by Sam Willis
23
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A Three Decker, without a Mizentopgallant Mast
24
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A Two Decker compleat
25
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Ditto
26
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Ditto
They were in the same Order the next morning but some of their Defects, apparently made good.
CHRST. NICHOLLS
Signal Lieutenant’s Log of the Royal Sovereign
Howe enclosed with his letters numerous documents and reports including this extract from the signal lieutenant’s log of the Royal Sovereign, flagship of the van division. It is useful because it provides an alternative view of the events and does so in a format which includes the timing and detail of signals. The signalling system is particularly significant in this battle because it was actually invented by Howe and he was using it to signal his own tactical ideas. Howe didn’t just win this battle; he did so using his own ideas expressed through his own signalling system, which was quite some achievement.
That he was fond of signals is made rather obvious by this log. According to this, Howe made his first signal at 04.00, well before dawn, so that it could be seen as soon as the lookouts were able to see. At 05.50 he then made his next signal, to alter course, and then a flurry of signals which included signal number 34, ‘to engage and pass through the enemy’s line’, and then signal 36, made at 08.24, ‘for each ship of the fleet to steer for, and independently engage the ship opposed to her in the enemy’s line’. This was the essence of Howe’s tactics on 1 June. He did not intend to cut through the enemy line in one body but for every ship of his fleet to cut though the line astern of the ship opposite them in the French line.
Howe’s innovative tactics required each ship to break the line astern of the ship opposite them in the French line.
The French line would thus not be broken once, but at every link in its chain. It was an entirely novel tactic designed to disrupt the enemy’s line and then prevent his ships from escaping to leeward. What this log does not reveal is that, in spite of these very clear signals, only five British captains actually did as Howe had ordered. This has been taken as clear evidence of Howe’s poor style of command or of his subordinates’ poor response to his signals. But we also know that these explicit signalled orders were protected by a cartilage of unwritten rule and convention and were boosted by verbal and written orders passed between captains and their commanders. In this instance we know that Howe’s signalled order to break through the line co-existed with an understanding that, in the confusion of battle, it might not be possible. Although generations of historians have condemned Howe or his captains for failing to execute his plan, Howe, after several days of contact and with a fleet of damaged ships, made no such criticism of his men nor is there any evidence of confusion among his subordinates.
At 08.00 Admiral Graves ordered Captain George Berkeley of the Marlborough to swap places with him in the line so that the three-decked Sovereign would line up against a three-decker in the enemy fleet. This was standard practice and a matter of honour as much as of practicality. Flag-officers wanted to engage flag-officers and the best way of occupying an enemy three-decker and preventing her from savaging weaker ships was to keep her engaged with a ship of similar size. This was a particular concern for the British in this battle because the French three-deckers were enormous, far bigger in every dimension than their British counterparts and armed with more, and heavier, guns. The master of the 100-gun Royal Sovereign lined her up with the appropriately named 110-gun Terrible, an absolute brute of a ship of 2,500 tons, 325 tons larger than the Sovereign and no less than 13 feet deeper in the hold. If she was fully manned, she would have had 389 more men than the undermanned Sovereign, enough to crew two frigates.
The Caesar, under Captain Molloy, receives several mentions, all for failing to do what was expected, and other ships are reprimanded with her: the Russel, Marlborough, Impregnable and Barfleur. It is evidence that several captains were not behaving as their Admiral expected, of whom the worst offender was Molloy.
At 09.50, just 27 minutes after opening fire, Graves was injured and taken below to the surgeon. From this moment on Collingwood was in command of the Royal Sovereign. The log then gives a vivid description of a French three-decker rolling so heavily that water poured into her lowest gunports. This was quite a common occurrence because the lowest gunports were often no more than three feet above the waterline. It was certainly not a problem experienced by the French alone; we know that the lowest deck of Howe’s flagship was also awash and that the water had to be drained by opening the lee gunports.10
At 11.17 the Sovereign was hit by gunfire from another British ship, the Valiant. Such accidents were common in sailing warfare because the guns generated such a thick cloud of smoke that entire ships would vanish from sight. The French then grouped together and rallied, forcing the Sovereign to flee to the protection of other British men of war. This was more evidence of impressive French seamanship in the heat of battle, as had already been demonstrated on 29 May.
