On January 28 Hitler once again reassured him that they would “slowly manage to reestablish strong lines of defense in the east.” Goebbels noted that it would “naturally be a fatal mistake if we clung to fantasies about our defensive capabilities.” He “sometimes [had] the impression that that is the case with the Führer.” Now he was having increasing doubts. Naturally “it [is] right that we must stop the enemy somewhere. But whether that’s possible with the limited means currently at our disposal will only become clear in the next few days.” Basically he agreed with Hitler that the enemy coalition would collapse, but at the moment there was little sign of its happening.72
Thus at the end of January Goebbels became preoccupied with the question of how to defend Berlin against a Soviet breakthrough.73 His defense of Berlin would, he wrote at the end of January, be a “masterpiece.”74 He organized the building of barricades and tank traps and studied the Soviet preparations for the defense of Leningrad and Moscow.75 He planned the formation of four divisions for Berlin composed of Wehrmacht, police, and Volkssturm,76 but had to put up with the fact that the moment they had been established, at least in rudimentary form, they were dispatched to the Eastern Front. Hitler explained that he wanted the city defended “in the forward area.”77 Lacking strong forces, he contemplated the formation of women’s battalions and units made up of prisoners.78
Using word-of-mouth propaganda he encouraged the Berlin population to leave the city—with relatively little success, which he interpreted as “real trust in our defensive capabilities.”79 As ever he was not slow in publicizing his efforts in the media. On March 18, for example, reporting on the defensive preparations in the capital, Das Reich noted: “Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels is the soul of our defensive operations.”80
At the end of January and the beginning of February Goebbels undertook repeated attempts to persuade Hitler to embark on a foreign policy initiative, preferably toward the west. But Hitler responded negatively: They must “go on waiting until a favorable opportunity” occurred. “I’m only afraid that in the end going on waiting will rob us of our most valuable and perhaps last opportunity,” Goebbels commented critically.81
On February 11 Hitler told Goebbels that he was convinced that Churchill “would like to jump ship if he had the opportunity,” but for domestic and foreign policy reasons he was probably unable to do so. Goebbels then urged Hitler “at least to provide the English with a board from which to spring, but the Führer doesn’t think the time is yet right.” Hitler continued to insist that “during the course of this year the enemy coalition will break up. We must hold on, defend ourselves, and stand our ground waiting for this moment.” Goebbels thought that Hitler was now pinning his hopes more on Great Britain rather than, as had still been the case shortly before, the United States. “But I keep telling the Führer in response to all his arguments that we must take advantage of our political opportunities, which I don’t think is really happening, particularly given the current phase of the war.”82
On February 12, following the Yalta Conference, Hitler once again discussed with Goebbels the prospects for a separate peace. Now it was mainly up to Stalin whether he wanted to cause a breach in the coalition, but in view of his military successes this was highly unlikely. Goebbels believed that Hitler was now “much more receptive to such political considerations.” He felt bound to admit that Hitler was right in thinking that “a political solution” was possible only if they had had some military successes. On the other hand, he reached the logical conclusion: “If we no longer have a military presence at all, then we can no longer exploit a change in the war situation.” But however clear-sighted his conclusion and however much he doubted Hitler’s willingness to end the war and despite all his criticism, Goebbels was not in a position to oppose Hitler’s policy, which amounted to a total catastrophe for the German Reich.
Nevertheless, Goebbels seized the initiative. The following day he discussed matters with the head of the Reich Security Main Office, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. They aimed to use a planned trip to Switzerland by the former Polish ambassador to the United States, Count Jerzy Józef Potocki, who was living in Vienna, to point out to the western powers that Germany was the only power that could prevent the Bolshevization of Europe.83 In fact, of course the whole idea was a nonstarter, and there is no further mention of it in Goebbels’s diaries.
