by Sam Willis
I have only to lament that this sort of Attack, confined within intricate and narrow pilotage excluded the Ships, particularly under my command, from the opportunity of exhibiting their valour, but can, with great truth, assert that the same spirit animated the whole of the Fleet, and trust that, the contest in which we are now engaged, will, on a future day, afford them an occasion of shewing that the whole were inspired by the same spirit, had the Field been sufficiently extensive to have brought it into Action.
It is with the deepest concern I mention the loss of Captains Mosse & Riou, two very brave and gallant officers – and whose death, I am well informed, will be sensibly felt by the Families they have left behind; the former, a Wife & Children; the latter, an Aged Mother.
From the known gallantry of Sir T. B. Thompson on former services, the Naval Service will have to regret the loss of the future exertions of that brave Officer.
For any further particulars I beg leave to refer their Lordships to Captain Otway, the bearer of my Dispatches, who was with Lord Nelson in the latter part of the Action, and is capable of answering any questions their Lordships may think necessary to put to him.
A return of the Killed and Wounded you will receive herein.
I have the honour to be,
Sir
Your most obedient
humble servant
Parker
P.S. An account of promotions and removals which have taken place in consequence of this Action, shall be sent by the next opportunity.
The Captain of the Monarch being killd early in the Action, Lieut. Yelland continued it with the greatest spirit. I therefore cannot avoid, in justice to his merit, particularly, recommending him to their Lordships favour & attention.
H.P.
EVAN NEPEAN ESQ.
Robert Otway, the man sent home with the dispatches, was in fact with Nelson during the latter part of the action. This was most unusual because Otway was Parker’s flag captain, not Nelson’s. He had, in fact, requested to go to Nelson shortly after Parker had made a much-criticised signal for Nelson to withdraw, which Nelson ignored (p. 233). It is possible that Otway explained to Nelson that the signal was permissive, that is that it gave him the option of withdrawing with honour if the situation demanded it. Parker, too far distant to make out the detail of the action, would not have been able to see that a stumbling British withdrawal, under fire and in damaged ships, might easily have proved fatal to the entire squadron.
Correspondence between Admiral H. Parker and the Commander of the Kronborg Castle 27–29 March, 1801
The next letters were enclosed with Parker’s battle dispatch. First is the correspondence between Parker and Governor Stricker, commander of Kronborg, in which each follows the other’s lead in a diplomatic dance that ends in a declaration of war.
In the first of these letters, Parker refers to the Danish expulsion of the British envoy, the politician William Drummond, and requests a definitive explanation of Danish intent. In the second, Stricker buys time by sending an express to Copenhagen; at this stage, the Danes are still scrabbling desperately to prepare their defences. In the third, Stricker gives the official response, his words coming directly from the Crown Prince of Denmark. The nature of the ‘expulsion’ of William Drummond is contested but a door to a political settlement remains open, though this is nothing more than another delaying tactic.
The final letter is written at two o’clock in the morning. By now Parker has been awaiting an acceptable reply for two full days and has immediately penned his irritated response. He does not declare war, but claims that the Danish letter itself is a declaration of war which leaves him with no choice but to attack.
To continue the diplomatic dance, however, Parker makes it clear that the British are anxious to restore the ‘amity and friendship’ between the two Courts. This is not mere bluster. This letter encapsulates the difficulties that Parker faced when he was forced to attack a country with whom the British were anxious to remain friends. Not only did the British need to retain access to Baltic grain and shipbuilding supplies but the monarchies were closely linked by blood. Crown Prince Frederick’s mother, Matilda, was none other than the sister of the British King, George III. Indeed, the King had personally made it clear to Parker that he preferred a negotiated solution. These letters, therefore, are for the eyes of the King and they have been included in the dispatches by an insecure admiral who is defending his decision to attack. He later wrote to his wife, after five days without proper sleep, ‘My health is tolerably well, notwithstanding all my anxiety of mind, which is beyond anything I have ever experienced.’9
No 1
LONDON, IN THE CATEGAT
27 MARCH 1801
From the hostile transaction, by the Court of Denmark, of sending away His Britannic Majestys Chargé D’Affaires The Commander in Chief of His Majestys Fleet is anxious to know, what the determination of the Danish Court is, and whether, the Commanding Officer of Cronenburg Castle has received Orders to Fire on the British Fleet, as they pass into the Sound? as he must deem the firing of the First Gun a Declaration of War on the part of Denmark.