By 14.40 the battle was over and the Sovereign had secured a prize. The America took aboard no less than 301 prisoners, a large and potentially dangerous number for a ship that began the action with 762 men, but whose numbers were now reduced by 58 dead or injured.
At the bottom of the page is a poignant reminder of the inaccuracy of these logs: the Master freely admits that the timings may not be accurate because the sailor allotted that task was killed at 09.40, only 17 minutes after the engagement began and a full five hours before it finished.
Rear-Admiral T. Pasley to Admiral Howe, 6 June 1794
This is one of the captains’ reports that Howe enclosed with his letter to the Admiralty. It is written by Thomas Pasley of the Bellerophon, a man renowned for his courage and a ship renowned for her speed. His letter is dated 6 June, a full five days after the main battle and more than a week since he fired the first shots of these engagements when he opened fire on the Révolutionnaire. The delay in writing is explained by Pasley’s loss of a leg on 1 June which he refers to in the first paragraph as ‘my unfortunate situation’. The letter has been written by a secretary and Pasley is barely able to scrawl his name at the end (p. 67).
He comments on the conduct of his own ship and others that he could see. He begins with a brief discussion of the Bellerophon’s conduct on 28 May with specific reference to his clever manoeuvre which brought the Bellerophon into contact with the enemy long before any other British ship. It was an inspired and extremely courageous piece of seamanship. The Bellerophon was a 74-gun Third Rate, similar in size to the Audacious, and was thus dwarfed by the 110-gun Révolutionnaire. Like Parker of the Audacious and Howe himself, Pasley believes erroneously that the Révolutionnaire has been captured.
His comments on the conduct of the van division on 1 June confirm the observations made in Howe’s second letter (p. 52) and in the log of the Royal Sovereign (p. 60). Pasley singles out the Russel, Leviathan and Caesar as ships which did not act as expected, an uncomfortable observation that caused a man who had just lost a leg ‘great pain’. Pasley also draws attention to the curious behaviour of the Tremendous. Although she appeared to Pasley to be undamaged, her rig, in fact, was so shattered that she was immobile while her hull was leaking so much that the pumps were in constant use. Adequate excuses were also discovered for the behaviour of the Russel and the Leviathan but Molloy of the Caesar was court martialled. He claimed in his defence that his ship was too damaged to comply with his orders, an excuse that was not accepted by the court. Even after all these years, Molloy reeks of incompetence.
The letter finishes with a characteristic Pasleyan flash of splendid language, praising the ‘steady coolness and determined intrepidity’ of his crew. A magnificent letter, it rings with pride and zeal even though it was dictated by a man wracked with exhaustion and pain. It will come as no surprise that Pasley was loved deeply by hi
s crew and widely admired by his fellow professionals. He was a consummate 18th-century fighting sailor and his loss to the service at the start of this war was a grievous blow to the Royal Navy.
BELLEROPHON AT SEA
THE 6TH JUNE 1794.
My Lord
It was not my intention to have made any Publick report upon the proceedings of the ships that came within my observation until I should have been able to have done it in Person; but as from my present unfortunate situation it may be some time before I shall have that satisfaction and your Lordships order of the 5th instant puts it out of my power to suppress my sentiments I cannot but lament what I am called upon in honour to relate.
