Call Sign Extortion 17

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Call Sign Extortion 17 Page 21

by Don Brown


  Second, it appears that the Pathfinders got part of the recorder (“we got as much as we could”) but could not get all of it because it was still smoldering. However, there is enough ambiguity in this portion of the testimony that “we got as much as we could” could be referring to something other than the flight recorder.

  Third, after a flooding rain, they came back to look for the rest of the flight recorder, but couldn’t find it: “And then, after the flood came in, we looked again and we also—we had a couple, I guess, false alarms, but we could never actually find the actual flight recorder.”

  Fourth, the search for the flight recorder expanded beyond just the Pathfinders, and included the human remains team.

  So there was an all-­out effort committing considerable military resources to looking for the now-­lost flight data recorder after the “flood.” But all the manpower dedicated to the search turned up nothing.

  Fifth, and this point will become crucial later, the Pathfinder platoon leader testified that this was the first time they had never recovered the flight recorder from a crashed helicopter.

  Keep in mind most downed helicopters in Afghanistan, in fact, half of the helicopters shot down, were CH-47 Chinooks. But the Pathfinder platoon leader said this was the first time ever they had failed to recover the voice recorder from a downed helicopter.

  So there is evidence suggesting that the recorder was possibly spotted, that part of it might have been recovered, that they came back, after the “flood,” and it was gone. Again, the Pathfinders had always been successful in recovering black boxes before, many from the exact same model of helicopter, the Chinook CH-47D that as noted earlier had been involved in roughly half the helicopter shoot-­downs in Afghanistan. So what went wrong there? And how did the recorder mysteriously disappear between the time the Pathfinders apparently spotted it and apparently, retrieved part of it? Or, could it have been removed earlier, before the Pathfinders arrived on the scene? Could the flight recorder have somehow disappeared during the “flood” mentioned in the testimony?

  When Extortion 17 hit the ground, it broke into three main pieces, scattered into a triangular debris field with each part of the destroyed helicopter separated by just over 100 meters . The three parts included the forward pylon (containing the forward rotor blade), the aft pylon (containing the aft rotor blade), and the fuselage.

  The fuselage itself, including the cockpit and the main body of the helicopter, fell into a small, shallow muddy creek known as a wadi. This wadi is also known as the “Logar River bed.” In the hours after Extortion 17 was shot down, heavy rains moved into the area, apparently causing a rise in the level of the wadi (referred to as “flooding” in the testimony). When the Pathfinder team returned after the initial rain and was unable to locate the black box, there was speculation that it might have washed downstream with other debris—realistically an unlikely scenario because of its weight and because it would have been bolted into place (assuming that it did not become displaced in the crash).

  At page 17 of Exhibit 65, a third Pathfinder team member testified to the problems created by the flooding of the wadi: “Once the rain and the flash flood came in, we had to go searching the Wadi looking for the pieces that had floated down with the current.”

  But the wadi, in reality, is nothing more than a narrow, shallow, muddy creek, as shown in photographs in Exhibit 60 of the Colt Report.

  Which raises the question again, where is the black box?

  The notion that the black box just disappeared in the wadi is a fantasy. As is commonly known, black boxes emit low-­frequency electronic pings, which make them immediately traceable. Black boxes, because of the pings, are often pulled off the bottom of the ocean floor.

  One flight recorder, the one on South African Airways Flight 295, a Boeing 747 that went down in the Indian Ocean in 1987, was recovered off the ocean floor from a depth of over 16,000 feet. Likewise, the black box for Air France 447, an Airbus 330 that crashed in the Atlantic in 2009, was also recovered, this time in over 13,000 feet of water. In August of 2013, a British company recovered the black box of a Super Puma helicopter that went down in the North Sea off the Shetland Islands.

  A black box submerged in water in a muddy wadi with depths ranging from knee-­deep to a little over waist-­deep should present no serious challenges. Yet, in spite of the fact that the Army committed a team of soldiers specializing in aircraft recovery to searching for the black box, who fanned out and walked in and along the wadi, they came up with nothing.

