by Sam Willis
In some ways Nelson was prepared for battle and in others he was not. His tactics, at least, were settled. He wanted to cut the enemy fleet in the centre and rear, and then overpower those sections before the van could come to their aid. In a further attempt to keep the enemy van out of the picture, his own division would feint towards it on the approach to lure it away from where the strike would actually fall. This plan required his ships to bear down at right angles to the enemy, exposing their vulnerable bows to enemy fire. This part of the plan, therefore, had to be executed as quickly as possible, far more so than was usual. It would also be led by the largest ships of the fleet, the flagships, whose bulk could better withstand the enemy shot. Again this was unusual; the flagships usually nestled in the centre of their divisions. Once the fighting had started, Nelson then required his captains to engage the enemy closely and to keep them there until they were beaten.
The problem he faced, however, was how to ensure that his captains understood his ideas. His fleet at Trafalgar was a motley collection of men and ships, hastily gathered from wherever they could be found; this was no ‘Band of Brothers’ like that which had fought at the Nile. Nelson had never even met some of his captains and 11 of the 27 had never served with him before. Indeed six of the British captains had never been in battle before, let alone in battle under Nelson’s command. Moreover five of the crews had been together for less than six months and nine of the captains had only been in charge of their ships for a similar period.
In the days before the battle, therefore, Nelson held regular dinners and conversations aboard his flagship, to get to know his fellow officers and to instil in them, in very general terms, what he expected of them in the coming engagement. He had thought that three months was sufficient for such a task but now he had a matter of days. For that reason, he focused on simple, practical methods to increase the chances of cohesion and unity. He ordered the crews of all British ships to paint their mast-hoops yellow, to contrast with the black mast-hoops of the enemy fleet, and he declared, in that famous phrase, that ‘No captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of an Enemy’.5 He later reinforced this simple message with a verbal instruction via one of his frigates: ‘If, by the mode of attack prescribed, they found it impracticable to get into Action immediately, they might adopt whatever they thought best, provided it led them quickly and closely alongside an Enemy.’6 Nelson’s ideal tactics may have been innovative and subtly nuanced, therefore, but in the hours before battle he kept them as simple as possible. His final signal, ‘England expects that every man will do his duty’, was part of that process of simplification and encouragement.
As the masts of the Allied fleet darkened the horizon, Nelson’s thoughts turned inward and then to home. He wrote a prayer and carefully amended his will.
The Dispatches
The dispatches describing the subsequent events are unique for several reasons. First and most obviously, the main dispatch is written by Collingwood, the second-in-command. Second, they include descriptions of important events after the main battle. Third, they include the dispatch sent from another British fleet commander, recounting another battle. We also have the letter written from Collingwood to Lieutenant John Lapenotiere,7 the officer given the honour of taking the dispatches back to London. This is the only such letter to the bearer of dispatches included in this collection and it gives us a valuable glimpse into the urgent and exciting moment that news of the victory left the fleet. The letters are addressed to William Marsden, a renowned intellectual who had already been Second Secretary of the Admiralty for a decade.8
Vice-Admiral C. Collingwood to W. Marsden, 22 October 1805
Collingwood’s missive is a masterpiece. He solved the problem of how to begin such a problematic dispatch with a phrase that echoes through the centuries: ‘The ever to be lamented death of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson … ’
For Collingwood and the thousands who read this letter when it was swiftly published, the headline of the battle was not the defeat of the Allies but the death of Nelson. It is an impressive piece of writing for someone whom we know to have been distracted and lost for many hours after the battle. Collingwood himself later described how he was in a ‘forlorn state; my servants are killed … and Clavell [Collingwood’s first lieutenant, a long-term, trusted friend and colleague] is wounded.’9 Others described how he stood alone on the quarterdeck for hours, tugging at his clothing, nibbling at the occasional apple or biscuit and occasionally sipping wine. This was a man in shock.
The subsequent letter describes some important aspects of Trafalgar but ignores just as many others. We hear of the attack, which was not executed, as Collingwood is at pains to add, ‘in the usual manner’. The British sailed quickly at right angles to the enemy in two lines, formed to save time in order of sailing rather than in order of battle, and then cut them at two points, in the centre and towards the rear.
The mode of attack was innovative but we know that Villeneuve had fully expected something of the sort. Before the battle he wrote to his captains ‘the enemy will not confine himself to forming on a line of battle with our own and engaging us in an artillery duel, in which success is frequently with the more skilful but always with the more fortunate; he will endeavour to envelop our rear, to break through our line and to direct his ships in groups upon such of ours as he shall have cut off, so as to surround them and defeat them.’10
To counter this, the enemy should have met the British in a ‘close and correct line’ which is exactly how Collingwood describes the enemy appearance. However, this description is challenged by other accounts which emphasise the poor structure and dislocation of the enemy line, the result of an ill-judged and ill- executed manoeuvre that was attempted as the British bore down.11
Collingwood provides little detail of the actual engagement apart from making it clear that, as Nelson desired, the enemy van was severed from the main body in an attack that was ‘irresistible’. It is an intriguing choice of word because it was also used by Nelson in his Nile dispatch. This is Collingwood mimicking Nelson, a conscious nod to his lost friend; he is reporting Nelson’s last victory in a way that Nelson would appreciate. And then, 566 words into the dispatch, Collingwood finally gets to the point: the British have won a ‘complete, and glorious victory’.