FINAL PROPAGANDA EFFORTS
In their conversations during these weeks Goebbels and Hitler tried to find historical precedents for nations being saved at the last minute as proof that hanging on at all costs was the right strategy. The history of their own party in 1932 was brought up again84 but also the example of Frederick the Great, who in the end won the Seven Years’ War despite his prospects having appeared hopeless.85 Goebbels based this argument on Thomas Carlyle’s biography of the Prussian king, which he passed on to Hitler.86
At the end of January he referred Hitler to the example of the Second Punic War, in which the Romans had finally succeeded in defeating Hannibal despite major setbacks.87 A few weeks later the Führer instructed him to publish lengthy accounts of it in the German press. It was the “great example on which we can and must model our actions.”88 Goebbels, however, believed that another propaganda theme would be more effective than such excursions into history. At the beginning of January, after a long gap—“We mustn’t let the topic be forgotten”89—he once again published an article on the “Jewish question,” in which he revived his old line that the Jews were the “glue that binds the coalition together, despite its major ideological differences and clashes of interest.”90 He could not, however, make the topic of anti-Semitism once again the main leitmotif of German propaganda. That was blocked by Hitler’s statement of April 1944 that anti-Bolshevik and anti-Semitic propaganda should remain distinct.
Goebbels now placed more emphasis on the topic of Bolshevik atrocities than on “Jewish revenge.” In January he had still been wary about releasing “reports on Bolshevik atrocities” in eastern Germany for domestic propaganda.91 But in February he changed his mind. He dismissed fears that using atrocity propaganda might cause a panic; on the contrary, they must commit themselves “unconditionally” to the “final struggle” against Bolshevism.92 On February 7 he wrote that, having secured the requisite authorization from Hitler, “I’m ratcheting up atrocity propaganda against the Soviets throughout the Reich.” However, there was an obstacle in the way of his campaign in the form of the Reich press chief, Otto Dietrich, who believed that “the German people would be shocked” by details of Soviet brutality.93
On February 28 Goebbels made a radio broadcast in which he acknowledged the “military crisis.” They were facing “the hardest test,” and only by maintaining “an iron will to carry on” could they stave off the threat of defeat. He made a fairly brief reference to “horrific reports” from eastern Germany without going into detail about the atrocities. He concluded the broadcast with a lengthy quotation from a letter Frederick the Great wrote to his sister in 1757 at a particularly critical moment during the Seven Years’ War (“We are faced with either death or victory”).94 He described the reception of this address in his diary in unusually guarded terms as “mixed.”95
As Hitler had repeatedly reassured him that he approved of the attack on Soviet atrocities,96 Goebbels endeavored to give the topic greater prominence in propaganda, as for example on March 8, when he undertook a day trip to Silesia, which the front line had now reached. He visited Lauban, which had been reconquered that very morning, although it was largely destroyed. He made a speech in the city hall in Görlitz in front of soldiers, members of the Volkssturm, and civilians, in fact his last public speech, which was shown in the weekly newsreel. In this speech Goebbels emphasized the themes of atrocity and revenge by proclaiming that “those divisions […] which during the coming weeks and months will be taking part in major offensives” would be taking part in this struggle “as if in a religious service” with “their murdered children and rape
d wives before their eyes.”97 In general, however, he was unable to achieve his aim of making the Red Army’s atrocities a propaganda leitmotif with which to mobilize the nation’s last reserves.98