  Moreover, it’s significant that not one question was asked, anywhere in the Colt Report, about the low-­frequency signals that the black box emits. Instead, the Pathfinders testified about their unsuccessful efforts to find the black box, and not one investigator asked, “Did you try and find it in the water by homing in on its electronic pinging signal?”

  It’s as if the black box was being intentionally ignored by the investigators, and questions that were asked weren’t followed up on to determine the whereabouts of this, the most crucial piece of evidence, nor was there any clarification placed on the record about its absence or presence at the wreck scene.

  It’s clear that the Pathfinders committed considerable assets to finding it, and the Pathfinder platoon leader said this was the first time they hadn’t recovered one in a crash in Afghanistan.

  So what happened to the black box?

  That cannot fully be determined from the record, except it appears to have gotten lost between the Pathfinder’s first approach to the smoldering wreckage, and sometime later that day, after a heavy rain “flooded” the wadi. At least that was the narrative first pushed by the military.

  However, there is additional evidence to be considered.

  First, while the Pathfinders have provided most of the information about the search for the black box, it’s crucial to understand that the Pathfinders were not the first unit on the ground to secure the chopper, nor were they the only unit on the ground.

  Unidentified Joint Special Ops Task Force Unit on Ground before US Army Pathfinders

  It’s important to know that another unidentified unit, whose identity is blocked in the Colt Report, but a unit attached to the Joint Special Operations Task Force, was also on the ground along with the US Army Pathfinders.

  We see this in testimony at page 115 of Exhibit 1, given by the J3 (operations) officer from the Joint Special Operations Task Force:

  Based on our assessment of the time it was taking, you know, the decision was made to infill the Task Force element into an HLZ, you can see reflected there at item Number 10. But, really, what had ended up happening was our guys, ended up getting there prior to the path finder element.

  Who was this unit? And how much sooner were they on the ground?

  There is no way to know for sure. But remember, the Pathfinders were on the ground at 4:15 a.m. That means that the unidentified task force had to have arrived on the ground prior to 4:15 a.m. (with the shoot-­down having occurred at 2:39:40 a.m.). In fact, the official chronology, which was attached to Enclosure H, states that the unidentified Task Force arrived at 3:04 a.m., over an hour before the Pathfinders arrived.

  ENCLOSURE “H” Chronology

  0239:48 P states “There’s an explosion, there’s another . . . explosion.” Further states: “Extortion is down.” (3/4)

  0240:17 makes “Fallen Angel” NET call to all elements in the Objective area indicating EXTORTION 17 has been shot down (4)

  0240:18 [Apache Helicopter . . . Gun 1] suppresses suspected enemy positions IVO the suspected point of origin (POO) (3)

  0240:18 [AC-130] establishes security orbit over crash site (3)

  0240:36 notifies TOC that EXTORTION 17 has been shot down (4)

  0242:59 [Gun 1] P 5 relays to (AC-130) suspected POO of RPG attack (3)

  0243 TOC initiates downed aircraft procedures (7)


  0243 TF [unidentified unit] element notified of downed aircraft (15)

  0245 PB reports secondary explosions at crash site (1)

  0245 TF [unidentified unit] duty log reports crash site IVO (2/7)

  0245 10th CAB (Combat Air Battalion) Duty Officer notifies Division of downed aircraft (10)

  0248 EXTORTION [16] remains in a holding pattern 3 miles from crash site (1/7)

  0250 1/B reports they are leaving all detainees on Objective LEFTY GROVE and moving to crash site ASAP (19)

  0252 Additional AWT (Air Weapons Team) at FOB (Forward Operating Base) assumes REDCON level 2 (1)

  0254 EXTORTION 16 arrives at [Forward Operating Base] (1)

  0254 10th CAB Fire Support Officer (FSO) reports [unidentified unit] (B1-B) nine (9) minutes away from crash site (10)

  0255 10th CAB intelligence section reports N (MQ-1) UAV O/S over crash site (10)

  0256 (AC-130) assumes role as On-­Scene Commander (4)

  0304 10th CAB FSO reports [unidentified unit] O/S at the EXTORTION 17 crash site.