No 2.
CRONBERG CASTLE
28 MARCH 1801
In answer to the Admiral’s honour of the letter, I have to inform that, no orders are given to fire on the English Fleet. An Express is gone to Copenhagen and should any Orders be sent, I shall immediately send an Officer on board to inform the Admiral.
Stricker,
Govr
NO 3.
CRONBERG CASTLE 28 MARCH 1801
In answer of Your Excellencys letter which I first, the day following at 8½ received I have the honour to inform you that I am perfectly acquainted with, that His Majesty the King of Denmark has not sent away the Chargé D’Affaires, but he has according to his own Demand obtained a Passport.
As a Soldier, I can not meddle with Politicks, but it is not allowed for me, to let a Fleet, whose intention is not yet known, approach the Cannons of the Castle which I have the honour to command.
In case Your Excellency should think proper to make any proposals to His Majesty the King of Denmark I wish to be informed before the Fleet further approach the Castle. A documented answer on this is desired.
Stricker
No. 4
ON BOARD THE LONDON
29TH MARCH 1801 AT 2 AM.
Sir
In answer to Your Excellencys Note, just now received, the Undersigned has only to reply that, finding the intentions of the Court of Denmark to be hostile against His Britannic Majesty, he regards the answer as a Declaration of War, & therefore, agreeable to his Instructions, can no longer refrain from Hostilities, however reluctant it may be to his feelings.
But, at the same time will be ready to attend to any proposals of the Court of Denmark for restoring the former Amity & Friendship which has for so many Years subsisted between the two Courts
H Parker
Rear-Admiral H. Nelson to Admiral H. Parker 3 April, 1801
The next letter enclosed with Parker’s dispatch is Nelson’s description of the battle. As with his Nile dispatch, this is written by a Secretary. It is not, therefore, in Nelson’s distinctive handwriting.
The letter begins with a description of the British surveying the outer channel. There is no mention of the fearsome 270 guns of the Kronborg fortress because not one shot hit the British fleet which simply sailed past, out of range of the Danish guns. The Swedish guns on the other side of the strait, which could have had some impact, if only in driving the British towards the Kronborg’s guns, remained silent, the Swedes betraying the Baltic alliance. Without them, the mythical bark of Kronborg fortress was more potent than its bite.
Nelson then lists the full strength of the Danish defences, a formidable array of weaponry that the Danes had gathered while the British dithered over their preferred strategy. The preparation of the Danes at Copenhagen in 1801 was everything that the French at the Nile in 1798 had not been. Against so powerful
a foe, anchored in such a strong position and in unsurveyed water, the British were unable to avoid serious casualties. A cloud of impending catastrophe hung over the attack. Nelson brought his fleet around the Middle Ground shoal from the north, turned back on himself and sailed past the Danish defences from the south.
ELEPHANT, OFF COPENHAGEN
3 APRIL 1801
Defence
Monarch
Bellona
Edgar
Russel
Ganges
Glatton
Isis
Agamemnon
Polyphemus
Ardent
~
Amazon
Desirée
Blanche
Alcmene
~
Dart
Arrow
Cruiser
Harpy
~
Zephyr F.S.
Otter F.S.
~
BOMBS
Discovery
Sulphur
Hecla
Explosion
Aetna
Terrror
Volcano
&
8 Gun Brigs
Sir.