The letter is written aboard the frigate Euryalus because Collingwood’s flagship Royal Sovereign had suffered so much in the battle.
EURYALUS, OFF CAPE TRAFALGAR
22 OCTOBER 1805.
Sir
The ever to be lamented death of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, who in the late conflict with the Enemy, fell in the hour of victory, leaves to me the duty of informing my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that on the 19th Instant, it was communicated to the Commander in chief from the Ships watching the motions of the Enemy in Cadiz, that the combined Fleet had put to sea–; as they sailed with Light Winds Westerly, his Lordship concluded their destination was the Mediterranean, and immediately made all sail for the Streights’ Entrance with the British Squadron consisting of Twenty seven Ships, three of them sixty fours, where his Lordship was informed by Captain Blackwood (whose vigilance in watching, and giving notice of the Enemy’s movements has been highly meritorious) that they had not yet passed the Streights.
On Monday the 21st Instant, at day-light, when Cape Trafalgar bore EbS. about 7 leagues, the Enemy was discovered, six, or seven miles to the Eastward, the Wind about West, and very light, the Commander in Chief immediately made the Signal for the Fleet to bear up in two Columns, as they are formed in order of sailing; a mode of attack his Lordship had previously directed, to avoid the inconvenience, and delay, in forming a Line of Battle, in the usual manner; The Enemy’s Line consisted of thirty three ships (of which 18 were French, and 15 Spanish) commanded in Chief by Admiral Villeneuve, the Spaniards under the direction of Gravina, wore, with their heads to the Northward, and formed their Line of Battle with great closeness, and co
rrectness; – but, as the mode of attack was unusual, so the structure of their Line was new, – it formed a Crescent, convexing to Leeward, so that in leading down to their Centre, I had both their Van, and Rear, abaft the beam, before the fire opened, every alternative Ship was about a cable’s length to windward of her second a-head, and a-stern, forming a kind of double line and appeared when on their beam to leave a very little interval between them, and this without crowding their Ships. Adm. Villeneuve was in the Bucentaire, in the centre and the Prince of Asturias, bore Gravinia’s Flag in the Rear. – but the French, and Spanish Ships were mixed without any apparent regard to order of national squadron.
As the mode of our attack had been previously determined on, and communicated to the Flag Officers and Captains, few Signals were necessary, and none were made, except to direct close order, as the Lines bore down.
The Commander in Chief in the Victory lead the Weather Column, and the Royal Sovereign, which bore my Flag, in the lee.
The action began at 12 O’Clock, by the Leading Ships of the Columns breaking through the Enemy’s Line, the Commander in Chief about the 10th Ship from the Van the Second in Command, about the 12th from the Rear, leaving the Van of the Enemy unoccupied, – the succeeding Ships breaking through in all parts, astern of their Leaders, and engaging the Enemy at the muzzles of their Guns: – The Conflict was severe, – the Enemy’s Ships were fought with a gallantry highly honourable to their Officers, but the attack on them was irresistible – , and it pleased the Almighty disposer of all Events, to grant His Majesty’s arms, a complete, and glorious Victory; about 3 P.M., many of the Enemy’s Ships having struck their Colours, their Line gave way –; Admiral Gravina with ten Ships joining their frigates to leeward, stood towards Cadiz: – the five headmost Ships in their Van tacked and standing to the Southward, to windward of the British Line, were engaged, and the sternmost of them taken – the others went off, leaving to His Majesty’s Squadron, nineteen Ships of the Line, (of which two are first rates, the Santissima Trinidad, and Santa Anna,) with three Flag Officers, vizt. Admiral Villeneuve, the Commander in Chief, Don Ignatio Maria D’Aliva Vice Admiral and the Spanish Rear Admiral Don Baltazar Hidalgo Cisneros.12
After such a victory it may appear unnecessary to enter into encomiums on the particular parts taken by the several commanders: – the conclusion says more on the subject, than I have language to express. – the spirit which animated all was the same, – when all exert themselves zealously in their country’s service, all deserve that their high merits should stand recorded, – and never was high merit more conspicuous than in the battle I have described.
The Achille (a French 74) after having surrendered by some mismanagement of the Frenchmen took fire and blew up, 200 of her men were saved by the Tender.
A circumstance occurred during the action which so strongly marks the invincible spirit of British seamen when engaging the Enemies of their Country, that I cannot resist the pleasure I have of making it known to their Lordships; – the Temeraire was boarded by accident, or design, by a French ship on one side, and a Spaniard on the other, the contest was vigorous but in the End, the combined Ensigns were torn from the Poop, and the British hoisted in their places.
