4. ADAP D VII, no. 513, Schmidt note about the conversation between Henderson and Ribbentrop on 1 and 2 September 1939, no. 515, Schmidt note of 2 September about the conversation between Ribbentrop and Coulondre of 1 September 1939; on these conversations, see TB, 2 September 1939.
5. ADAP, D VII, no. 560, British ultimatum of 3 September 1939, no. 561. German reply from the same day, ADAP D VII, no. 563, note about the conversation between Ribbentrop and Coulondre of 3 September; TB, 4 September 1939.
6. TB, 4 September 1939; these appeals were published in VB (B) of 4 September.
7. BAK, ZSg 109/3, V. I., in particular 6 September, no. 3, 7 September, no. 4, 8 September, 2. E., no. 2, 9 September, no. 4, 10 September, no. 3, 11 September, no. 1, 12 September, no. 3, and 14 September 1939, no. 1; VB (B), 8 September 1939, “Grauenhafte polnische Verbrechen an Volksdeutschen” (headline), 9 September, 1939, “Das Blut der Gemordeten in Bromberg fordert London vor das Weltgericht” (headline), and a page of photos, 10 September 1939, “Ganz Wirsitz sollte in die Luft gesprengt werden!” (headline), 13 September 1939, “Polens schmutzige Waffen: Heckenschützenkrieg und Greuelpropaganda,” 14 September 1939, “Schärfste Maßnahmen gegen das polnische Heckenschützentum—Von jetzt ab mit allen Mitteln!” (headline), 15 September 1939, “Posen ein zweites Bromberg” (headline).
8. Jansen and Weckbecker, Der “Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz” in Polen 1939/40, 27ff.; Jastrzebski, Der Bromberger Blutsonntag; Böhler, Der Überfall, 112ff.
9. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945, 48; Böhler, Überfall, 116.
10. Jansen and Weckbecker, Der “Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz,” 111ff.; Böhler, Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. On the Einsatzgruppen, see Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland, 88ff.; Rossino, “Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy During the Polish Campaign”; Krausnick, “Die Einsatzgruppen vom Anschluß Österreichs bis zum Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Entwicklung und Verhältnis zur Wehrmacht,” 33ff.; Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers investigate the role of the order police and the Waffen SS in an edited volume, Genesis des Genozids.
11. BAB, R 58/825, 8 September 1939.
12. TB, 4 September 1939. TB, 5 September 1939: “Vigorously attack England’s government but leave the people alone. Don’t touch France.” A similar line appears in TB, 6, 7, 10, 13, and 15 September 1939; BAK, ZSg 109/4, 4 September, no. 1, 5 September, no. 7, and 15 September 1939, no. 2.
13. Longerich, Propagandisten, 134ff.; TB, 18 August 1939.
14. ADAP D VII, no. 574.
15. ADAP D VIII, no. 31, Führerbefehl vom 8 September 1939; Otto Dietrich, 12 Jahre, 129f.; TB, 7 and 9 September 1939.
16. TB, 9 September 1939, and 14 September 1939.
17. TB, 5 November 1939. Negative about Dietrich also in 13 January, 16 March, 18 April 1940. Some of the minutes of the ministerial briefings are edited in BK and in Boelcke (ed.), Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg? (henceforth BW); a complete series for the years 1939–43 is in the Special archive in Moscow, Bestand 1363-3 (henceforth MK).
18. Longerich, Propagandisten, 137.
19. BK, 140ff.; on his further disputes with the AA, see also TB, 28 October, 18, 19, 21, 23, and 24 November, 21 December 1939.
20. TB, 6 October 1939.
21. TB, 12 and 13 December 1939.
22. Criticism also in TB, 16 September, and 5, 6 (quotation), 15 and 27 October, 17 and 26 November, 13, 15, and 22 December 1939 and 9–11 January 1940.
23. TB, 29 and 30 December 1939; Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 184ff.
24. Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 188.