  * * *

  0321 AWT (Air Weapons Team) conducting containment fire (7)

  0327:43 element identifies possible FKIA IVO crash site for first time (3) **Refuted after viewing gun tapes and crew statements; coroner finds injuries invalidate the initial report**

  * * *

  0347 [Unidentified unit] reports insurgents have identified that coalition elements had entered a field, surveyed the aircraft, and then headed back to an unspecified road (14)

  * * *

  0350 TF (unidentified Task Force) approves the launch of the [Pathfinder] element to crash site (10)

  0359 Pathfinder element (20 pax) (20 personnel) depart FOB (Forward Operating Base Shank) en-­route crash site on GALLANT 40/44 (2 x UH-60) (7/10)

  * * *

  0405 TF (task force) reports there is one friendly spotted 10-15 meters outside of crash site (10) **Refuted after viewing (apache) gun tapes and crew statements; coroner finds injuries invalidate the initial report**

  0407 TF (task force) reports one coalition service member recovered from Crash site by (10) **Refuted after viewing gun tapes and crew statements**

  * * *

  0414 [Air Weapons Team Black Hawk helicopters] initiates suppressive fires IVO (in vicinity of) Pathfinder HLZ (helicopter landing zone)

  0415 with Pathfinder element lands in HLZ approximately 600m southeast of crash site. (1/4/7)

  0415 reports visual contact of Pathfinder element, but has not established radio communications (7)

  There is considerable detail in the chronology, quite a contrast with the strange lack of detail in General Colt’s Executive Summary, which created a different impression of what happened on the ground in the aftermath of the crash.

  Recapping some key points in the chronology: By 2:50 a.m. the unidentified unit (Lima Bravo) is abandoning its Lefty Grove position and heading to the crash site.

  At 2:55 a.m., the Predator drone is overhead, providing close aviation supervision of the site. Remember that the Predator drone can provide fire support from the air.

  At 3:04 a.m., an unidentified unit (presumably Lima Bravo) is on site.

  At 3:47 a.m., “insurgents have identified that coalition elements had entered a field, surveyed the aircraft, and then headed back to an unspecified road.” Note that “coalition elements” entered the field, surveyed the aircraft—whatever that means—and left. It’s odd that there was no ­follow-­up and no clarification on this point. No questions were asked in the transcripts along the lines of “who were these coalition elements?” Or “what does it mean that they surveyed the aircraft and then left?” All that is ignored.

  Three minutes later, at 3:50 a.m., the Task Force (presumably Lima Bravo on the ground) approves the launch of the Pathfinder element. So all the activity described so far has taken place on the ground before permission is granted for the Pathfinder element to take off. Nine minutes later, at 3:59 a.m., the Pathfinder element, with two members aboard, takes off headed for the crash site.

  Stop and think about the timing of the Pathfinder launch. Extortion 17 was fatally attacked at 2:39 a.m. The principal unit that typically searches wreckage sites was not even launched until one hour and twenty minutes after the shoot-­down.

  Then at 4:14 a.m., the Air Weapons Team delivered pre-­assault fire on the landing zone, and one minute later the Pathfinder team landed on the ground, 600 meters from the crash site, or 656 yards (1,968 feet) from the crash zone. To put that in more perspective, the Pathfinders have landed a little less than one half mile away.

  Testimony from exhibits 65 and 84 helps explain what both the Pathfinders and Rangers found when they landed.

  Here is what the Pathfinder leader said (Exhibit 65, page 3).

  PF PLT LDR: Just when we touched down and LZ was just starting to get light sir, so we were still moving [in a] period of limited visibility. I think it was 560 meters from our LZ to the crash site just would have been to the southeast, we moved parallel in the Wadi up to the khalat the Lima Bravo element was already on scene, I think they beat us about 30 minutes.

