Carlo has so many qualities, being patient and calm ranking highly among them. His patience could be seen as both a strength and, to some, a weakness, and, while it’s served him well in many situations, there were one or two occasions when I thought he might have been a bit too patient.
I was, however, always impressed by his ability to keep everything in perspective, no matter how bad things got, and to retain dignity and integrity. During Carlo’s second year at Chelsea we were struggling. It was not looking like we were going to win anything unless we could progress past Manchester United in the quarter-finals of the Champions League. We lost the first game, so there was a lot riding on the second leg, away at Old Trafford; we lost that too and we were eliminated from the competition. When we got back to the dressing room at the end of the match, Mr Abramovich was there on his own waiting for us.
Everybody sat down and there was a period of silence. A lot of people started looking down at the floor to find the answers that weren’t there and there was plenty of looking around at each other, wondering what was coming. Some of the other suits arrived, including Ron Gourlay, the chief executive, but there was silence in the room for what felt like an eternity. People started to feel uncomfortable, looking around, thinking, ‘Is someone going to say something? Is the owner going to speak? The CEO? Are they waiting for the manager to say something?’
Eventually, a signal was given by Abramovich to Ron Gourlay that someone needed to speak. The chief executive looked a bit sheepish, so Carlo did the honourable thing and took the responsibility. I can’t remember his exact words because it was so tense and emotions were running high; the best thing to do would have been to get changed and get out of there. But Carlo couldn’t do that. He was forced to say something and it was very difficult. It seemed to go on and on – it felt like we were in there for ever. It was a memorable-for-the-wrong-reasons moment.
Perhaps I would have stayed working at youth level if it weren’t for Carlo. Only by his inspiration and motivation was I given the chance to operate at the highest level, which is what we all want to do, whatever sphere we’re in. After my initial ‘loan’ spell with the first-team squad, I told him it was perhaps time for me to go back to the academy because I wasn’t sure I was ready for the first team. He wouldn’t have any of it. ‘Of course you’re ready,’ he said. ‘You stay with me.’
His endorsement enabled me to make that step up. He’s been the single biggest influence on me as a coach and as a person. We keep in contact regularly, on the phone and texting each other all the time.
When he arrived at Chelsea he was an icon in European and world football, and that was intimidating at the start. But as soon as you get to know him you realize he’s a lovely guy, humble. There is no doubt that Carlo is a special person. He judges everybody on their merits. Nobody is better or worse than anybody else in his eyes; everybody has value. He cares about people – his players and his staff.
7. The Product
Every business has at its heart the delivery of the product to the consumer. In football that product is on the pitch. What happens there drives the three basic revenue streams of the business: match day (ticket sales), commercial (sales and sponsorship) and broadcasting (which dominates the turnover of most of the elite European football leagues). So, ultimately, despite the importance of everything else to the business, I will be judged on the game and delivering success. Of course, success at the big clubs means trophies; at smaller clubs it could mean avoiding relegation or simply staying in business.
Identity
The key to everything on the field is the identity of the team. What I mean here by identity is the style of your play, what is seen on the pitch. Are you defensive? What are your views on possession? What do you do when you have control of the ball? These are the factors that create the identity of the team. I do not think of my own identity, but only that of the team, and this depends on what the club asks of you, the characteristics of the players and the history and tradition of the club.
Real Madrid has a very clear identity that is rooted in its history and traditions. In the ten years from 1956 they won six European Cups, five in a row, playing in a certain way, and that is part of the DNA of the club. This was one of the reasons why ‘La Décima’ was so important. They like to have attacking football. The fans expect it and the president has to honour that.
When you arrive at a club, you want to introduce some change to re-motivate the players and to announce yourself and your views, but you don’t want to fundamentally change the identity. There was little difference in identity between the way Milan played and the identity that was being developed at Paris Saint-Germain: possession of the ball, finding space between the lines. So, instead, when I joined each of these teams I changed a lot of the training sessions while keeping the same identity. The players would do different exercises from before and we generally mixed things up to keep the attention of the players. When you are proposing something new the players are more motivated to listen and work. They concentrate more in training, which helps me in the job, especially in the beginning.
The maintenance of an identity was the problem Louis van Gaal faced when he arrived at Manchester United and it was the same for David Moyes before him. Manchester United’s identity, like Real Madrid’s, is to attack – for United it is to attack with power and pace. Of course, if they continue to win that will be accepted, but when things begin to get difficult the identity will become an issue. This is a problem at Madrid even if you are winning. Fabio Capello was sacked after winning La Liga and for Mourinho it ended the same way.
All of this was also a problem for me when I arrived at Madrid. The players had been asked to play in what was seen as a non-Madrid way before me, with more counter-attacking football. In my opinion, the players were not the problem. My job was to allow them to play the Madrid way. Of course it helped that we were able to recruit more players who fitted the club’s core identity. This was what the president wanted too, which always makes it easier.