In obedience to your directions to report the proceedings of the Squadron named in the margin, which you did me the honour to place under my command:
I beg leave to inform you that, having, by the assistance of that Able Officer, Capt. Rieu & the unremitting exertions of Cap. Brisbane, and the Masters of the Amazon & Cruizer in particular, buoyed the Channel of the Outer Deep, & the position of the Middle Ground the Squadron passed in safety and anchored off the Draco Fort the Evening of the first, and that Yesterday Morning, I made the Signal for the Squadron to weigh, and to engage the Danish Line consisting of 6 Sail of the Line, 11 Floating Batteries mounting from 26, 24 pounders to 18, 18 pounders & one Bomb ship, besides Schooner Gun Vessels – These were supported by the Crown Islands, mounting 88 Cannon & 4 Sail of the Line moored at the Harbour’s Mouth, & some Batteries on the Island of Amaak.
The Bomb Ship & Schooner Gun Vessels made their escape, the other 17, are sunk, burnt or taken being the whole of the Danish Line to the Southward of the Gamn Islands, after a Battle of about Four Hours.
From the very intricate navigation – the Bellona and Russel unfortunately grounded, but altho’ not in the situation assigned them, yet so placed as to be of great service. The Agamemnon could not weather the shoal of the Middle and was obliged to anchor – but not the smallest blame can be attached to Capt. Fancourt; it was an event, to which all the Ships were liable. These accidents prevented the extension of our Line, by the three Ships beforementioned who would I can assert, have silence the Crown Islands, the two outer Ships in the Harbours Mouth & prevented the heavy loss in the Defiance & Monarch, and which unhappily, threw the Gallant & good Capt. Rieu (to whom I had given the command of the Frigates & Sloops named in the margin, to assist in the Attack of the Ships at the Harbour’s Mouth) under a very heavy Fire – The consequence, has been the death of Capt. Rieu, & many brave Officers and Men in the Frigates and Sloops. The Bombs were directed & took their station abreast of the Elephant & threw some shells into the Arsenal
Blanche
Alcmene
Dart
Arrow
Cruizer
Harpy
Zephyr
Otter
Capt Rose, who volunteered his services to direct the Gun Brigs did every thing which was possible to get them forward, but the Current was too strong for them to be of Service during the Action; but not the less merit is due to Capt Rose, and I believe all the Officers & Crews of the Gun Brigs for their exertions.
The Boats of those Ships of the Fleet who were not orderd on the attack, afforded us every assistance, & the Officers & Men who were in them merit my warmest approbation.
The Desireé took her station in raking the Southernmost Danish Ship of the Line & performed the greatest service.
The Action began at 5 minutes past ten – the Van, led by Captain George Murray of the Edgar, who set a noble example of intrepidity, which was as well followed up, by every Captain, Officer & Man in the Squadron.
It is my duty to state for you, the high & distinguished merit & gallantry of Rear Adm. Graves.
To Captain Foley, who permitted me the honour of hoisting my Flag in the Elephant, I feel under the greatest obligations, his advice was necessary, on many and important occasions during the Battle.
I beg leave to express how much I feel indebted to every Captain, Officer and Man for their Zeal & distinguished bravery on this occasion.
Capt Stewart did me the favour to be on board the Elephant, & himself with every Officer and Soldier under his Orders, shared with pleasure, the toils & dangers of the day.
The loss in such a Battle has not usually been very heavy; among many other brave officers and men who were killed, I have with honor, to place the name of Captain Mosse, of the Monarch, who has left a Wife and six Children to lament his loss; & among the wounded, that of Captain Sir B. Thompson, of the Bellona.