Such a Battle could not be fought without sustaining a great loss of men; I have not only to lament in common with the British navy, and the British nation, in the fall of the Commander in Chief, the loss of a Hero, whose name will be immortal, and his memory ever dear to his Country – but my heart is rent with the most poignant grief for the death of a friend, to whom by many Years intimacy and a perfect knowledge of the virtues of his friend, which inspired ideas superior to the common race of men, I was bound by the strongest ties of affection, a grief to which even the glorious occasion in which he fell, does not bring the consolation which perhaps it ought – his Lordship received a musket ball in his left breast, about the middle of the action, and sent an officer to me immediately with his last farewell, – and soon after expired.
I have also to lament the loss of those excellent Officers, Captains Duff of the Mars, and Cooke of the Bellerophon. I have yet heard of none others.
I fear the numbers that have fallen will be found very great, when the returns come to me; – but it having blown a gale of wind ever since the action, I have not yet had it in my power to collect any reports from the Ships, and when their Lordships consider that I have 23 infirm ships, 18 of them hulks, without a stick standing, and scarce a boat in the Fleet, I am sure they will have due consideration for the slowness with which all that kind of duty must necessarily be done, but as I feel the great importance of those reports to the Public, and to individuals, they may trust that I will leave nothing undone, to obtain them speedily.
The Royal Sovereign having lost her Masts, except the faltering Foremast, I called the Euryalus to me, when the action continued, which Ship lying within hail, made my signals, a service, Captain Blackwood performed with great attention; – after the action, I shifted my Flag into her, that I might more easily communicate my orders to, and collect the Ships, and towed the Royal Sovereign out to Seaward: – the whole Fleet were now in a very perilous situation, many dismasted, all shattered, in 13 fathom water, off the shoals of Trafalgar, and when I made the signal to prepare to anchor, few of the Ships had an anchor to let go their cables being shot: – but the same good Providence which aided us thro’ such a day, preserved us in the night, by the wind shifting a few points, and drifting the Ships off the Land, except four of the captive dismasted Ships, which are now at anchor off Trafalgar, and I hope will ride safe until those Gales are over.
Having thus detailed the proceedings of the Fleet on this occasion, I beg to congratulate their Lordships on a Victory, which I hope will add a day to the Glory of His Majesty’s Crown, and be attended with public benefit to our Country.
I am Sir
Your most obedient
humble Servant
Cuthbt Collingwood
WILLIAM MARSDEN ESQR
The letter is written the day after the battle, and Collingwood lists 19 enemy ships as prizes. It is an impressive amount but it is fewer than Nelson had hoped for. He had made it clear before the battle that ‘it is … annihilation that the Country wants, and not merely a splendid Victory of twenty-three to thirty-six, – honourable to the parties concerned, but absolutely useless in the extended scale to bring Bonaparte to his marrow-bones: numbers can only annihilate.’13
When he saw the Allied fleet of 33 ships arrayed before him, he wanted to capture or destroy 20. However, when Collingwood wrote this letter, the events of Trafalgar had yet to conclude; he had not foreseen the consequences of the storm that was then starting to lash his ships or, indeed, the possibility of Richard Strachan’s squadron, then cruising in the Bay of Biscay, increasing the number of prizes.
Collingwood lists the captured flag officers but, as he makes clear in a subsequent, rather embarrassing letter (p. 289), one of them, Don Ignatio Maria D’Alava, was not in his custody at all but on his way back to Cadiz. Collingwood then does something fascinating. He refuses to ‘enter into encomiums’ or eulogies on the behaviour of the fleet captains. This is a direct result of the pain he had felt himself when he was overlooked in the dispatches describing The First of June. He knew that, so soon after the action, he couldn’t possibly comment accurately and fairly on all of his captains’ behaviour. He therefore chose to comment on none of them, mentioning only those who had died and Blackwood, who was in command of the frigate squadron.
This failure to comment is particularly important because, in doing so, Collingwood deliberately chose to protect several captains who had failed to fight properly (pp. 279–80). It has taken naval historians many years to realise this and Collingwood’s disingenuous dispatch is partly responsible. However, it is now known that several officers failed to engage as Nelson or Collingwood had expected. Indeed, the extent to which Nelson’s indoctrination of new captains actually worked is still very much open to deb
ate.
In this letter, therefore, Collingwood is consciously protecting the reputation of his navy in its moment of glory; he wants nothing to tarnish the public perception of the victory and the esteem in which it will be held. It is far more than a letter describing a battle; it’s a press release spinning the story in the way that he wanted. Collingwood was a shrewd political operator. He understood that a navy’s reputation was only partially formed by its actual deeds and that public support was essential for the success of British maritime strategy.
General Order from Vice-Admiral C. Collingwood, 22 October 1805
Collingwood included with his letter a copy of a General Order issued at the same time that he wrote his battle dispatch. Clearly proud of his ‘ever to be lamented death’ line, he repeats it at the start of this order which is to be repeated to his men. He congratulates and praises ‘every Officer, every Seaman, and Marine’ in another conscious attempt to smooth ruffled feathers and bury the evidence of poor performance.
His praise for and deliberate naming of ‘Rear Admiral the Earl of Northesk’ – William Carnegie, commander of the First Rate 100-gun Britannia – is particularly curious because Northesk’s behaviour was the most suspect of all British officers.
GENERAL ORDER