Goebbels tried to persude Hitler to give another speech. He unwillingly agreed to do so,99 but it never happened. “The Führer now has a fear of the microphone that’s incomprehensible to me.”100 Now, lacking resources, he had to switch the focus of propaganda to “small-scale activity”: word-of-mouth propaganda, stickers, chain letters, and the like—of necessity propaganda had to return to the methods of the Party’s “time of struggle.”101
GROWING CRITICISM OF HITLER
After his conversations with Hitler Goebbels eagerly took note of the Führer’s criticism of Göring, of his lack of interest in the political and military situation, his “pompous lifestyle,” his lack of “steadfastness.”102 He had, he told Goebbels on January 31, “serious doubts” about whether Göring was suitable as his successor.103 Goebbels decided to urge Hitler strongly that he must either “get Göring to change both his attitude and his behavior or kick him out.”104 But Hitler kept saying that he did not see any possibility of dismissing the Reich marshal; there was no suitable successor.105
Hitler’s stubborn retention of the Reich marshal was partly responsible for Goebbels increasingly including the Führer in his criticisms. For even when Goebbels finally asked him whether the “German people were going to be destroyed because of the failure of their Luftwaffe,” Hitler continued to hang on to Göring for lack of an alternative.106 “But it’s always the same story when one talks to the Führer about this. He explains the reasons for the Luftwaffe’s failure, but he can’t make up his mind to draw the necessary conclusions.”107 “I’m furious,” he wrote a few days later, “when I think that despite all the good reasons for it and arguments in favor of it, it’s impossible to get the Führer to make the change.”108
The topic of Göring was not the only issue that prompted Goebbels to become increasingly critical of Hitler during these weeks. In March Goebbels’s diaries became full of entries expressing growing doubts about Hitler’s leadership qualities. When Hitler repeatedly complained to him about the generals having given him false prognoses or not having obeyed his orders, he noted that it was “incomprehensible how the Führer, given his clear view of things, could not get his way with the general staff, for after all he is the Führer and is the one who gives the orders.”109 During the following days he kept trying to get Hitler to show greater “decisiveness.”110
On March 15 he wrote in an aggrieved tone that “instead of giving long speeches to his military staff [Hitler] would do better to give them brief orders and then brutally ensure that these orders are carried out. Thus the numerous wrong moves that we have made at the front are attributable not to a faulty assessment of what should be done but rather to flawed methods of leadership.”111 He could tell from the reports on the public mood that Hitler was now quite evidently included in the criticism of the regime’s policies that was now prevalent among the population.112
Goebbels could not understand the decision Hitler made in the middle of the month to continue to evacuate people in the west, even though the population was refusing to leave their homes. “The Führer’s decision is based on the wrong premises.”113 Toward the end of the month he came to the conclusion that “in some respects we are fighting the war in a vacuum. We in Berlin are giving out orders that lower down the line are effectively not even received, let alone carried out. I can see the danger of a massive loss of authority.”114 After a lengthy discussion with Hitler on the same day he noted resignedly: “When talking to Hitler one feels ‘Yes, you’re right. Everything you say is true. But when will there be some action?’ ”
It was not by chance that he kept commenting on Hitler’s physical frailty. Thus at the beginning of March he was “horrified” to note that “the nervous shaking in Hitler’s left hand […] [had] gotten a lot worse”; at the end of the month he noted “sadly that his gait is much more bent.”115 Although the entries indicate that he was concerned about whether Hitler was physically and psychologically in a fit state to lead the country, he kept convincing himself that Hitler was indeed fully capable of doing so.116 Goebbels could not free himself from his total psychological dependence on his Führer.
PEACE IN THE EAST?
