustn’t shrink from the ultimate.”125 But by the following day, after a conversation with Speer, he was beginning to have second thoughts. There was no point in their letting the enemy conquer territory that had been devastated if they were planning soon to re-conquer it.126
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