With respect to the attack made upon the Enemies rear on the evening of the 28th ultimo I have but little to observe upon, except to remark, that, on that day and for some days before the Bellerophon was the worst sailing ship of the flying squadron; yet by embracing the moment for tacking after the Enemy, she was enabled to bring their Rear Ship to action, with which she was engaged alone near an hour and an half. As from the situation of the Queen Charlotte your Lordship had a full view of the conduct of the Captains who were able to get up with the Enemy, I shall forbear to make any strictures, as I conceive the intention of your Lordship was effected by the enemies progress being retarded. I feel it my duty however to remark that I made the Gibraltars signal to assist the ships engaged at 14 min: past and at 9, I ordered the Marlborough to make sail for the same purpose – It is a duty I owe to the Captains of the Leviathan and Audacious to observe, that in their attack upon the enemies rear, they behaved most nobly, and, that through the steady conduct of the latter, their Rear ship was captured. the Bellerophon had been obliged to take in her main topsail a shot having upset the Main Cap and totally disabled it.
In regard to the proceedings of the 29th, the situation of the Bellerophon being next astern of the Charlotte, nothing of moment came within my view; but what must have been remarked by your Lordship.
I have now my Lord to make my remarks upon the division of the Van squadron under my more particular direction on the 1st inst. the Marlborough having exchanged situations with the Royal Sovereign I have only to observe upon the behaviour of the Russel, Leviathan and Cæsar, and it gives me great pain in being obliged to report that Admiral Graves made Cæsar’s signal to make more sail when we were going down to the attack, and, that I felt myself under the disagreeable necessity of throwing out her pendant twice for close action, while in battle, viz: at 23 min: past 10 and at 12 min: past 11 o’clock, at which times she was laying near half a mile to windward and not before the Bellerophons beam – neither of these sigls were complied with – and Captain Hope reported to me that he thought it his duty, after I was taken off the deck, to make the Cæsars signal again for close battle – to Chace the van ship of the enemy, then veering and making off – and when they hauled upon the starboard tack, signal was made for the Cæsar to do the same, the Cæsar hauled her wind; but the other signal to chace was not complied with – I make no doubt, but Captain Molloy will explain to your Lordship his reasons for his conduct.
Lord Hugh Conway and Captain Payne demand my warmest praise, particularly the former, who supported me most gallantly during the whole of the battle.
How it came to pass I cannot tell; but as the Tremendous was observed from the Bellerophon laying upon the Leviathans quarter and near three quarters of a mile to windward of that ship, I made her signal at 35 min: past 10 for close battle, which she answered at 54 min: past 10 by signal of inability – the Tremendous did not appear to be damaged either in Masts Sails or Yards.
Before I close my Letter permit me my Lord to pay the tribute due to Captain Hope and the Officers and Crew of the Bellerophon who supported me during the several actions with a steady coolness and determined Intrepidity.
I have the honour to be
My Lord
Your Lordships
most faithful and Obedt
Humble Servant
Thos. Pasley
Boatswain’s damage report of HMS Brunswick
In the midst of battle on 1 June, two ships, the British Brunswick and the French Vengeur du People, fought the battle in microcosm, the might of the British and the determination of the French playing out in a private duel. And what a duel it was (fig. 4).
John Harvey, captain of the Brunswick, was determined to break through the French line and headed for a tantalising gap which had opened up between Le Patriote and Le Vengeur, three ships astern of the French flagship. However, his intention was as clear as the defensive response was simple. Captain Jean-François Renaudin of the Vengeur increased his speed to close the gap. Harvey was too committed to stop quickly and the starboard bow of the Brunswick smashed into the bow of the Vengeur with such force that both ships were driven out of the line. In the collision the starboard anchors of the Brunswick hooked into the larboard fore shrouds of the Vengeur, locking the two ships together. Harvey was delighted and the British set about reducing their enemy to kindling by firing their guns alternately high and then low, catching the French gun crews in a deadly crossfire and tearing the ship apart from the inside.
As this document shows, however, the Brunswick did not escape lightly. It is a damage report compiled by her boatswain, the warrant officer in charge of the ship’s maintenance. It reveals the astonishing scope of the damage, not all of which was inflicted by the French. The 10 gunports on the starboard side that are listed as being ‘carr[ie]d away’ were destroyed not from the outside but the inside. After the ships collided the British guncrews on the lowest deck found that they could not open the gunport lids and, not willing to let this get in their way, fired all the guns with the lids down, blasting them away so that they could more easily get at the French.