Goebbels was increasingly concerned about whether it would still be possible to find the right moment to undertake a peace initiative with one side or the other. Having repeatedly discussed this question with Hitler in January and February, at the beginning of March Goebbels discovered to his surprise that Hitler no longer considered the best prospects for a separate peace to be in the west but rather in the east, as Stalin was having “very serious difficulties” with the Anglo-Americans. After having reached a deal with the Soviet Union, Hitler then wanted “to continue the fight against Britain with the most brutal energy.”117
On the same day, on March 4, Goebbels learned from Ribbentrop’s liaison at Führer headquarters, Walther Hewel, that the foreign minister’s attempts “to put out feelers to the western countries […] have no prospect of success at the moment.” Goebbels was now finally prepared to put all his efforts into seeking an arrangement with the Soviet Union. On March 7 he met Himmler in Hohenlychen, the SS sanatorium north of Berlin, where the Reichsführer was recuperating from a nervous breakdown following the failure of the Army Group Vistula, which he was commanding, to halt the Red Army offensive in Pomerania. This defeat also marked the start of the final break between Hitler and his “loyal Heinrich.” For Hitler told Goebbels some days later that he blamed Himmler personally for this defeat and was accusing him of disobedience. Hitler had already dropped plans, which Goebbels had supported, to make Himmler commander-in-chief of the army.118 Thus the Himmler Goebbels met on March 7 was not only in poor health but was also someone whose aura as the second most powerful man in the Third Reich was in decline. Himmler told Goebbels that “reason tells him that we have little hope of winning the war militarily, but his instinct tells him that sooner or later a political opportunity will occur to secure a change in our favor. Himmler sees this as being more likely to occur in the west than in the east. […] I believe that we have a better chance in the east, as Stalin seems to me more of a realist than the English-American lunatics.”119
However, he did not express these views to Himmler on March 7. He now knew that Himmler’s idea that they could establish contact with the west had completely isolated him politically and that any further attempts to put out feelers to the west would inevitably lead to a final breach with Hitler. On leaving the sanatorium Goebbels was quite cheerful: “I felt that Himmler was surrounded by a very nice, modest and absolutely National Socialist atmosphere, which was extremely agreeable.”
A few days later Goebbels learned that the idea of a “western option” had finally been abandoned. Ribbentrop had had to admit that his attempts to establish contacts with Britain via Stockholm had proved a complete fiasco.120 The almost triumphant tone in which Goebbels recorded this and other pieces of news shows that, in the face of the catastrophic situation, he took comfort from one thought: Whereas Göring, Himmler, and Ribbentrop were setting their hopes on contacts with the west, he knew that at this moment Hitler was looking only to the east.
Four days after his visit to Himmler, Hitler confirmed Goebbels in his approach. “A separate peace with the Soviet Union would not of course fulfill our 1941 aims, but the Führer hopes that nevertheless there will be a division of Poland and that Germany will acquire sovereignty over Hungary and Croatia and secure a free hand in the west.” Goebbels considered this “program […] terrific and convincing.” The only problem was that “for the time being [!]…there is no possibility of achieving it.”121
On March 21 Hitler, who made a very tired and worn-out impression and was “somewhat in despair” about the military situation, told Goebbels that the enemy coalition would “inevitably break up, so it i
s only a question of whether it breaks up before we are knocked out or when we have already been knocked out.” Once again Hitler was assuming that the breakup of the enemy coalition would be “more likely to be caused by Stalin than by Churchill and Roosevelt.”
After Goebbels had once again tried in vain to persuade Hitler of the need to appoint a new commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, he was on the edge of despair. “How can I do what I know is the right thing to do? I feel a great moral and national sense of duty toward the German people, since I’m one of the few people who now still have the ear of the Führer. Such an opportunity must be exploited in every sphere. But I can’t do more than I am doing.”
On March 22 he saw a real chance to intervene in the course of events. He urged Hitler to put out feelers to the Soviet Union via Sweden. “But the Führer doesn’t want to. The Führer thinks that at the moment making an approach to the enemy would be a sign of weakness.” Goebbels took a very different view. “I take the view that the enemy already knows we’re weak and that we are not proving it to him through our willingness to negotiate. But the Führer won’t budge. He thinks that speaking to a leading Soviet representative would simply encourage the English and Americans to make further concessions to Stalin and the negotiations would end in complete failure.” Despite having serious doubts, Goebbels was obliged to settle for this response.
At the beginning of April he learned that the Foreign Ministry had put out feelers in Switzerland, Sweden, and Spain in order to assess the enemy’s willingness to make peace, but this had yielded completely negative results. The feelers to the Soviet Union had proved the most productive, although it was demanding East Prussia, which “naturally” was out of the question. Goebbels put the main blame for the failure of these contacts on the Foreign Ministry’s incompetence.122
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