25. TB, 6, 12, and 18 September 1939.
26. TB, 6 October 1939.
27. TB, 9 and 15 September 1939.
28. TB, 10, 11, and 13, also 3 September 1939; on the Italian initiative, see Thielenhaus, Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand, 196ff.; and Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941, 49ff.
29. TB, 3 and 4 October 1939.
30. ADAP D VIII, no. 176, Schmidt note concerning the conversation between Hitler and Ciano on 2 October 1939; no. 222, Weizsäcker note, 9 October 1939.
31. TB, 4 and 22 September 1939; also 21, 24, 25, and 26 September.
32. Domarus II, p. 1317.
33. RGBl. 1939 II, 1683.
34. Various documents in BAB, R 43 II/669, to some extent published and discussed in detail in Latour, “Goebbels’ ‘Außerordentliche Rundfunkmaßnahmen’ 1939–1942”; here also the letter from Hess of 3 September (p. 420f.); VB (B), 2 September 1939, “Das Abhören ausländischer Sender ist verboten!”; TB, 2, 3, and 5 September 1939. On the origins of the decree, see most recently Hensle, Rundfunkverbrechen, 26ff., which emphasizes above all the role of Hess.
35. On the legal proceedings, see Gruchmann, Justiz im Dritten Reich, 905. Only a few death sentences were actually carried out. TB, 14 December 1939: “A lot of people are listening to foreign broadcasts. I get a few draconian sentences passed and published. Maybe that will help.”
36. Gruchmann, Justiz, 901ff.; on the Gestapo executions, see Broszat, “Zur Perversion der Strafjustiz im Dritten Reich.” On the publication of the sentences, see BAK, ZSg 109/4, VI, 4 October 1939, 8. This shows that the Reich propaganda offices decided which cases should be given publicity.
37. Minutes in 2852-PS, IMT 31, 224ff.
38. TB, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 23 September, 8 and 10 October 1939. On the population’s concern, see the clear evidence in Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938–1945, Bericht zur innenpolitischen Lage, 11 October 1939, 339ff., esp. 345f.; 13 October 1939, 347ff., esp. 355f., 20 October 1939, 372ff., esp. 377.
39. TB, 16 November 1939; Session of 15 November, IMT 31, 236ff.; Müller, Organisation und Mobilisierung, 364ff.
40. TB, 8 November 1939; BK, 20 November 1939, 3.
41. Domarus II, 1354ff. TB, 20 September 1939: “A terrific speech.” Also 21 September 1939 on the speech’s impact. Because of this speech Goebbels had to cancel a planned broadcast speech (18 September 1939).
42. TB, 28 September 1939.
43. TB, 28 and 30 September 1939.
44. TB, 30 September 1939. The notes made on the same day by Rosenberg about Hitler’s plans for Poland are very similar. Rosenberg, Tagebuch, 81. When Goebbels writes in his diary “The Führer explains the situation to me,” he appears to be somewhat exaggerating the intimacy of this meeting.
45. Details in Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 251ff.
46. TB, 1 October 1939.
47. ADAP D VIII, no. 157.
48. TB, 1 October 1939.
49. TB, 4 October 1939.
50. Domarus II, 1377ff., quotation 1390; Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945, 364f.
51. TB, 6 October 1939, and 7 October.
52. TB, 12 October 1939.
53. TB, 14 Otober 1939.
54. Kershaw, Hitler. 1936–1945, 365.
55. TB, 13 October 1939 (see also 14 and 18 October on his agreement with Hitler’s anti-British attitude).
56. TB, 11 October 1939; see also the corresponding press directives: BAK, ZSg 102/19, 24 October 1939; BAK, ZSg 109/4 VI of 24 October 1939, and 25 October 1939.