When the ships finally broke apart, the Vengeur was in a shocking state and water poured into her lowest gunports. She was boarded by a British officer who swiftly left as the state of the ship became clear. Some British ships sent boats but several others, including the Brunswick herself, deliberately did not, in spite of the Vengeur’s obviously distressed condition. The Brunswick’s crew were particularly aggrieved at the French use of heated shot, ‘raw ore’ and ‘sulphur pots’, which ‘scalded our people so miserably that they wished for death to end their agony’.11 Indeed, one of the things that this damage report does not mention is that, at one stage, the Brunswick was on fire in four different places: she survived one of the fiercest duels of the entire age of sail but had a very lucky escape.
The Vengeur soon sank by the stern with as many as 365 dead and injured still aboard. The Brunswick, meanwhile, was still in a very dangerous situation. More British sailors were killed or injured on her than on any other British ship. She was crippled, far behind the French line and some distance from any British ship. It is not surprising that Howe was concerned about her fate in the days after the battle (p. 49). She eventually made it home after a limping voyage that took 11 days. Her captain, John Harvey, also made it home but died shortly afterwards. He has a memorial, which he shares with Captain John Hutt, who was captain of the Queen at The Glorious First of June, in the north aisle of the nave of Westminster Abbey.
THE DEFECTS OF HIS MAJESTYS SHIP BRUNSWICK JOHN HARVEY ESQR COMMANDER IN THE ACTION OF THE 29TH MAY & 1 JUNE 1794
LOWER DECK STARBD SIDE
The starbd fore hause piece and knight head above the Hause hole much wounded
The Ports 1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.10.13 Shot & Carrd away
One Shot between 3rd & 4th ports & two half Beams carrd away
Shot between the 9th & 10th ports
LARBOARD SIDE
Spare Tiller Shot. – Spungiton2 under the 10th Gun shot thro’
9th Gun the Port Timber & Clamp shot thro’
between the 8th & 9th a Shot in the End of the Beam & the Clamp Shot
thro’ in two places and hangg knee shot away
Head of the Rider between the 5th and 6th Port Shot
&nb
sp; Foremast beam – the lodging knee broke by a Shot
UPPER DECK STARBD SIDE
5th Port the lower Cele and Spungiton shot thro’
The 4th Beam from Aft Shot
Clamps after pieces upper and lower wounded between 12th & 13th gun
Between the 10th & 11th gun a Shot below the Clamp
9th Gun the Clamp & upper Cele Shot away
Over the 8th Gun the Clamp & upper sheer shot away
7th Gun the port timber & sling shot thro’ 8th Gun Ditto
Beak Head Beam much wounded
4th Beam of the Forecastle Shot. Hanging knee betwn 3rd & 4th port Shot
Between the 2nd& 3rd the Head of the Top rider shot
Between 1st & 2nd Port one Hangg & 2 Lodg Knees Shot
The Clamps and Spungiton cut under the Forecastle
The Fore Topsail sheets bits wounded
Plank Boards, Plank Sheers & the Skids much cut
UPPER DECK LARBD SIDE
The Clamps of the Forecastle much Wounded
Hanging Knee of the 3rd & 4th Gun Shot & port timber of the 5th Shot
A shot between 8th & 9th Gun
Upper piece of sling shot thro
Upper & Lower Clamp & Hanging Knee of the 10th Gun shot away
Skids & Gangboards much cut Iron stantions shot away
Larboard Quarter Gallery shot away
Limber Heads of the Forecastle many shot away
The Mizen Mast Shot Overboard Main Mast much wounded
Main TP mast sprung. Fore Mast wounded. Fore Yard shot thro’
Main & Main topsail yd wounded one Shot & lost overboard
The bow spreet much wounded. The Decks much cut
The Channells much Shot and cut
All the Boats spare Masts & Booms & Spars cut to pieces