  Here’s what the Army Ranger Platoon Leader said at page 5, Exhibit 84.

  We got a few hours of sleep, probably four hours of sleep or so, and then at a point somebody came and got me and woke me up and said you guys have been notified you are going to be the element to go and relieve 1/B at the crash site. You need to get up and get spinning on this.

  From this testimony, we know the Ranger unit was actually deployed into the crash site to relieve this Lima Bravo unit. This is corroborated by the brief exchange at page 8 of Exhibit 84.

  SME-­GFA: And correct me if I’m wrong, but the element had some outside security is that true?

  RANGER PLATOON LEADER: Roger sir, they still had the outer cordon, they didn’t have any folks right on top of the wreckage or just outside for security purpose.

  So we know, not only from Enclosure H, but also the testimony from Exhibits 65 and 84, that this “Unit 1/B” or “Lima Bravo” was on the ground considerably sooner than the Rangers.

  But that’s not how it’s portrayed in Brigadier General Colt’s Executive Summary. General Colt made it appear that the Rangers first arrived at 4:12 a.m. Nothing was mentioned of anything happening on the ground before then.

  Here’s how the Executive Summary described the first moments on the ground after the shoot-­down:

  6. Recovery Operations, Following the shoot-­down, the Ranger-­led assault force began a rapid foot movement to the crash site. At 04:12. The assault force was the first element to arrive at the crash, established a security perimeter around it, and began searching for survivors. The assault force initially discovered twelve friendly remains, but could not immediately continue recovery efforts due to secondary explosions from within the wreckage. Within minutes, the 20-man Pathfinder element (downed aircraft rescue and recovery unit) joined the assault force to assist in site security and recovery of remains.

  So the question here is “Why?” Why no mention in the Executive Summary of the Predator drone securing the airspace? Why no mention of the Unit “1/B” arriving at 3:04 a.m.? Why no mention of Coalition elements “surveying” the aircraft at 3:47 a.m.?

  Did General Colt not want this important data in the official report? If not, why not? Did something happen in that period of time that the military does not wish to focus upon? Perhaps the removal of the black box?

  “Lima Bravo” a Joint Special Operation Unit?

  Just who was this mysterious Lima Bravo unit, apparently also known as “1/B,” that appears to have been the first unit on the ground, but whose presence was mysteriously not mentioned in the Executive Summary?

  The unit appeared to be part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force. The testimony of the JSOTF operations officer confirmed this (Exh
ibit 1, pages 115–116) when he called the infiltrating team “our guys.”

  JSOTF J3: Immediately after the crash happened, you know, obviously, the battle space owner element, they offered up their Pathfinder element, which is a quick reaction force they have standing by primarily for aviation incidences like this. They said they’re ready to go and they wanted to infill them.

  Obviously, we were very hesitant to put in any additional aircraft. So we were weighing the time it was going to take to get there because it was about a 3.9 kilometer movement. By the time it was going to take them to get there with—you know, they needed to get that site secure and the additional risk, the rotary wing aircraft getting them there. Based on our assessment of the time it was taking, you know, the decision was made to infill the Task Force element into an HLZ, you can see reflected there at item Number 10. But, really, what had ended up happening was our guys, ended up getting there prior to the Pathfinder element.

  They secured the site, and the Pathfinder element linked up with on the ground about 0027 Zulu there.

  Joint Special Operations is a joint unit, meaning the unit could have been composed of several branches of the military—possibly Navy SEALs, possibly US Army Rangers, possibly US Army Delta Force, possibly Marine Recon. They were not regular US Army. This unit arrived much earlier than the regular Ranger unit, based upon the Ranger unit leader’s testimony at Exhibit 84, indicating that the “1/B” unit and the Pathfinders were already on the ground when the regular Ranger unit arrived.

  There appears to be a distinction between Lima Bravo, apparently under the Joint Special Operations Task Force for this mission, and the Ranger unit referenced in their unit leader’s testimony at Exhibit 84.

 

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