57. TB, 8 November 1939.
58. TB, 5 and 7 September 1939; BAK, ZSg 102/19, 4–7 September 1939; Reuth, Goebbels, 431f.
59. TB, 14, 15, and 19 October 1939; BAK, ZSg 102/19, 14 October 1939.
60. VB (B), 21 October 1939, “Churchill am Pranger”; 23 October 1939, “Schneidende Abrechnung mit einem Erzlügner. ‘Jetzt hat der Angeklagte Winston Churchill das Wort’ ”; 24 October 1939, “Wann antwortet Winston Churchill? Erste faule Ausflüchte des Angeklagten nach der Rundfunkrede von Dr. Goebbels” (headline); TB, 20 October, 23 October, 24, 25, 26, 27 October; BAK, ZSg 102/109, 22 October 1939 (broadcast speech recommended to the press). On the Athenia incident, see ibid., VI, 19 October 1939, 1. E., no. 1, 20 October 1939, no. 6; 23 October 1939, no. 3. 912-D, published in IMT 36, 3ff. (British minute of the broadcast speech). The Athenia incident continued to be used by German propaganda into the following year.
/> 61. TB, 10 October 1939.
62. BAK, ZSg 102/19, 20 October 1939; see also 24 October: “Eine Berichterstattung in Polen ist im allgemeinen unerwünscht.”
63. Dobroszycki, Die legale polnische Presse im Generalgouvernement 1939–1945, 66ff.; Frank, Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen, 52.
64. TB, 2 November 1939; see also Reuth, Goebbels, 434f.
65. TB, 3 November 1939.
66. TB, 9 November 1939.
67. TB, 10–15 November 1939.
68. TB, 13 and 14 November 1939; BK, 11 November, 1; 13 November, 1, emphasizes England’s responsibility; DAZ, 10 November 1939 (E), “Hintergründe und Vorbereitungen”; Der Angriff, 11 November 1939, “Mit Pfund und Höllenmaschine.”
69. TB, 16 and 17 November 1939.
70. VB (B), 22 November 1939, “Der Attentäter gefaßt” (headline); 23 November 1939, “Otto Straßer das Werkzeug des englischen Geheimdienstes: Wiederholte Anschläge auf den Führer” (headline); 24 November 1939, “Captain Stevens sagt aus: Intelligence Service organisierte 1937–1938 Schiffs-Sabotageakte” (headline); 25 November 1939, “So wurde Straßers Werkzeug Elser zur Strecke gebracht.” Similar line in the DAZ from 22 November and in Der Angriff on 22 November 1939.
20. “THERE IS ONLY ONE SIN: COWARDICE!”
1. TB, 22 January 1940.
2. TB, 6 February 1940.
3. TB, 28 January 1940. See also 4, 5, 7, and 8 March 1940.
4. TB, 20 March 1940. ADAP D IX, no. 1, Aufzeichnung des Gesandten Schmidt über die Unterredung; Kershaw, Hitler. 1936–1945, 396ff.
5. TB, 19/20 March 1940; BK, 18 March 1940, 1: They were not going to respond to rumors about the meeting; also 19 March 1940, 2.
6. TB, 29 December 1939; BK, 28 December 1939, 3.
7. TB, 13 January 1940.
8. TB, 25 January 1940.
9. TB, 15 March 1940. At the end of December Hitler had already referred to the removal of a class of “west European” leaders by the Bolsheviks (TB, 29 December 1939).
10. TB, 16 March 1940.
11. TB, 21 March 1940. See also BK, 9 January 1940 as well as 5 and 16 January 1940, according to which Goebbels had adopted a more benign attitude toward the anticommunist literature. However, see BAK, ZSg 101/15, 1 February 1940, Anweisung no. 224: “Representations of Russian life must not be allowed to create the impression among the German public that we want a kind of ideological amalgamation and that it is as if we were simply adopting and imitating Bolshevist ideology.”
12. TB, 12 April 1940.
13. Longerich, Propagandisten, 139. During this period there are repeated complaints in the diaries about the relationship with the Foreign Ministry: 23 January 1940: The AA was trying to “lure [editors] away” by offering higher salaries; see also 1 February 1940; 12 March 1940: The AA was wanting to “tempt [his able officials] away” also: 12, 16, and 19 January, 6, 7, 8, 13, 16, and 17 February, 3, 22, and 30 March, also 3, 5, and 6 April 1940.