I have the honour to be with the greatest respect
Sir
Your most obedient & very humble servant
Nelson & Bronté
Nelson thus adds a little more detail where Parker did not. We now know that 17 enemy ships were sunk, burnt or taken in a battle that lasted for four hours, a very long period for ships to be permanently engaged and the direct result of the distance of engagement. Unlike all other battles in this book, Copenhagen was fought at very long range because the British had no idea of the location of the deep water. In fact, they thought that it was towards the Middle Ground shoal when in reality it was in the opposite direction, towards the Danish ships. The duration of the combat, therefore, is intricately linked to the fact that the Russell and Bellona both grounded on the Middle Ground early in the action. The stranding of those ships also had a significant impact on the course of the battle. Nelson’s line was now no longer able to extend the full length of the Danish line as intended. This meant that the British frigate squadron faced the massive Danish defences at the north of the King’s Channel alone. This was where Edward Riou’s Amazon was anchored. Within minutes of the attack beginning, Riou and many of his sailors were dead.
Nelson also mentions the efforts of Captain Rose, who did everything he could to bring the British gun brigs into the action, but was foxed by the currents that ran through the King’s Channel like a river. It is an important reminder that, not only did the British have to cope with unknown depths of water, but also with the unknown speed and direction of powerful currents in that shallow water.
Nelson carefully records the names of men who particularly distinguished themselves – Murray, Graves, Foley and Stewart – and, like Parker, he mourns the loss of Captains Mosse and Riou and the wounding of Thompson. His comment that ‘not the slightest blame’ could be attached to Captain Robert Fancourt of the Agamemnon for grounding his ship is slightly disingenuous; in fact Fancourt was strongly criticised by his fellow captains.
There is, unsurprisingly, no mention of the story that Nelson ignored Parker’s order to withdraw by raising his telescope to his blind eye, a myth that has been told and embellished by historians for over two centuries. It is, nevertheless, certain that the signal was made and that it was, indeed, a general signal made to the entire fleet. The fact that it was ignored, therefore, is undoubted and it is also clear that, had the signal been obeyed, the crippled British ships would have been shattered in their attempted retreat from the Danish guns. Nonetheless, the telescope story gained traction along with several other anecdotes and unofficial accounts, all of which celebrated Nelson and ridiculed Parker and soon reached the ears of the Admiralty. Parker’s reputation was crumbling.
Nor is there any mention in Nelson’s letter of how the fighting actually stopped by a classic ruse de guerre which is still a talking point. In short, Nelson sent an ultimatum to the Crown Prince in which he
threatened to burn the captured Danish prizes with the Danish sailors still inside if they did not immediately surrender. It worked. The damaged British ships, many of which were likely to have grounded in vulnerable positions had they attempted to retreat, were thus saved from further injury, destruction or even capture. In the case of one particular ship, the shattered Monarch, one witness was quite clear about the effect of the letter. ‘The poor Monarch particularly suffered & is nearly a wreck – it became a positive butchery on board her, till the interchange of Ld. Nelson’s flag of truce slackened & at length stopped the fire from the enemy on the Crowns.’10
Nelson’s ultimatum has been interpreted by some as the threat of a war-crime and by others as a magnificently judged bluff to save the English fleet and secure a victory at a crucial moment in the battle. Its omission in this official report is certainly an important addition to that debate. Nelson would have us believe that the battle was won by cannon alone; in fact Copenhagen is unique in this collection of battles because it was won by diplomacy as much as by force. If, indeed, it was a clever bluff then it is surprising that Nelson did not describe it in order to receive the acclaim; perhaps, however, it was considered slightly underhand, a trick that no warrior should celebrate. Maybe Nelson was even a little ashamed of his actions.
There is, however, at least some sense of a ‘result’ in Nelson’s dispatch that is missing from Parker’s. Nevertheless, neither dispatch mentions the outcome of the battle in relation to its political, rather than its military, intention, despite Parker’s letter being written on April 6, three full days after Nelson dictated his dispatch and four after the battle. The whole purpose of the battle had been to force the Danes to leave the League of Armed Neutrality by threatening to destroy its sailing fleet. However its sailing fleet still lay snug inside Copenhagen harbour and there is no indication of Danish intentions regarding the League. One can imagine the frustration back in London when these dispatches were read. A battle had been fought and the dispatches written and received but one rather crucial question remained to be answered: what on earth was going on?