We signed Gareth Bale from Tottenham and Isco from Malaga. Bale was just a special talent that any team would want. I wanted Isco because he is a talented player but also a hard worker; I believed he could become an important long-term player for Madrid. Once the players were all in place, I could change the system to suit the type of the players at my disposal, so that we would have more control of the ball. I made some changes, putting Di María in midfield.
For the start of my second season, we were able to get Toni Kroos from Bayern Munich, who is exactly the type of player that fits the identity of Madrid. He is very precise – perfect to build play from the back. I didn’t want to lose Xabi Alonso because I thought he and Kroos could play together. Previously, we had played Luka Modrić and Alonso together. When Modrić got injured during the season we went through a bad time because, with no Alonso, there was no ideal replacement. German midfielder Sami Khedira was out with a long-term injury, so I had to try different things, like playing Ramos with Kroos, and it could not be the same. Ramos played really well, but he is not a natural midfielder like Modrić or Alonso.
When we lost Karim Benzema to injury that season it meant that the centre of our identity was lost. We had to play 4-4-2 instead of 4-3-3, with Ronaldo and Bale up front. Ramos was also not fit but he was there – because he is Ramos. People only see Benzema as a striker but he also has the skills of a clever midfielder. He’s everything – a fantastic all-round footballer. He linked our play, so when he was missing it damaged our identity.
I am often asked why Real Madrid hired Mourinho. The answer is easy: They wanted to beat Barcelona. At that time Mourinho was the best manager in Europe.
Forget tradition? Of course – winning is the best tradition of all. Aligning with the identity and culture of the club will not be enough if you don’t win. In my last season we played attacking football and scored over 150 goals. We followed the tradition, the history of the club – but ultimately it didn’t matter. Ultima
tely, if you don’t win trophies you get sacked.
The identity has to come from the head coach but it cannot override the club. The tradition and brand of the club are massively important. Each manager has their own way they like to play, and any club hiring them must accept that they will bring this approach with them. When you hire a Guardiola or a Wenger, you are buying into a specific approach to the game. Their obsession is that style – playing with a lot of possession – will drive results. If it’s a Ferguson or a Mourinho, you are buying into a different approach. Winning is the aim, and that will drive the style.
A winning culture is something that all clubs want to have. Most might be proud of their identity, but they would sacrifice it straight away just to win. Of course, there are exceptions like Barça and, strangely enough, West Ham United in England. When Sam Allardyce was their manager, he was challenged about the club’s style, the famous West Ham way, and he would say that West Ham had a false image of themselves – that the ‘West Ham way’ seemed to be ‘not winning’. In the end, even though Allardyce won promotion to the Premier League and did well there, even though he delivered everything that was asked of him by the owners, he still got the sack, because he was anti-culture. Slaven Bilić was then hired to deliver success the West Ham way and, so far, it seems to be working well.
Whenever my Chelsea team played Sir Alex’s Manchester United it was easy to see a clear identity. That identity of the team perfectly matched the brand of the club; the manager and owners were in unison. They tried to play the same way every time – same style, same attitude, same intensity. This was partly because Sir Alex built not only a team, but an infrastructure, from top to bottom – he built everything. I saw a real sense of belonging in everybody around the club. It reminded me of my time at Milan, this feeling of family and tradition again. At Chelsea you could see a similar sense of belonging in people like John Terry and Frank Lampard. Perhaps this is why clubs often appoint their ex-players – they believe they will naturally be part of the family.
That was definitely why I was appointed at Reggiana and Milan. Of course, it doesn’t mean that you will be successful – we have seen many ex-players fail badly – but it enables a quick entry and understanding of the organization and identity. If you look at Diego Simeone’s success at Atlético Madrid, it is partly due to his relationship with the fans and the club as a player. But he still had to deliver results, which he has done brilliantly, and with a very specific identity. This was an example of picking the head coach to fit with and maintain the culture of the club and match the identity of the team to that culture. If Atlético had wanted to change the identity, then maybe Simeone would not have been the correct appointment.
After Sir Matt Busby at Manchester United, several managers had a go at the job but none was so successful until Sir Alex came along. It wasn’t until Sir Alex that the true identity of the club could be re-established, which, along with the trophies, of course, helped him stay a long time. Busby had been manager for twenty-four years and his first replacement didn’t last a year – a similar situation to David Moyes after Sir Alex. Sadly, in today’s game it seems that these types of long-term managers, who provide success as well as maintaining the identity and tradition of the club, are unlikely to be seen again.
Tactics
Although the overall identity of the team, the style of play, is very important, it is perhaps best understood as strategic. The tactics – how to perform in particular games or particular periods of the season, or how to change systems or personnel against particular opponents – are also crucial to success.
When people talk about football they often seem to believe that to play ‘offensively’ is good and to play ‘defensively’ is bad. That’s not true. If you have a team that plays well defensively but not so well offensively, or the other way round, that is the sign of a bad manager. You must be strong when either attacking or defending. In Italian football, the tradition and history of the game are defensive: catenaccio, a defensive system of play, was born in Italy to an Argentine, Helenio Herrera.