14. TB, 9 January 1940; and 5, 12, 23, 25, and 28 January 1940.
15. BK, 18 March 1940, 10: “Der Minister betont nochmals, daß über deutsche Kriegsziele in der deutschen Presse überhaupt nichts erscheinen darf.” Ibid. 6 May, 1 and 10 June 1940, 6; BAK, ZSg 102/29, TB of 5 November 1940: Reflections on the “future organization of Europe and the world” were “inappropriate”; see also Longerich, Propagandisten, 69ff.
16. TB, 14, 15, and 18 November 1939.
17. TB, 17 November, 12 December 1939; see also 7 November 1939.
18. TB, 13 December 1939; BK, 12 December 1939, 1, corresponding instruction to Fritzsche; see also TB, 21 and 24 December 1939.
19. TB, 21 and 22 December 1939; BAK, ZSg 102/19, 20 December 1939, Verstärkung der Plutokratiepropaganda; ibid.: BAK, ZSg 109/6, VI 5 December 1939, 2. E, no. 1, 7 December 1939, 1. E, no. 2, 20 December 1939, no. 1; BK, 23 December 1939, 3.
20. TB, 21 and 23 December 1939; BK, 2 February 1940, 3; BAK, ZSg 109/8, VI, 2 February 1940, no. 6: “Alle kommentarfähigen Zeitungen haben bis spätestens Dienstag einen Aufklärungsartikel über den Begriff ‘Plutokratie’ zu bringen.” Also BAK, ZSg 109/9VI, 27 March 1940, no. 2.; VB (B), 3 February 1940: “Was ist Plutokratie? Eine deutliche Antwort geschichtlicher Tatsachen.”
21. BAK, ZSg 109/7, VI, 13 January 1940; Longerich, Davon, 154.
22. TB, 26 January 1940; Umbreit, “Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Westeuropa,” 251. The incident had occurred on 10 January. When, as a result, the Belgian and Dutch armed forces were placed on alert Hitler did not consider it necessary to inform Goebbels of the reasons for the postponement (TB, 16 January 1940). Apart from the intelligence leak, weather conditions also played a part in the decision to postpone the offensive. See also Reuth, Goebbels, 439f.
23. OKH had worked out the final plan for “Sickle Cut” by 24 February; Umbreit, “Kampf,” 254ff. Originally the attack was planned for mid-April (ibid., 283).
24. Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung der europäischen Nordflanke,” 203ff.
25. TB, 7, also 8 and 9 May 1940 (quotation).
26. Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung,” 197. In December 1939 Hitler agreed to an investigation by OKW of the possibility of an invasion of Norway in December 1939, in February 1940 appointed General Falkenhorst to head a special staff that had been formed in the meantime and on 1 March 1940 signed the directive “Weserübung” (Weser Excercise). On the background, see Bohn, Reichskommissariat Norwegen, 15ff.; Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien; Loock, Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven, 518ff.
27. TB, 9 and 10 April 1940.
28. On the military details of the operation, see Hubatsch, “Weserübung”; Ottmer, “Weserübung.”
29. TB, 10 April 1940; VB (B), 10 April 1940, “Memorandum der Reichsregierung.”
30. BK, 10 April 1940, 1; TB, 10 April 1940.
31. TB, 11 April 1940.
32. TB, 12 and 13 April 1940; BK, 11 April 1940, 1.
33. TB, 14 April 1940; BK, 13 April 1940, 2 and 3.
34. On the first problems, see TB, 11 and 12 April 1940, but optimistic on 13 and 14 April 1940.
35. TB, 14 and 15 April 1940; Hubatsch, “Weserübung,” 110ff.
36. BK, 16 April 1940, 1, 17 April 1940, 19 April 1940, 1; TB, 16 and 17 April 1940.
37. TB, 17 April 1940.
38. TB, 19 April 1940. VB (B), 15 April 1940, reports on the battle near Narvik, but does not mention the German casualties; VB (B), 19 April, “Heldenhafter Kampf vor Narvik” (headline).