Attacking play is more about the creative qualities of the players, but defensive play is different. Anybody and everybody can learn to defend well. If they don’t it is because either the manager allows it to happen or the players choose not to defend well. Great defensive play is mostly organizational and positional in the modern game – it’s not so much about tackling any more. It’s all about concentration. Of course, you have to be physically conditioned, you have to run and sacrifice. Players don’t like it when they don’t have the ball. Nobody likes to run without the ball – they all want to run with it.
This is where systems become important. As I’ve said, when I was starting out I was wedded to 4-4-2. I have now learned to be more flexible although I still believe that 4-4-2 is the outstanding defensive system. You have the best coverage of the pitch, it is simpler to press forward and press high, with coverage behind the pressing players. With 4-3-3, for example, although you can press high because you have three strikers, it can expose limitations in midfield behind those forwards, especially on the flanks. Also, if your forwards are not great at defending it can be easier for defenders to bypass them and get into the next line with superior numbers. This is less likely with 4-4-2, where you can bring in the wide players to bolster the midfield so that your central players are not overwhelmed.
There is, of course, a downside that can be exposed in 4-4-2. When you are attacking you have to use a lot more lateral passes to get forward and then deliver into the scoring zone, whereas with 4-3-3 you can move the ball through the lines quicker and attack more centrally. Perhaps the ultimate will be the Guardiola vision of eleven midfielders – even the goalkeeper. This is not so crazy, because if you play with a high line then the goalkeeper has to be fast and competent with his feet, like Manuel Neuer at Bayern Munich or Hugo Lloris at Tottenham.
When I hear other coaches saying that their team was outnumbered in midfield, I say, ‘Look, we’ve got to stop thinking like this because we’ve got eleven players on the field and they’ve got eleven – if we’re outnumbered somewhere, they must be outnumbered somewhere else on the field. Let’s concentrate on playing in these areas.’
In the military, they say that no strategy survives contact with the enemy. This is so true in football. You plan all week and then the opponent chooses different players from those you had thought he would or, as soon as the game starts, you realize that they are using a different system to the one you had planned for. Or, for specific matches, where the opponent always plays the same way but your team struggles against them, you might have to change formation to fit the opposition.
In my time at Real we had difficulties with our local rivals Atlético. They always played the same, but were always difficult. When we played them we had to counter what they wanted to do. Their strength was in the middle of the pitch, where they were very aggressive. When they won the ball they would immediately use it to attack. So, our tactics for the games were not to use the middle of the pitch, but to use the flanks to put in crosses quickly. I also made the full backs play really high up the pitch to press the ball quickly when we lost it to deny them any possibility of counter-attacking.
You often have to change formation to work around injured players or to accommodate new ones. Sometimes this is where the best ideas come from – from constraints. At Milan, we had a lot of quality players arrive and at first I was struggling to fit them all in the team and keep them happy, but then we stumbled upon a beautiful accident. First, Andriy Shevchenko picked up an injury, so I moved Andrea Pirlo back to a deeper role, as playmaker behind the two offensive midfielders. We ended up inventing the Christmas tree formation. It came about as a practical necessity but it married perfectly to the philosophy of the president. As they say in England, ‘Necessity is the mother of invention.’
The key to the success of the Christmas tree formation came in one game, against Deportivo de La Coruña in the Champions Le
ague. They had two deep-lying midfielders and I thought that playing with our normal team, minus our injured players, we would not be able to defensively cover the position of these players. They would be too deep for us to affect. So, instead we played two offensive midfield players who could push up on them when we didn’t have the ball. You could say that the whole idea was, in fact, born of thinking not offensively, but defensively, which you might say is typically Italian. ‘How could we stop the opposition?’ was first in my thoughts. We won the match 4–0. Maybe if we had lost 4–0 I would have discarded the idea altogether. In our next game in the Champions League we played against Bayern Munich and we won again, 2–1, with the formation, so I started to believe that I was necessity’s child.
In football, as in anything, you must never stand still. Never believe that the tactics you deploy today and that have brought you great success will continue to be effective tomorrow. Your opponents will not be sitting back and letting it happen again. Look at the Chelsea team in the 2015–16 season. The season before, they were champions and all but invulnerable; then, suddenly, they can hardly win a game. It’s the same players, tactics and system, so what’s changed? The difference is that other teams have moved on and worked out how to play the Chelsea system.
To stand still can actually mean to go backwards. I like tennis and each time I see a new type of player emerge – Chris Evert, Martina Navratilova, Steffi Graf, Serena Williams, Björn Borg, Andre Agassi, Pete Sampras, Roger Federer, Novak Djokovic – I can never believe they will be beaten. But they always are. When I was talking with Billy Beane, of the Oakland Athletics baseball team and Moneyball fame, he said that his revolutionary practices gave him an edge for maybe one year and then everyone else copied and improved.
Quiet Leadership: Winning Hearts, Minds and Matches Page 16