39. TB, 21 April 1940.
40. Loock, Quisling, 366ff.
41. TB, 26 April 1940. See also 25 April 1940: “In the ministerial briefing I speak up again for Quisling. We mustn’t oppose him so long as the Führer supports him. I don’t want any member of the Ministry to do that.” BK, 26 April 1940, 1: “The Quisling issue has to be put on the back burner for the time being […].”
42. TB, 28 April 1940.
43. “But we want to give him another chance” (TB, 9 May 1940); “he should be dropped” (25 May 1940). Goebbels received Quisling at the beginning of July: “A völkisch-Germanic dreamer, more of a professor than a political fighter. I don’t really believe he can lead a country. But his heart’s in the right place and ideologically he’s OK” (6 July 1940). “He should remain in Norway and lead the party. That’s OK. If he can get his way then fine, if he can’t then it’s his own fault” (22 July 1940). “Quisling will now secure the influence he deserves after all.” (24 September 1940).
44. Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung,” 219. TB, 26, 27, 28, and 30 April, 1 and 5 May; BK, 29 April 1940, 1, Propaganda should emphasize the “hardships and difficulties” of the German troops, similarly 30 April 1940, 2, and 30 May 1940, 1.
45. Maier and Stegemann, “Die Sicherung,” 219.
46. TB, 5 May 1940: “That really annoys the Führer.”
47. BK, 7 May 1940, 1.
48. TB, 7 May 1940.
49. TB, 10 May 1940.
50. TB,
11 May 1940.
51. ADAP D IX, no. 214 (Belgium and the Netherlands) and no. 215 (Luxemburg). On Goebbels’s role in the war in the West, see Reuth, Goebbels, 445ff.
52. TB, 11 May 1940; Umbreit, “Kampf,” 285.
53. TB, 11, 12, and 13 May 1940; Ueberschär, Freiburg im Luftkrieg, 1939–1945, 88ff.
54. BK, 10 May 1940, 2.
55. BK, 11 May 1940, 3.
56. TB, 11 May 1940.
57. TB, 3 May, very similar on 18 June 1940.
58. See, for example, TB, 15 September 1940 and 19 November 1941.
59. On the military course of the war in the West, see Umbreit, “Kampf,” 284ff.
60. TB, 22 May 1940.
61. TB, 14, 15 May 1940; BK, 12 May 1940, 3.
62. TB, from 18 May onward almost daily entries on the work of the radio stations. From 17 May onward every day the minutes of the ministerial briefings contain detailed instructions for the work of the secret radio stations. On the secret radio stations, see Boelcke, Die Macht des Radios, 171ff.
63. TB, 21 and 22 May 1940.
64. TB, 30 May 1940 as well as 1 and 2 June 1940; BK, 30 May 1940, 1, and 7; BAK, ZSg 109/11, VI of 29 May 1940, 8, as well as 30 May 1940, 1, and 31 May 1940, 6. On the implementation, see VB (N), 29 May 1940, “Feige Mörder als ‘Ankläger’ ”; 30 May 1940, “Deutscher Fliegeroberst schändlich von Franzosen mißhandelt”; 31 May 1940, “Gefangene grausam gequält und ermordet”; 1 June 1940, “Französische Tobsucht”; 2 June 1940, “Der Zusammenbruch des französischen Nationalismus.”
65. TB, 5 June 1940.
66. TB, 21 August 1935: “Torgler has written a book attacking communism. Führer is interested in it”; 25 January 1937: “Torgler is given a salary of 800 Mk per month by the Führer. He is to work on academic matters but not appear in public.” In spring 1941, however, Hitler told Goebbels surprisingly that he believed that Torgler had organized the Reichstag fire, which Goebbels refused to believe (TB, 9 April 1941).
67. TB, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 June 1940; BK, 2 and 8 June 1940, 2 (on the employment of the communists); during June there are repeated references to the secret radio stations in the minutes of the ministerial briefings (BK). There is no further information on this activity in Podewin and Heuer, Ernst Torgler.
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